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Epigraph 
The fundamental conceptions, which a legal system embodies or expresses, are 
seldom grasped or imderstood in their entirety at the time when their actual in-
fluence is greatest. They are abstract ideas usually arrived at by generalization and 
developed by analysis. But it is a mistake to regard such ideas as no more than 
philosophic theories suppUed ex post facto to explain a legal structure which has 
already been brought into existence by causes of some other and more practical 
nature. On the contrary, sometimes the conceptions, even though never analysed 
and completely tmderstood, obsess the minds of the men who act upon them. 
Sometimes indeed they are but instinctive assumptions of which at the time few 
or none were aware. But afterwards they may be seen as definite principles con-
tained within the ideas which provided the ground of action. Further, when such 
conceptions have once taken root they seldom disappear. They persist long after 
the conditions in which they originated have gone. They enter into combinations 
with other conceptions and contribute to the construction of new systems of law 
and of government. 
Owen Dixon, "The Law and the Constitution", 1935, 
reprinted in Jesting Pilate: And Other Papers and 
Addresses (1965), 38. 
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Preface 
This book is a study by a poUtical scientist of the politics of judicial review in 
Austraha. Its piurpose is to examine the High Court as a political institution and 
to assess the way it has exercised its power throughout Australia's political 
history. Since that is a dauntingly large topic for a single book, especially as there 
is a dearth of Uterature and research on the subject, the coverage is selective and in 
many instances only schematic and suggestive. While the book follows a broad 
historical framework, it is not a history of the Court but an analysis of the 
Court's political performance during successive historical periods. Nor is the 
book an attempt by a "bush lawyer" to write constitutional law, even though a 
good deal of time is taken up vdth examining legal opinions and trends injudicial 
doctrine. Legal reasoning merits close attention in a poUtical study of judicial 
review because it provides the formal rationale for the Court's decisions. 
Parts of the book are based on my original Ph.D. thesis completed at the 
University of Toronto in 1978. That thesis was the result of applying what I 
learned from my teachers at a fine university to my own reading and reflections 
on Australian politics. I am especially indebted to Peter Russell and Walter Berns 
for their scholarly example and guidance over several years, to Peter Hogg of 
Osgoode Law School for his advice and encouragement, and to that grand old 
scholar Albert Abel with whom I had the privilege of working before his death. 
Since returning to Australia in 1979 I have completed the research for the book. 
As well I have drawn on the work of many Australian scholars in the fields of 
history, law and politics and am indebted to the work of three in particular, John 
La Nauze, Geoffrey Sawer and Fin Crisp. Numerous others are acknowledged in 
references throughout the book. 
Some of the material of the book and parts of the argument have been previous-
ly pubhshed as journal articles. An earlier version of chapter 2 was published as 
"Judicial Review in the Australian Federal System: Its Origin and Fimction", 
Federal Law Review 10 (1979): 367. Parts of the argument about the Court's 
political strategy, the nature of the constitution and the reason for Labor's oppo-
sition to its federal structure have been published in two articles: "Legitimating 
Judicial Review: The Politics of Legalism ".JoMma/ of Australian Studies 8 (1981): 
33; and "FederaUsm's Ideological Dimension and the AustraHan Labor Party", 
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xii Pre&ce 
Australian Quarterly 53 (1981): 128. The last section of chapter 5 on the Tasma-
nian Dam case draws on a longer article, "The Dams Case: A Political Analysis", 
in M. Sornarajah, ed.. The South West Dam Dispute: The Legal and Political Issues 
(1983), 102. 
I am grateful to the AustraUan Research Grants Scheme for supporting further 
research under a 1980 grant and to Gaynor MacDonald for her work; to the 
School of Social Sciences at La Trobe University for assisting with additional 
research; to the Fhnders University of South Australia for allowing me access to 
the Evatt papers; and to Don Aitkin and the Research School of Social Sciences at 
the AustraUan National University for inviting me to spend a year as a visiting 
feUow in the PoUtical Science Department, where I was finally able to finish the 
book. I should Uke to thank aU those who have assisted writh suggestions, critical 
comment and typing, particularly James Thomson who read the entire manu-
script and offered innumerable helpful suggestions, Don Aitkin who read parts of 
it, Carol Beames, Janet Grubb and Brigitte Coles who typed the final manuscript, 
and GilUan O'Loghlin for proof reading and Suzanne Ridley who prepared the 
index. Thanks also to Clare Hoey of University of Queensland Press for editorial 
suggestions. 
Finally I owe a special debt of gratitude to my wife and colleague, Roslyn, 
who has generously supported this work and allowed it to take precedence over 
her own. 
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Introduction 
PoUtics is concerned with power: how it is exercised by individuals; how its exercise 
is structured in institutional arrangements and practices; and how the various sets 
of individuals and institutions exercising power interrelate with one another and 
with the larger subject society over which they rule. PoUtics is not concerned 
with aU aspects of power and power relations, but with the more formal ones 
that entail an essential element of public authority and legitimacy. Quite clearly, 
judges, courts and judicial decisions all come within the broad definition of poUtics. 
Put another way, the political system includes the legal world as a specialized 
subsystem. 
In past times and in less complex poUties the standard legal functions of 
adjudicating conflicts and interpreting laws, now performed by our speciaUzed 
court system, were carried out either directly by ruUng assemblies and executive 
heads or by their committees and agents. In fact that is how courts originated. 
Even today in many countries where the "rule of law" is not as highly developed 
as in Australia, leading individuals and groups or local communities still perform 
such functions. In highly complex liberal democracies like ours, however, where 
the processes of poUtical evolution and technical specialization have produced an 
independent judiciary and court system staffed by specialist lawyers, there is a 
formal separation of law from poUtics narrowly defined as government. 
Unfortunately for the proper understanding of both law and politics in our 
society, the respective academic discipUnes have largely accepted this formal line 
of demarcation, and "law" and "politics" are narrowly defined as separate and 
distinct subjects. What was only a conventional distinction, based on constitutional 
separation and professional speciaUzation, became de facto generic because the 
separate disciplines of poUtics and law each used different methodologies and studied 
their subjects for very different purposes. Law studied judicial decisions and was 
concerned primarily with technical and professional issues, while poUtics studied 
the more obvious governmental institutions and processes such as parUament and 
the executive to see how governments ruled and public affairs were administered. 
The power and social control that courts exercised were ignored—by lawyers 
because that was not their concern, and by those who studied poUtics because 
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2 Introduction 
that was outside their domain. Recently sociologists have stepped into this breach 
and have begun studying law as part of the system of social control. 
More surprising was the extension of this artificial segregation of the discipUnes 
of law and politics to judicial review by the High Court. The High Court is the 
third branch of government and as such is an integral part of the institutional 
machinery of government. This is obvious from the constitution itself which, 
in its basic institutional arrangements, formaUy enshrines the principle of separation 
of poUtical power into legislative, executive and judicial branches. Chapter 3 
describes the judicature, foUowing chapter 1 on parUament and chapter 2 on the 
executive. Chapter 3 deals with "judicial power" and specifies the structure of 
the High Court. Not only does the High Court receive major emphasis in the 
constitution, but its primary function of judicial review is also an important part 
of the ongoing political process. 
Through exercising judicial review, the High Court plays an important role 
in AustraUan poUtics that is both adjudicative and constitutional. In its adjudicative 
role, the Court arbitrates the kinds of jurisdictional disputes that invariably arise 
when legislative, executive and judicial powers are divided between two levels 
of government, as in our federal system. Through its adjudicative role, the Court 
is involved in the political process. Controversial cases that involve disputed 
jurisdictional claims either between federal and state governments or between private 
interests and one or another level of government come to the Court for decision. 
The Court's decisions then feed back into the political process, producing winners 
and losers and affecting the balance of power between federal and state governments 
and private interest groups. 
From a lawyer's perspective, such poUtical disputes might be seen as "legal" 
cases when they come to the Court for resolution and are decided on strictly "legal" 
grounds. But that does not mean that they are in fact apoUtical; rather the Court 
and its legal method are being used for a political purpose. Perhaps the point is 
clearer if one adopts a political-systems point of view. Consider the High Court 
as that part of the larger political system through which certain kinds of high-
level poUtical issues, disputes involving governments, are routed and resolved. From 
the viewpoint of the individual institution, the Court receives inputs from the 
political process (disputes concerning jurisdictional powers) and initiates outputs 
(decisions) that form part of the poUtical process. If the poUtical system is a process 
of authoritative decision making in which poUtics takes place as a systemic flow, 
as modern poUtical science teUs us,^ then clearly the High Court in its 
constitutional work is an important part of the poUtical system and performs a 
key function within the poUtical process. 
In its adjudicative role, the Court is involved in resolving high-level disputes 
that are thrown up by the ongoing business of federal government. In so doing, 
the Court also exercises its complementary, but more important, constitutional 
role of authoritatively interpreting the constitution. In this sense, the Court stands 
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above the political system and the poUtical process of which it is also part. By 
interpreting the constitution which sets up the machinery of government and 
controls the poUtical process, the Court is itself, to a significant extent, shaping 
the poUtical system and process. Since the constitution is the basic instrument 
of government, the High Court's role of authoritative interpreter is a primary 
poUtical function. 
The High Court's poUtical role in exercising judicial review has been neglected 
by the disciplines of both law and of poUtics. James Thomson has recently pointed 
out the shortcomings of the lawyer's approach: 
Exposition and analysis of Australian constitutional law continues to be predominantly 
an exegesis of particular results and reasons contained in judgments rendered by courts. 
AustraUan case and text books designed for constitutional law courses perpetuate this 
approach. Extracts from High Court decisions are reproduced and synthesized, more 
often than not, in a vacuum. Placement of this traditional approach within a wider 
spectrum, encompassing, for example, the historical, political, economic and comparative 
miUeu, is overdue. That in turn should generate discussions and issues whose focus 
will draw and gather from the particular instance the more universal theme or general 
premise. 
For their part poUtical scientists have left the study of the High Court and ju^licial 
review to constitutional lawyers. Emerging as a separate discipUne only in the 
postwar period in Australia, poUtical science has been mainly concerned with 
poUtical parties, elections, bureaucracy, interest groups and voting. As Don Aitkin 
notes in his recent report on poUtical science in Australia: "there has not been 
much interest in fundamental constitution-making: parUament, the federal system, 
legal institutions and the Uke; these are assumed to be given, or taken to be the 
province of lawyers".^ As a result the political role of the High Court has been 
ignored by both lawyers and poUticians. The notable exception is Geoffrey Sawer, 
one of AustraUa's most renowned constitutional lawyers, who has written 
extensively about the poUtical aspects of the Court's work. 
This book is a further attempt to fill that gap from a poUtical science perspective. 
It discusses the poUtics of judicial review at three levels: first, it locates the Court 
and its functioning within the larger poUtical system; second, it focuses on the 
Court as a poUtical institution in its own right, giving particular attention to 
its composition and decision making over time; and third, it looks in detail at 
particular leading cases that have had major constitutional or poUtical impact. Each 
of these three levels of analysis is necessary for a proper understanding of the poUtical 
work of the Court. 
The first and most general level of analysis is necessary because the Court 
functions as an interdependent part of a larger and more complex poUtical system. 
The political system is itself embedded in a broader environment made up of an 
evolving poUtical culture and a dynamic poUtical history. All these broader factors 
and interdependent relations determine the sorts of constitutional cases that come 
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to the Court for decision. As well they affect the strategy that the Court adopts 
to faciUtate its work and legitimate its decisions. Chapter 1 on the poUtical 
environment of judicial review is concerned specifically with these larger issues. 
But throughout the book an attempt is made to locate the Court's work in the 
larger poUtical and historical contexts. The Court's adjudication of periodic 
challenges made to the constitution by federal Labor governments is a major theme 
of the book. 
The second level of focus is on the Court as a poUtical institution in its own 
right. Such a focus is necessary if we are to understand the Court's operation, 
even if this too is alien to the standard approach of constitutional lawyers who 
focus narrowly on the Court's outputs or cases. Here the emphasis is on questions 
about the Court's function, its staffing and internal dynamics. Chapter 2 sets out 
the founders' design of the High Court and the poUtical function of judicial review 
which they envisaged. Successive chapters examine how the Court has carried 
out that function. Because the staffing of the Court is crucial, close attention is 
given to the impact of judicial appointments, dominant individual judges and 
changing factional groupings on the Court. Major decisions and doctrinal 
developments are shown to be influenced by the composition of the Court at any 
particular time. For the most part, doctrinal changes occur not spontaneously but 
when new judges with different views are appointed to the bench. 
The third, micro level of focus is that of individual cases and lines of doctrinal 
development that Unk cases. Although this is the famiUar domain of constitutional 
law, the emphasis given here is rather different from that of lawyers. There is 
less attention paid to forensic dissection of judicial opinions and more to the poUtical 
aspects and context of the cases. Judges' opinions are examined not for their own 
sake or because of their contribution to the law but as official reasons that purport 
to justify particular poUtical decisions. As weU the cases that are examined in detail 
have been selected as much for their political as for their legal significance. Hence 
one cannot piece together a potted version of constitutional law from these pages; 
a constitutional law textbook, and AustraUa has many high quaUty ones, is necessary 
for a thorough account of constitutional law.' 
If the book stimulates constitutional lawyers to broaden the scope of their study 
of constitutional cases and leads political scientists to include the High Court and 
judicial review within mainstream poUtical analysis, it will have achieved its purpose. 
It is not intended to be the final word in this fascinating and interdisciplinary 
area, but to be a provocative beginning. 
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Stability and Conflict in Australian 
Politics: The Political Environment 
of Judicial Review 
The poUtical history of the AustraUan nation from its federation in 1901 to the 
present day has seen the working out of two separate and opposing sets of forces 
which have tended to produce stabiUty on the one hand and confUct on the other. 
The stabiUzing forces have been dominant. Despite periods of polarization and 
confrontation associated for the most part with chaUenges to the estabUshed order 
by federal Labor governments, conflict has been peacefully resolved within existing 
poUtical institutions. For more than three-quarters of a century Australia has enjoyed 
periods of steady growth and prosperity interspersed with periods of national crisis 
caused by war and depression. Nevertheless the Australian federal system has coped 
and retains the basic framework set out by its founders. The federal government 
comprises the institutions designed in the 1890s, and embodies in somewhat bloated 
form the original powers that were shorn from the colonies in 1901. The states 
are the same family of colonies that welded their peoples into "one indissoluble 
Federal Conmionwealth" for specific national purposes. During a history of national 
growth that has included periods of crisis and acute conflict, political stabiUty 
has triumphed. 
What are the underlying causes of stability and of conflict in the Australian 
poUtical system? And why has stabiUty been dominant? These are among the most 
important questions of AustraUan poUtics. It is contended here that stabiUty is 
due primarily to three factors: a social and poUtical culture that is relatively 
homogeneous, a poUtical tradition that is essentially Uberal democratic, and a 
federal constitution that embodies and reinforces the principles and practices of 
a Uberal poUtical economy. ConfUct in AustraUan politics has been due to real 
differences in party, class and ideology. True, the similarities among Australian 
poUtical parties, classes and ideologies are greater than their differences, but that 
is only another way of affirming the dominance of the stabilizing factors already 
mentioned. The major confUct present in AustraUan poUtics has been rooted in 
real differences in social class and poUtical ideology that are represented by the 
division between the Liberal and Labor parties. Romantic Labor historians have 
characterized the Labor party as the standard bearer of AustraUa's radical national 
ethos. It would have been more accurate to describe AustraUa as predominantly 
a Uberal poUty whose natural governors were the Liberal parties, with Labor being 
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the reformist challenger to the dominant Uberal ethos. It is argued in this book 
that the federal constitution has been the structural anchor, bringing stabiUty to 
AustraUan poUtics while the Labor party in the past, but less so in the last couple 
of decades, has been the main institutional agent for change. 
The High Court, as guardian of the constitution, has played an important 
StabiUzing role. Since its creation in 1903 it has been remarkably active in deciding 
constitutional issues and in forcing governments, particularly federal Labor 
governments, to abandon legislative initiatives or to modify their poUcies to fit 
the constitutional mould. At various times in AustraUan history, but especially 
during the 1940s, the Court has made important constitutional decisions affirming 
the Uberal character of the AustraUan poUty. The Court overruled the major sociaUst 
initiatives of the Chifley Labor government and effectively put Labor's sociaUzation 
objective beyond the pale of the AustraUan constitution. What is more surprising, 
the Court did that without jeopardizing its neutral image with the pubUc or 
sacrificing its formal legitimacy with the Labor party. There was no direct challenge 
to the Australian High Court comparable to Roosevelt's threat to pack the United 
States Supreme Court in 1937; nor did the AustraUan Court, unUke the American 
Court, back down. 
The Court's poUtical achievement has been substantial and is the subject of this 
study. Because it is only a part of the poUtical system, however, and not the most 
important part at that, the Court as political actor has to be viewed vnthin the 
larger poUtical context. That the Court has been able to adjudicate great poUtical 
disputes, upholding the constitution and legitimating its decisions, has been as 
much due to factors beyond its control as to its own considerable poUtical skiUs. 
To appreciate the poUtical work of the High Court, one has to locate its functioning 
within the larger context of AustraUan poUtics. That is the purpose of this chapter, 
most of which is concerned with the character and institutions of the AustraUan 
poUtical system, of which the judicial branch of government is an integral part. 
Party, class and ideology 
The two great institutional structures that have shaped Australian politics are the 
constitution and the poUtical party system. Each of these two structures encompasses 
both StabiUty and confUct but in rather different ways. Moreover, the combination 
of the two systems produces a unique balance between tendencies towards stabiUty 
and conflict. Considering the constitutional system first, conflict is deliberately 
built into key institutions and arrangements. For instance the division of the federal 
legislature into two houses of roughly equal powers but quite different electoral 
bases aUows, and even fosters, conflict within the legislature. More importantly, 
the federal system ensures intergovernmental conflict by spUtting powers between 
competing levels of government. At the same time the overriding purpose of 
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institutionaUzing conflict in these ways is to produce poUtical moderation and 
the StabiUty of the overaU system. The fragmentation of power and internal 
checking of institutions is designed to ensure that tyranny and political excesses 
are unUkely. To sum up, the constitutional system seeks stabiUty through 
introducing conflict into key parts of the system; power is deliberately diffused 
and institutions fragmented in order to stabiUze the system as a whole. 
The poUtical party system has quite a different mix of elements of stabilization 
and confUct. Even allowing for the complications of a Liberal coaUtion rather than 
a single party, and the periodic existence of minor parties such as the Democratic 
Labor party between 1955 and 1974 and the AustraUan Democrats in recent years, 
AustraUa has basically a two-party system. Each party is an instrument for 
aggregating support in order to form a vidnning electoral majority. As such it 
is a StabiUzing force, since a successfiil party needs to ameUorate confUct within 
its own ranks and as weU to build majority support in the wider community. 
Conflict of a Umited sort is institutionaUzed between the two parties, however, 
as they compete against each other to win the majority support necessary to gain 
office. 
AustraUa's discipUned two-party system is clearly compatible with a unitary 
Westminster arrangement where government and opposition confront each other 
in a dominant legislative chamber. The Westminster part of the Australian 
constitution, particularly responsible government, is entirely consistent with, and 
both reinforces and promotes, the system of disciplined parties. When disciplined 
parties work the federal parts of the constitution, however, additional conflict 
is generated. For example, when opposing parties control the two houses of the 
federal legislature, as they sometimes do, or when opposing parties control different 
governments at the federal and state levels as they almost invariably do, extra 
conflict is generated because of the constitutional mismatch brought about by 
combining Westminster and federal systems. 
A more important source of conflict in AustraUan poUtics has been the class 
base of the political parties and the ideological differences between them. When 
political parties were formed in Australia around the turn of the century they 
institutionaUzed aspects of class division within the Australian poUty between the 
working class and the middle class. These class differences were articulated in 
conflicting party ideologies: UberaUsm and labourism, or Uberal democracy and 
democratic socialism of the British Labour variety. Parties were the bearers of 
confUct since they represented in the poUtical arena the class and ideological cleavages 
of the AustraUan poUty. The class dimension of AustraUan poUtical parties is obvious 
if a comparison is made with the United States, a similar but much larger and 
more complex liberal democracy. Although a nation of greater regional diversity 
and more extreme social conflict, the United States is not polarized by disciplined 
poUtical parties articulating class differences and espousing conflicting ideologies. 
Rather, American parties have been loose-knit institutions for building a national 
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consensus across class Unes. Both the RepubUcan and Democratic parties are 
essentiaUy liberal parties, even though the Democrats have traditionally had more 
support from labour unions and disadvantaged groups. 
Two immediate qualifications need to be made regarding the AustraUan cleavages. 
The first concerns their relatively minor extent. In the spectrum of poUtical 
possibiUties, AustraUan classes, ideologies and parties are quite close together. In 
fact there is far more common ground than there are differences. The AustraUan 
working class has always enjoyed one of the highest standards of living in the 
world and the disparities of wealth in AustraUan were never as great as in most 
other countries. Although there have been significant income differentials, class 
distinctions have been more apparent in the subtler terms of quaUty and dignity 
of work, and in the web of social relations that flow from, and are broadly 
determined by, one's position in the productive process. Class differences in AustraUa 
have been considerably smaller than they might otherwise have been because of 
the poUtical and industrial strength of the working class and its political 
achievements through the Labor party. Indeed Labor's successes in reforming 
AustraUan capitaUsm and setting in place the modem welfare state have contributed 
towards the lessening of differences in party, class and ideology. 
In the realm of ideology, differences between liberalism and labourism are not 
excessive. AustraUan liberalism was an offshoot of nineteenth-century English 
liberalism and has always had an important radical component. This liberalism 
benefited from the progressive and compassionate reformulations of MiU and Green 
in the second half of the nineteenth century. A self-professed but somewhat confused 
AustraUan liberal could say in aU earnestness in 1953 that he was "against self-
interest, economic or class interest" and was really "a very Fabian socialist".* It 
is hardly surprising that the Labor party took over many strands of radical UberaUsm 
when it was formed in the 1890s, and that ever since then its outlook and poUcies 
have had much in common with those of progressive Uberals. Similarly the Liberal 
party has both tolerated and retained democratic socialist poUcies and practices. 
As Robert Menzies, the father of modern AustraUan liberalism, acknowledged 
in 1964, "Where government action or control has seemed to us to be the best 
answer to a practical problem, we have adopted that answer at the risk of being 
called SociaUsts."^ Moreover, in competing for a majority of popular votes, both 
poUtical parties have been forced to modify their policy platforms in the direction 
of a compromise middle ground. 
The second important quaUfication that needs to be made in any plausible class 
view of Australian poUtical parties is that the relationship between party and class 
has changed substantially over time. Put briefly, there has been a reduction in 
class differences and a scrambUng of the class basis of poUtical partisanship. Australia 
was never the battleground where Marx's epic forces of capital and labour were 
locked in mortal combat. Classes were never rigidly distinct nor was there a simple 
one-to-one relationship between class and party. Hence the common concept of 
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the AustraUan party "as based upon a class division, with trade unionists forming 
the stable core of one such class" was probably always a somewhat romanticized 
simpUfication of the real situation. Certainly since World War II, as Don Rawson's 
careful study of recent trade union trends estabUshes, "the gap between this model 
of the party system and the beliefs and actions of real people has widened 
rapidly". With AustraUan society becoming more affluent and complex, 
manufacturing and blue-coUar trade unions declining relative to service industries 
and white-collar unions, and large segments of "unwilUng conscripts" and non-
Labor voters being conscripted into unions, class divisions have become blurred. 
As a result the reasons why people support the parties they do have become more 
inscrutable. Common sense observation attests to this fact, and those who have 
carried out empirical research claim to have demonstrated it scientifically. 
In his study of Society and Electoral Behaviour in Australia (1978), David Kemp 
concludes that there has been a "convergence in electoral behaviour among 
individuals on different sides of the old cleavage systems" in the period from 1945 
to 1975, and in particular "a substantial decUne in the importance of class as a 
structural basis for voting behaviour".'* Kemp's findings are based on extensive 
attitudinal research which is Unked to generally recognized changes in AustraUa's 
postwar social environment such as increased affluence, rising levels of education, 
growth in the service sector, greater urbanization combined with the diffusion 
of the working class into suburbia, and a "middle-classing" of attitudes among 
blue-coUar workers. The result has been the increased homogenization of the 
electorate and the erosion of Labor's traditional solid constituency within the blue-
coUar workforce. The convergence part of Kemp's analysis broadly supports the 
complementary argument that will be developed subsequently in this study: that 
there has been a transformation of Labor poUcy in postwar decades from traditional 
concern for working-class gains to concern with overall economic management 
and quaUty of Ufe considerations. The important consequences for this study are 
a marked decrease in tensions between Labor and the constitution and a consequent 
decline in the political significance of the Court's pivotal role of judicial review. 
Whether the process of integration and homogenization has gone as far as Kemp 
claims —to the extent that "it becomes difficult to identify the grounds on which 
an appeal could be made to distinctive class interests"'—is more dubious. The 
evaluation of this rather extreme claim is beyond the scope of the present work 
and would require a methodological evaluation of the adequacy of attitudinal survey 
data alone for investigating aggregate social relations. The argument being advanced 
here is that historically the federal Labor party has been a major institutional agent 
of conflict in Australian poUtics, but that it has become increasingly less so in 
recent decades; and that a large part of the reason for the heightened conflict earUer 
on and the reduced conflict in recent decades has been the changing class base 
of the Labor party. When the class component of party poUtics was stronger there 
was greater conflict in the system, but as it has been reduced there has been less. 
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While Kemp's evidence might corroborate parts of that argument, one has to 
rely mainly on an analysis of the historical developments within the political 
economy of AustraUan capitalism. 
That entails briefly reviewing an old and favoured topic in Australian 
historiography—the origins of the Labor party. Labor's entry into poUtics as an 
independent working-class party in the 1890s ended the golden age of the AustraUan 
bourgeoisie when the Uberal ethos reigned supreme and poUtics was Umited to 
factional squabbles between competing middle-class eUtes.' By rejecting Uberal and 
radical middle-class leadership in favour of direct parliamentary intervention in 
its own right, the working class shattered the prior consensus that UberaUsm was 
a universal creed taking care of all classes and interests. The rise of the Labor 
party pointed to the growing awareness of confUcting class interests. Labor 
introduced the principle of party based upon different class interests into AustraUan 
poUtics, and forced a reaUgnment of poUtical forces along the famiUar Liberal versus 
Labor lines.' Much of the tension in AustraUan poUtics resulted from the class-
related confUct that the Labor party both reflected and produced. 
In a theoretical book on liberal democracy, C. B. Macphefson has argued 
generally "that the chief function the party system has actually performed in 
Western democracies since the inception of a democratic franchise has been to 
blunt the edge of apprehended or probable class conflict, or . . . to moderate and 
smooth over a conflict of class interests so as to save the existing property 
institutions and the market system from effective attack".* This blurring of class 
lines by the party system is supposed to explain why mass enfranchisement of 
the working class did not lead to the overthrow of the capitalist system. In fact, 
in Australia the opposite has occurred, with the party system that developed at 
the turn of the century articulating and representing the class divisions in AustraUan 
society. Previously these divisions had been blurred by a universalist liberal ethos 
and factional politics. The mass franchise did not bring dramatic changes to the 
basic capitalist order because of the overall prosperity that capitalism produced 
and the generous share of its benefits that the working class was able to secure 
through poUtical organization. 
The institutional check to working-class pressiures in AustraUa was not so much 
the party system as the federal constitution and the High Court, the former through 
determining the basic organizational shape of poUtical parties and specifying Umits 
to their practical policies, the latter by poUcing those limits. The constitution's 
shaping and moderating of the party system needs to be taken into account in 
rounding out Don Aitkin's study of Stability and Change in Australian Politics in 
which he also selects "the massive stabiUty" of the system as its outstanding feature. 
Aitkin finds the explanation of this stabiUty in party soUdarity and continuity. 
Aitkin's thesis is "that the shape of Australian poUtics has been largely unchanged 
since 1910, and that the causes of this stability are to be found in the adoption, 
by milUons of AustraUans then and since, of relatively unchanging feelings of loyalty 
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to one or other of the AustraUan parties".' The freezing of poUtics into the 
Labor-Liberal party mould is said to explain the dominant stabiUty of the system, 
while confUct is present in a secondary, regulated fashion because the parties 
represent different ideologies and classes. According to Aitkin, ideology that 
contains some account of the good society and how to achieve it is an essential 
element of modern parties; it provides "a thick ideological coating to the bases 
of economic self-interest on which the party system rests"."* The class element 
is also present in Aitkin's account because the party system embodies "a simple 
social cleavage—that between the haves and the have-nots, both very broadly 
defined"." 
Aitkin quite properly emphasizes the crucial role of party soUdarity in stabiUzing 
AustraUan politics, but his account does not give sufficient weight to the moulding 
and moderating effect of the constitution. He gives parties full credit for the massive 
StabiUty of the system and dismisses the federal structure as "a skeleton that 
represents the anxieties of colonial days better than it does the reaUties or needs 
of industrial AustraUa in the late twentieth century".'^ Although commonly used 
by others as well as Aitkin, this "horse-and-buggy" characterization of the 
constitution fails to recognize that it is a Uving skeleton that provides the shape 
and form of the AustraUan body poUtic. Pre-dating the federal parties on which 
Aitkin's study focuses, the federal system has helped mould those parties into their 
present form. Aitkin examines only one level of the party system and explains 
the StabiUty of the total system in terms of it vidthout acknowledging that parties 
at the national level are already severely checked by their own state machines, 
by the Umited powers that the constitution aUows to the federal government and 
by the division of powers among the branches of the federal government. 
Like Rawson and Kemp, Aitkin also argues that there has been a convergence 
in AustraUan poUtics in recent decades and a scrambling of the social and economic 
factors affecting partisanship. He too is sceptical about class having any explanatory 
value in modem AustraUan poUtics and dismisses class confUct as "one of the myths 
of Australian poUtics". Aitkin denies there is any significant class consciousness 
in AustraUa, despite the finding of his 1967 survey that "the great majority not 
only accepted that there were classes, they seemed equally clear about which class 
they themselves belonged to" ." Further testing in 1979 suggested that some 
"middle-classing" had occurred, but that most Australians had a sufficient sense 
of class to slot themselves into either the middle class or the working class. In 
addition there was a doubling of those who saw class conflict as inevitable, up 
from 25 per cent to 50 per cent in 1979." This increased polarization reflected 
the onset of economic recession in 1974. 
Aitkin originally sought to explain away this popular perception of class with 
the thesis of Giovanni Sartori that parties produce class consciousness.'' This 
explanation was not altogether convincing. While poUtical parties, and particularly 
the Labor party, do identify and articulate class conditions for the ordinary voters 
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so that their class perceptions are often summed up in their party allegiance, it 
seems equaUy obvious that there is some element of real class condition underlying 
such appeals. Otherwise one is left wdth a curious version of "false consciousness . 
Aitkin, in the second edition of his book, returned to this troublesome part 
of his argument that party identification could not be explained by social stmcture 
or class. Aitkin offered two further explanatory reasons. The first was that the 
poUtical worid had a richness and Ufe of its own that could be understood wholly 
in terms of poUtical processes so that more fundamental social and economic 
substmctures were not needed. The second was that the structure of modern 
societies is so complex that any individual's partisan choice is "the relatively 
unpredictable result of a unique interaction" of diverse factors. Certainly 
poUtical parties, Uke constitutional systems, tend to have an institutional life of 
their own once they have been estabUshed. While Aitkin's analysis builds in a 
certain amount of social cleavage which he locates earlier in AustraUan political 
history, he argues that subsequently parties have had an independent political Ufe 
of their own and society has become too complex for any link to remain between 
an individual's partisanship and class position. Because of increased social complexity, 
Aitkin considers class is no longer a meaningful category. 
As with Kemp, one suspects Aitkin has gone too far in drav^dng extreme 
conclusions about aggregate social relations from individualistic survey data. A 
very different, and to some extent corrective, analysis of stability and confUct in 
Australian poUtics is given in Bob ConneU's Ruling Class Ruling Culture (1977) 
and Connell and Irving's Class Structure in Australian History (1980). Although poles 
apart from Kemp and Aitkin in methodology and causal explanations, these authors 
agree that stability is the major outcome in Australian politics and that conflict 
is in fact, although not in principle, the minor phenomenon. Connell and Irving 
rely on party, class and ideology as explanatory variables, but use each in an entirely 
different manner to Aitkin. Equally important for the purposes of this study, neither 
author refers to the stabiUzing role of the constitution. Connell and Irving rely 
on a basic Marxist perspective that puts class confUct that is inherent in the capitaUst 
mode of production at the heart of Australian politics. ConneU's book focuses 
on ideology and contemporary affairs while ConneU and Irving's more recent book 
examines class in AustraUan history. 
In his 1977 book, which is subtitled "Studies of ConfUct, Power and Hegemony 
in AustraUan Life", ConneU argues that there is a ruling class that maintains its 
privileged position by fostering a middle-class culture and mobilizing its superior 
political resources whenever it is threatened. The class confUct that is endemic 
to capitaUsm is effectively shrouded and depoUticized by an aU-pervasive bourgeois 
culture and an elaborate process of personal sociaUzation. Consequently, stability 
of the middle-class variety is the normal state of afiEairs. Conflict periodically surfaces 
when this false bourgeois tranquilUty is disturbed by industrial strife and politicial 
chaUenges from the Labor party. In such instances the true nature of the system 
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stands revealed and real power relations become apparent. Stability is restored 
because invariably the rulers win: the angry strikers at the Ford assembly plant 
in Melbourne in 1973 were enticed back to work writh extra pay incentives; the 
Chifley Labor government in 1949 and the Whitlam Labor government in 1975 
were bundled out of office when the aroused capitaUst beast mobiUzed its forces. 
ConneU's account focuses on class and ideology that is extended to the broader 
notion of culture. The concepts of hegemony, mobiUzation and political 
sociaUzation are used to explain how the ruling class stays on top and why the 
ruled class is satisfied with its lot. Party has a minor role, though ConneU does 
identify poUtical leadership in the Liberal and Country parties as an entrepreneurial 
speciaUzation within the mling class. The Labor party has a more ambivalent role. 
It represents the working class and at times threatens ruling-class hegemony. 
Although ConneD describes the Whitlam brand of reform as "committed to making 
capitalism a Uttle more just and a good deal more efficient", he opens his book 
writh the claim that Whitlam's dismissal in 1975 proved beyond doubt the class 
nature of AustraUan poUtics. 
ConneU's account supplements that of Kemp and Aitkin by emphasizing class 
differences and the potency of conflict in AustraUan poUtical life, but ConneU's 
Marxist paradigm takes him much too far. He first posits a model of confUct that 
is too extreme for Australia and then has to call upon the vague and somewhat 
mystifying notions of poUtical sociaUzation to explain its non-existence in practice. 
There is insufficient distinction between those who benefit and those who rule, 
and inadequate weight is given to the autonomy of the state and the strength 
and moderation of the working class. Lingering in the background of ConneU's 
analysis is the Marxist model of a more extreme altemative to bourgeois capitaUsm 
than labourism, and in comparison most of Australian politics appears to be 
bourgeois. 
ConneU and Irving's analysis of class structure in Australian history is the most 
systematic and careful study of AustraUan poUtics yet produced by Marxist-
orientated scholars. The authors combine an essentiaUy Marxist view of capitaUst 
production with an acute historical examination of the process of class formation 
throughout AustraUan history. They set out by rejecting a priori stractural analysis 
which was previously the favoured method of the New Left and advocate instead 
a sympathetic historical analysis of the particularities of Australian developments 
that is modeUed on E.P. Thompson's classic. The Making of the English Working 
Class. And yet the study never subsumes its underlying Marxist paradigm which 
determines its findings and dictates both its logic of analysis and its language of 
presentation. Whereas the book begins by eschewing a definition of class —"the 
whole book is a contribution to the definition of class"''—it soon settles into the 
routine Marxist ruling-class/working-class paradigm. By the time the fifth and 
final chapter is reached, the whole period 1930 to 1975 can be summed up as 
the reign of "The Industrial Ruling Class". 
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Where ConneU's earUer book did not take proper account of the Labor party 
and its broad constituency, the 1980 book is equaUy deficient in its treatment 
of the middle class. It focuses on workers as the ruled class and capital owners 
whom it caUs the ruUng class. The larger middle class that is the broad constituency 
of the Liberal party is virtuaUy ignored.*' The massive ambivalence between 
owning and benefiting on the one hand and ruling on the other, and between 
the owning capitaUst bourgeoisie and the more extensive and tamer middle class 
is never sorted out. The paler reaUties of AustraUan poUtics never quite match 
the requirements of Marxist theory, and yet are sufficiently suggestive to give 
it a certain plausibiUty. 
The truth about the AustraUan condition, it is contended here, faUs somewhere 
between the Kemp-Aitkin position and the ConneU-Irving one. There is a more 
substantial economic and class basis to confUct than Kemp and Aitkin do uncover, 
or could possibly uncover, in their study of individuaUstic survey data and voting 
trends. But that conflict is not the titanic struggle between capital and labour 
that Marxist analysis presupposes. The stability and confUct that is present in 
AustraUa is translated into the real institutional confUcts of AustraUan poUtics as 
Kemp and Aitkin assume, but the constitutional system, which they ignore, does 
play a significant stabiUzing and moderating fiinction. Because ConneU and Irving 
set their perspective from a more extreme model of confUct than is reflected in 
the real world of AustraUan poUtics, they want to explain away what actuaUy 
happens as if it were a puppet show being staged and manipulated by darker, 
more potent forces to distract attention from the real issues. 
Conflict in AustraUa is by and large as great or as Uttle as is institutionaUy 
manifest in party conflict, subject to the Umiting and moderating constraints of 
the constitution. The Labor party represents AustraUan social democracy that has 
grown out of Uberal democracy and its complementary capitaUst system as a reforming 
movement. OUgarchic and inflexible capitalism may throw up a proletarian class 
of exploited wage labourers who wiU overthrow it in a bloody revolution, but 
liberal-democratic capitaUsm spawns a milder altemative because it is itself more 
flexible and humane. Therefore the fiiU-blown Marxist theoretical analysis is as 
irrelevant to an understanding of AustraUan poUtics as the Communist party is 
to real poUtics. AustraUa's predominant Uberal-democratic poUtical culture supports 
neither except in very attenuated forms. 
Political culture: radical or liberal? 
Supporting the constitution and the poUtical work of the High Court and 
underlying the important commonaUties shared by opposing poUtical parties is 
Australia's poUtical culture. Some diagnosis of its essential character is necessary 
for a proper appreciation of Australian poUtics generally, and the poUtical role 
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of the Court in particular. It is generaUy recognized that AustraUa's poUtical culture, 
unlike Canada's, is nationaUy homogeneous, but there has been considerable dispute 
over what it actually is. 
The traditional Uterature on Australian poUtics exaggerated the radical character 
of the national ethos^ and cast the Labor party as the dominant force. Labor was 
depicted as the standard bearer of radical nationaUsm and the party of initiative 
and action; the Liberals were the party of resistance and reaction, the "anti-Labor" 
party. The most ambitious account of the dominance of radicalism and Labor 
has been advanced by the American historian Louis Hartz and documented in some 
detail by another American historian, Richard Rosecrance.^ The Hartzean thesis 
as such has never had much currency in AustraUa and has not sparked the ongoing 
debate among indigenous historians and political scientists that still rages in 
Canada. This was mainly because it was out of date by the time it was 
pubUshed. Rosecrance overlooked the "middle class" revolution in AustraUan 
historiography that occiured in the 1950s and 1960s.^ Nevertheless the Hartzean 
interpretation of Australian poUtics is stiU widely accepted outside AustraUa and 
is a powerful, if somewhat exaggerated, statement of a more traditional view. 
It is worth considering, albeit briefly, in order to place Australian poUtical culture 
and the Australian Labor party in ideological perspective. 
According to the Hartzean thesis, Australia is the radical fragment thrown off 
by Britain in the nineteenth century. Radicalism secured an early victory over 
Whiggery and was enthroned as the national ethos. It spawned the Labor party 
which in turn "seized the nationaUsm of the fragment and . . . even in defeat, 
determined the context of Australian poUtics".^' The radical myth "captured 
capitalism and never let it go . . . AustraUan capitaUsm was 'kept' by the radical 
ethos"; Australian financiers and industrialists became its domestics.^ In short, 
the Labor party was the dominant force in Australian poUtics because it embodied 
the ruling ideology which was radicalism. 
The Hartzean thesis depicts AustraUa as a radical fragment whose national ethos 
congealed in the mid-nineteenth century. In fact, the AustraUan colonies were 
neither radical nor fragments. Rather they were loyal British colonies which grew 
to nationhood under the benevolent umbrella of the British Empire. Australia 
retained close ties with Britain until well into the twentieth century, and as a 
result, its developing indigenous culture was fed by waves of British immigrants 
bringing the latest British ideas. This ensured that the class nature and ideological 
configuration of Britain, minus those aspects of the class system that did not travel 
weU, Uke the upper class itself and truly conservative beliefs, were faithfuUy 
reproduced in Australia. Australian advances in union organization and political 
representation of the working class paraUeled those in Britain. If AustraUa appeared 
more radical it was because progressive British ideas and practices could be more 
easily implemented in a new country. But the developments from speciaUzed craft 
unions to mass industrial unions and from "Lib-Lab" poUtical associations to an 
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independent Labor party were essentiaUy the same in both countries and occurred 
in the same time frame.^' 
Tom Mann, the notable British sociaUst and trade union leader, spent several 
years in AustraUa organizing unions and sociaUst ceUs at the turn of the nineteenth 
century. Mann found AustraUa Uttle different from Britain and other capitalist 
countries in its economic system, and wrote from Melbourne in 1904: "The 
conditions in aU countries under a capitaUst regime are so unsatisfactory that the 
Australasian States are compelled to look forward to a CoUectivist regime; this 
the workers believe to be inevitable, and this they are sensibly preparing for by 
peaceful and constitutional methods."^' Mann's optimism was for a future 
alternative to the then reigning capitalism. The Webbs who toured the AustraUan 
colonies on the eve of federation and after the formation of the Labor party recorded 
that AustraUa was "just a slice of Great Britain and differs only sUghtly from 
Glasgow, Manchester, Liverpool and the suburbs of London. Bad manners, ugly 
clothes, vigour and shrewdness characterise the settlements of Sydney, Melboume 
and of bush stations, exactly as they characterise the lower and upper middle class 
folk of the old country".^' 
Recent historical work has completed the process of discrediting the radical 
interpretation of AustraUan history by exposing the origins of the AustraUan legend. 
The Schedvins have traced the typical Australian values of the early bushmen — 
egaUtarianism, mateship, rugged masculinity and indifference to regular work— 
back to the London underworld where AustraUa's first unwilling settlers were 
sociaUzed. They argue that these characteristics were expressions "not so much 
of innovative social codes of behaviour in response to an aUen and seemingly hostile 
environment", but rather the social defences and manifestations of an insecure 
criminal class developed to protect the fragile and immature personalities of its 
members who Uved in degrading conditions.^ Graeme Davison shows that most 
of the Australian legend did not come from the bush but was invented by disaffected 
city intellectuals. For the most part the famous Bulletin journalists of the 1890s, 
including that great bush writer Henry Lawson, knew virtually nothing about 
the real outback. They invented a rural ideal as an alternative to the sordid and 
cramped conditions of the inner city where they lived and worked.^* 
Besides historical inaccuracy, the root of the problem with the Hartzean thesis, 
and to a lesser extent with the AustraUan Uterature it built upon, is the mistaken 
diagnosis of ideologies. LiberaUsm and labourism are lumped together as radicaUsm 
and contrasted with Whiggery or conservatism as it is sometimes called. Hartz 
and Rosecrance divide AustraUan history into two ideological periods; radicalism 
versus Whiggery before 1860, and the ascendency of radicaUsm after 1860. It is 
more appropriate to use three periods and to characterize them roughly as the 
stmggle for liberal democracy (1840-60), the triumph of UberaUsm (1860-90), and 
liberalism versus labourism (after 1900). 
RadicaUsm is a misleading term since it emphasizes what is common to both 
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AustraUan UberaUsm and labourism. RadicaUsm during the nineteenth century 
was the left wing of UberaUsm. It was important because its constituency was 
the working class before the formation of the Labor party. After the formation 
of the Labor party in the 1890s, radicaUsm remained an important part of AustraUan 
UberaUsm but became as weU a major ingredient of Labor ideology. Thus Dr Evatt 
was a spiritual heir of Higinbotham and Higgins, who were middle-class 
radicals, but he was something more. Whereas they were neither labourites nor 
sociaUsts, Evatt led a mature Labor party that had become social democratic rather 
than simply radical. To blur UberaUsm and labourism together on the basis of 
the common strands of radicaUsm and leave out the significant points of difference 
is to distort the pattern of AustraUan poUtics. 
The second and related problem of ideological diagnosis is identifying the upstart 
oUgarchy of merchants and squatters—the aspiring "bunyip aristocracy" —that tried 
to comer political power in the first half of the nineteenth century. They have 
been caUed Whigs by some and conservatives by others and provided the 
countervailing force against which the radical legend was developed. Though its 
leaders did invoke the rhetoric of Britain's estabUshed upper class to support its 
claims, this group was neither truly Whig nor conservative. It was a cUque of 
self-made men who reaped the easy benefits of being first in a new country. The 
Macarthurs and the Wentworths were shrewd businessmen who amassed quick 
fortunes by exploiting government patronage.^' They were rather crude capitaUsts 
who substituted convict labour and patronage for wage labour and a developed 
market that were absent in the early colonial era. In their motivation and pursuits, 
however, they were mature capitaUsts who amassed huge tracts of land through 
influence or squatting in order to produce wool for the export market. GeneraUy 
they dabbled in every trading venture that promised a quick profit. Their only 
conservatism was in attempting to secure the excessive property and privileges 
acquired under early colonial governors. If they must be given a title they were 
"patronage capitalists", and as such they were staunch opponents of the rising 
claims of Uberal democracy.^* 
Squatterdom secured some initial privileges in the nominated councils of colonial 
government in the early 1850s. But within a decade liberal democracy had 
triumphed; manhood suffrage, responsible government and land reforms were all 
achieved by 1861.^' Large property interests fought a Umited independent 
rearguard action in the upper houses of colonial parliaments. Nevertheless, that 
was incidental to the main political battle which had been lost to principles of 
democratic equaUty and the economic battle won by the advocates of a free market. 
In effect, it was hardly a defeat at aU for the large property interests. The victory 
of liberal democracy secured equality of poUtical rights in the formal sense, but 
in practice poUtical power passed from the squatters and large traders to middle-
class professionals and urban traders and manufacturers.'' 
Typical of this new urban power eUte that dominated colonial poUtics for several 
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decades before the formation of the Labor party were Henry Parkes and Samuel 
Griffith." Parkes, a Sydney shopkeeper and trader, then poUtical activist and 
newspaper proprietor, was premier of New South Wales three times between 1872 
and 1891. Samuel Griffith, a leading Brisbane barrister, was a dominant figure 
in Queensland poUtics during the same period, and was premier twice between 
1883 and 1893. Both Parkes and Griffith were premiers of their respective states 
during the turbulent period of the maritime and shearers' strikes in the early 1890s, 
and both used the force of the state on the side of capitaUsts and against striking 
workers to protect estabUshed property rights. According to his biographer, Parkes 
viewed strikes as conspiracy, and was dedicated to preserving law and order in 
a way that "ineluctably assisted strike-breaking employers".^* Griffith was more 
enlightened, but his government and some hot-headed ministers were implicated 
in supplying firearms to pastoraUsts and assisting strike-breakers to reach country 
areas.^' Thus radical UberaUsm as practised by two of its most eminent colonial 
representatives aUgned itself with the pastoraUsts and financiers and against the 
working class when the cranch came over industrial relations in 1890-91. In effect 
the advent of liberal democracy in colonial AustraUa had opened the way for a 
purer form of capitalism free from blemishes of convict labour and oligarchic 
interference. Market freedom was universaUy extended whUe property rights were 
secured. 
Liberalism that secured both equal rights and the right to unequal property 
carried within itself the seeds of its own fragmentation. The powerful motor of 
capitaUst production, fiieUed by market freedom and property security that UberaUsm 
guaranteed, combined with the limited frontier of this harsh new continent to 
produce the Australian working class. The development of large scale industrial 
capitaUsm in mining and manufacturing and the expansion of large scale pastoraUsm 
based on the wool industry converted aspiring independent settlers and immigrants 
into wage labourers. The severe 1890s depression that ended several decades of 
easy prosperity and expansion"*" triggered the clash between trade unionism and 
large capitalism that gave an enormous impetus to the politicization of the labour 
movement. The story of the formation and rapid success of the Labor party has 
been told and retold with ever greater precision by contemporary historians and 
is not our concern here.'" Our concern is rather with putting that key event 
which determined the subsequent shape of Australian politics into its proper 
ideological perspective. 
The traditional view of AustraUan poUtics was a somewhat romanticized version 
of the struggle between labour and capital. There was a tendency in the Australian 
epic, however, to stand Marx on his head and make labour rather than capital 
the stronger party. This view was rooted in the obvious fact that labour won 
substantial industrial and poUtical gains with relative ease in Australia. Yet labour 
was never the dominant partner and capital was not the gadfly of AustraUan poUtics 
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as Rosecrance claims.''^ Rather, in Bede Naim's terms, the achievement of Labor 
can best be described as that of "civiUzing capitaUsm".^^ 
The Hartzean radical interpretation cannot explain the Labor party which it 
acknowledges as the primary agent in AustraUan poUtics. If a radical working 
class ideology had prevailed before 1890, the Labor party would never have emerged 
as an independent poUtical party—an event that Nairn has correctly described as 
"the most decisive . . . in the history of the AustraUan working classes".^ 
Similarly, if a radical Labor ideology had prevailed after 1890, there would be 
no explanation of Labor's continual stmggle for reform nor for its regular defeats 
and only modest successes. In fact, the Labor party was created to reform the 
Uberal capitalist regime and the pattem of its progress ever since indicates that 
it has usually been the outsider in AustraUan federal poUtics. 
The traditional historians of the Labor movement dwelt on the extremes and 
the pecuUarities of the AustraUan story, emphasizing what they preferred, and 
were sympathetic to, rather than the harsher bourgeois reaUty that was dominant. 
They over-generaUzed the polarization of industrial forces produced by the great 
strikes of the 1890s and used this as a framework for Unking subsequent Labor 
party history with the major struggles of the nineteenth century between convicts 
and gaolers, squatters and land reformers, and rebelUous Eureka miners and 
reactionary colonial governments. This story of extremes tended to lose sight of 
the most obvious and pedestrian fact of aU, the middle class. As A. W. Martin 
has pointed out, much of AustraUan poUtical history can be more accurately 
explained by reference to "that diverse middle class which has shaded off into the 
working class, and which has always been a dominant element in the community, 
or at the very least a powerful mediator between labor on the one hand and big 
capital on the other".*' 
If the radical interpretation cannot explain the pattern of Australian poUtics 
and the Labor party in particular, nor can the Uberal-bourgeois thesis that goes 
to the other extreme. Writing in Pravda in 1913, Lenin gave the classic statement 
of this view.** He contemptuously dismissed the AustraUan Labor party as "a 
Uberal-bourgeois party". To preserve the obvious differences between Labor and 
its opponents, Lenin had to add a second implausibiUty, that "the so-called 
AustraUan Liberals are reaUy conservatives". This judgment reflected Lenin's own 
crude "insurrectionary" brand of socialism,'" and violated his sound maxim that 
"In order to understand the real significance of the parties it is necessary to examine 
not their labels but their class character and the historical conditions of each separate 
country". 
The Leninist thesis has been kept aUve on the fringes of Australian poUtics by 
the Communist party, which alienated itself from the working class by slavishly 
following the Moscow line even when Stalin's power was at its peak.*' More 
recently in the 1970s the Leninist thesis came into vogue with the New Left and 
was the basic paradigm underlying much of their reinterpretation of Labor history 
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before the more substantial work of ConneU and Irving. The giants of traditional 
Labor history in the past were often people of the Old Left such as Brian Fitzpatrick 
and more recently Robin GoUan. These scholars had a profound respect for the 
popuUst, working-class and mildly sociaUstic character of the Labor party and an 
optimism in its abiUty to reform AustraUan society eventuaUy. Their story of Labor 
was one of a progressive straggle towards the fairer and more just society in which 
they beUeved. It was essentiaUy an unfinished tale since it narrated the past in 
the Ught of a nobler future. The New Left repudiated the Old Left for idealizing 
the old Labor order of AustraUan poUtics rather than demoUshing it. 
Heirs to the failure of the Curtin and Chifley governments to achieve any 
breakthroughs towards sociaUsm in the 1940s and the ensuing twenty-three years 
of Liberal government, many New Left academics in the 1970s were intent upon 
recasting Labor as a bourgeois party. They married Lenin's thesis with that of 
the "middle-class" reinterpretations of historians and concluded that AustraUa 
remained liberal because it had always been so and because the Labor party had 
never provided any real altemative. 
According to Catley and McFarlane, Labor was "a party serving the needs of 
a modern capitaUst economy with the techniques of liberal capitaUsm"; it differed 
from the Liberals only as Tweedledee did from Tweedledum.*' For Humphrey 
McQueen, the rise of Labor in the 1890s was "by no means a break with the 
past. In every respect it was a fiilfilment of it". The Labor party was cast as an 
active protagonist in integrating the workforce into the consensus of capitaUsm."' 
Or as John Playford summed it up, in typical doctrinaire fashion: 
The ALP has never understood the nature of economic and political power in Australia. 
Marxists, on the other hand, realize that the principal objective of revolutionary action 
is state power and the necessary precondition of any socialist revolution is the destruction 
of the bourgeois state apparatus. The conclusion is obvious: the ALP is not and never 
has been a socialist party. As Lenin pointed out as long ago as 1913, it is a "liberal-
bourgeois party". 
Like the Hartzean radical interpretation, the Leninist liberal-bourgeois thesis 
fails to explain the AustraUan phenomena because its categories are generaUzations 
from an alien poUtical environment. Instead of examining the local poUtical 
phenomena, these grand theories are highly selective in choosing data that tend 
to fit their preconceived paradigms. In the Leninist case, the real differences between 
Liberal and Labor in Australian poUtics pale into insignificance when judged against 
Marxist categories and Soviet experience. 
The federal constitution 
Party in Australia is potentially more divisive and destabiUzing than it has been 
in practice. Aristotle pointed out long ago that the basic issue in politics was the 
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straggle between the few and the many who were the rich and the poor. Aristotle's 
best practical regime was one where the virtue of moderation curbed the extreme 
passions of the rich and the poor, and a middle class held the balance of power. 
When the ideal of the perfect man of antiquity and the virtue of the mean were 
replaced by modernity's view of man as naturally a selfish seeker of power and 
property, a new mechanism had to be found to ensure poUtical stabiUty. MachiavelU 
found this in the cunning rule of a prince when the people were corrupt, or in 
the creative tension between rich and poor that was institutionaUzed in the ancient 
Roman repubUc when the people were virtuous. Hobbes found it in an absolute 
sovereign. Neither solution was appropriate for the capitaUst system of production 
that was emerging in Western Europe, nor for the rising forces of democracy. 
The Americans, who estabUshed popular government in a modern form that 
was both liberal democratic and positively compatible with capitaUsm, had to face 
the age-old problem of poUtics. In Madison's famous formulation oi Federalist no. 
10, a stable system of popular government had to "break and control the violence 
of faction", the source of which was usuaUy the "various and unequal distribution 
of property".'^ A ruling majority animated by a single class passion confronting 
a powerful minority of entrenched property owners, aU unrestricted by traditional 
moral and reUgious motives, were the typical ingredients for turbulence and poUtical 
violence. Add the inherent tendency of the capitaUst mode of production to produce 
large property accumulation on the one hand and a class of wage labourers on 
the other, and the problem of producing a stable political system was heightened. 
Despite aU the ameliorating quaUfications that must be made for Australia, that 
is potentiaUy the case here. 
Why then has the AustraUan political system been so stable in practice? 
Undoubtedly ConneU's cultural explanation is part of the answer, even though 
one may prefer to use the terms of a dominant consensus upon, and a political 
sociaUzation in, liberal democratic values, rather than use "ruling class" terms. 
The strong British traditions of poUtical moderation and dedication to the rule 
of law are also significant factors. In this respect AustraUa is similar to Britain 
itself or New Zealand. In Australia's case, however, the main cultural attributes 
producing stability are embodied in and supported by our constitution. The 
institutional explanation of political stabiUty in AustraUa is to be found in the 
working of the federal system. 
Federalism breaks up the popular majority by dividing the Australian people's 
aUegiance between the commonwealth government and the state governments. 
It creates a multitude of politicaUy distinct majorities and checks the most powerful 
of these, the national majority, by restricting the jurisdiction of the commonwealth 
government. Besides being confronted by strong and jealous state governments 
from wdthout, the commonwealth govemment is weakened by institutional checks 
and balances from within. The commonwealth's legislative power is divided 
between two houses of parliament organized according to different principles of 
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representation. If the AustraUan Senate does not represent state interests as it was 
designed to do and as its American model does to a much greater extent, its 
structure does allow opposition parties to control half the legislative machinery. 
Thus both the SculUn Labor government during the Great Depression and the 
recent Whitlam govemment were effectively hamstrung by hostile Senates that 
were controUed by the opposition. 
The constitution divides the powers of the central govemment among the 
legislative, executive and judicial branches. The separate judicial power provides 
a constitutional base from which tenured judges can overrule legislative and 
executive acts that they judge to exceed constitutional limits. By this means the 
most radical initiatives of the Fisher-Hughes Labor government from 1910-13 and 
the Chifley Labor government in the late 1940s were defeated. Finally, the 
reactivation of the obsolete prerogative power that was embodied in the executive 
part of the constitution was used by the governor-general to dismiss the Whitlam 
government in 1975. That accounts for all the federal Labor governments that 
existed up to 1983 and were not totally absorbed in fighting the two world wars 
as were the Hughes government from 1914-16 and the Curtin governments from 
1941-45. The Australian poUtical system has been stable because it has tamed or 
terminated the main disruptive and reforming attempts of federal Labor 
governments. 
In AustraUa's strong and culturally homogeneous federation, chaUenges from 
the states to the established political and constitutional order have been less 
significant. Australia lacks the powerful regionaUsm of Canada and is spared the 
special problems associated with a distinct francophone culture in Quebec.'* The 
secessionist movement in Western AustraUa during the 1930s was an isolated 
phenomenon. The most serious state challenge to the established order came, 
t)rpicaUy, from the Labor side. It was mounted by the greatest popuUst demagogue 
AustraUa has produced. Premier Jack Lang of New South Wales. After the SculUn 
government capitulated to the hostile Senate and conservative financial interests 
in 1931, Lang broke with the federal Labor party and made an independent stand. 
He ordered a moratorium on New South Wales' overseas debt payments so that 
financial capital as weU as labour would bear the brant of the depression. Lang 
was quickly brought to heel by the superior authority and financial power of the 
federal govemment. The Lyons United Australia party government paid the New 
South Wales debt and impounded New South Wales monies. The strong action 
was upheld by the High Court in the Garnishee cases (1932), and Lang was dismissed 
from office by the state governor. 
That the Labor party has consistently been the agent of challenge in AustraUan 
poUtics supports the previous argument that the estabUshed order has been 
predominantly liberal. Labor's reforming initiatives and challenges have been 
effectively absorbed or cut off by the system, suggesting that the system itself 
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is inherently a liberal structure. The American theory of federaUsm supports in 
principle what the Australian experience has indicated in practice. 
The American designers of the modern federal system deliberately fragmented 
power and broke up the ruUng majority wiU by dispersing it into diverse and 
confUcting channels." At the highest poUtical level, ambition was to be pitted 
against ambition and institution against institution. The tyranny of rulers was 
to be controUed, not by restricting passions and inculcating virtue, but by designing 
a system of competing and offsetting power clusters: the president against the 
Congress; the Court over the Congress; the Senate vying with the House of 
Representatives; the power of the federal govemment offset by the combined 
strength of the states. There would be no single strong figure or dominant 
institution. The wiU of the people would be sovereign but their rale would be 
filtered and refined through a system of institutional checks and balances. 
Indirectness and dispersion of the popular wiU combined with the sheer size and 
diversity of the new country would ensure there was no dreaded tryanny of the 
majority. At the popular level, the people themselves would be citizens of both 
the union and the states. The American founding fathers claimed that they had 
invented a new system of popular government that stabiUzed majority rule. The 
great French poUtical philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville recognized their claim 
and credited them with "a wholly novel theory, which may be considered as a 
great discovery in modern poUtical science"." 
The mechanisms of American government were negative, but their overaU 
purpose was positive. That purpose was to secure the basic rights and property 
acquisitions of individuals who were considered naturally independent and 
acquisitive and responsible for defining and pursuing their own happiness—in other 
words, individuals who were Lockean liberals. The positive side of American 
government was the protection of commerce. Madison, who has rightly been 
honoured with the title of "Father of the American Constitution", could confidently 
predict in Federalist no. 10 that "A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, 
for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project" 
would be unlikely to pervade the whole body of the union. By securing property 
rights without Umiting or damping down acquisitive passions, the Americans-laid 
the foundation for a great commercial republic.'' 
The spirit and character of the federal system of government that the tough-
minded Americans invented in 1787 inspired the AustraUan founders in the 1890s, 
as we shall see in detail in chapter 2. By 1890 America was a thriving nation, 
and the AustraUans rightly perceived that America's enviable prosperity and stabiUty 
were rooted in its basic laws. The Australian colonies were ripe for the American 
system of government; with estabUshed colonial governments, strong British 
traditions of political moderation and respect for the rule of law, and about three 
milUon people scattered over a huge undeveloped territory, AustraUa in 1890 closely 
resembled the American colonies at the time of their federation. AustraUa's 
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burgeoning capitalist economy and bourgeois aspirations disposed it naturally 
towards the American example. 
Federating the Australian colonies was like negotiating the inevitable; the 
problems were associated with timing, detaU and striking an acceptable compronuse. 
The motives behind federation were convenience, self-interest and, in IngUs Clark's 
words, "the low and selfish ground" of commercial free trade." The AustraUan 
founders may not have fully appreciated the powerful liberal logic with which 
the Americans had forged and defended their system, but they were practical people 
who appreciated its suitabiUty and proven strength. Liberals to a man with the 
sole exception of WilUam Trenwith, a Victorian Labor delegate and trade union 
leader, the AustraUan constitution makers found Uttle that was aUen in the spirit 
of the American model. Except for retaining responsible government and the 
weakening imperial tie with Britain and not adopting a biU of rights, the AustraUans 
implemented the essential features of the American federal constitution. In view 
of this, it is hardly surprising that the constitution has proved such an effective 
barrier to Labor's more extreme poUcies. 
It is the supreme irony of Australian politics that the federal constitution and 
the Labor party were formed in the same decade, but that the constitution was 
put in place just before Labor became a major political force. The constitution 
was the mature achievement of the older order of nineteenth-century colonial 
poUtics, and the institutional embodiment of its Uberal capitalist spirit." The rise 
of the Labor party marked the beginning of the new era of Labor-versus-Liberal 
politics. The initial successes of Labor in New South Wales in 1891 directed 
attention away from the first draft of the constitution. When Federation was 
reactivated half a decade later in a second round of constitution making. Labor 
was barely involved; the constitution was completed without Labor input and 
implemented despite its opposition. Labor entered the race too late to affect the 
basic design of the constitution. Instead, the constitution forced the young party 
to develop within the federal mould. The separate colonial Labor parties were 
just establishing themselves when they had to add a common federal tier. Thus 
the Labor party embodied the essential federal stracture within its own organization. 
The ingenious American device of fragmenting power and breaking up majorities 
was built into the Labor party. 
The federal system divided Labor against itself. The initiative for reform 
legislation soon passed to the federal party because of the superior resources of 
the federal government and the national sweep of its legislation. Party power, 
however, remained decentraUzed at the state level. As L.F. Crisp has pointed out: 
"The maintenance of the strictly federal basis of the Labour Party . . . has cut 
clean across the Party's principle of majority rule. For the ALP has clung stoutly 
to equaUty of State Branch representation irrespective of divergent population and 
Party membership levels in the several States".'" 
When Labor first won office both federally and in New South Wales in 1910 
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Hughes's drive to expand central powers was offset by Holman's championing 
of state rights m New South Wales." In the Great Depression crisis of the 1930s, 
the federal structure of the Labor party and the constitutional system aUowed 
Premier Lang of New South Wales to take an opposite stand to the ScuUin-
Theodore federal Labor government, which led to a disastrous spUt in the party. 
At one point before the spUt, Theodore and Lang, the " two Caesars" of New 
South Wales Labor poUtics, addressed a mass rally from the same platform and 
advocated a "Yes" vote and a " N o " vote respectively in a forthcoming federal 
referendum to expand commonwealth legislative powers.'^ 
Ever since Harold Laski pronounced "The Obsolescence of FederaUsm" in 
1939, his foUowers have tended to dismiss federaUsm as an archaic form and 
an obstacle to national development. Its potent influence in moulding national 
life and political parties has been played down or overlooked. The demise of 
federaUsm was widely predicted or at least desired in the 1940s and 1950s. FederaUsm 
was considered obsolete because it fragmented poUtical power, whereas the national 
economy was becoming an integrated unit composed of giant corporations. But 
federaUsm is arguably stronger today than ever before precisely because it has 
withstood the centraUzing pressures of war and postwar periods. The critics often 
did not appreciate the powerful liberal rationale that underpinned this ingenious 
system of government, nor did they recognize federalism's propensity for 
perpetuating itself and adjusting to new conditions. 
Once set in place, a federal system has a Ufe of its own. By moulding the dynamic 
political forces of a nation along federal lines, the basic division of powers tends 
to ensure its own survival. Once poUtical parties, bureaucracies and interest groups 
have been shaped into a federal framework, they in turn reinforce and promote 
the federal system. The federal structure is like the bed of a turbulent river; it 
directs the flow of the waters and is at the same time broadened and deepened 
by their flow. 
The Canadian political scientist Alan Cairns has recently given a powerful 
statement of the primacy of a federal constitution in determining the subsequent 
shape of a nation's political Ufe.** Cairns stressed that a system of government 
tends to reinforce itself and shape the other vital forces of a country acording to 
its own form. Although Caims was discussing Canadian federaUsm, his observations 
are equally appUcable to Australia. Cairns said that the federal system 
has become a system of powerful governments, sustained by interest groups and parties 
which, with imperfections, mirror the governmental structure in which they exist. 
The chain of federal influence, commencing with the elemental fact of a federal 
constitutional system, has successfully exerted strong pressures to align parties, interest 
groups, and individual voters behind the distinct governments which are the essence 
of federalism. Federal and provincial governments, federal and provincial parties, and 
federal and provincial pressure groups reinforce each other and they reinforce 
federalism. 
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In AustraUa, federal and state governments that reinforce federaUsm have divided 
the Labor party within itself. While professing the aboUtion of federaUsm in 
principle for most of its history, the Labor party has been locked into the federal 
system in practice by its powerfiil state machines and the substantial prizes of 
state governments. Labor's appeal to a national working-class constituency has 
been broken up by state governments that represent local majorities and fragment 
poUtical Ufe. As a result Labor's challenge to the federal constitution has been 
Umited. Nevertheless that challenge has been at the centre of AustraUan poUtics 
when Labor has been in federal office. 
The constitution versus Labor 
Two of the major stractural determinants of AustraUan politics are the federal 
constitution and the Labor party. These institutions shape the forces of Australian 
politics and give the Australian polity its uniquely Australian form. Neither 
institution is unique in itself, but the combination is. The Australian Labor party 
is comparable to the British and New Zealand labour parties, whereas the AustraUan 
constitution implements an American federal system and combines federalism with 
responsible government as does the Canadian constitution. In having both a federal 
constitution and a Labor party, Australia does not have the best of both worlds. 
In fact. Labor and the constitution are incompatible in important respects, and 
much of Australian politics has involved the working out of the confUct inherent 
in the juxtaposition of these two political institutions. • 
For much of its history, as the Canadian-Australian political scientist David 
Corbett observed in 1962, the Labor party has appeared more interested in 
constitutional than social reform.*' The reason is that the constitution has 
restrained federal Labor policy and at times been an effective obstacle to its 
implementation. As Gough Whitlam fairly summed up Labor's experience of the 
first half century of federaUsm in his 1957 Chifley Memorial Lecture, appropriately 
titled "The Constitution versus Labor", 
the Australian Labor Party, unlike the British and New Zealand Parties, is unable to 
perform, and therefore finds it useless to promise, its basic policies. It has been 
handicapped, as they were not, by a Constitution framed in such a way as to make 
it difficult to carry out Labor objectives and interpreted in such a way as to make it 
impossible to carry them out. 
The Labor party was opposed to the federal constitution from the beginning. 
The fledgUng colonial parties fought against the adoption of the constitution in 
1898 and 1899 although they supported federation, or more accurately speaking, 
the national unification of the AustraUan colonies. As early as 1891 the New South 
Wales party had adopted the plank of "Federation of the Australasian Colonies 
upon a national, as opposed to an imperialistic, basis". In 1897 the New South 
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Wales party ran a slate of ten candidates for that colony's ten delegates to the 
convention that drafted the constitution. They advocated such direct democratic 
measures as initiative and referendum, and unicameraUsm or, failing that, a senate 
elected in proportion to population. None of the candidates was successful and 
the New South Wales Labor party's proposals were not adopted by the 
conventions.'* 
After the draft constitution had been adopted by the constitutional convention 
in 1898, it was put to referendum in all the colonies. The New South Wales 
Labor party was the strongest and best organized of the colonial parties and launched 
an extensive campaign against its adoption. The radical Labor view that federation 
was "a fatman's trick to dam back the ocean of Democratic state legislation" and 
"delude" the masses was persistently put by the Victorian weekly newspaper 
Tocsin. Labor spokesmen shared platforms with such notable radical critics as 
Piddington and Higgins. They achieved some success when, in the 1898 
referendimi, sixty-one per cent of the total "No" vote was registered in New South 
Wales. Despite a sUght majority in favour, the set quota of 80,000 affirmative 
votes in New South Wales was not reached. In Victoria, South AustraUa and 
Tasmania, majorities of electors favoured the biU and set quotas were reached, 
while Queensland and Western Australia did not vote. 
The New South Wales rejection enabled Premier Reid to press the other premiers 
for concessions that appealed to New South Wales interests and went part of the 
way towards satisfying Labor demands for a more democratic constitution. The 
national capital was given to New South Wales, provided it was not located within 
one hundred miles of Sydney. The other changes allowed for a simple majority 
to pass biUs in joint sittings of both houses rather than a three-fifths majority, 
referenda proposals to be submitted to the people if twice passed by one house 
rather than by both houses, and the termination of the Braddon financial clause 
after ten years.™ These changes neither altered the substance of the document nor 
induced the New South Wales Labor party to moderate its opposition to the second 
referendum in 1899 that approved the amended constitution.'' 
Other colonial Labor parties were less mature than the New South Wales party, 
and their campaign against the constitution was less significant and often coloured 
by local politics. The Queensland party had no specific policy on federation, some 
Labor party members supported it while others opposed it as a middle-class device 
for diverting attention from Labor demands for reform. Federation was not high 
on the political agenda in Queensland and no delegates were sent to the 1897-98 
convention. Nevertheless Queensland ratified the constitution. In South AustraUa 
and Tasmania, the Labor parties campaigned for a unitary state and the abolition 
of the Senate. The Victorian party was opposed to the draft constitution but did 
not carry many voters with it. In Western AustraUa, however, the small Labor 
party strongly supported federation in order to capitalize on a strong popular 
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movement against the Forrest government that was inclined to stay out of 
federation.'^ 
Thus Labor was generally opposed to federation with the exceptions reflectmg 
local poUtical conditions. Considering that none of the parties was even a decade 
old, the extent of their opposition was significant. The fledgling Labor parties 
sensed that their trade-union brand of popuUst, sociaUst reformism would be 
curtailed by the proposed constitution. Hence they sought to ameUorate its impact 
by singUng out its indirect and "undemocratic" features for special criticism. Where 
the constitution's amending formula called for a double majority of the people 
voting as a nation and in their states (that required majorities in four of the six 
states), the Labor parties proposed amendment by simple majority irrespective of 
state boundaries. Reid had just introduced direct income tax in New South Wales 
with strong Labor support, but the new commonwealth was expected to rely 
on indirect taxes from tariffs which was fiscally less progressive. Had federation 
been delayed one or two decades, the constitution would probably have been 
substantially different. 
The early New South Wales Labor party's instincts and suspicions of the 
constitution were more firmly based than its chronicler, Bede Nairn, acknowledges. 
Nairn admits that "the making of the federal constitution was a task for the educated 
middle class" and was subject to "the inbuilt conservatism of both the legal 
profession and the mass of the middle class". But then he asserts that "the 
constitution was above and beyond politics" and blames the New South Wales 
party for failing to comprehend "that Federation was not a political issue and that 
their decision to fight on a specific policy had placed them outside the arena" of 
constitution making.'^ Nairn does not appreciate that a constitution is political 
in th^ most fundamental sense. It will only appear as a neutral instrument where 
there is a national consensus on the basic principles that underUe it and are implied 
by it. In Australia that was not the case since the Labor parties were challenging 
the estabUshed liberal order and in the process of formulating a coUectivist and 
mildly socialist alternative. 
The colonial Labor parties, however, were too new and immature to make an 
impact on the great national issue of federation, which was the last and greatest 
achievement of the estabUshed forces of nineteenth-century liberal poUtics. The 
constitution was set in place before Labor could influence national policy, and 
as a result Labor was shaped as a national party by the federal constitution. Only 
the bitter lessons of subsequent experience would speU out for Labor the fiiU extent 
of its incompatibility with the federal constitution that it had originally sensed. 
While the Labor party was becoming federaUzed in practice, its adoption of 
a coUectivist objective in 1905 and a sociaUst objective in 1921 ensured that it 
would remain firmly opposed to the principle of federaUsm. The 1905 Federal 
Labor Conference adopted as its objective "The securing of the fuU results of their 
industry to all producers by the collective ownership of monopolies and the 
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extension of the industrial and economic functions of the State and the 
MunicipaUty". This was essentiaUy state sociaUsm on a limited scale. Andrew Fisher, 
the future Labor prime minister, was reported as saying at the time that no Labor 
party worthy of the name "can deny that its objective is sociaUsm, but no sociaUst 
with any parUamentary experience can hope to get anything for years to come 
other than practical legislation of a sociaUst nature".'* In moving the adoption 
of the 1905 objective. Labor leader Watson directly Unked the need for an objective 
with the federal constitution's propensity to subvert Labor poUcy and goals. Watson 
said: 
It is a wise thing to direct the attention of the people to what we are really aiming 
at as a party. The great thing is to let the people know the good we are working for. 
The manner in which the Constitution circumvents the Federal Party in politics is an 
additional reason why we should have an Objective on the programme." 
In 1921 during a period of left-wing ascendency in the party, the stark British 
Labour slogan of "The sociaUsation of industry, production, distribution and 
exchange" was adopted as the party's objective. It is significant that the federal 
party was then in opposition and had lost many of its influential moderates in 
the exodus of members foUovidng Hughes out of the party in the 1916 conscription 
spUt. Theodore, who was premier of Queensland at the time, opposed adopting 
such an objective because he saw it as an electoral liabiUty that was devoid of 
substantive meaning in the context of AustraUan poUtics. The Blackburn 
Declaration, sponsored by the moderates, was also carried and severely restricted 
the socialist objective to bring it into line with more traditional Australian Labor 
goals. The declaration specified that collective ownership would be pursued only 
"for the purpose of preventing exploitation", and affirmed the party's respect for 
private ownership wherever property was "utiUsed by its owner in a sociaUy useful 
manner and without exploitation"." The Blackburn rider in effect modified the 
sociaUst objective to a democratic sociaUst objective that was in keeping with Labor 
party traditions and aspirations. In one form of words or another, this has been 
Labor's objective ever since and was reaffirmed as recently as the 1981 Federal 
Labor Conference." 
Although often controversial and at times an electoral albatross. Labor's objective 
has given an important orientation to the party. As Lloyd Ross has pointed out, 
"The Objective was never at any stage anything other than a vague generaUsation 
of Labor ideals and Labor methods".'* Yet it has been important for directing 
the vision of leading Labor people and anchoring the intention of the party. While 
its practical fruits have been exceedingly modest, its inspirational value has been 
significant. As Geoffrey Sawer has affirmed, "The ALP will tend to choose a 
'sociaUst' solution to a specific problem, where the other parties will seek a private-
enterprise one."" Menzies put it more strongly: 
[Our] first impulse is always to seek the private enterprise answer, to help the individual 
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to help himself, to create a cUmate, economic, social, industrial, favourable to his activity 
and growth. 
Our opponents have an exactly opposite point of approach. Their first instinct is 
the Socialist one: "The right way to deal with this matter is for the Government to 
run it!" Private enterprise and effort are the alternatives to which they reluctantly turn 
only when the SociaUst plan proves to be constitutionally incompetent or in practice 
unworkable. 
Implementation of Labor's objective has been severely restricted in AustraUa 
for a variety of reasons. The people have not generally been amenable to sociaUsm 
because the capitaUst system has been sufficiently prosperous and flexible to satisfy 
ordinary demands. The state at both federal and state levels has always played 
a major role in managing capitaUsm in AustraUa. The proven relationship between 
modified free enterprise and basic democratic liberties has been preferred to the 
unproven promises of complete democratic Uberty in a collectivized economy. Yet 
at specific times in Australian history, the Labor party has attempted the partial 
implementation of sociaUst policy. In such instances, as the foUowing chapters 
will show, Whitlam's claim has been vindicated; the constitution is framed in 
such a way as to make it difficult to carry out Labor's objective and it has been 
interpreted by the courts, both the High Court and the Privy Council, in such 
a way as to make it impossible for Labor to implement its more sociaUst policies. 
In the confrontation between Labor and the constitution. Labor has had to change, 
modifying or abandoning its more extreme policies and moderating its objective. 
In determining the outcome of that confrontation the High Court has played a 
crucial role. In fact the key events in the poUtics of judicial review in AustraUa 
have been the Court's decisions upholding our liberal constitution against Labor's 
centraUst and sociaUst challenges. 
The political role of the Court 
Immediately one speaks of the AustraUan High Court as a poUtical institution 
exercising a prime poUtical function, one confronts the most solemn public denials 
of the fact by the Court's own leading spokesmen. The High Court's persistence 
in claiming that its work is strictly legal has been widely recognized as a 
distinguishing characteristic. Therefore, at the very beginning, a study of the poUtics 
of judicial review has to deal with the Court's avowal of apoUtical legaUsm. Since 
legaUsm has come under increasing attack by AustraUan legal scholars in the last 
couple of decades, that means taking up and evaluating the counterclaims of the 
critics. 
The classic statement of legaUsm was given by its leading practitioner and 
reputedly AustraUa's greatest judge. Sir Owen Dixon. At his swearing in as chief 
justice in 1952 Dixon claimed that the Court's sole function in constitutional 
adjudication was a strictly legal one; as he put it, to "say whether a given measure 
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faUs on one side of a Une consequently drawn or on the other, and that it has 
nothing whatever to do with the merits or demerits of the measure". Dixon 
complained of a widespread misunderstanding of the Court's role and a popular 
misuse of terms in describing its decisions. He endorsed legaUsm in these often-
quoted terms: "It may be that the Court is thought to be excessively legaUstic. 
I should be sorry to think that it is anything else. There is no other safe guide 
to judicial decisions in great conflicts than a strict and complete legaUsm."*' 
At the time Dixon was an experienced judge, having already served on the 
High Court for twenty-three years and having been its most influential and learned 
member throughout the 1940s. He was chief justice for the next twelve years, 
from 1952-64, and his opinions and spirit stiU influence the Court today. Sir Robert 
Menzies, an admirer of Dixon and an eminent constitutional lawyer in his own 
right, has said: 
Owen Dixon . . . has left an ineradicable mark upon the constitutional history of 
Australia. He established the interpretation of our constitution as a pure matter of law 
and of legal concepts. He had never been engaged in politics, and always seemed to 
me to have little interest in them; certainly no partisanship; no sociological objectives 
to achieve . . . He rejected the notion that the Constitution, being in its origin and 
effect a political document, should be interpreted in the light of current political views 
by judges of a political frame of mind. 
LegaUsm was reaffirmed as the official stance of the High Court by Sir Garfield 
Barwick, AustraUa's most controversial chief justice, in June 1976. In a National 
Press Club address, Barwick distinguished the AustraUan High Court from the 
American Supreme Court on the grounds that the High Court did not make biU-
of-rights decisions. He acknowledged that such decisions were clearly poUtical 
and questioned whether an unelected body such as the Court could continue for 
long to exercise such a function. Barwick argued that the AustraUan Court's work 
was "strictly legal" because it had no bill of rights to interpret. He justified the 
Court's "legalistic attitude to the Constitution and to other matters" on the grounds 
that it was the "right thing and the only stable thing to do". Barwick's position 
was summed up in the following claim: "We have no general Bill of Rights 
situation in which we can go beyond the law, and as in the case of decisions about 
the BiU of Rights make what really are political decisions."" 
Barwick's reasoning may be simplistic, but his message as official spokesman 
of the High Court was quite clear; legalism remained the Court's official doctrine 
on constitutional adjudication. In the Court's most significant and controversial 
decision in recent years, the Tasmanian Dam case in 1983, a majority of judges 
insisted that their decision making was essentially legaUstic.** 
LegaUsm is the view of constitutional adjudication which holds that judges 
interpret the constitution by reading the natural sense or plain meaning of its 
provisions. Judges are then supposed to characterize the subject matter of the 
impugned statute and determine its constitutionaUty by a legal decision. Advocates 
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of legaUsm contend that contextual and consequential factors of a poUtical, economic 
and social nature are not taken into account in this decision-making process. The 
High Court claims that its reasoning is legaUstic and this view is generaUy accepted 
without critical analysis.*' For example Professor Lane, a prominent constitutional 
scholar, has characterized the mental attitudes of the judges that inform the High 
Court's work as "UteraUsm" and "legaUsm". By UteraUsm, Lane means the Court's 
propensity to take at face value both the statute under review and the constitution. 
He claims that the Court is "more impressed by the form of a statute than by 
its substance", and that it looks only at the narrow legal aspects of a case while 
completely ignoring the broader communal considerations. LegaUsm refers to the 
Court's preference for abstract categories and technical distinctions. The High 
Court, says Lane, holds fast to the beUef that constitutional terms are "absolutes 
deemed to be frxed by the Constitution for aU eternity".*' This is something of 
a caricature drawn from the Uteral acceptance of the Court's own formal rhetoric, 
as we shaU see subsequently when particular Court decisions and judicial opinions 
are examined, but it does sum up the Court's professed method. 
The Australian judiciary has tended to be impeccably nineteenth century and 
British in the manner in which it has conceptualized and discussed its role. Its 
inspiration has been drawn from the "classical epoch" of English law, the second 
half of the nineteenth century when, according to Dixon, "Among legal historians, 
jurists, and judges . . . the qualities of scholarship, penetration, clearness of 
exposition and feUcity of expression appeared to an extent and in a degree that 
had not before been equalled."*' The High Court has cultivated a strict legal 
positivism that assumes that the law is an imperative prescription, clear in itself 
or logically deducible from legal principles that are clear, and simply to be expounded 
and declared.** Only in recent years has this orthodoxy begun to cramble. 
The persistence of AustraUan judges with very traditional and positivistic modes 
of legal thinking, writing and speaking has come under increasing critical comment 
from academic lawyers during the last couple of decades. LegaUsm is under threat 
as waves of modern realist criticism spread from North America and break over 
the Australian judicial citadel. The work of Professors Sawer, McWhinney, Lane 
and Blackshield, four of the High Court's most eminent critics, has been informed 
by the latest academic trends of value relativism, reaUsm and behaviourism. Judges 
are creative policy makers, says McWhinney;*' they actively govern as a "judicial 
oUgarchy" in AustraUa, says Lane."* Constitutional decisions are ultimately 
determined by the personal preferences or "general set of values" which judges 
internaUze and then smuggle into their legal reasoning, says Sawer;'' or by the 
"deep bias" of judges, says Blackshield.'^ By adopting alternative models of 
judging drawn from modern social science, these critics have highlighted aspects 
of judicial decision making that legalism has disguised or denied.''' 
McWhinney has pointed out that the account of judging given by Dixonian 
legaUsm does not square with the actual phenomena, and to prove his point cites 
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the obvious example of the judicial interpretation of section 92 of the constitution. 
McWhinny criticizes legalism as a constitutional method on the grounds that it 
ignores poUtical, social and economic elements that are integral parts of a 
constitutional decision. He makes the strong point that judges do not operate 
in a poUtical and social vacuum simply by professing to do so; judicial prejudices 
and presuppositions invariably flood in to fill the void and supply the hidden 
premises of the "legal" argument. McWhinney concludes by advocating that the 
High Court abandon altogether "the purely mechanical conception of the judicial 
office, the fiction that judges never make the law but simply apply it, and 
[recognize] frankly the essentiaUy creative role of a supreme court exercising judicial 
review". He advocates that judges should be given a good social science 
education so that they might, as master policy makers, be acquainted with aU 
the relevant evidence. 
Lane acknowledges that constitutional adjudication necessarily has important 
poUtical, social and economic consequences, but assumes that these follow as 
unintended consequences of the Court's legaUstic approach. He marvels that such 
random consequences of the Court's UteraUsm and legalism do not always have 
"the—quite unintended — effect of obstructing Commonwealth and State 
government"." Lane goes out of his way to emphasize that when the Court's 
decisions are beneficial to government and serve the public interest, such 
consequences are largely accidental byproducts of legal considerations." At the 
same time Lane maintains that the court is ' 'a co-ordinate legislator and our polity 
is a judicial-legislative govemment"^^ because of the active and creative law-making 
role of judges. 
If the reaUst criticisms of Lane and McWhinney reveal obvious aspects of judicial 
decision making that legaUsm obscures, the paradigms of judging that inform their 
criticisms —"government" for Lane and "policy-making" for McWhinney—are 
themselves simplistic and partial. It is because Australian courts do not govern 
in the active manner of Lane's model that they are able to govern in the passive 
way that is peculiar to them. Lane tends to maintain the artificial distinction 
between legal and political decision making that legalism itself presupposes; he 
differs from the legalists by putting judicial review back into the political realm 
through calling it government. Moreover, Lane's claim that there has been in 
fact a complete severance of the judges' legal act and intentions from the practical 
policy outcomes of their decisions is quite implausible, as we shall see. 
McWhinney's preferred alternative to legaUsm is equally flawed. The active, 
policy-making role he advocates seems singularly unsuited to the non-elected and 
tradition-bound institution that a court typicaUy is. His model of judging as poUcy-
making is fraught with as many theoretical difficulties as legalism itself. It reUes 
on the optimistic assumption that rational policy making is possible, and reflects 
a naive beUef in the trath and practicability of modern social science. McWhinney's 
practical solution of "giving the legal decision-maker the broad training in the 
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social sciences that is so necessary in handling the complex public law issues of 
present-day society"'* assumes that science can replace practical wisdom and that 
training in the social sciences can be a substitute for judicial technique in highly 
poUticized constitutional conflicts. Both are problematical. McWhinney does not 
seem to appreciate that legaUsm has provided a powerful legitimating rhetoric 
for judicial review in AustraUa that is completely lacking in his activist policy-
making model of judging. 
What is especially noticeable about the critics of legaUsm is their own tendency 
towards legaUsm. While maintaining in principle that constitutional adjudication 
is a key socio-economic function, they persist in a Uteral analysis of the Court's 
opinions and public rhetoric. Such critics overlook the possibiUty that legaUsm 
might be the Court's method of executing judicial review and legitimating its 
decisions within the context of AustraUan poUtics. The reason for this oversight 
is that the Court's actual decision making and its professed legaUsm are not 
examined within the context of AustraUan poUtics and poUtical culture. Despite 
general protestations against legaUsm, critics Uke McWhinney and Lane have tended 
to work within the cocoon of legal reasoning and rhetoric that the Court itself 
has spun. 
A far more radical account of judging is inherent in the quantitative analysis 
of A. R. Blackshield that is based on the hard-core behaviourist approach of the 
American pioneer of jurimetrics, Glendon Schubert. Judicial decisions register 
judges' biases, it is claimed, while judicial opinions merely express judges' attempts 
at rationalizing their biases. In a judging situation, the judge's inherent attitudes 
are activated by specific input stimuli which in turn produce a decisional output 
registered by a vote. Judgments, Schubert says, 
are the products of sets of judicial attitudes that have been activated by particular stimuU; 
and from this perspective the attitudes of the justices are of much more fundamental 
99 mportance than the decisions 
. . .[IJssues can be perceived by ajudge only through his own personal system of values 
. . . [T]he values of the judge are the latent parameters that determine how he will define 
and respond to the issues. ""^  
Since a judicial decision is the product of a psychological rather than a rational 
process, it can be studied properly only by psychological methods. But not any 
psychological method, for Schubert is a "hard" empiricist, not a "soft" Freudian. 
His method is "based upon the S-R (stimulus-response) model of behaviourist 
psychology and learning theory". Instead of probing judicial psyches for 
subconscious fears and complexes, he examines patterns of judical decision making 
on the assumption that these reflect an underlying "consistency in the structuring 
of attitudes in the minds of individual judges".*"^ Schubert's method and the 
results it produces are only as sound as the ultra-behaviourist theory on which 
it is based. At the very least, such extreme behaviourism is fraught with theoretical 
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difficulties. It cannot give an adequate account of itself in its own terms. When 
arguing for his approach, Schubert claims that recourse is needed to psychological 
attitudes because logical reasoning is not sufficient to explain judicial decision 
making. But that overlooks the third altemative of prudential or practical 
reasoning. Jurimetrics then is an approach one beUeves in or opts to follow. But 
because of its narrow philosophical assumptions about human behaviour and 
scientific method, it presents a crade and simpUstic view that ignores reason and 
speech, the defining attributes of human beings and, in particular, judges. 
How much of Schubert's theoretical baggage Blackshield accepts is not clear, 
as jurimetrics is only one of Blackshield's several approaches to studying the work 
of the High Court.'"* In a major article on quantitative analysis Blackshield does 
modestly caU his work "Uttle more than a footnote" to Schubert."' He is more 
carefiil, however, in specifying that his purpose is "to uncover precisely those 
elements in judicial decision-making which are subjective, non-rational, and 
stubbomly value-charged".'* This does not say that judging can be reduced solely 
to non-rational psychological components, but that Blackshield is trying to isolate 
precisely those elements in judging that can be so reduced. In other words, it may 
be his view that judging is a combination of rational and non-rational components, 
and that the non-rational component can be isolated by jurimetrics. While such 
a position has a certain superficial plausibiUty, it is basicaUy flawed. The patterns 
in decision-making that are documented by jurimetrics may be either entirely, 
or at least partly, explained by rational factors. How could one teU? Certainly 
not by plotting the pattern of outcomes that are the product of both causes, and 
perhaps primarily of rational, rather than irrational, psychological factors. In any 
case there is a speculative leap from these patterns of decisional outcomes to the 
identification of underlying psychological causes or "deep bias". 
It is hardly surprising, given the theoretical bankruptcy of Schubert's extreme 
behaviourism and the methodological flaws of Blackshield's modified jurimetric 
approach, that jurimetric analysis of judging has produced no significant insights 
into the judicial decision-making processes. Jurimetrics only provides, with any 
certainty, a useful diagram of the relative trends in judicial decisions. To label 
the two ends of the judicial spectrum that one plots as "liberal" and "conservative" 
explains very Uttle. If judicial attitudes and personnel change over time, such labels 
become positively misleading. Blackshield concludes his article after comparing 
his findings with those of others, as follows: 
At the very least . . . in reaching decisions based upon their divergent degrees of 
"conservatism" and "authoritarianism" Australian High Court judges were showing 
themselves to have much the same psychological structure as American or Japanese judges. 
At its widest, it means that in thus deciding, they were faUing into a pattern of universal 
1 107 
human response. 
That is to say, judges are human. Such a banal conclusion was never in dispute. 
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The promise of jurimetrics to uncover the psychological basis of judging has not 
been fiilfiUed, and in principle cannot be. 
The study of judicial review in Australia has generally been the preserve of 
constitutional lawyers and law teachers who, until recently, were prepared to serve 
as the academic wing of the tightly knit legal profession, accepting the leadership 
of the judiciary and disseminating professional and doctrinal orthodoxies to neophyte 
lawyers. Constitutional lawyers worked within the law; evaluating, reconciling 
and criticizing judicial decisions, and consoUdating them into comprehensive texts. 
Their work was essentiaUy "the ordinary business of lawyers, courts and law 
teachers", as Sawer has described it; it was "the criticism of legal doctrine by 
reference to the law's internal standard—the estabUshed techniques and the 
authoritative sources"."" AU non-lawyers, including poUtical and social scientists, 
were lay people and for the most part respected the strict delineations of an 
entrenched legal apartheid."" Given this tradition, it was perhaps not surprising 
that when constitutional lawyers like Lane, McWhinney and Blackshield took 
over models of decision making from modem social science, they did so quite 
uncritically and with Uttle appreciation of the political consequences. 
It is more surprising that a scholar like Sawer, who has worked with such 
distinction in the overlapping fields of Australian constitutional law and poUtics, 
should also faU back upon an impoverished model of judging and a crade distinction 
between the legal and the poUtical. Sawer's otherwise rich treatment of judicial 
review has been handicapped by this basic theoretical flaw. In this final analysis 
of judging, Sawer has two separate categories, one for the legal and the other 
for the poUtical. Concerning the legal, he posits only two attributes and 
corresponding criteria for evaluation: the logical and the aesthetic. But that does 
not take one very far in evaluating legal decisions since, as Sawer himself notes, 
"in a majority of the cases where the High Court has divided, or where the High 
Court or the Privy Council has overruled or departed from a previous doctrine, 
all the divergent views so exposed were logicaUy possible and none was logicaUy 
necessary". He argues consequently that criticisms must be based on the "aesthetic 
rather than the logical". Preference is given to one decision rather than another, 
not because it is wiser or more prudent or more in keeping with the character 
of the constitution, but because it is "more elegant" or, more importantly, because 
it agrees with one's own "general set of values". Sawer points out that judges 
smuggle in their personal preferences and social biases which are then internalized 
in legal reasoning. "Since a critic, like a constitutional judge, must have some 
general set of values", says Sawer, he should divulge them. Sawer does this and 
states that it is his point of view "that the courts should handle constitutional 
doctrine so as to minimize the impact of judicial decision on parUamentary activity 
and so as to facilitate the expansion of Commonwealth competence to keep pace 
with the integration of the AustraUan nation"."" This is a modified version of 
the Laski-Greenwood thesis that prefers the aboUtion of federaUsm in the name 
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of national integration. But it is hardly fair to fault the Court because it does 
not phase out federaUsm, when that is the essence of the constitution it is supposed 
to uphold. 
That neither High Court judges nor constitutional lawyers have given an 
adequate account of judging is not so remarkable. Their primary concem is with 
the ongoing application and development of the law rather than with speculation 
about the nature of the judging. Judges make decisions and write supporting 
arguments, while lawyers study judicial opinions in order to know what the law 
is. For the internal purposes of the legal system, it does not matter whether or 
not judges or lawyers can give a theoretically sound account of what is entailed 
in judicial decision-making. This lack of self-explanation is not unique to law. 
Most complex human activities are more easily performed than explained—for 
example the creative arts such as painting or vmting, statesmanship and leadership, 
and even knowing itself. Nevertheless, regardless of its validity, theory affects 
practice. This is particularly the case in the social and political fields. If judges 
think they are doing one thing rather than another, their performance is Ukely 
to change. Since what judges do and what they say they do have enormous poUtical 
consequences, the matter is of prime poUtical significance. 
Most Australian judges still rely on the public rhetoric and rationaUzations of 
a neutral legalism, but their credibUity is becoming increasingly questionable. The 
onslaught of modem reaUst criticisms must soon undermine the credibility of the 
Court's legaUsm."' Australian judges of the future will be increasingly exposed 
to the new social science models of judging. The legal fraternity of today is at 
least schizophrenic: according to Mr Justice Kirby, it "asserts most vehemently, 
the absolute removal of judges from political issues, [but] nevertheless spends so 
much time and mental energy examining the prejudices and attitudes of 
judges"."^ Such an attitude wiU appear quaintly archaic to the next generation 
of lawyers who wiU probably take for granted Senator Gareth Evans's view that 
the court be "pragmatic, purposive and openly poUcy-oriented in its decision-making 
style".'" 
AustraUa's isolation and its legal conservatism can provide only temporary barriers 
against the forces and ideas that have changed both the substance and the pubUc 
perception of the judicial fvinction in America. We can take advantage of the 
breathing space to take stock of the High Court's political role and to assess the 
likely impact of activist models of judging before they penetrate the court system. 
Before legaUsm is abandoned, the poUtical function it has served needs to be 
understood. A major purpose of this study is to explore the poUtical role of legaUsm 
in faciUtating and legitimating judicial review in AustraUa after the rise to national 
prominence of the Labor party. An overaU interpretation of the poUtical significance 
of legaUsm is sketched in the next section and elaborated in subsequent chapters. 
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Legalism as a political strategy 
LegaUsm disguises, and the reaUst critics tend to overlook, those aspects of judging 
that are not reducible either to formal logical inference or the personal bias of 
judges. For a proper appreciation of judicial reasoning and decision-making in the 
area of constitutional adjudication, one has to return to an older and richer notion 
of judging and political speech than those used by Sawer, Lane, McWhinney or 
Blackshield. Judging is neither a process of strict logical deduction and formal 
inference, nor simply an assertion of preconceived biases. If it were the former, 
logicians rather than experienced practical lav(ryers would be the leading candidates 
for judicial office. If it were the latter, then the spectram of community biases 
should be represented in the Court as critics have suggested. WhUe conunon sense 
acknowledges that technical reasoning skills and personal values are significant 
in the process of selecting judges, it also insists that they are not sufficient 
quaUfications for a judge. Judging reUes on logical inference as does aU practical 
reasoning, but is not reducible to logical inference."* Judicial opinions might 
often reflect the personal views of judges but that does not mean they are reducible 
to the "deep bias" of judges. 
Judging and judicial opinion vmting belong to the realm of practical reason 
rather than theoretical reason, to use Aristotle's distinction. Judicial reasoning is 
closer to moral reasoning, another area of practical reason, than to logic or pure 
theory. Judging entails reconciUng, weighing and choosing between principles 
and precedents that often are in confUct or overlap; then applying them to particular 
factual disputes. At best a judicial decision gives only practical certainty and a 
net balance of reasonableness in favour of one side. 
Constitutional adjudication is not simply a matter of legal interpretation, as 
the critics of legaUsm point out; it is also poUtical decision-making of a high-
profile and contentious character, a crucial fact that the critics tend to overlook. 
Constitutional decisions have attributes of important decisions of state, and judicial 
opinions share qualities of political speech. Judges, like statesmen, cannot afford 
to be entirely open and irresponsibly oblivious to their poUtical environment. 
PoUtical circumstances combined with a prudent concern for maintaining their 
legitimacy may constrain judges to use arguments and even make decisions that 
they would not otherwise countenance. And whatever their decisions, judges can 
be expected to support them by the most convincing arguments that they can 
muster. Law itself is based on the art of persuasion and reasonable inference, so 
it is hardly surprising that constitutional law with its extra poUtical dimension 
includes a good deal of public rhetoric. 
What then of the High Court's "strict and complete legalism"? The first point 
to note is the obvious one that this is the Court's pubUc statement about itself. 
It is often a ritual invocation that judges make before tackUng contentious 
constitutional questions. Despite the High Court's formal protestations about strict 
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legaUsm, the pattem of its decision making and the substance of individual judges' 
opinions are not especially legaUstic, as our subsequent detailed analysis of 
constitutional developments and individual opinions wiU show. AustraUan High 
Court judges select precedents that support their position; they qualify others that 
do not; and they gerferally write as judges do. Even the arch-legaUst Dixon wove 
an elaborate and reasonable theory of federaUsm into his constitutional opinions, 
as Leslie Zines has shown.'" One has only to read Dixon's opinions to see that 
he was not in fact a strict and complete legaUst. Thus strict legaUsm is more a 
quaUty of the High Court's rhetoric than of its actual decision making. 
The second and more substantive point is that judicial review is a vulnerable 
poUtical procedure since it entails a court, traditionaUy a non-poUtical body, making 
important decisions of state. The AustraUan poUtical environment is particularly 
inhospitable towards judicial review for two reasons: first, because popular 
sentiment favours parUamentary supremacy of the Westminster kind; and second, 
because the Liberal-Labor party division has tended to polarize AustraUan poUtics 
over substantive issues of poUtical economy. AustraUa did not have the same "higher 
law" background that was significant in legitimating judicial review in 
America.'" Moreover, it has lacked the dominant liberal consensus that anchors 
the American constitution in the poUtical culture of the nation and enables the 
American Supreme Court to appeal to substantive principles in adjudicating 
constitutional disputes. In the more difficult environment of Australian poUtics, 
legaUsm has been championed by the Court because it is an effective poUtical strategy 
for exercising judicial review. By actively cultivating an impartial image and 
professing an apoUtical method, the High Court has been able to carry out its 
delicate political function with ease. 
Legalism as a political strategy is not something new. Its origins lie in centuries 
of EngUsh common law practice. A typical example is the famous 1770 judgment 
in the Case of John Wilkes^" in which Lord Mansfield made a highly political 
decision on the narrowest technical grounds. He reversed a declaration of outlawry 
against the popular hero John Wilkes on the grounds that the original warrant 
of arrest omitted the location "of Middlesex" from the description of the county 
court. In a ringing declaration that must gladden the heart of every advocate of 
legalism Mansfield asserted: "The Constitution does not aUow reasons of State 
to influence our judgments: God forbid it should! We must not regard poUtical 
consequences, how formidable so ever they may be: if rebellion was the certain 
consequence, we are bound to say, 'Fiat Justitia, mat coe/um'.""* Since rebelUon 
was a likely consequence if Wilkes were not released, Mansfield had made an 
expedient decision. At one and the same time he satisfied three zealous masters: 
he upheld the dignity of the law; he satisfied the popular clamour for Wilkes's 
release; and he avoided directly confronting the government that had imprisoned 
Wilkes. The comment of another famous EngUsh judge. Lord Denning, to an 
Australian audience in 1975 appropriately summed up the outcome: "the crowd 
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did not know what to admire the most, the eloquence by which he silenced the 
people or the subtlety by which he let their hero free"."' The case of John Wilkes 
was a renovwied instance in which legaUsm was used to defuse an explosive poUtical 
situation while maintaining the dignity of the law. In AustraUa, legaUsm has become 
the accepted judicial method of constitutional adjudication for similar reasons. 
LegaUsm has enabled the dignity and independence of the law to be maintained 
while aUowring the Australian High Court to perform a delicate political function 
in a society that has been divided over important aspects of poUtical ideology and 
political economy. In AustraUa, in contrast to America, the constitution did not 
preside over political confUcts; rather it was itself one of the points of confUct. 
Labor has opposed the constitution because it hindered the implementation of its 
poUcies. Whereas in America the two major poUtical parties have generally 
supported the constitution, in AustraUa they have not. The basic commonaUty 
in Australia has not been one of substantive poUtical principles as in America, 
but one of forms and institutions. AustraUans were united by a common aUegiance 
to parUamentary institutions and to the rale of law. Each poUtical party might 
strive for a different societal and economic order, but both were committed to 
using the same institutional means for pursuing their different goals. In view of 
this, it is not surprising that the High Court had based its constitutional 
jurispradence on forms and technique rather than on substantive principles. LegaUsm 
has built on what is held in common, and it has avoided what is contentious. 
LegaUsm has developed over time as the product of two converging sets of factors. 
From a micro point of view, the most significant ingredients of legalism are the 
traditions of the Australian legal profession, the strong influence of EngUsh 
jurisprudence, the custom since 1913 of appointing leading barristers rather than 
public figures to the court, the predominance of private appeal cases in the Court's 
work, and the character of AustraUan constitutional cases that involve questions 
of the division of powers rather than civil rights. AU of these factors are important 
and have been stressed by the various commentators, but they provide only a partial 
explanation of the phenomenon of legaUsm. The other part of the explanation 
must be found in the character of the poUtical environment within which the 
Court has had to operate. From this larger macro point of view, legalism has 
thrived in Australia because it was appropriate for the poUtical environment and 
provided the Court with an effective strategy for exercising judicial review. LegaUsm 
has developed and been consolidated because it suited the poUtical circumstances. 
Many of the judges, formed and practised in the traditional mould of their 
profession, may have been unaware or only partly aware of the poUtical impUcations 
of legaUsm, yet by adopting it so wholeheartedly they have affirmed its suitabiUty. 
Some of the leading judges, notably Dixon and Barwick, have undoubtedly 
appreciated its strategic impUcations. In his 1976 National Press Club address 
referred to earlier, Barwick emphasized the vulnerabiUty of the American Supreme 
Court that had become openly poUticized. "The right thing and the only stable 
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thing" for the High Court to do, claimed Barwick, was to maintain "a legaUstic 
attitude to the Constitution". In view of Barwick's own career and opinions as 
a champion of free enterprise both on and off the Court, as a leadmg Liberal minister 
for six years under Menzies, and as an active ally of Governor-General Kerr in 
1975, it is hardly surprising that he appreciated the apoUtical image of the Court 
and insisted on maintaining its legaUstic rhetoric.'^ And yet, as we shaU see, 
Barwick in his later years as a member of the Court did much to expose and discredit 
legalism. 
In his pubUc defence of legaUsm in 1952, just after the Court had strack down 
the Liberal government's biU banning the Communist party and following the 
court battles of the 1950s, Dixon argued that close adherence to legal reasoning 
was the only way to maintain the confidence of all parties during federal confUcts. 
He insisted that there was no other safe guide to judicial decisions in great confUcts 
than "a strict and complete legaUsm". Dixon placed the Court's adjudicative role 
in poUtical context; it had to "maintain the confidence of aU parties" while settling 
"great disputes". In a subsequent passage of his address that is generally overlooked, 
Dixon pointed out to both Liberals and Laborites that the Court stood apart from 
their basic political differences, on the neutral ground of law: 
Those who believe in a planned society should perceive that the rule of law administered 
by the courts offers a reconciliation of ordered liberty with planned control. Those who, 
on the contrary, believe that society is best served by giving reign to the competitive 
exertion of the energies of everyone in his calling or pursuit must also see that the 
courts must preserve the rights of each from the encroachment of the others.' ' 
According to Dixon, the law provided the foundation and framework for the 
edifice of society which could wear either a Uberal or a democratic socialist face. 
A "strict and complete legalism" has been the High Court's solution to the 
problem of adjudicating great poUtical disputes where there was no consensus on 
substantive principles. In this respect legalism is the "noble Ue" of AustraUan poUtics; 
it has allowed the Court to carry out its function of upholding the basic 
constitutional order with ease and success, and has helped ensure a constitutional 
StabiUty that might not otherwise have been achieved. The development and use 
of legaUsm in leading High Court cases are examined in the following chapters, 
while the poUtical impUcations of its demise and Ukely replacement by reaUst views 
of judging are taken up in the final chapter. 
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The Origin and Function of 
Judicial Review 1890 to 1900 
The High Court is a powerful branch of the Australian government. In a 
parUamentary system such as Australia's where, by the conventions of responsible 
government, the executive is in effect the leader of the legislature, the judiciary 
provides the basic institutional check on majority rule. The Court can disallow 
executive and legislative initiatives that go beyond the limited constitutional powers 
of these two branches of government. More importantly, the Court defines the 
limits of federal and state powers and acts as an arbiter in jurisdictional disputes. 
By making key decisions at important moments of history, the Australian High 
Court has kept the nation's dynamic political and economic forces within 
constitutional limits. Sometimes the Court has made incremental adjustments to 
the constitution. At other times, as during the two world wars and in allowing 
uniform taxation, the Court has sanctioned more sweeping changes to the 
constitutional system. Quite often, especially against federal Labor governments, 
the Court has overruled legislation, forcing governments to moderate their objective 
and modify their policies. The constitution forms and moulds the political forces 
of the nation, so that by interpreting and applying the constitution the High Court 
has been an active agent in the ongoing process of constitution making. Judicial 
review is therefore a crucial part of the Australian federal system. 
This chapter examines the origin and function of judicial review in the AustraUan 
federal system. An examination of the federation debates makes it clear that the 
Australian founders intended judicial review as an essential part of the AustraUan 
constitution. Futhermore it is argued that judicial review is an integral part of 
the stractural logic of a federal system. While not absolutely essential to federaUsm, 
judicial review does provide a most efficient operational solution to the key issues 
of authoritative interpretation of the constitution and adjudication of jurisdictional 
disputes. 
Disputed origin and basis 
Although judicial review is an estabUshed part of the AustraUan constitution there 
is some dispute over its origin.' The Australian-Canadian constitutional scholar 
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Edward McWhinney, has claimed that judicial review in the various 
Commonwealth countries is "a vestigial survival of the Privy CouncU's old judicial 
hegemony in relation to the Overseas Empire, rather than a direct derivation or 
borrowing from American constitutional experience".^ This may be a correct 
generaUzation of Canadian experience but it does not hold for AustraUa where 
the direct borrowing from American experience with judicial review by those who 
drafted the constitution was much more significant than colonial law vestiges. 
An article on the 1975 constitutional crisis claimed more generaUy that "While 
the influence of American federal theories is obvious in the provisions for sharing 
power between the national and state governments, the document is above all 
a summary of British experience."' AustraUa's greatest judge. Sir Owen Dixon, 
rejected the view that the predominant influence on the AustraUan constitution 
was British. Dixon claimed to belong to a court "fashioned upon the model of 
the Supreme Court of the United States", and described the AustraUan constitution 
as "framed after the pattem of that of the United States".* Dixon was right, as 
we shall see presently. 
There is also dispute over the basis of judicial review in the Australian 
constitution. Despite the fact that the High Court has been prominent and active 
in deciding major poUtical issues, it has rarely had to justify its enormous power,' 
While judicial review is a fundamental part of the AustraUan political system, 
judges have usuaUy taken their role for granted or appealed to the justificatory 
reasoning of the leading American decision, Marbury v. Madison,''' as self-evident 
and sufficient. According to Chief Justice MarshaU's reasoning in the Marbury case, 
judges are required to apply higher over lower laws in the ordinary course of 
deciding cases, and hence to interpret and apply the constitution as the highest 
law. For instance, Mr Justice FuUagar asserted in 1951 that "in our system the 
principle oi Marbury v. Madison is accepted as axiomatic".' These were not empty 
words, as FuUagar was then a member of the Court that strack down 
commonwealth legislation banning the Communist party even though this anti-
Communist legislation implemented a key plank of the Menzies government's 
successful election platform. Likevdse, Dixon maintained: "To the framers of the 
Commonwealth Constitution the thesis oi Marbury v. Madison was obvious. It 
did not need the reasoned eloquence of MarshaU's utterance to convince them that 
simply because there were to be legislatures of Umited powers, there must be a 
question of ultra vires for the courts."* AustraUan legal commentators, for the 
most part, have foUowed the judiciary in taking for granted the Court's most 
important political fimction. Recently, Geoffrey LindeU pointed out that "many 
of the text books and articles which deal with judicial review of legislation seem 
to assume, rather than discuss in any great detail, the proper basis for the doctrine 
of judicial review".' 
This ready acceptance of judicial review in AustraUa is in marked contrast with 
the ongoing controversy over its constitutional legitimacy, historical origins and 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
44 Politics of the High Court 
proper exercise in the United States. In America, as Alexander Bickel has put 
it, judicial review is seen "as a present instrument of government. It represents 
a choice that men have made, and ultimately we must justify it as a choice in 
our own time."'" In AustraUa judicial review has not been seen as an instrament 
of government and no doubt partly because of this its exercise by the High Court 
has been unquestioningly accepted by generations of judges and academic lawyers. 
Moreover, despite AustraUa's strong tradition of parliamentary sovereignty and 
popular majoritarian democracy, which is antithetical to judicial review, the Court's 
legitimacy has not been seriously questioned. Why has this been so? One part 
of the explanation is a major thesis of this book; because the Court has been so 
effective in exercising its poUtical fvinction while at the same time portraying itself 
as a strictly legal and non-poUtical actor, its political function has never been 
seriously chaUenged. One might have expected that Australian academic lawyers 
would have followed their American counterparts in probing the foundations of 
judicial review, but a narrow positivistic orientation to "black-letter" law has kept 
them at the surface of this important issue. In any case, it would have been 
impossible for the AustraUan High Court and legal estabUshment to give a credible 
justification of judicial review in terms of their dominant legalistic paradigm of 
law and judging. To have attempted the former would have entailed calUng in 
question much of the latter. 
Another probable reason why judicial review has not been so problematical in 
AustraUa has been the influence of James Bryce. Bryce's classic The American 
Commonwealth (1888) was the standard work on the American system of 
government for generations of leading Australians for half a century. Bryce had 
a surprisingly uncompUcated view of judicial review. Arguing against the contrary 
European impression, Bryce asserted that there was "reaUy no mystery about the 
matter"; it was not a novel or complicated device, he claimed, but "the simplest 
thing in the world if approached from the right side"." Bryce, an EngUshman, 
then set about explaining this novel American institution to other EngUshmen 
(and AustraUans) in typical English legal terms that have been seized upon by 
the Australian High Court.'^ A "stream cannot rise above its source", Byrce 
argued, and in the same way a subordinate body cannot go beyond its enabling 
legislation. In this respect the American Congress was in exactly the same position 
as "an EngUsh municipal corporation or railway company"; it could not validly 
exercise powers beyond its appointed Umits. The crucial questions of "how and 
by whom" the precise Umits of powers were to be judged were posed by Bryce, 
but not properly answered. To the "how" question, Bryce gave a mechanical, 
legaUstic explanation of what was entailed in exercising judicial review—"setting 
the statute side by side with the Constitution, and considering whether there is 
a discrepancy between them". Such an answer impUed that the "by whom" question 
would be answered in the court's favour, and so it was. Bryce concluded that 
since the interpretation of laws properly belonged to courts, judicial review of 
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congressional legislation was part of the normal function of a court. Bryce did 
give other prudential reasons why the judiciary, rather than the executive or 
legislature, should make such decisions, because he admitted that judicial review 
was not absolutely necessary for a federal constitutional system. His main 
explanation as outUned, however, gave a constitution exactly the same status as 
an ordinary statute and assumed that its interpretation came within the ordinary 
legal fiinction of courts. Bryce's simpUstic view became the orthodox one in 
Australia. 
P. H. Lane is one leading constitutional scholar who has probed the basis of 
judicial review in the constitution and found it insufficient. Lane says: "I can find 
no express constitutional basis for such a doctrine."'^ He rejects the reasoning 
in Marbury v. Madison on the grounds that it slides over from the ordinary role 
of courts to an unproved federal role. Lane concludes: "Thus, the best that I can 
offer as a basis for judicial review by the High Court is the historic practice of 
the United States Supreme Court, the Privy Council and pre-Federation Colonial 
courts."'* This is a rather vague foundation for such a potent and cracial poUtical 
procedure. Lane does acknowledge that "what was introduced by history has now 
been sanctified by prescription. ParUament and people throughout this century 
have tacitly acquiesced in the role assumed by the High Court in the government 
of the Commonwealth."" Lane's position on judicial review in the AustraUan 
constitution can be summarized in three propositions: (1) judicial review has no 
express constitutional basis; (2) it was introduced by history and is now sanctioned 
by the tacit acquiescence of the people and parliament; and (3) it is a role assumed 
by the High Court in the government of the Commonwealth. If Lane is correct, 
the important function of judicial review has been buUt on insufficient constitutional 
foundations. 
In response to Lane, Geoffiey LindeU has argued that judicial review, and 
moreover the duty of courts to exercise judicial review, is properly based in law. 
Lindell's position reUes on the common law role of judges and "the general duty 
of a court to apply and interpret all laws"," including the constitution. The 
extensive evidence that LindeU gleans from EngUsh and AustraUan case law 
estabUshes that judicial review has deeper roots in law than Lane acknowledges. 
Whether this argument meets the main thrast of Lane's objection that judicial 
review is, in the last analysis, a function that judges have usurped for themselves 
depends on the view one takes of the basic character of the Australian constitution. 
If the constitution is essentially just another statute passed by Westminster and 
deriving its authority from that source, then LindeU's analysis that reUes on common 
law principles of interpretation would seem to be conclusive.'^ If this is a legal 
"fantasy" and there is an essential difference between the constitution and an 
ordinary statute, as Lane in my view correctly claims,'* then the gap that 
MarshaU sought to bridge in Marbury v. Madison remains. Only a systematic study 
of the structural logic and original design of the constitution can properly 
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substantiate judicial review and get round the problem posed by Lane. 
As Lane points out, Marshall's reasoning in Marbury v. Madison does slide over 
from the ordinary role of judges to an improved federal role. Where the constitution 
is silent, judicial proofs must beg the question." Arguments can be advanced on 
behalf of the federal executive, or the legislature, or aU three branches of govemment 
having the constitutional right of interpreting the constitution in matters that 
concern them.^ The Court's assumption that it can authoritatively determine 
whether judicial review is constitutionally mandated presupposes that the Court 
has the power of interpreting the constitution definitively. And that is precisely 
what has to be estabUshed. As Alexander Bickel has pointed out, MarshaU's proofs 
of judicial review are "too strong; they prove too much. Marbury v. Madison in 
essence begs the question. What is more, it begs the wrong question." 
That MarshaU's insufficient argument formaUy estabUshed judicial review in the 
American federal system is proof of his political finesse and masterly rhetoric. In 
the words of the American constitutional historian, Robert McCloskey, "The 
decision is a masterwork of indirection, a brilUant example of Marshall's capacity 
to . . . advance in one direction while his opponents are looking in another."^ 
In turn, AustraUan judges for the most part have been shrewdly discreet in relying 
on MarshaU's authority or have simply taken for granted that their primary function 
is to exercise judicial review. Few AustraUan judges have attempted to establish 
judicial review by their own arguments and reasoning.^ 
The reasons why judicial review was not spelt out in the various constitutions 
are less clear. In the AustraUan case, as we shaU see, and probably also in the 
American, judicial review was impUed by judicial decisions and the paramountcy 
principle. We can speculate that there were perhaps other reasons of poUtical 
expediency and pradence for not making such an important power expUcit. To 
speU out judicial review would violate that discreet reticence which tends to disguise 
the court's deUcate poUtical fimction and to enhance its abiUty to exercise such 
a fiinction. Judicial review is a poUtical function, albeit of a peculiar kind, and 
it is exercised by a legal body. That implies a certain tension or contradiction. 
The court performs the key function of ensuring federal paramountcy in enumerated 
areas while at the same time confining it to those constitutionally defined areas. 
That is a crucial function in a federal system. The power to declare legislative 
and executive acts unconstitutional cannot properly be given to either level of 
government, national or state, because to do so would tend to make that level 
of government superior to the other and thereby destroy the federal balance. 
Moreover, the adjudication of federal disputes is not left immediately to the people, 
save in the exceptional instances of constitutional amendments, or under the Swiss 
constitution (which is an exception in this regard), because the people are generaUy 
considered to lack the quaUties necessary for its proper exercise.^* 
Thus the court is given the important function of federal adjudication for two 
reasons: negatively, because it cannot prudently be given to any other body and 
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so the court assumes it by default; and positively, because the court possesses 
institutionaUzed attributes derived from its legal character which fit it for such 
a role. Those attributes include independence, learning, experience and reflection. 
The court's arbitral role is a delicate poUtical power that has to be exercised in 
a judicious manner. The court's legal characteristics tend to disguise the poUtic^ 
nature of the role and thereby remove it from a disputatious and charged poUtical 
atmosphere. The formal procedure of the court tends to narrow the focus of the 
issue to a manageable form. The fuU ritual, sober dignity and calm deliberation 
of the court lend an air of finality and objectivity that plays an important part 
in legitimating the resolution. Judicial review removes a poUtical dispute to a 
traditionally non-poUtical arena for resolution. Partisans are forced to transpose 
their positions from the passionate rhetoric of poUtical dispute to the more neutral 
rationaUzations of the law. In this indirect transposition and calm resolution the 
exhilaration of the victor tends to be damped down and the disappointment of 
the loser to be lessened. 
The court then is a major arbiter in federal disputes. That clearly is a poUtical 
function, so in this respect Lane is correct in describing the court's role as 
government. But the court's role in constitutional adjudication is not simply 
government, but govemmental or poUtical only in a special sense. A court cannot 
normaUy govern in the sense of legislating about a general class of things, nor 
can it govern with the flexibiUty of the executive in directing specific actions. 
Generally speaking a court decides disputes between parties that are brought to 
it and that involve conflicting laws. At least that is the classic view of a court's 
role that inspired Alexander Hamilton's famous words that the judiciary has "neither 
force nor ifi7/but merely judgment", and is therefore the "least dangerous" branch 
of government.^ 
Superior courts exercising judicial review have become more powerful, more 
activist and more controversial since Hamilton's time. The American Supreme 
Court in particular has taken on an aggressive poUcy-making role in pubUc Utigation 
of biU-of-rights issues in recent decades. Because of its sweeping affirmative action 
decisions and deeply controversial moral rulings made in civil and personal rights 
areas, the American Supreme Court would not now be regarded by many as the 
least powerful branch of government, nor by some as the least dangerous branch. 
Even in AustraUa where the High Court has a much lower public profile and 
a more legalistic public image, there are signs that the Court is becoming more 
controversial, and its major decisions, like the Tasmanian Dam case (1983), more 
politically contentious. These developments, which wiU be taken up in the final 
chapter of the book, make imperative the task of properly estabUshing the 
constitutional basis of judicial review. 
That is the purpose of this chapter. The critical argument of Lane and others 
is that since judicial review has no express textual basis its constitutional legitimacy 
cannot be estabUshed directly from the words of the constitutional text or from 
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judicial decisions. But fortunately for judicial review, those are not the only sources 
of constitutional authority. It does not matter whether or not judges have given 
an adequate account of judicial review, provided that the fiinction can be shown 
to be an integral part of the system's design and its stractural logic. There is ample 
evidence in the federation debates to establish that judicial review was not introduced 
by history, as Lane claims, but by the framers of the AustraUan constitution who 
deUberately foUowed the American model. Likewise judicial review was not simply 
assumed by the High Court, but was fiiUy intended and clearly specified in the 
federation debates as an integral part of the Australian federal system. That judicial 
review was not spelt out explicitly in the constitution is not evidence to the 
contrary. 
The founders' design and intention 
The AustraUan constitution was the product of a protracted series of constitutional 
conventions that spanned the last decade of the nineteenth century. The Australian 
founders grafted the American federal system on to the traditional British executive 
of responsible government. Though federalism was by then a mature and well-
tried system of govemment in North America, it was quite novel to the AustraUans. 
As Dixon has pointed out: "In many respects the plan or scheme of government, 
which we took from the United States and adapted to our British system of 
ministerial responsibiUty, involved, not a development of conceptions then current 
among us and familiar to us, but a departure from them."^^ The fundamental 
principle of dividing powers between two autonomous levels of government and 
the corollary of a powerfiil court to police that division were strange and novel 
doctrines for AustraUans who were nurtured and practised in the traditions of 
parUamentary supremacy.^ The federation debates combined political negotiation 
with an intensive learning process. The AustraUan founders adopted the American 
model of a powerfiil federal court as part of their new constitution at the beginning, 
but only gradually did they work out the fiiU poUtical impUcations of such an 
institution. 
Presentiments, Melboume 1890 
From the very beginning of the federation discussion it was asserted that the court 
would play a vital role in the federal system. At the preUminary Melbourne 
conference in 1890, when delegates made only broad and tentative suggestions 
about the future federation, it was becoming evident that the American constitution 
would serve as the model for the Australian, and that the proposed federal court 
like the American Supreme Court, would have a larger-than-legal role Alfred 
Deakin, the youngest delegate but one of the ablest and best read, who was to 
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be responsible for the Judiciary Act thirteen years later, recommended the adoption 
of an American-style federal judiciary. Drawing upon Bryce's recently pubUshed 
American Commonwealth which he described as a first class "text-book for the 
philosophic study of constitutional questions" and a "magnificent work", Deakin 
explained the essential characteristic of the American federal system. The central 
govemment, he pointed out, acted "directly and immediately on every citizen 
of the entire country" in certain specified powers. The judiciary was an important 
organ of such direct central action. Deakin expressed himself as "glad to think 
that we shaU see a Sovereign State in Australasia which will be able to act directly 
through its judiciary, and in other ways, on every citizen within its borders".^ 
Future conventions were to adopt Deakin's recommendation for an American-
style federal system and supreme court, and to accept Bryce as an authoritative 
reference.^ 
Andrew IngUs Clark, attorney-general for Tasmania, spoke immediately after 
Deakin. He endorsed Deakin's recommendation for an American-style court and 
spoke more generaUy about the character of a federal union for the AustraUan 
colonies. Clark preferred "the lines of the American Union to those of the Dominion 
of Canada."." He cited the Donoinion veto power in the Canadian constitution 
as a method of amalgamation antithetical to the federal structure. Clark predicted 
that the Canadian provinces would be reduced to the status of municipaUties, a 
view that did not take sufficient account of the strength of regionaUsm in Canada 
and the remarkable juridical feat of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
in legitimating the turnaround of the constitutional division of powers. Clark's 
evaluation of the American system was more accurate. He attributed the cause 
of the Civil War to slavery and not to any deficiency in the American federal 
system. This analysis undercut the Canadian founders' reasons for departing from 
the allocation of legislative powers in the American model. According to Clark, 
the enviable success and prosperity of the American nation were due to its federal 
system. Local public Ufe and regional differences of custom and industry were 
preserved within a strong national grouping. Since the AustraUan colonies had 
the territory and potential for such national growth and at the same time the 
regional differences and estabUshed governments to preclude a unitary system, 
Clark argued that they should adopt the American federal system. He proposed 
American bicameraUsm as the only way round the question of federal finances 
that Samuel Griffith had raised as the principal difficulty in the way of federation. 
AU in all, in 1890 the American system appeared tailor-made for the AustraUan 
colonies. 
Clark's influence and the first draft, Sydney 1891 
IngUs Clark's influence on the formation of the AustraUan constitution was 
profound. "[M]ore American than the Americans in his admiration of American 
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institutions", as Bemhard Wise described him,'^ Clark was instramental in 
moulding the broad lines, and especially the judiciary sections, of the Australian 
constitution to the American federal model. Clark's role in the founding of the 
AustraUan constitution has not always been properly appreciated, nor have the 
extent and implications of the American poUtical principles in the AustraUan 
founding been fully reaUzed." No doubt the former partly explains the latter. 
We can identify several reasons for this dual neglect. 
First, Clark's influence on the federal constitution occurred at the beginning. 
He did not attend the second round of conferences in 1897-98 that finaUy produced 
the constitution. Clark tended to lose touch with the federal movement as federation 
approached. He actually opposed federation in the 1898 referendum because he 
thought the financial security of the smaller states was not sufficiently protected. 
He held no public office in the new commonwealth government and narrowly 
missed out on being appointed to the original High Court bench. A shy person 
who avoided the public limelight, Clark was a man of ideas rather than a leader. 
Second, the High Court's break with the constitutional jurisprudence of the 
earUer Griffith Court in the famous Engineers case'* in 1920 was a departure from 
the Court's close identification with the American Supreme Court and its leading 
constitutional doctrines. At that point the Court broke with its own origins and 
adopted a rhetoric that has tended to obscure them. 
Clark's role was better appreciated by his peers. Bernhard Wise, a distinguished 
delegate to the 1897-98 convention where he was a member of the judiciary 
committee, gave the following glowing account of Clark's influence: 
No one in Australia, not even excepting Sir Samuel Griffith, had Mr Clark's knowledge 
of the constitutional history of the United States; and, when knowledge of detail is 
combined with zeal, its influence on a deliberative body becomes irresistible. That our 
Constitution so closely resembles that of the United States is due in a very large degree 
to the influence of Mr A. I. Clark. His speech at this Conference [1890] . . . is interesting 
as containing the germ of the ideas which dominated the Convention of 1891." 
Clark's was the predominant influence on the overaU design of the AustraUan 
constitution, and particularly its judiciary sections. Other men such as the 
convention leaders Griffith (1891) and Barton (1897-98) made greater practical 
contributions towards shaping the instrament and having it adopted, but Clark's 
influence on its general principles and structure was pre-eminent. Of course, in 
Samuel Griffith's words, the 1891 biU "was not the work of any one man. It 
was the work of many men in consultation with one another."" And the 1891 
biU was itself only the blueprint for the new beginning that was made in 1897. 
Moreover, as La Nauze points out, Griffith was technicaUy capable of doing what 
Clark did. But the honour of drafting the first constitution to federate the AustraUan 
colonies belongs to IngUs Clark." 
Clark had long been an admirer of American constitutional principles. As early 
as 4 July 1876, when he gave the presidential address to a smaU group of devotees 
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gathered at Hobart's Beaurepair's Hotel to celebrate the centenary of American 
independence, Clark had advocated American principles of constitutional and federal 
government. Those principles he declared to be "permanently applicable to the 
poUtics of the world and the practical application of them in the creation and 
modification of the institutions which constitute the organs of our social Ufe to 
be our only safeguard against poUtical retrogression".'* By the 1870s Clark had 
become a champion of AustraUan federation and had turned to American principles 
as a basis for federating the Australian colonies. Clark continued his advocacy of 
the American model at the preliminary Melbourne conference in 1890. Later that 
year he made the first of three extended trips to the United States, "a country 
to which in spirit he belonged, whose Constitution he revered and whose great 
men he idoUzed." There Clark supplemented his extensive reading in American 
history and politics with discussions and observations. 
Returning to AustraUa, Clark prepared a draft constitution that embodied his 
beloved American constitutional principles. He circulated this draft to leading 
delegates before the 1891 Sydney convention caUed to frame an AustraUan 
constitution. Clark's draft closely foUowed the American model in its overaU federal 
arrangement, in the division of powers between federal and state governments, 
in its bicameral legislature with a Senate constituted by equal state representation 
and a House elected on the basis of single constituencies of roughly equal size, 
and finally in its strong and independent federal judiciary. Clark retained the 
traditional formulation of executive rule by the monarch through the governor-
general, but left open the option of having the Executive Council or efficient 
executive constituted either in the traditional form of responsible cabinet 
government or in the American cabinet form. Clark's personal preferences were 
repubUcan and American, but the British tradition was too deeply engrained to 
be directly chaUenged on this point. 
Clark's draft constitution, however, was not the only one prepared before the 
1891 Sydney convention. A second draft constitution was circulated by Charles 
Kingston, a leading South AustraUan poUtical figure who was one of the more 
significant contributors throughout the federation debates. Kingston's altemative 
was produced after he had studied Clark's draft. As Crisp explains, Kingston "was 
moved to produce and circulate—as a preferred altemative—a significantly modified 
draft", but he had "had much learning and thinking to do about both the essentials 
and details of the American system" and its appUcabUity to Australia.*" Kingston 
suggested a constitutional scheme that was simUar to the one suggested by 
Clark.*' It was Clark's draft rather than Kingston's that provided the convention 
with a concrete plan that was significant in focusing thinking and general discussion. 
Clark's draft biU also provided the original text for Samuel Griffith's drafting 
committee.*^ Clark's draft constitution played a similar role in the framing of the 
AustraUan constitution to that of the Randolph Plan in the 1787 American 
Convention, although it was not directly debated on the convention floor. Despite 
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a new beginning to the task of drafting in 1897 and innumerable amendments, 
the final Australian constitution embodies the substance of Clark's first draft and 
his beloved American principles. 
Clark was active in the 1891 convention as chairman of the judiciary committee, 
as a member of the constitutional committee and of the select three-member drafting 
committee. The real work of the 1891 convention was done in special 
committees —constitutional, finance and judiciary—after a general discussion of 
broad principles had indicated a general consensus sufficient for such detailed work. 
"In those few days", report Quick and Garran, "federation came down from the 
clouds to the earth; it changed from a dream to a tangible reality. The idea was 
once for aU crystalUzed into a practical scheme, complete in aU its details." This 
statement overlooks the role of Clark's first draft, but it does capture something 
of the importance of the first official drafting of a constitutional bill. Clark was 
chairman of the judiciary committee and dominated its work. He was deputed 
to draw up a set of resolutions which he did by simply poUshing up the judiciary 
sections from his draft biU. These were then submitted to the committee and all 
accepted, but three of them only with the aid of Clark's casting vote.** 
The constitutional committee reconsidered Clark's judiciary conunittee proposals 
and the drafting committee rewrote them. Though a member of both committees, 
Clark was absent with an attack of influenza when the judiciary sections were 
recast.*' He was unhappy with the changes but was unable to do anything about 
them. As he acidly commented, "they altered aU the clauses relating to the judicature 
. . ." and "messed it".** Most of the changes, however, were styUstic ones. The 
important exception was to substitute a Canadian-style formulation that parliament 
"shaU have power to estabUsh a Court" for the stronger American expression, 
reverted to in 1897, that "The judicial power of the Commonwealth shaU be vested 
in a Federal Supreme Court".*' 
Despite a second reformulation in 1897, the judiciary sections of the constitution 
that were embodied in the 1891 biU contain the substance of the American clauses 
and reflect Clark's original draft. There were of course significant differences 
between the Australian and American clauses: section 71 aUowed the parUament 
to invest state courts vnth federal jurisdiction; section 71(u) adopted the more 
traditional Canadian method of dismissing ajudge after an address from both houses 
of parUament; section 73 gave the court a more extensive appeUate jurisdiction, 
including appeals from state Supreme Courts in matters of non-federal law; and 
parts of sections 73 and 74 dealt with Privy Council appeals. Otherwise Article 
III, sections 1 and 2 of the American constitution which are the charter of the 
American Supreme Court were reproduced in sUghtly different form.*' 
La Nauze points out that "The draft of 1891 is the Constitution of 19(X) not 
its father or grandfather."'" Despite fairly extensive modifications in the several 
sessions of the 1897-98 convention, the form of the 1891 biU is apparent. As we 
have seen, the main Unes of that 1891 biU were sketched by Clark in his original 
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draft proposal. As author of the first draft constitution and as chairman of the 
judiciary committee in the 1891 convention, Clark played the leading role in having 
an American-style federal court written into the AustraUan constitution. 
There was Uttle time for detailed discussion of the judiciary clauses in the 1891 
convention debates. Nevertheless we can surmise from the extensive discussion 
concerning the court in the 1897-98 convention debates that they were not fiiUy 
understood or appreciated. The Australian constitution makers adopted the stark 
formulations of an American court because of the persuasive oratory and drafting 
of IngUs Clark and other leading delegates such as Griffith, Barton and Deakin 
who were famiUar vidth, and \vho admired, the American Supreme Court. But 
only graduaUy did most other delegates come to appreciate the fiiU meaning of 
judicial review. The next section traces the evolution of that understanding. 
Judicial review intended, Adelaide 1897 
The 1891 draft constitution "had been constracted in six weeks. It was to be 
'put by' for six years."" One cause was the dramatic entry of the recently formed 
Labor party into New South Wales politics in the June election of 1891. Labor 
won 36 of the 141 seats and held the balance of power. It traded support for 
concessions. Labor's single-minded concern with social legislation at the colonial 
level was combined with an ignorance and suspicion of federation. It seemed to 
the fledgUng Labor party that a new level of federal govemment that was perceived 
to be undemocratic in its bicameraUsm and proposed amendment procedures was 
being added just as Labor was beginning to make inroads into the first level of 
state government. As a result of Labor's entry into poUtics, the attention and 
poUtical skiUs of New South Wales poUticians were focused internally on colonial 
matters. The other colonies were not prepared to proceed with federation while 
New South Wales, the key to any federal union, was absorbed in accommodating 
this new poUtical force. 
There was some rather half-hearted discussion of the 1891 draft constitution 
in the colonial legislatures.'^ Parkes gave notice of a resolution to approve the 
constitution biU in the New South Wales Legislative Assembly in May, shortly 
after the 1891 convention ended. However, an election in June left him in office, 
but dependent upon the support of the new Labor members. Parkes was forced 
to resign the premiership in October 1891 and his resolution to approve the 1891 
constitution biU was not moved until later the next year." Detailed discussion 
in committee had barely got underway when the New South Wales parliament 
was prorogued in December 1893. Barton and O'Connor, the two leading 
proponents of federation, resigned their ministerial portfolios soon afterwards 
because of a parUamentary censure against their acceptance of briefs in litigation 
against the Railway Commission. Thus, after intermittent consideration the 1891 
constitution biU lapsed in New South Wales. Neither Queensland nor Western 
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AustraUa considered the biU; Queensland because Griffith rightly held that there 
was no point in moving ahead without New South Wales, and Western AustraUa 
because the government was engrossed in operating the newly estabUshed system 
of responsible government. After some debate Tasmania adopted the Queensland 
stance of waiting to see what happened in New South Wales. In Victoria and 
South AustraUa there was more serious discussion and the issue of judicial review 
was touched on. Both the Legislative Assembly and Council in Victoria wanted 
an express provision in the constitution speUing out that the court had the power 
of judicial review; the Assembly, to decide the validity of federal legislation; the 
Council, to judge both federal and state legislation. In South AustraUa, John Gordon 
opposed the constitution biU because it made a bench of judges "not only the 
guardian but also the master of the Constitution".'* The desultory nature of 
discussion of the 1891 biU in the colonial legislatures showed that the AustraUan 
people and their colonial governments were not yet prepared for federation. 
The federal cause was rejuvenated in 1897 and the first of three long convention 
sessions began at Adelaide in late summer. The 1897-98 convention was attended 
by delegates elected by the people of the colonies rather than appointed by colonial 
legislatures as in 1891. Many new delegates were present and several of the previous 
convention leaders did not attend. The 1891 convention leader, Samuel Griffith, 
had been made chief justice of Queensland in 1893, and IngUs Clark was absent 
because of illness and a second recuperative trip to the United States. Armed with 
a new mandate, the convention made a fresh start, while using the 1891 draft 
biU as an unofficial blueprint. Edmund Barton, who had substituted for IngUs 
Clark on the 1891 drafting committee, was elected convention leader and chairman 
of the constitutional drafting committee. Barton was responsible for overseeing 
the debate on the convention floor and preparing successive drafts of the biU, an 
immense task that caUed forth aU of Barton's great abiUties. 
As in the earlier Sydney convention of 1891, the Adelaide convention began 
with a general discussion of broad principles, mainly to hear the views of the new 
delegates, who included three future justices of the High Court in O'Connor, 
Isaacs and Higgins. To focus discussion. Barton presented a set of resolutions 
specifying the basic federal principles that he considered should be embodied in 
the new constitution. These resolutions stipulated that the colonies and colonial 
legislative powers would remain intact, except that powers over defence, customs 
and trade would be given to the federal govemment. The federal govemment 
was to consist of a bicameral parliament, responsible government executive and 
a federal judiciary." This of course was the essence of the 1891 draft biU. What 
concerns us here is the federal court, detailed discussions of which are largely absent 
from the 1891 record of the debates. Perhaps because of this. Barton saw a need 
to explain the character and functions of the federal court at the very beginning 
of this convention. 
Barton's resolution regarding the federal judiciary read: "There shall be a Supreme 
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Federal Court, which shaU also be the High Court of Appeal for each colony 
in the Federation." Like the formulation of the judiciary sections in the constitution, 
these brief words were deceptively simple. What they impUed was forcefuUy stated 
by Barton in his explanatory speech. Barton thought the need for a federal court 
was so obvious that he doubted whether more than one or two delegates would 
oppose it. More to the point was the role of such a court. In this respect Barton 
noted that most of those who discussed the matter saw the court principaUy as 
a court of appeal. But for him the court's appeUate role was secondary to its role 
of arbiter in federal disputes. Barton claimed that the "peacefiil arbitrament of 
a Federal Court" was the best means of holding the federation together and 
preserving the honour of the constitution. In Barton's powerfiil rhetoric, judicial 
arbitration was the alternative to negotiation and the final "arbitrament of 
blood"." 
Barton predicted that disputes between the states and between the federal 
government and the states would invariably arise under a federal constitution. 
He saw the federal court as providing "a continuous tribunal of arbitration" where 
states could bring their differences. "The peaceful and calm atmosphere of a court" 
would replace the "perturbed imagination" and "infuriated party poUtics" of the 
poUtical arena. Barton claimed: "One of the strongest guarantees for the continuance 
and indestructibiUty of the Federation is that there should be some body of this 
kind constituted which, instead of allowing the States to fly to secession because 
they cannot get justice in any other way, vvdU enable them to settle their differences 
in a calm judicial atmosphere."" Barton pointed out that giving the arbitral role 
to the court would prevent the federal government's being ajudge in its own 
case. Both state and federal parliaments and governments would be bound by the 
constitutional division of powers which would be poUced by the court. This was 
something quite novel to the traditional parUamentary system.'* It proved a hard 
lesson for the Australians to learn and was to be stressed over and over again in 
the debates. 
With the exception of Privy Council appeals, the judiciary sections of the 
constitution aroused little substantial controversy compared vwth such contentious 
matters as finance and equal state representation in the Senate. The judiciary 
committee of the 1897 convention was the smallest of the three committees and 
carried out its work with the least trouble. Its resolutions were well drafted and 
went straight into the draft biU. This was in marked contrast to the controversial 
and vague recommendations of the finance committee which were repudiated by 
leading committee members on the convention floor." From its earUest 
conception the federal judiciary enjoyed a certain apoUtical status. 
The judiciary sections were essentially a rewrite of the 1891 bill, with a few 
important exceptions. At the instigation of a delegate from impecunious Western 
AustraUa, the novel expedient of investing state courts with federal jurisdiction 
as an alternative to creating subsidiary federal courts was added. This change was 
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first cleared by wiring Samuel Griffith*" who, along with IngUs Clark, was now 
a respected authority on federal matters and continued to exert a powerful influence 
on the convention in absentia. A far more significant change was to reinstate IngUs 
Clark's original intention of entrenching the estabUshment of the court in the 
constitution rather than leaving its creation to parUament's discretion. Clark was 
reported to be "flattered" by this change." 
The most blatant disagreement regarding the judiciary was over retaining the 
Privy Council as an appeal court. The majority of delegates, including aU eminent 
lawyers in the convention, felt adamantly committed to estabUshing a powerfiil 
AustraUan court as the final court of appeal. A vocal minority supported retention 
of the Privy Council, however, making appeals to monarchic and imperial 
sentiment. They were strongly supported outside the convention by a mixed alliance 
of powerfiil interests that included the British Colonial Office, a group of colonial 
chief justices and retired judges, and wealthy EngUsh corporate investors who 
distrusted the impartiaUty of an AustraUan court as a safeguard for their colonial 
investments.'^ The debate was often quite heated with the convention leaders 
giving short shrift to the arguments of the pro-Privy Council faction and making 
disparaging remarks about the quality of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
CouncU." One of the best arguments used against retention of the Privy Council 
was that it would have no competence in AustraUan constitutional cases since 
it would lack an intimate knowledge of AustraUan history and local conditions.'* 
The force of this argument depended on the fact that constitutional questions 
were not abstract legal matters that could be decided by a foreign legal body. 
The attempt to reinstate Privy Council appeals at this stage failed by a majority 
of two to one. 
Our main concem, however, is not with the formulation of the judiciary sections 
which, with the few exceptions noted earlier, remained virtuaUy the same as in 
1891. It is with the convention's understanding of judicial review. Judicial review 
was not expressly enunciated in the constitutional text, but nevertheless it was 
a dominant theme that constantly recurred throughout the debate on the judiciary 
clauses. The bald formulations of the text need to be fleshed out with the substance 
of the debates for an appreciation of the design and intention of the founders in 
this matter. 
It is quite clear from the debates that the founders intended to create a strong, 
American-style court that would be an independent branch of government and 
exercise judicial review over both state and federal legislation. Convention leaders 
Barton, Downer, O'Connor and Kingston, with judiciary committee members 
Symon, Wise and Glynn, dominated the debate and aU supported vesting the court 
with the power to declare legislative and executive acts unconstitutional. Trenwith 
the sole Labor delegate, was no exception and gave one of the best accounts of 
the court's role of exercising judicial review in the proposed federal system" 
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We are creating a Constitution in connection with which we are fbcing aU kinds of 
matters for protecting State rights; but, whatever we do, unless we provide a competent 
tribunal to act as custodian of the Constitution, the people virill have doubts as to whether 
the Parliament wiU exceed the powers that were intended by the Constitution, and 
thereby curtail the State rights about which we are all so anxious. We want to create 
unification in a central body for specific purposes, but we are extremely anxious that 
the central body shall deal with nothing else but what we submit to it. Therefore, 
we shall have a strong and dignified custodian of the Constitution." 
The founders were quite clear that they were estabUshing the court as an 
independent branch of govemment. In heading off a proposal to delete the 
requirement setting the minimum number of judges at five, Bemhard Wise stressed 
that the whole object of the judiciary committee had been to "make the High 
Court in aU essential parts independent of ParUament"." He warned that in 
fiiture controversies between parUament and the court it was imperative that 
parliament not have the power of dismissing judges. Wise advocated an independent 
court wnth a sufficient number of judges to command the respect both of the 
legislature and the state Supreme Courts. The judiciary committee chairman, 
Symon, went fiirther and claimed that the federal principle was to "make the judges 
of the High Court once appointed, irremovable. The High Court in its position 
should be equal to, if not above, the ParUament and Executive."" 
The draft biU that emerged from the special committee had entrenched the High 
Court in the constitution as Clark had originally recommended. Now the 
convention sitting as a committee of the whole adopted Kingston's amendment 
for strengthening judicial tenure. Where previously judges could be removed by 
the governor-general after an address from both Houses of parUament, the 
conditions of "proved misbehaviour or incapacity" were added. Kingston's purpose 
was to "preserve intact the absolute independence of the judges, both in relation 
to the Federal Executive and the Federal Parliament".'* Glynn, who firmly 
supported him, had drawn attention to the probable lag in political complexion 
of the court which would make it especially vulnerable to political disfavour from 
the legislature. He cited early American experience and the attempted impeachment 
of Justice Chase in 1803 to demonstrate the kind of political pressures a federal 
court might have to withstand." 
The most significant difference of opinion regarding the court was a division 
within the majority who favoured a final court of appeal in AustraUa. The difference 
was over the character of such a court and throws light on subsequent 
jurisprudential changes by the court. Isaacs and Higgins preferred to stay close 
to English legal tradition, with the court restricted to a somewhat narrow scope 
in its legal interpretation. Their view is important because it was the seed of the 
more legaUstic view of the High Court's role that became dominant on the Court 
after 1920. It was also significant in the convention because it called forth strong 
statements from other leading delegates regarding the intended character of the 
Court and of judicial review. 
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Higgins spoke and voted against the majority over retaining a specified minimum 
size for the court. He admitted there were very strong reasons for having a court 
of five justices but held that it was properly a matter for the fiiture legislature 
to decide.™ Isaacs tried unsuccessfiiUy to have the British law regarding removal 
of judges retained. He ably explained that under such a law a judge could be 
removed for two reasons: first, if he were guilty of misbehaviour; and second, 
if the parUament wanted him removed for its own good reasons. Isaacs stressed 
that in the latter case it was parUament's opinion of the matter which was to 
be paramount. Since this procedure had worked weU in the British constitution 
for two centuries without abuse, he advocated its retention." Higgins supported 
him. "I hope we shaU adhere to the British Constitution so far as we can", he 
said, "because we are more used to it."'^ 
The stance taken by Isaacs and Higgins stirred the others to strong statements 
in support of their preferred American-style court. Symon was quick to take issue 
with Isaacs. The position of judges under the British constitution was weU known 
to the convention, he said, but they were creating a federal system that was closely 
modelled on the American constitution. Symon claimed that Isaacs did not 
distinguish sufficiently between a unified state and a federation; what appUed to 
one did not apply to the other. In support of his case, Symon approvingly quoted 
Hamilton's strong argument from Federalist no. 78. In the passage he quoted, 
Hamilton argued for permanent tenure for judges because the courts were the 
"bulwarks of a Umited Constitution against legislative encroachments". Symon 
called the court "the keystone to the federal arch"." 
Backing up Symon, Barton claimed that the Canadian model of a supreme court 
should not be followed. Canada, he said, had neither a true federation nor a true 
union: it was "a mongrel between both". Barton had in mitid the centraUzing 
mechanism of dominion veto over provincial legislation which was an alternative 
to judicial review by an independently entrenched court. In the proper federation 
that they were creating, argued Barton, a strong and independent court was needed 
to exercise the power of judicial review. Barton's account of what judicial review 
would be Uke in the AustraUan constitution drew directly from the great American 
tradition: 
The Federal Judiciary must be the bulwark of the Constitution. It must be the supreme 
interpreter of the Constitution, and it is not true that in the United States the Supreme 
Court is above the Constitution, and the ParUament below it. That is the way in which 
the matter has been stated by EngUshmen who have not thoroughly studied the question. 
The truth of the matter is this, as laid down in the American Constitution in few and 
stately words: This Constitution is the supreme law of the land . . . When the Federal 
Judiciary of the Supreme Court of the United States has confided to it the maintenance 
of the Constitution, which is confided to it by that very phrase, the settlement of any 
question in which Parliament makes an attempt to transgress the law of the land comes 
within their jurisdiction. Acrimony may arise between the Parliament and the Supreme 
Court, and we have to ensure that the judges shaU not be removed upon the occurrence 
of that acrimony. 
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Quoting his colleague O'Connor, Barton stated in a follow-up speech that the 
most important questions the court would have to decide would be "between 
the States and the Commonwealth, the validity of State laws, and the validity 
of Commonwealth laws which may overlap or override them"." 
Downer, the third member of the constitution's drafting committee with Barton 
and O'Coimor, was equaUy determined that the American model of judicial review 
should be foUowed in AustraUa. "We should make our Supreme Court so strong 
and powerfiil", he said, "that no Govemment wiU be able to set the Constitution 
at defiance ovwng to the presence of a majority in either House, whereby an 
authority would be obtained that was never intended by the founders of the 
Constitution."" 
We must be carefiil, however, not to exaggerate the difference between the 
majority opinion as formulated by the drafting committee members Barton, 
O'Connor and Downer, with judiciary committee members Symon, Wise and 
Glynn on the one hand, and the view of Isaacs and Higgins on the other. While 
the majority were persuaded by the dominating influence of the American Supreme 
Court, Isaacs and Higgins preferred to adhere more closely to traditional EngUsh 
practice. This was a difference in the preferred style, exercise and scope of judicial 
review, not in the intended function of judicial review. For example, Higgins 
emphasized the need for a strong and independent court, "especially as it has to 
decide between the States and the Federation and upon encroachments by the 
Federation upon the States".^ 
Despite these differences over judicial style and the degree of independence of 
the court from the legislative branch, aU the convention leaders came out strongly 
in favour of judicial review. In order that this function could be properly performed, 
and they saw it as necessary to the federal system, they structured their court 
accordingly. The Court was entrenched in the constitution and the tenure of its 
judges was guaranteed. Constituting such a powerfiil court, and investing it with 
the key role of arbitration of federal disputes and keeping each branch of govemment 
within its appointed powers, was, for the most part, an adoption of the American 
model. 
Judicial review reaffirmed, Melboume 1898 
The Adelaide session had produced a draft biU but had left many matters unsettled. 
There had been serious divisions within the convention, but now the bill would 
be thoroughly vetted by both Houses of parUament in each of the colonies. This 
was the occasion for every would-be constitutional draftsman and a chance for 
such anti-federaUst chambers as the New South Wales Legislative Council to indulge 
in a spoiUng campaign. The colonial premiers hurried off to England to attend 
the diamond jubilee celebrations of Queen Victoria and a Colonial Conference 
called by the secretary of state for the colonies, Joseph Chamberlain. Hence they 
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were absent during much of the public debate on the constitutional biU for which 
they were jointly responsible. In this period the British Colonial Office was also 
busy. Chamberlain lectured the premiers on the importance of retaining Privy 
Council appeals in private law cases while his office prepared schedules of detailed 
criticisms and suggested improvements to the draft biU. These were discreetly 
passed on via Reid to Barton and a few others in the convention. 
After a short Sydney session in September of 1897, the convention adjourned 
to Melbourne for the longest and final session in January 1898. The Sydney and 
Melboume sessions were occupied with settling all outstanding matters and 
disposing of the various suggested amendments from the colonial parliaments. 
There was necessarily much attention to fine detail. 
The sections on the judiciary were considered at Melbourne. There was no change 
in the basic view of a powerful and independent court that would exercise judicial 
review over state and federal legislation. The debate on the court was reopened, 
however, to consider diverse sets of suggested amendments from colonial 
legislatures. In the event, the minimum size of the court was reduced, after a 
close vote, to a chief justice and two justices. A penny-pinching scheme from 
South Australia to staff the court with state chief justices on a part-time basis, 
now supported by Glynn and Kingston who had championed the court's 
independence at Adelaide, was defeated. The question of aUowing appeals to the 
Privy Council in private law cases was reopened. Despite the beefing up of the 
minority position by Chamberlain's considerable political weight —aU premiers 
except the radical Kingston spoke and voted for aUowing such appeals—the Adelaide 
clauses that ruled out such appeals were upheld by a substantial majority. 
Again, as in Adelaide, the debates are more significant for revealing the thinking 
of convention leaders on the general role of the court rather than for the substance 
of the disputed details. In the context of finaUzing the judiciary clauses, the 
convention reaffirmed its commitment to judicial review by a strong and 
independent court. This was eloquently formulated by such leading delegates as 
Barton, O'Connor, Symon, Downer, Isaacs and Higgins, a group that included 
four of the five original justices of the future High Court. 
The debate over the Glynn-Kingston amendment to staff the High Court with 
state Supreme Court chief justices on a part-time basis was interesting because 
it raised the issue of poUtical bias in the court. The delegates seemed rather coy 
about broaching this deUcate issue because a court of law was supposed to be above 
such suspicions. With masterly circumlocution. Barton raised the issue. Such an 
expedient would, he said, "lead to the suspicion that the Chief Justices chosen 
from the various states were intended to be in some sort of way the representatives 
of provincial interests, and that it was not intended that the court in its impartiaUty 
should be representative of the Commonwealth as distinct from the provinces" " 
Symon, an outspoken and forthright man, put the matter more bluntly and claimed 
that state-appointed judges would act as state partisans.*" 
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Such charges of state partisanship could be easily turned around, as they were 
by Kingston immediately afterwards. In this instance the roles were reversed with 
the federaUsts now playing coy about the possibiUty of federally-appointed judges 
having a bias —or as one delegate suggested, an "unconscious bias"—in favour 
of the federal government.*' 
The AustraUan founders were generally reluctant to dweU on the poUtical 
character of judicial review, but it was sporadically raised. The matter was taken 
up by O'Connor who sharply distinguished between the accustomed legal role 
of judges and the novel poUtical role that was to be given to the federal court. 
O'Connor stressed that state judges were not concerned with poUtical questions 
whereas federal judges might at any time have to decide "a question which may 
become a matter of burning poUtical moment — a question of the validity of a law 
which may affect very largely the interests of a state and the Commonwealth, 
and may at any time become a matter of heated controversy between a state and 
the commonwealth".*^ 
The general poUtical character of the court's role was very much to the fore 
when the amendment reducing the minimum size of the court from five to three 
was debated. The danger of manipulating the court through controUing 
appointments was discussed. O'Connor stated that the main danger would come 
not from outright packing which could attract popular disapproval, but from the 
less blatant strategy of letting numbers dwindle. Therefore, he insisted on specifying 
a reasonable minimum size for the court.*' Isaacs claimed that appointments to 
the American Supreme Court had been used as a means of amending the 
constitution. He asserted that in America the great judges of the Supreme Court 
had been as influential in shaping the constitution as the founding convention 
and predicted the same would be the case in AustraUa: 
We are taking infinite trouble to express what we mean in this Constitution; but as 
in America so it wUl be here, that the makers of the Constitution were not merely 
the Conventions who sat, and the states who ratified their conclusions, but the Judges 
of the Supreme Court. MarshaU, Jay, Storey [sic], and aU the rest of the renowned 
judges who have pronounced on the Constitution, have had just as much to do in shaping 
it as the men who sat in the original Conventions. 
Isaacs predicted that the court would have to decide "vast issues" involving the 
very existence of states, their taxing powers and their rights over rivers and 
territories. 
Higgins took a different tack that stressed the particular vulnerabiUty of a federal 
court in the AustraUan context of responsible cabinet govemment. In such a system, 
he claimed, the executive was "the creature of the Legislature" and together they 
would have "every temptation to so mould the character of the High Court as 
to get it to adopt their views".*' Consequently, he argued, it was even more 
important here than in America to constitute a strong and permanent court. On 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
62 Politics ofthe High Court 
this occasion differences between Isaacs and Higgins and the other convention 
leaders were not apparent. 
Symon's criticism of the interpretive style of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council was also to the point. The Privy Council's narrow legalistic approach 
was unsuitable for a constitutional court, claimed Symon. "[T]hey are guided by 
a more rigid adherence to what is Uteral, as though they were interpreting simply 
an Act of Parliament, rather than by a regard for those great constitutional principles 
which throw light upon and assist in the efficient interpretation of a 
Constitution."** Symon approvingly quoted Bryce's eulogy of MarshaU and his 
praise for MarshaU's broad constitutional jurispradence which had given the 
American constitution an admirable flexibiUty and capacity for growth from the 
beginning. Bryce had contrasted with this the Privy Council's vmsatisfactory "spirit 
of strictness and UteraUty" in interpreting the Canadian British North America 
Act. It was weU understood by the leading AustraUan constitution makers that 
judicial review was not simply a legal fiinction. 
Judicial review was so fundamental a part of the founders' intention and design 
that the judiciary sections ofthe constitution cannot be fiiUy understood without 
acknowledging that fact. Furthermore, the founders considered that a strong court 
exercising judicial review of legislative acts was an integral and necessary part of 
the federal system that they were instituting. The federal system entailed aUocating 
specific national powers to the federal government and making it paramount in 
those areas, while at the same time restricting it to those areas. Therefore, some 
independent arbitrator was required. That arbitrator was to be the federal court 
which was constituted in such a way as to enable it to undertake this fiinction. 
In carrying out such a role, the High Court was expected to apply and develop 
the constitution in an innovative and creative fashion. Despite the lack of an express 
provision mandating judicial review, the evidence from the federation debates makes 
it quite clear that the founders intended judicial review to be the Court's primary 
fiinction. That expectation was summed up in the eloquent formulation of the 
distinguished constitutional draftsman, John Downer: 
[Federal judges] wiU have the greatest part in forming this Commonwealth; because 
honorable members must not forget that, although we form it in form, they form it, 
to a large extent, in substance. With them rest the vast powers of judicial decision, 
in saying what are the relative functions of the Commonwealth and of the states. With 
them rests the interpretation of intentions which we may have in our minds, but which 
have not occurred to us at the present time. With them rests the obligation of finding 
out principles which are in the minds of this Convention in framing this Bill and applying 
them to cases which have never occurred before, and which are very little thought of 
by any one of us. With this Supreme Court, particularly in the earlier days of the 
Commonwealth, rests practically the estabUshment on a permanent basis of the 
Constitution, because with them we leave it not to merely judicially assert the principles 
which we have undoubtedly asserted, but with them rests the application of those 
principles, and the discovery as to where the principles are applicable and where they 
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are not. As was felt in America, and in every Federation which has had any permanence, 
there comes the necessity of a tribunal to stand between the states and the 
Commonwealth, of such dignity and held in such esteem, so free from all possibiUties 
of influence or corruption that the general people ofthe Commonwealth will recognise 
that the jurisdiction has been weU placed, and must be properly exercised.*' 
The rivers question: a test case for judicial review 
The AustraUan founders considered judicial review in two main parts of the 
federation debates: generally in the discussion of the judiciary clauses, and as a 
specific solution to the contentious rivers question. The rivers question was 
immensely important in the founding conventions — at the Melbourne session alone 
it occupied two weeks of prime convention time and took up over 400 double 
column pages of the official record. The matter is of no consequence today since 
railways replaced river steamers within a decade, an outcome predicted by Barton 
in convention and urged as a reason for omitting mention of river navigation from 
the constitution and cutting short the debate.** A River Murray Waters 
Agreement regarding water usage was in fact signed by the commonwealth 
govemment and the three interested states in 1914. In this respect La Nauze's 
representation of the protracted debate as "much ado about nothing" is quite 
vaUd.*' This dead issue is resurrected here because it provides an excellent case 
study on the intended role of judicial review in the federal system. 
In dispute was control of dry Australia's single great river system, the Murray-
DarUng, with catchments spreading from monsoonal Queensland through westem 
New South Wales to the snow covered AustraUan Alps in the south. New South 
Wales and, to a lesser extent, Victoria were beginning to undertake extensive 
irrigation schemes and were concerned to maintain state water rights. South 
AustraUa, through which all these waters flowed via the Murray to the Southern 
Ocean, was the centre of the river steamer trade which tapped the rich raral markets 
of New South Wales and Victoria. The South AustraUan delegates were concerned 
with guaranteeing this trade by ensuring the continuing navigabUity of the Murray 
and, if possible, the DarUng. All the elements of a classic federal dispute were 
present. Under the proposed federal system interstate trade and commerce were 
to be federal matters that extended to river navigation. Water conservation and 
irrigation, however, came under state property and riparian rights. WhUe navigation 
required maintenance of water levels and waterways, irrigation impUed using water 
and constracting conservation and flood control works across rivers. South AustraUa 
pushed for a specific federal power over rivers to protect its interstate navigation; 
New South Wales was equaUy stubborn in insisting on entrenching state water 
rights in the constitution. 
The Sydney convention of 1891 raised the matter but left it unresolved: as Quick 
and Garran aptly put it, "discussion showed that the question was too difficult 
to be dealt with off-hand".*" The Unes of battle were more firmly drawn at the 
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1897 Adelaide session of the second convention when various formulations were 
tried, but none accepted as satisfactory. The third and final Melboume session 
of the 1897-98 convention had to resolve aU outstanding points, not least among 
which was the rivers question. 
At the very beginning O'Connor, who was supported by Barton, set out what 
was to be finaUy accepted; that federal control over river navigation was sufficiently 
protected in the trade and commerce clause." O'Connor explained the American 
law at length and predicted that it was "only reasonable to suppose that our Judges 
in interpreting our Constitution wiU be guided very much by the same 
principles".'^ In other words, the court would resolve particular disputes between 
navigation rights that were incidental to trade and commerce and water rights 
that remained under state jurisdiction. This American solution of judicial review 
was not acceptable to either the South AustraUan or the New South Wales partisans 
at this point. The New South Wales premier, George Reid, accused the South 
AustraUans of "trying to federalize us" for their own benefit. 
After the first week of thrashing about over "amendments innumerable", 
conventibn leader Barton secured a short respite while the delegates from the 
interested colonies discussed the matter privately.'* Since they could not agree, 
the rivers question came back for a second full week of debate. In the meantime 
the judiciary clauses of the constitution had been finalized and delegates were in 
a better position to appreciate the O'Connor-Barton proposal for leaving the whole 
matter to the federal court to sort out. O'Connor restated the court solution as 
the "simplest and most statesmanUke way" of solving the problem. But O'Connor 
alarmed many delegates when he spelt out the broad political role of the court: 
it would decide both the merits of a particular case and "absolutely and definitely 
the rights and the principles upon which the decision should proceed"." 
Many delegates were opposed to such an extensive scope for judicial review. 
They had agreed to a powerfiil American-style court in theory, but baulked at 
leaving it with such wide powers of decision when it came down to a practical 
issue. Downer had recommended that in "making a new Constitution, we should 
place our meaning in plain and unmistakable words"." Reid said he was prepared 
to "risk legal decisions in regard to what I am giving, . . . [but] always so long 
as the absolute possession of these waters by New South Wales is made clear"—at 
which point honourable members laughed, to Reid's consternation." Glynn from 
South AustraUa wanted to define navigabiUty so as to put the matter beyond doubt; 
he was "not going to let the Federal Judiciary be the legislators".'* Similarly, 
Isaacs wanted to spell out the meaning of navigability and have it entrenched in 
the constitution lest an AustraUan court foUow EngUsh rather than American 
precedents and define navigabiUty in terms of tidal flow." This was rather a 
laboured and pedantic view, but it does show the extent to which even leading 
delegates were chary of judicial review. 
Higgins took a different tack and insisted that the navigation-irrigation 
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controversy be left with the federal parliament. It was a poUtical rather than a 
legal question and would necessitate new policies as knowledge and conditions 
changed. Therefore it ought to be left with parUament and not the federal 
court.'"" FinaUy, when aU attempts to speU out a specific federal power over 
navigation had failed, Higgins sided with Barton and O'Connor. His summing 
up of the outcome of the debate and the judicial review solution caught the spirit 
of many delegates: "As we cannot agree upon an amendment that vn\[ secure 
to South AustraUa, and I may say to AustraUa, the federal control of this river 
system we ought to stop . . . and . . . aUow the glorious uncertainty of the 
construction of the law to operate on the [trade and commerce clause]."'"' 
The final outcome, and for our purposes here the significance of this large section 
of the federation debates, was that judicial review was accepted as a means of 
resolving, or at least bypassing, an otherwise intractable problem. River navigation 
was not specified as a separate federal head of power because it was considereed 
to be incidental to, and impUed by, the federal commerce power. Just to be sure, 
however, it was spelt out in section 98 that the commerce power did extend to 
navigation and shipping. New South Wales carried its insistence into a special 
clause, section 100, specifying that the federal commerce power did not abridge 
the right of a state to use its rivers for irrigation, but only after the qualifying 
word "reasonable" had been added. 
In effect the matter was left to the court to resolve in the future as specific 
disputes arose. Although this potentiaUy rich field for Utigation was neutered almost 
immediately when railways replaced river steamers, the difficult question had aUeady 
been resolved in principle by the convention. The solution was judicial review. 
The AustraUan founders were forced to realize that they could not resolve the 
rivers question in advance through specific formulations. In the first place they 
could not agree. Second, the subject was too extensive and abstract, and they 
lacked adequate information. Third, they were forced by the strong claims of the 
senior state of New South Wales to respect state rights that were not essential 
to a federal union. That ruled out the possibiUty of an overarching federal power 
to formulate river poUcy and balance navigation against irrigation rights. The federal 
solution of national sovereignty over navigation and state sovereignty over irrigation 
at first appeared to most delegates to be no solution at aU since navigation and 
irrigation were but two confUcting aspects of the one issue. Leaving the matter 
for a federal court to sort out under a broad commerce clause jurisdiction was 
enthusiasticaUy promoted by a few, but only reluctantly accepted by the convention 
as a whole after exhaustive debate proved no other solution was forthcoming. 
The rivers debate shows the Australian founders finally and, for the most part, 
only gradgingly adopted judicial review as a practical, federal solution to the rivers 
question. But when they did so it was with fuU knowledge of what it entailed. 
This test case shows that judicial review was intended to work as an essential 
part of the constitution. 
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An integral part of the federal structure 
The Australian founders laboriously thrashed out the issue of judicial review in 
the federation conventions and accepted it as the primary function of their federal 
court. Those who designed AustraUa's federal constitution copied the great 
American model and continuously drew upon America's long federal experience. 
In Sir Owen Dixon's words, "The framers of our own federal Commonwealth 
Constitution . . . found the American instrament of govemment an incomparable 
model. They could not escape from its fascination. Its contemplation damped the 
smouldering fires of their originaUty."'"^ 
To appreciate fully the theory of federaUsm and the function of judicial review 
in such a system, we have to go back to the American constitution makers since 
federaUsm in its modern form is an American invention. The American founders 
were acutely aware of the fragility of the old federal form because that was the 
basis of the Articles of Confederation under which they had fought the War of 
Independence. In such a system central authority tended to be ineffectual. As Martin 
Diamond has carefiiUy documented, a federation in the old sense was a confederation 
or league of societies in which the central government acted not on the individual 
citizens but on the constituent social units.'"^ By way of contrast a national 
government acted directly on the citizens. The American constitution was, in 
Madison's summing up in Federalist no. 39, "in strictness, neither a national nor 
a federal Constitution, but a composition of both". This fiindamental innovation 
of grafting national powers on to the old form of federal alliance and thus making 
the individual a citizen of the union as well as a citizen of his own state was well 
appreciated by the American founding generation. It was praised by its supporters 
as overcoming the basic weakness of ineffectual central control and a tendency 
to disintegration that characterized the traditional federal form.'"* It was Ukewise 
blamed by critics of the constitution such as Luther Martin, the Maryland attorney-
general and champion of a loose confederation of autonomous states, as "a system 
neither wholly federal, nor wholly national—but a strange hotch-potch of 
both".'"' 
The Americans created a new form of government by dividing powers between 
two levels of government and making each sovereign within its appointed sphere. 
Judicial review was part of the elaborate system of checks and balances bmlt into 
the federal government and provided a practical means of keeping each level of 
government to its constitutionally defined Umits. Influential Americans such as 
James Madison had originally favoured a central government power of veto over 
state legislation to ensure it did not infringe upon the federal domain. This was 
rejected by Jefferson and others as a proposal "to mend a smaU hole by covering 
the whole garment". Jefferson proposed instead the alternative of judicial review: 
"Would not an appeal from the state judicatures to a federal court, in aU cases 
where the act of Confederation controuled [sic] the question, be as effectual a 
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remedy, and exactly commensurate to the defect."'"* Jefferson was writing to 
Madison from Paris in 1787. The same solution emerged at the Philadelphia 
convention which was drafting the American constitution at the same time. 
The Randolph Resolutions, which were probably drafted by Madison and which 
provided the focus for discussion in the 1787 American constitutional convention, 
specified the paramountcy of national legislation in areas of national jurisdiction. 
According to these resolutions the national legislature was empowered to "negative 
aU laws passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of the National 
Legislature the articles of Union".'"' After considerable debate this was rejected 
as too serious a threat to the independence of the states, and the supremacy clause. 
Article VI section u, was adopted. This clause stated that the constitution was 
the supreme law of the land and would take precedence over state laws. It was 
not stated in the text of this clause that the court would give practical substance 
to this clause by exercising judicial review, but that was suggested by some delegates 
during the debate. As one delegate pointed out, "A law that ought to be negatived 
wiU be set aside in the Judiciary department."'"* 
Although the American founders were rather tentative about defining judicial 
review, it seems that many intended it to be the mechanism for resolving 
jurisdictional disputes between two levels of govemment each of which was 
sovereign in its own powers.'"* It took the consummate poUtical and legal skiUs 
of John MarshaU to estabUsh judicial review as a practical part of American 
constitutional law and practice. Once he had done so, however, there could be 
Uttle dispute over its aptness. There is an obvious link between governments of 
Umited powers and judicial review by the court, at least in countries where the 
rale of law is given pre-eminence."" In fact classic writers on federaUsm, like 
K. C. Wheare, assume that this Unk is natural and inevitable. Wheare says: "The 
substance of the matter is that while it is the duty of every institution estabUshed 
under the authority of a Constitution and exercising powers granted by a 
Constitution, to keep within the limits of those powers, it is the duty of the 
Courts, from the nature of their fiinction, to say what these Umits are."'" 
If the American founders were somewhat tentative about the court's key function 
of judicial review in 1787, the Australian founders in the 1890s certainly were 
not. By that time judicial review was weU estabUshed in North America and the 
AustraUan founders took it over as an integral part of their federal system. Many 
AustraUans had considerable difficulty reconciling themselves to such a broad 
poUtical role for a court, but IngUs Clark, Barton and O'Connor gradually led 
them to accept American-style judicial review as an important part of federalism. 
The AustraUan founders had a more even-handed view of federaUsm than either 
the Americans or the Canadians, and thought that the federal government was 
as likely as the states to overstep its defined areas of jurisdiction. Consequently 
they considered judicial review by the court as absolutely crucial for keeping both 
levels of government within their constitutional boundaries. 
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The Canadian founders in 1867 did not consider judicial review such an essential 
part of the system they were devising, but as Edmund Barton inelegantly put 
it, theirs was a "mongrel" brand of federalism. The Canadian British North America 
Act was heavily weighted in favour of the centre, and included expUcit powers 
of reservation and disaUowance—of federal legislation by the govemor-general and 
of provincial legislation by the Ueutenant-govemor. These were practical alternatives 
to judicial review adopted as means of keeping each level of government within 
its proper limits."^ Also, as Jennifer Smith has pointed out in explaining the 
origins of judicial review in Canada, disaUowance was considered to be more in 
keeping with traditional parUamentary supremacy than was American-style judicial 
review. Smith explains that "DisaUowance not only undermined the need for judicial 
arbitration, whether by the Judicial Committee or a national court, it also suited 
partisans of parUamentary supremacy . . .who clearly understood the threat to 
this supremacy posed by a tribunal patterned after the American Supreme 
Court."'" Despite the ambivalence of the Canadian founders towards judicial 
review, the Canadian Supreme Court and the Privy Council soon made judicial 
review an integral part of the Canadian federal system."* As the forces of 
regionalism redressed the balance of power in favour of the provinces, and 
reservation and disaUowance fell into disuse, the courts exercising judicial review 
became the authoritative interpreters of the British North America Act. Thus the 
Privy Council and the Canadian Supreme Court became indispensable parts of 
Canadian federaUsm. MaUory has described the process as foUows: 
[The Canadian Constitution] began as—at best—quasi-federal and became more and 
more truly federal by a process of constitutional evolution . . . While it was the forces 
of economic, political and ideological change which turned the Canadian States into 
a "classical" federal system on the American model, it was the courts which coniinned 
this change by giving it authoritative sanction. 
Judicial review has become an integral part of the Canadian federation as weU 
as of the American and the AustraUan. 
Those who would aboUsh the judiciary's role in constitutional adjudication have 
to propose some alternative mechanism for settling jurisdictional disputes between 
the two levels of government. The Canadian constitutional scholar, Paul Weiler, 
has recently advocated the aboUtion of judicial review. Weiler claims that there 
is no necessity for judicial review "even though federaUsm by its very nature involves 
the creation of limited legislative powers".'" He claims that "a federal system is 
precisely the kind of relationship for which an external umpire may not be necessary 
and in which the better technique for managing conflict is continual negotiation 
and poUtical compromise"."^ Weiler is concerned that judicial review is essentially 
unprincipled—he charges the Canadian Supreme Court with deciding constitution^ 
questions on the basis of doctrines that it makes up as it goes along—and that 
a court is singularly unsuitable for resolving the "very compUcated poUtical and 
economic confUcts which are the 'stuff' of constitutional adjudication"."* 
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Weiler's critique of judicial review highUghts many of the problems associated 
with this somewhat incongraous institution whereby a court of law settles great 
questions of state; but he goes too far. Judicial review need not be as unprincipled 
as he claims since the constitution provides a basic order against which confUcting 
claims can be weighed and to which new developments can be fitted. Admittedly 
the Canadian Supreme Court's task is made more difficult because the British North 
America Act's original centraUst division of powers does not fit the strongly 
regionalized and decentralized nation that Canada has become. 
WeUer proposed poUtical negotiation and compromise as an altemative to judicial 
review by the court, but what about those hard cases where neither government 
wiU compromise sufficiently to aUow a negotiated settlement? Weiler acknowledges 
the problem and would solve it by giving paramountcy to the national govemment 
in aU disputed cases: 
There should be one easUy applicable rule, singling out one jurisdiction's legislation 
as dominant. There seems also no doubt that, if such is the character of the rule, the 
dominant jurisdication must be the Dominion Parliament which is responsive to the 
whole electorate, including voters in the province whose legislation is being 
overriden. 
That is a rather simple and straightforward altemative to judicial review, but unUke 
judicial review it is not a federal solution. Weiler would give the decision of 
paramountcy to the federal legislature, thus making it a judge in its own case. 
Presumably courts would stiU have the subsidiary fiinction of deciding when laws 
were inconsistent, but that would be a considerably reduced role. Such an altemative 
was rejected by the American founders in 1787 as a dangerous threat to the states— 
as Jefferson said, it was a patch that covered the whole garment. Neither was 
it countenanced by the AustraUan founders a century later for the same reason. 
Rather, the AustraUan founders deliberately created a powerfiil court whose 
prime function was to interpret the constitution and apply it in settUng federal 
disputes. In so doing they were consciously adopting an integral part of the classic 
American federal system. They intended the federal court to exercise judicial review 
over both state and federal legislation and constituted it accordingly. The federal 
court was made strong and independent; its structure was set out in the 
constitution; its minimum size was stipulated and the tenure of judges elaborately 
safeguarded. Moreover, the intended exercise of judicial review by the new court 
explains why other parts of the constitution appear as they do. The commerce 
clause was left in very broad terms on the assumption that the judiciary would 
interpret and apply it in the fiiture. The contentious question of reconciUng 
confUcting river navigation and irrigation claims was left essentially unresolved 
by the founding conventions precisely because the court was to handle the matter. 
Since the federal court was to make such important poUtical and economic decisions, 
the AustraUan founders were intent upon making it, rather than the Privy Council, 
the final arbiter m constitutional matters concerning the division of powers. In 
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adopting American judicial review by a strong court, the AustraUans were 
implementing what has now become generaUy recognized as a necessary operational 
part of federaUsm in Canada as weU as in the United States and AustraUa. 
The AustraUan federal system was completed when the High Court was set 
up by the first Commonwealth parUament in 1903, as v«U be discussed in the 
foUovsring chapter. Introducing the Judiciary BiU in 1902, Alfred Deakin, by then 
attorney-general and soon to replace Barton as prime minister, reiterated the central 
role of the High Court in the AustraUan federal system in terms that re-stated 
the thinking of the constitutional conventions: 
The Constitution is to be the supreme law, but it is the High Court which is to determine 
how far and between what boundaries it is supreme. The federation is constituted by 
distribution of powers, and it is this court which decides the orbit and boundary of 
every power. Consequently, when we say that there are three fundamental conditions 
involved in federation, we reaUy mean that there is one which is more essential than 
the others—the competent tribunal which is able to protect the Constitution, and to 
oversee its agencies. That body is the High Court. It is properly termed the "keystone 
of the federal arch". . . . [T]he High Court exists to protect the Constitution against 
assaults.'^ 
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The Establishment and Consolidation 
of Judicial Review 1900 to 1940 
Controversy over the High Court, and particularly over its key poUtical fiinction 
of interpreting the constitution and arbitrating federal disputes, did not end with 
the final favourable divisions in convention, nor even after popular approval of 
the constitution by aU the eastem states in the 1899 referenda (Western Australia 
held out until late 1900 for special terms). Before the United Kingdom parUament 
at Westminster would formally enact the constitution in 1900, secretary of state 
for the colonies Chamberlain forced a modification of clause 74 that restricted 
appeals to the Privy Council. Again in 1903 when legislation for its estabUshment 
was before the first commonwealth parUament, the High Court was severely 
criticized both inside and outside parliament, and the debate over its character 
and fiinction was re-opened. Although its staunchest defenders were now members 
of the government—Barton was prime minister, Deakin attorney-general and 
O'Connor govemment leader in the Senate—the new High Court narrowly escaped 
legislative emasculation or indefinite postponement at the hands of its opponents. 
Even after being set up in late 1903, the High Court's fiiture was not assured. 
Despite the strength of its constitutional credentials and the pre-eminence of its 
American parent, the AustraUan High Court had to contend with a poUtical culture 
that was markedly different from that of America, where judicial review thrived. 
As a colonial offshoot of Britain, Australia had strong populist tendencies that 
favoured direct majoritarianism, parliamentary supremacy and a restricted role for 
courts. Armed only with the power of its own judgment, the early Court had 
to estabUsh in practice its right to decide great issues of state, and build up sufficient 
public prestige to ensure that its decisions were respected and obeyed. Moreover, 
the Court had to accompUsh these things in the face of a growing chaUenge from 
the Labor party that called in question the constitutional order that the Court 
was estabUshed to uphold. The High Court therefore needed to develop a poUtical 
strategy suitable to the conditions of AustraUan poUtics. It was to do so by adopting 
the techniques and pubUc rhetoric of a "strict and complete legaUsm" for 
constitutional cases. 
The development and use of legalism by the High Court over the next half 
century roughly paraUeled Labor's rise to power in federal poUtics. The political 
conditions produced by Labor's rapid emergence as a dominant federal poUtical 
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party, commanding the popular support of half the AustraUan electorate, affected 
the character of constitutional jurispradence developed by the Court in two ways. 
First, the divisiveness of AustraUan poUtics fostered the appointment of "apoUtical" 
legal speciaUsts who, not surprisingly, crafted a legaUstic jurispradence. Even Labor 
governments often appointed such speciaUsts in order to avoid poUtical controversy 
and accusations of court packing. Second, legaUsm was an appropriate strategy 
for deciding constitutional issues between Uberal democrats and social democrats 
divided over basic issues of poUtical economy. The rise of the Labor party in federal 
poUtics was accompanied by an intensification of legaUstic technique used by the 
Court. By the 1940s, when Labor's federal power had peaked and its threat to 
AustraUa's Uberal constitution was greatest, Dixonian legaUsm had triumphed in 
the Court. The technique of the Court, the thrast of federal Labor party poUcy 
and the coUision course between Labor and the constitution had been set in the 
previous decades. This chapter examines the developments in federal politics and 
constitutional interpretation from federation until the second world war. 
The High Court in dispute 
It may come as something of a surprise that setting up the High Court should 
generate so much controversy when, only a few years previously in the federal 
conventions, that same institution had been lauded as "the keystone ofthe federal 
arch".' Although the Judiciary Bill and the High Court Procedures BiU were put 
high on the agenda of the first commonwealth parUament that opened in Melbourne 
on 9 May 1901, more than two years elapsed between the formal introduction 
of these biUs and their final passage in August 1903. During that time, the 
legislation had been postponed through lack of support, scarified by opponents 
in debate, and placed in jeopardy because of fickle political aUegiances and 
unpredictable cross-voting that characterized the early federal parUament. It was 
an open secret, reported the Age, that the government was saved from absolute 
defeat on the second reading of its High Court legislation primarily because of 
personal consideration for the attorney-general rather than any other cause.^  
Deakin, who as attorney-general was responsible for securing passage of the bilk 
through parUament, gave a dramatic account of the ordeal in his anonymous weekly 
report on AustraUan poUtics in the London Moming Post: 
. . . [PJrovinciaUsts fought the Attorney-General inch by inch at every stage of his 
cherished measure. Its second reading is publicly alleged to have been secured only by 
the threat of his resignation with which he steadied wavering Ministerialists who were 
unaware of the significance of the BiU and to whom its import could not be disclosed 
without arousing fresh antagonists. In the Senate the measure was much more 
sympathetically handled, because its value to the less populous States was to a certain 
extent appreciated. But it was fiercely assailed to the last by the economists the States' 
rights militants, and the Opposition guerillas. Twice its fate in the House depended 
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in critical divisions on a single vote, while defeat was evaded again and again by 
postponements or recommittals. No measure yet launched in the Federal Parliament 
was so often imperiUed, skirted so many quicksands, or scraped so many rocks on its 
very uncertain passage. 
Even aUowing for Deakin's propensity to overdramatize events for the sake of 
jouraaUstic colour, this High Court legislation had had a rough passage through 
parUament. Timing was one of the immediate issues in dispute; economy was 
the other. Those who opposed the legislation, and this group included such eminent 
founding fathers as Glynn, Higgins and Quick, argued that there was no urgency 
for the new federal court and that economy precluded its immediate estabUshment. 
The hostile Melboume press dismissed the measure as a "splendid luxury". The 
Age asked: "Why estabUsh a piece of magnificent machinery a long time before 
the need for it has become manifest?" While pajdng tribute to Deakin's "high 
thoughts", the paper claimed that "not one proof was offered that this proposed 
estabUshment of a Federal Judiciary would not be so much surplusage, so many 
sinecures".* The Argus looked forward to a prestigious High Court in the future 
when the time was ripe, but insisted that the existing judicial machinery of the 
various states combined with facilities for appeal to the Privy Council was quite 
sufficient for initial federal needs.' Glynn, the most implacable parliamentary 
opponent ofthe new court, took a similar position. He mocked Deakin's proposed 
third tier of federal government as "a glorious tribunal to which we can address 
apostrophes as exhibiting the splendours of federation, while it is sitting in soUtary 
grandeur and waiting for business to come to it".' 
The debates over establishing the High Court in the first parliament, and 
previously at Westminster in 1900 over the extent of appeals to the Privy Council 
were intensely poUtical ones that concerned elite, rather than popular, interests. 
The general pubUc had Uttle appreciation of the significance of a federal court 
in constitutional govemment, nor much concem about the niceties of jurisdictional 
questions in a federal system. If anything, there were suspicions ofthe new court 
as "a device of the lawyers placed upon the Statute book in the interests of their 
profession".' If the matter came into the arena of popular opinion at aU, it was 
in the crade terms of nationalism versus imperialism, and luxury versus economy. 
The radical newspaper Tocsin was complimentary towards Deakin's presentation 
ofthe biUs, but cynical about their practical purpose which it reported as follows: 
Of course, the first reason of the Judicature Bill is to provide a Federal High Court; 
its second, is to provide a biUet for Toby Barton. And it is because of this that the 
BiU will be rushed for all the Ministry is worth. The number who want a judgeship 
is amazing. Barton, O'Connor, Griffiths [sic] (of Queensland), Quick, Wise (NSW), 
Symons [sic], Reid, and Isaacs are after billets. They feel the mantle ofthe Court already 
on them; and some of them are so completely in the backwash of poUtics, and 
overwhelmed at the apparent permanence of the Ministry that they wiU squelch any 
criticism, in order to grasp the certainty of a Federal judgeship and a fat salary. 
The govenment's predicament was that with little popular support for the legislation 
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in any part of the country, it faced tough opposition from eUte groups intent 
upon retaining Privy Coundl appeals and the prestige of the state courts. 
The parUamentary coaUtion against the federal court included a multipUcity of 
diverse positions. Glynn proposed an alternative "scratch court" of state Supreme 
Court justices serving on a part-time basis, a suggestion that had been roundly 
defeated at the Adelaide convention. A tireless advocate of South Australian 
interests, Glynn made no bones about defying the will of the convention which, 
he claimed, had been "too pedantic" and had followed too closely the example 
of the United States.' Glynn's home state boasted in its chief justice. Sir Samuel 
Way, the leading lobbyist for maintaining Privy Council appeals and a champion 
of the local pre-eminence of state Supreme Courts. The proposed High Court 
infiinged upon both areas. As Deakin explained: "A large proportion of its authority 
wiU be carved out of the jurisdiction of the State Courts on the one side, and 
to a smaUer extent, from the Privy Council on the other."'" 
Quick spoke for many others when he strongly opposed the estabUshment of 
the High Court on the grounds of economy. The earlier euphoria for federation 
had now been replaced by a niggardly concem for its costs. Although the new 
court would require an annual vote of less than £30,000, that was considered 
excessive, at least until the need for such a court was more apparent. The short-
term concerns of the poUtician were incUned to cloud the nobler vision of the 
statesman and scholar. In making the opposite case, that parUament had a solemn 
obligation under the constitution to estabUsh the High Court, Isaacs could quote 
Quick's earUer authoritative interpretation that the opening words of the judiciary 
sections: "The judicial power of the Commonwealth shaU be vested in a Federal 
Supreme Court" (section 71), were "imperative . . . and mandatory on the 
Parliament to carry the vesting into effect"." 
The case against the new court was greatly strengthened by the support of such 
an ardent federaUst as Higgins. He opposed the government's legislation for the 
same sorts of reasons promoting his opposition to ratifying the constitution: that 
it did not go far enough. From Higgins's radical point of view, no court was 
better than a weak court. "If we create a High Court under the Constitution 
as it stands", he claimed, "we shaU erect a body which wiU be docked of power 
and shorn of dignity—which wiU be in the leading strings of some higher power 
elsewhere." Higgins looked forward to a constitutional amendment that would 
overturn the 1900 Westminster compromise and allow "an ideal court such as 
Sir Henry Parkes had in mind"; that is, one that was final and from which there 
could be no appeal whatsoever to the Privy Council. There were only two 
respectable positions available, argued Higgins; either "to keep the sap ranning 
from the root of British jurisprudence everywhere throughout the Empire", or 
to be "self-contained and self-sufficing . . . [taking] the responsibiUty of interpreting 
our laws as weU as of making them".'^ After passage of the legislation was 
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assured, Higgins actively supported the govemment's unsuccessful attempt to have 
five rather than three judges constitute the first High Court. 
The scope for, and probable frequency of. Privy Coundl appeals were key issues 
in the 1903 debate. Deakin's famous second reading speech in June 1902 had been 
a grand affafr that reformulated, as he put it, "many of the traisms of our federal 
debates".' Subsequently, government spokesmen were forced to show that the 
changes made to clause 74 of the constitution at Westminster in 1900 had not 
jeopardized the position of an AustraUan federal court. Opponents argued that 
because of those changes which expanded the scope for appeals to the Privy Council, 
an Australian court could be neither independent nor autonomous, and hence would 
have Uttle to do. Higgins argued that since nearly aU the large corporate and financial 
institutions had lobbied for retention of Privy Council appeals during the 1890s 
conventions and at Wesminster, this major class of potential litigants would now 
choose to bypass the High Court by appeaUng direct from the state courts to 
the Privy Council.'* 
In responding to such critics. Barton had to explain precisely what had been 
changed in 1900 and why such changes did not vitiate the position ofthe proposed 
federal court. As Barton, one of the five AustraUan delegates sent to London in 
1900, admitted, that delegation was charged vwth securing passage "word by word, 
and letter by letter, of the Constitution which the people of this country had 
claimed for themselves"." The original clause 74 ofthe constitution biU that was 
sent over to Westminster for formal enactment had specified that no appeal to 
the Privy CouncU would be aUowed 'in any matter involving the interpretation 
of this Constitution or of the Constitution of a State, unless the pubUc interests 
of some part of Her Majesty's Dominions, other than the Commonwealth or a 
State, are involved"." In other words, all local constitutional issues were to be 
reserved exclusively for the High Court. 
In the name of imperial interests which he understood primarily as commercial 
interests, and in response to the powerful lobby of EngUsh corporate investors 
and colonial chief justices, who included not only the obstreperous Way of South 
AustraUa, but also, surprisingly, Griffith of Queensland,'^ Chamberlain refused 
to accept such a severe limitation on appeals as of right to the Privy Council.'* 
But an unrestricted right of appeal was totally unacceptable to the AustraUan 
delegates. After months of haggUng, a compromise was agreed to that broadened 
the scope somewhat for Privy Council appeals, but at the same time restricted 
the bulk of constitutional cases to a decision by the High Court. No appeal was 
to be allowed to the Privy Council from a decision of the High Court in any 
case involving the Umits of constitutional powers of the commonwealth and the 
states, or of any two or more states, unless the High Court itself agreed by issuing 
a certificate to allow such an appeal. Curiously these were called inter se questions. 
Appeals as of grace, those which "the Queen may be pleased to exercise by virtue 
of Her Royal Prerogative" as the constitution formulated it, had been allowed 
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by the original constitution bUl, but subject to the provision that "ParUament 
may make laws limiting the matters in which leave may be asked". This was not 
touched except for adding the rider that proposed laws containing any such 
Umitation were to be reserved by the govemor-general for "Her Majesty's pleasure". 
This was not a major change, and in any case the government was not proposing 
to exercise parUament's power for Umiting appeals as of grace at this early stage. 
How significant were the changes made in 1900? As Barton put it, the High 
Cout had been "maimed to a certain extent", but that extent was less than Glynn 
or Higgins made out. The restriction on aUowing Privy Coundl appeals in 
constitutional matters had been narrowed to High Court dedsions involving mainly 
the federal division of powers. Appeals direct to the Privy Council from the state 
courts in constitutional cases were formaUy permitted, although this avenue could 
be cut off by the commonwealth parliament, as it was in 1907, by restricting 
the exerdse of federal jurisdiction vested in state courts. The High Court could 
grant certificates aUowing appeals from its own dedsions in inter se questions, 
but it would be unlikely to do so. Thus the constitution stiU provided for a powerfiil 
federal court that was, or by commonwealth legislation could be made to be, 
autonomous in aU key areas of constitutional adjudication. The High Court would 
be responsible for defining what Deakin termed that "large area of disputed 
territory" between the commonwealth and the states which, because of the general 
language employed in the constitution, was "unmarked, and upon many points 
. . . difficult to determine".^ As final arbiter of the boundaries of poUtical power, 
the Court would be powerful in its own right. 
Although much of the debate over setting up the Court was coloured by 
considerations of poUtical expediency, it did raise some fiindamental issues of 
government. Was the Court a necessary part of the machinery of federal 
government or "an institution which might be blown up or down at the mere 
caprice of any ParUament"?^' Was it simply an appellate court that could be 
dispensed with by channelling legal work to existing courts, or did it have an 
essential poUtical fiinction under the constitution? The opponents of the Court 
took the narrow legal view; its defenders the broad poUtical one that was consistent 
vrith the founding conventions. 
The debate reflected basic disagreements on the central issues of constitutionaUsm 
versus parUamentary sovereignty. The government argued that the constitution, 
rather than parUament, embodied the higher wiU of the people because the people 
had approved the constitution and elected parUament according to its provisions. 
Barton insisted that the people were the real founders of the constitution since 
they had elected the delegates who drafted it, and had subsequently approved it 
in referenda.^' Deakin pointed out that the people had done so with "the 
provisions for the High Court writ large across its face".^ O'Connor claimed 
it would be "treachery of the most unparalleled description" towards the people 
not to set up the Court because the constitution had been approved on the 
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understanding that the High Court would maintain the respective rights of 
individuals, states and the commonwealth.^ 
The method of interpreting the constitution was also at the heart ofthe dispute. 
Glynn's case relied on a narrow legal view both of the Court's role and of the 
constitution's mandate for its estabUshment. Glynn argued that there was no strict 
requirement to estabUsh the Court since it could not be enforced by a court 
injunction. Such legaUsm was dismissed by Barton: "we must take not only the 
lawyer's view, to be arrived at by the constraction which is to be extracted from 
the meaning of the words used, but a broader view", that of the statesman. To 
consider the Court in such a narrow legal way was, according to Barton, "one 
of the worst sins" because the Court was the "third arm of the Constitution". 
If the High Court was an integral part of the machinery of federal govemment, 
its fimction could not be performed by other appeal courts. Neither would appeal 
judges from other courts be equipped for the High Court's work which Barton 
saw as primarily poUtical: 
It is in controUing transgressions beyond the Constitution, either by this Parliament 
or by the ParUaments of the States, that the work of the High Court wiU in a large 
measure Ue. Clashes between the authorities that are created will arise as often as weak 
humanity overrides its powers, either in the Federal or in the States' Parliaments. In 
the heat of debate, and in the turmoil of party, excesses of power will inevitably be 
committed, as they have been committed in the United States. We want a tribunal 
composed of men who understand the people, who Uve amongst them, who understand 
the history of and the reasons for our Constitution, and who are not dependent for 
their knowledge upon casual reading. 
A strong start 
Barton's govemment prevailed and the High Court was set up as Deakin had 
originally proposed. During the protracted second reading debate, the Age had 
claimed that the prime minister and attorney-general had "made the mistake of 
foUowing thdr mere sentimental Federal ideals rather than the practical requirements 
of the time".* If that were so, the outcome was a triumph of federal ideals over 
practical requirements. 
Although stiff opposition had forced a reduction in the required minimum 
number of judges from five to three, the Court's prestige and importance in the 
poUtical system were enhanced by the appointment of three of the most prominent 
founding fathers to its bench. The original judidal triumvirate of Griffith, Barton 
and O'Connor was indeed impressive. Griffith and Barton had been the leaders 
and chief draftsmen of the two constitution conventions; Barton had been the 
first AustraUan prime minister; whUe O'Connor had been a distinguished member 
of the 1897-98 constitution drafting committee and leader of the Senate. Since 
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these men had led the colonies into federation and presided over the drafting of 
the constitution, they could claim a spedal position as its authoritative interpreters. 
Such initial appointments estabUshed the pubUc status of the Court and ensured 
the immediate acceptance of judidal review by the High Court in Australia. That 
had not been the case in the United States or Canada, where state governorships 
and state judidal offices were initiaUy more highly prized than appointments to 
the Supreme Court." 
Selection of the first three High Court judges and the aUocation of the chief 
justiceship were deUcate poUtical matters. This was espedally so because Prime 
Minister Barton was one of the leading contenders for appointment, while 
Attomey-General Deakin was heir apparent to the prime ministership. Some, 
including the Labor leader Fisher and old coUeagues like Kingston, thought Barton 
was entitled to the position of chief justice.^ Others, particularly his old New 
South Wales poUtical rival George Reid, had railed against such a possibUity.* 
Despite his great achievements in the Federation Conventions, it was widely held 
that "As a poUtidan, Sir Edmund Barton did not shine, because his heart was 
not in the work."" With speculation about his intentions rife for months before 
the appointments were made. Barton had categoricaUy denied in the House that 
he had any thought of appointing himself to be chief justice." In any case Deakin 
strongly supported Griffith for the position, and it was offered to him.'^ 
O'Connor's appointment was championed by Barton and widely supported. 
The Argus praised him as "one of the most astute leaders any Chamber has ever 
seen" for his work in the Senate." EarUer in the convention he had demonstrated 
one of the most leamed and acute minds, and had worked closely writh Barton 
in defending the prindples ofthe constitution and in drafting its provisions. The 
Argus paid tribute to O'Connor as "a remarkable man": "As great a lawyer as 
Sir J. W. Symon, as great a constitutionaUst as Sfr Edmund Barton, and as great 
a tactidan as Sir WilUam Lyne and Mr Austin Chapman put together. Some great 
abilities vdU rust unused in him when he ascends to the bench, yet there he will 
hold his own easily with the other two judges."'* 
Barton wavered about accepting the remaining seat on the Court. On the one 
hand he was stung by accusations that he was engineering a "fat billet, and a 
safe harbour for a troublous old age"." Yet, on the other hand, he was strongly 
attracted by the judidal position as "both a haven and a reward . . . for which 
he [was] eminently fitted"." "Oriel" in the Argus mocked Barton's genuine 
agonizing over the dedsion by pubUshing a "secret dossier" of offidal letters between 
Barton the prime minister and Barton the prospective appointee. One letter read 
as follows: 
From the Prime Minister to Sir Edmund Barton, K.C., LL.D. 
Dear Sir,-It is the unanimous wish of my colleagues-and if I do not cordiaUy join 
in it I at least do not dissent from it-that you should take a position upon the High 
Court Bench about to be created. Your eminent services to the Australian Commonwealth 
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and your great abiUties as a constitutional lawyer fuUy entitle you, my colleagues hold, 
to the distinction they desire to confer upon you.—I am, etc., 
EDMUND BARTON 
Prime Minister. 
P.S.—We must make Griffith Chief to draw the teeth of criticism. Waver a bit before 
acceptmg, in order that we may get the capital site settled, and that Deakin may feel 
his way. 
AU had been finaUzed by the afternoon of 24 September 1903 when Deakin, 
the new prime minister, made the announcements in the House of Representatives. 
That moming Barton had received a telegram from Griffith accepting the chief 
justiceship. Barton then tendered his resignation to the govemor-general; Deakin 
was commissioned to form a new ministry; and Barton and O'Connor were 
appointed to the Court.'* These events were the cUmax of the last days of the 
first federal parUament, and they provided the occasion for a good deal of 
complimentary rhetoric. The overaU atmosphere of "friendUness and unanimity" 
was spoUed, however, by the sour reactions of Kingston and the Labor party to 
Griffith's appointment. There was no comment or congratulation from any Labor 
member, while several Queensland Labor senators joined Kingston in a bitter attack 
on Griffith. They charged that Griffith had "intrigued to get the High Court 
stripped of some of its plenary powers" in 1900; and that he had been devious 
in appointing himself to the chief justiceship in Queensland." This, however, was 
a minority view. 
The caUbre and status of the first appointees ensured that the High Court would 
become the institution that Deakin had envisaged. Just as the Court was a poUtical 
institution, these first judidal appointments were poUtical ones intended to achieve 
a certain kind of result. The Argus had previously reported Deakin's intentions: 
He desires a Court which shall work in a federal atmosphere, and shaU to that end 
be composed of lawyers with a federal training. Their decisions should be aU of a piece—all 
framed with the purpose of fiUing the federal outline with a clear, consistent, uniform 
purpose. He distrusts the state courts, not because they are not impartial and able, but 
because they are not surrounded with a spedal federal atmosphere and imbued with 
a distinctive federal spirit. The meaning of all this—if it does have a meaning—is that 
the Federal Court must be composed of lawyers who have been active in the federal 
movement; who have, in fact, been partisans on the great issues which divided the 
Convention, and which were settled by compromises. These are to be chosen by the 
Ministry, which will, as Mr Deakin indicates, make a selection of eminent men of the 
one way of thinking, whose dedsions will be consistent and homogeneous, and who 
will mould the constitution on the preconceived plan and with a definite purpose. 
In the same article the Argus had warned that judges should come to their task 
of constitutional adjudication "without any preconceived ideas, or any bias gained 
during their personal experience in the federal fray". They ought to be guided 
"by the strict letter of the bond, and by no notions of their own as to the intentions 
of the framers". For that reason people who had not partidpated in the federal 
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debates were to be preferred. That was the legaUst's view, but it was not foUowed 
when the High Court was first constituted. 
Because its purpose had been so thoroughly worked out beforehand, the 
AustraUan High Court began dedding constitutional cases as a matter of course. 
Consequently the Australian Court did not require the consummate judicial 
statecraft of a John MarshaU to estabUsh in practice its prime fiinction, nor did 
it serve a long apprenticeship to the more august imperial tribunal of the Privy 
CouncU as the Canadian Supreme Court had done. EstabUshed later in time, the 
AustraUan High Court came fiiUy formed from its makers' hands with its intended 
role of exerdsing judidal review more clearly worked out. Such origins were 
significant for legitimating judidal review in AustraUa from the very beginning. 
The method of constitutional adjudication adopted by the founders' Court 
reflected the character of its personnel. As senior statesmen, the original justices 
adopted a broad discretionary approach to constitutional adjudication rather than 
a narrow legal approach. The Court tried to maintain an even-handed balance 
between commonwealth and state powers, and for this purpose borrowed the 
doctrines of impUed immunities and impUed prohibitions that had been developed 
by the American Supreme Court.*' According to these doctrines, commonwealth 
and state agents and instramentaUties were held to be reciprocally immune from 
each other's regulation and taxation. Conversely, commonwealth grants of 
legislative power in section 51 were considered to be restricted by an implied 
prohibition against interfering with residual state powers, and so were interpreted 
more narrowly than a literal reading might have allowed. The approach of the 
early High Court relied more heavily on the sagacity and authority of the justices 
than on logical consistency or a literal construing of the constitution's text. The 
doctrines of impUed immunities and implied prohibitions provided the first justices 
with a convenient legal rationale for the exercise of broad discretionary powers 
of judicial statesmanship. 
The constitutional work of the early Court was dominated by questions of the 
reach of commonwealth and state legislative powers. The flavour ofthe Court's 
approach is evident from a sampUng of its leading constitutional dedsions. The 
first constitutional case, D'Emden v. Pedder (1904),*^ set out the basic immunities 
doctrine and exempted a federal officer from a Tasmanian receipts tax on his salary. 
In its decision the High Court adopted the dissenting opinion of fellow founder, 
IngUs Clark, then a justice of the Tasmanian Supreme Court. In a fiirther set 
of dedsions in Deakin v. Webb and Lyne v. Webb (1904),*' the Court exempted 
federal employees, in this case cabinet ministers, from paying Victorian state income 
tax on their federal salaries. In this instance the Court overruled the Victorian 
Supreme Court which had preferred to foUow principles laid down by the Privy 
Council in its interpretation of the Canadian constitution,** rather than the 
American doctrine of implied immunities required by the High Court. 
The Court demonstrated its even-handedness, and placated critics from the states 
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who were dissatisfied with the above dedsions, by exempting the states from 
commonwealth regulation. For instance, in PeterswaU v. Bartley (1904),*' the 
scope of the federal exdse power was Umited to aUow for state Ucensing of brewing. 
In the important Railway Servants case (1906),** important because raUways were 
the leading item in state budgets, the Court ruled that the federal arbitration power 
in section 51(xxv) of the constitution did not extend to state railway employees. 
The High Court asserted its independence early on by refiising to grant a 
certificate to allow an appeal from its dedsion in Deakin and Lyne v. Webb to 
the Privy Council, despite the support of five state premiers for such an appeal.*' 
Subsequently, the Victorian Supreme Court aUowed an appeal on a similar case 
to go direct to the Privy Council which, in its dedsion in Webb v. Outtrim 
(1907),** rejected outright the immunities doctrine. The radical paper Tocsin, 
which had critidzed the High Court's earUer dedsions for violating common sense 
and elevating commonwealth employees above the common bulk of dtizens, 
reported the Privy CouncU decision with glee: "The Federal High Court has 
hitherto taken a deUght in kicking the State FuU Courts. Now the Privy Coundl 
has given the High Court a cUp in the ear, and as the Privy Coundl is daddy, 
the High Court cannot even talk back . . . Alf Deakin and BiU Lyne wiU have 
to pay up, so v^ dU Sammy Griffiths [sic], Toby Barton, and Dick O'Connor."*' 
But the High Court struck back and repudiated the Privy Coundl's authority 
by its dedsion in Baxter v. Commissioner of Taxation (New South Wales) (1907)."* 
The AustraUan Court's insistence upon its prime responsibiUty for interpreting 
the constitution was supported by the commonwealth govemment which amended 
thejudidary Act in 1907 to ensure that aU matters of consitutional interpretation 
would henceforward be removed directly into the High Court when they arose 
in a state court. 
The early Court was highly successfiil, and the rapid growth of its business 
required the addition of two judges by 1906. Speaking to the 1906 Judiciary 
Amendment BiU, Attorney-General Isaacs boasted that 
the High Court of AustraUa has gained the complete confidence of the public. Inherently 
it is in a position of enormous power and influence, and I think it is not too much to 
say that its dedsions have justified the highest antidpations of its best friends. Apart from 
the Supreme Court of the United States, I do not think there is any legal tribunal in the 
world which has so much power. 
Even allowing for an element of hyperbole from a man who was to be appointed 
to one of the new positions, the substance of Isaacs's claims was not seriously 
questioned. The High Court had earned the hearty approval of federal parUament 
and the respect of the public. 
Papers tabled in the parUament with the Judiciary Amendment BiU (1906) 
demonstrated the need for expanding the Court's personnel. The Court's registrar 
certified that the business of the Court had been growing rapidly and would 
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contmue to grow. In 1906 it was overburdened writh work,'^ and as weU there 
was incessant travel between capital dties. The record for the first six months 
of 1906 revealed the Court's extraordinary pace: 
In 1906, the High Court commenced its sittings by sitting at Hobart on the 19th of 
February. The sitting there occupied 5 days. From Hobart the Court came to Melbourne, 
and commenced a sitting on the 27th February, which occupied 25 days. The Court 
then proceeded to Sydney, and commenced a sitting there on the 2nd April, and after 
sitting some days proceeded to Brisbane, and held a sitting there on the 17th April, 
and after finishing its sitting, returned to Sydney, and resumed the sitting there. This 
sitting the Court was unable to complete before it had to leave for Melboume, to 
commence a sitting on the 28th May, where a long Ust was awaiting it. The Court 
continued sitting until the 29th June, when it adjourned for the winter vacation, leaving 
several cases undisposed of. Up to the 30th June, the Full Court had, in 1906, sat in 
Melbourne for 50 days, Sydney 31 days, Brisbane 4 days, and Hobart 3 days, making 
in aU 90 days, and heard 42 appeals, and a large number of motions. 
O'Connor, who also served as president of the Arbitration Court, had complained 
to the government that due to the increasing appeUate work of the High Court 
it was impossible for him to hear an important industrial dispute between the 
steamship owners and maritime unions. The delay entailed "practicaUy a denial 
of justice" to the parties involved.'* 
The chief justice confirmed that the Court's appeUate work was Ukely to keep 
it continuously engaged throughout the year, leaving no time for O'Connor's 
arbitration work or for the hearing of original cases by single judges. Griffith 
pointed out that the Court's tight schedule would collapse if any judge feU sick 
even for a few days. He complained that the continuous pressure of work left 
very Uttle time for research, or for preparation of written or even oral 
judgments." 
There was widespread support for increasing the number of justices on the Court. 
The only controversy was whether one or two justices were required. The legal 
profession in the larger states had long been of the opinion that there should be 
no fewer than five judges on such a senior court.'* Many of those who had 
opposed the estabUshment of the Court earlier on had now become its staunch 
supporters. For example Joseph Cook, who voted against the estabUshment of 
the Court in 1903, supported the expansion in 1906. In view of "the growing 
friction between the States and the Commonwealth", he argued that the High 
Court was "the only body to safeguard both Federal and State rights, and whatever 
objection there might have been to the constitution of the High Court had now 
vanished". Some poUticians gave only grudging support for increasing the 
number of justices, but they were persuaded by the sheer amount of Utigation. 
Several blamed parUament for overburdening the Court by passing a good deal 
of experimental and iU-considered legislation, but argued that since parUament 
had brought about the necessity for more judges, it should appoint them. Another 
speaker suggested that the Court's growing reputation as "a Court of reversal 
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as weU as a court of appeal" accounted for its overwork by attracting unsuccessfiil 
Utigants from the state courts.'* 
PubUc discussion at the time over the type of judidal appointee was interesting 
because it indicated the perception of the Court's role. Cook, who emphasized 
that the Court was the only body to safeguard both federal and state rights in 
conditions of growing friction, identified three groups whose claims for judidal 
appointment should be considered: members of state courts, those engaged in purely 
legal pursuits and lawyer-poUtidans. He emphasized that lawyer-poUtidans were 
not the only contenders." The Argus called for the appointment of people of the 
"very highest attainable standard" because, it claimed, "[tjhe High Court holds 
an eminent position, for its work affects not only individuals, but also interests 
of the state and of the Commonwealth, and the privileges of each when they 
come in confUct".*" 
Prime Minister Deakin offered the new positions to Chief Justice Way of South 
AustraUa and to Isaacs, his attorney-general. Way refused because of his age, so 
Isaacs was given the first position and Higgins the second.*' O'Connor was keen 
to reUnquish his duties as president of the Arbitration and Condliation Court, 
so Higgins took over that office. The appointments of Isaacs and Higgins met 
with almost complete acceptance. "It is a matter of not inconsiderable boast", 
commented the Age, "that in such examples of Ministerial patronage a choice has 
been made which is so completely ratified by the pubUc judgment."*^ Even Tocsin 
admitted that the appointments of Isaacs and Higgins "would be unobjectionable 
were not the trail of poUtical influence over it aU". Nevertheless, it concluded, 
"both may be regarded as fairly safe democrats"." There was some quibble that 
the two men were both Victorians. The only other possible contender of comparable 
rank was Sir Josiah Symon, a founding father and a leader of the Adelaide bar. 
He belonged to Reid's opposition faction, however, and had had stormy relations 
with the older High Court judges while serving as Reid's attorney-general.** 
The expansion of the Court in 1906 was not only a response to its increased 
workload, but was also a deUberate attempt by Deakin's govemment to consoUdate 
the Court's dominant position and redirect the thrast of its constitutional 
adjudication. Commenting anonymously in his regular EngUsh newspaper column, 
Deakin affirmed that his purpose then, as in 1903, was to estabUsh a "commanding 
Federal Court". His aim was to make the Court "thoroughly effident for purely 
legal work, but above aU things to add to its dominance in constitutional questions 
and aU interpretations ofthe Constitution". This was of crudal importance for 
the commonwealth parliament because the definition of its powers depended directly 
on the Court's judgment. Deakin admitted that his prime motive in expanding 
the Court was to enhance the constitutional power of the commonwealth: 
The ardent and aspiring FederaUsts who look forward to the time when every truly 
national fiinction shall be in the hands of the Federal Govemment while the States and 
their Courts shall be restricted to subsidiary local affairs have no more zealous and 
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consistent aUy than the present Prime Minister. The mere drcumstance that this 
amendment of the Judidary Act of 1903 comes from him is suffident indication of 
the true motive for enlarging the Bench of the High Court. 
The new appointees, Isaacs and Higgins, brought to the Court "a pronounced 
poUtical radicaUsm".** Like Deakin, they were both ardent federaUsts intent upon 
expanding commonwealth powers. Since that meant rejecting the doctrines of 
impUed prohibitions and immunities that had been championed by the original 
three justices, the harmony and consensus of the original Court was shattered. 
These doctrines were not anchored in spedfic clauses of the constitutional text, 
but depended on a prior understanding of the nature of the federal compact that 
the constitution implemented. In the Court's early opinions, Griffith rejected stricdy 
Uteral construction of the text in favour of an approach that relied on an overall 
appredation of the federal character of the constitution that respected the integrity 
of the states. As he put it, the constitution was not "to be constraed merely by 
the aid of a dictionary, as by an astral intelUgence, and as a mere decree of the 
Imperial Parliament without reference to history".*^ The two new justices, 
however, looked forward to a more integrated nation with a dominant national 
govemment, rather than backwards to a historical compact between jealous states. 
The radical and progressive UberaUsm of the new justices who favoured national 
integration was at variance vnth the conservative UberaUsm of the senior justices 
who were more in favour of states' rights and the status quo. As a result the 
Court was consistently spUt three votes to two in its leading constitutional decisions, 
with Isaacs and Higgins being consistent and highly critical dissenters. This division 
plagued the Court for the next seven years, untU the appointment of three new 
justices in 1913. It was not resolved until the Engineers dedsion of 1920, and in 
recent years has re-emerged in the Koowarta and Tasmanian Dam cases that will 
be discussed in chapter 5. 
The method of constitutional interpretation foUowed by the original High Court 
had suited the deUcate balance of political forces in the first years of federation. 
Used to virtual autonomy before federation, the states would hardly have tolerated 
a centraUzing court immediately afterwards. Moreover, the consistent unanimity 
of the original Court in constitutional cases until 1906 was a significant factor 
in estabUshing its credibiUty. As Griffith said in paying tribute to O'Connor in 
November 1912: "Our minds ran to a great extent in simUar grooves."** After 
1906, the basic division within the Court over interpreting the constitution reflected 
the beginnings of a new stage in Australian development. The factions on the 
High Court represented two confUcting views of AustraUa: one as a nation of 
states which had formed a Umited federal compact; the other as an integrated nation. 
Because most of the senior justices who made up the majority viewed the 
constitution as a Umited federal compact, the High Court had become, even at 
this early stage, an impediment to national development and change. 
If the balancing, discretionary approach of the original High Court was necessary 
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to accommodate state sensitivities in the first years of federation, such an approach 
was possible because of the poUtical environment in which the Court was operating. 
This was not antithetical to such a jurisprudence since the Labor party was as 
yet an immature thfrd party in federal politics. Nineteenth-century parliamentary 
practices, assodated with loose-knit political alUances and fairly autonomous 
members, stiU held sway. Most important of all, the general consensus that 
supported the constitutional order was largely intact and the spirit of compromise 
that had characterized the founding conventions had not been destroyed. By the 
end ofthe first decade of federation, the poUtical environment had been transformed 
by the Labor party. Because of this change, the divisions on the Court became 
highly significant. Since the complicated interaction between Labor politics and 
the High Court is a central theme of our study, its origins need to be set out 
in some detail. 
The Labor party and the beginnings of confrontation 
The AustraUan constitution and the High Court were both set in place before 
the Labor party became a major force in national poUtics. Had federation occurred 
a decade later, it is probable that the constitution would have been quite different. 
As it was, the most vigorous opposition to the constitution and to judidal review 
came from the fledgling Labor party. As the champion of populist reformism and 
egaUtarianism, Labor was a strong advocate of parliamentary supremacy against 
the indirect and anti-democratic aspects ofthe constitution. But the colonial Labor 
parties were only being formed in the last decade of the nineteenth century when 
the constitution was bdng drafted. Consequently they had virtually no say in 
drafting the constitution and their campaign against its adoption was largely 
ineffective.*' 
Not surprisingly W. M. Hughes, Labor's spokesman on judicial affairs, spoke 
out in 1903 against the Judidary BiU that estabUshed the High Court. It was 
the people's prerogative to amend the constitution, he said, and the judges' function 
simply to say what the law was. Hughes rejected the view, put forward by attomey-
general Deakin, that the Court's main fimction would be to amend the constitution 
to keep pace with national development, and to adjust it to release excessive poUtical 
pressures. Piecemeal fiddling by the judiciary would be ineffective and would only 
blunt popular pressures for more sweeping reforms. Rather than "going round 
or over or under stone waUs", Hughes advocated popular plebisdtes, "that straight-
forward way of knocking the waUs down and have done with it".™ He blamed 
those who drafted the constitution for making the amendment procedure too 
difficult, and thereby unduly restricting the popular wiU. 
Consequently, it was hardly surprising that the federal Labor party soon came 
into confUct with the High Court. As a junior coaUtion partner to Deakin's 
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governing Liberals from 1905-8, Labor had seen some of its favourite policies and 
most carefiiUy laid legislative strategies rejected by the Griffith Court. Deakin 
and his Labor alUes had put together an elaborate "New Protection" deal that 
tied the benefits of tariff protection to industrial relations. AustraUan manufacturers 
would be protected only if they shared the benefits with labour by providing fair 
and reasonable working conditions. In his famous Harvester arbitration decision 
(1906)," Higgins applied the high excise duty and severe penalties of the Exdse 
Tariff Act against H. V. McKay, AustraUa's largest manufacturer of farm 
implements, because the defendant faUed to provide the conditions of employment 
that would have entitled the firm to an exemption. Higgins objected to "the 
shunting of legislative responsibiUty" for such grave economic and sodal questions 
to a court, but nevertheless seemed to reUsh the opportunity for transforming 
industrial arbitration in AustraUa. In defining a "fair and reasonable wage", Higgins 
rejected the free-enterprise method of determining wages according to business 
interests and considerations of profit. Instead, he defined it in terms of "the normal 
needs of the average employee, regarded as a human being living in a dviUzed 
community".'^ 
This key arbitration dedsion reinforced Labor's transition from an anti-federalist 
to a centralist-orientated party. Labor was in the process of aUaying its initial 
suspidons ofthe new system of national govemment. Party leaders were beginning 
to appredate the effidency and sweep of national legislation that could instigate 
sodal reform through a single Act rather than by a patchwork of state legislative 
initiatives. Winning federal office was now a possibiUty, and perhaps an easier 
route to legislative reform than bringing to heel reactionary state upper Houses 
which had been appointed by previous conservative govemments or which were 
elected on a limited property franchise." Higgins' judgment swept the Labor 
Leagues into the army of "New Protectionists", as Deakin had predicted,'* but 
the legislation it implemented did not stand up to the scrutiny of the Griffitli 
Court. The manufacturers of agricultural implements refiised to obey the 
controversial Exdse Tariff Act, and the High Court upheld them by ruUng it 
unconstitutional in The King v. Barger and The Commonwealth v. McKay (1908)." 
The Court decided that the Exdse Tariff Act was an attempt to regulate the 
conditions of manufacture which were state matters, and therefore it was not a 
valid exerdse of the federal taxing power. Moreover, the Court majority held 
that even if the taxation power could be stretched to include such indirect regubtion 
of a state's domestic affairs, there was an implied prohibition against such federal 
interference. 
Isaacs and Higgins presented typical strong dissenting opinions. In their view, 
federal powers were plenary and could be restricted only by express Umitations 
found in the text ofthe constitution. The commonwealth Act was to be construed 
according to "the natural meaning of the language used", and according to this 
test Isaacs and Higgins maintained that the legislation was a vaUd exerdse of excise 
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taxation. Griffith claimed that "[t]he question for decision is entirely one of 
constraction". And so it was. The implications of the dedsion were enormous 
because new protection was a key poUcy of the govemment and one of the strongest 
Unks in the fragUe alliance between Deakin's Liberals and the Labor party. As 
weU, Labor's attitude both to the Court and to the constitution, and its fiiture 
strategies for industrial reform were strongly influenced by the outcome of the 
76 
case. 
Despite such unfavourable Court dedsions, and no doubt partly because they 
were carried by the narrow three-to-two majority, Labor was attracted to federal 
rather than state initiatives for implementing its industrial reforms. At its 1908 
Brisbane Convention the Labor party pledged itself to constitutional amendments 
that would enable the commonwealth parUament to implement the "new 
protection", to nationaUze monopoUes and to expand the powers of the 
commonwealth Arbitration Court. That this slate of proposals was so limited was 
due in large part to opposition from the NSW branch of the Labor party. Holman, 
the rising star of the New South Wales party who was to become deputy premier 
in 1910 and premier in 1913, was an eloquent champion of state rights because 
he expected a Labor victory in New South Wales well in advance of a federal 
Labor victory." 
The Griffith Court had already rejected "new protection", and in 1908 it was 
probable that it would also restrict the federal government's legislative power to 
regulate trasts and monopoUes. It soon did so in the leading case oiHuddart Parker 
V. Moorehead (1909) which emasculated the commonwealth's corporation power, 
thus making it virtuaUy impossible for the commonwealth parliament to outlaw 
restrictive trade practices.'* The Court ruled, with Isaacs dissenting, that the 
sections of the Industries Preservation Act prohibiting monopoUes were invalid 
because they purported to regulate commercial trading, which was a state matter. 
Basing its decision squarely on the immunities doctrine, the Court insisted that 
corporate trading activities were a matter for state regulation. Hence the 
commonwealth's section 51(xx) power with respect to "trading or finandal 
corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth" was to be limited 
accordingly. The majority dedsion led Isaacs to exclaim: "The distinct unambiguous 
words of the power, couched in language quite unequivocal, do not —so it is 
argued—mean what they say."" In reporting the dedsion. Labor Call asked 
whether "it was not time we resolved to wipe out all restrictions on 
Commonwealth power".*" 
Thus, as early as 1908, Labor began its standard practice of prefadng policy 
planks with a commitment to appropriate constitutional amendments, and it did 
so partly in response to adverse judicial decisions by the High Court. The federal 
party campaigned in the 1910 election on national arbitration and regulation of 
monopoUes. Labor capped its extraordinary rise to power by vanning both the 
Senate and House of Representatives. Immediately upon taking office, the new 
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Labor government plunged into the business of constitutional reform. When the 
strong New South Wales party also won that key state a few months later, severe 
tensions developed within the Labor movement over amending the constitution. 
The McGowen-HoUnan state Labor govemment was as zealous in defending states' 
rights as the Fisher-Hughes federal Labor govemment was in undermining them. 
At Hughes's insistence the federal Labor party adopted in 1910 a slate of 
constitutional amendments that were much more centralist than the proposals that 
had been approved in 1908. The new proposals were designed to give the federal 
government plenary legislative powers over trade and commerce, corporate and 
monopoly affairs, and industrial relations. These proposals were put to referenda 
as a slate in 1911 and separately again in 1913, but on both occasions were easUy 
rejected.*' The federal Labor party's campaign was effectively nuUified by Hohnan 
and the New South Wales parUamentary party. For exaniple in the 1913 state 
election campaign, Holman countered the federal push for increased industrial 
powers with concrete proposals for strengthening his state's industrial laws and 
revamping the state Court of Industrial Arbitration, The respective electorates 
preferred Holman's federaUsm to Hughes's centraUsm; the federal Labor govemment 
was narrowly defeated, with all its proposed constitutional amendments, in 1913, 
while Holman's state govemment was re-elected with a greatly increased majority. 
Labor's campaign to amend the constitution was defeated by federal-state 
antagonisms within the party itself. The dilemma that Labor faced was an impossible 
one; the party was incUned to reject federalism in favour of unitary government 
and parUamentary sovereignty, but had to work within the existing federal system. 
As a consequence Labor's own party stracture was essentially federal. The national 
Labor party had been formed by the state parties just after federation, and the 
state parties continued as powerfiil, semi-autonomous branches. By participating 
in the federal system of goverment Labor reinforced in practice what it tended 
to reject in principle. The success of the state branches, especiaUy in New South 
Wales, undermined the party's case against federaUsm and gave the powerful state 
parties a vested interest in its retention. Thus Labor's opposition to, and persistent 
attempts to amend, the constitution were severely compromised by the party's 
internal federal structure. 
While carrying on its sustained campaign for constitutional reform between 
1910 and 1913, the Fisher-Hughes Labor government was also brawUng 
intermittently with the Griffith Court over attempts to deal with monopoUes 
and trade combinations within the ambit of existing law. AustraUan industry was 
dominated by a few large corporations and riddled with restrictive trade practices. 
There were thirty-three trusts and trade combinations operating in the country, 
according to Hughes, and between them they controlled the prices of important 
commodities such as coal, oU, frdghts, sugar, confectionery, tobacco, wheat flour, 
bricks, timber and meats.*^ Labor's attitude to trusts and monopolies was very 
different from the prevalent Liberal view. Liberals in America and in Australia 
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opposed trade restrictions in the name of free market competition which they 
wanted to restore. To the Labor party, according to BiUy Hughes, trasts and 
monopoUes were "an inevitable stage in the evolution of production as a sodal 
fiinction", but they needed to be regulated or owned by the government rather 
than private individuals. The Labor govemment wanted power over trasts and 
monopoUes not to restore competition, but "to nationaUze them if necessary, to 
control and regulate them, and to make what laws are essential from time to time, 
both for the benefit of the producer of the article and the community 
generaUy".*' Labor wanted national rather than state power over corporations 
because trasts and combinations were essentially national in scope. Without a 
generous expansion of legislative power through constitutional amendment, 
however, the federal Labor government's arsenal for regulation or nationalization 
was inadequate. This was demonstrated by the failure of its attempts to regulate 
two of the most powerfiil sectors, sugar and coal. 
The federal Labor government appointed a Royal Commission to inquire into 
aU aspects of the sugar industry in 1911. That industry was dominated by the 
Colonial Sugar Refining Company (CSR) which enjoyed a virtual monopoly over 
refining and marketing. When CSR officials refused to co-operate either by 
answering questions or producing documents, the government strengthened the 
Royal Commission Act to force their compUance. This amendment was held by 
the High Court to be unconstitutional, Isaacs and Higgins dissenting, on the ground 
that the federal government was exceeding its legislative powers by attempting 
to authorize investigation of the internal affairs of trading corporations. As 
O'Connor had recently died, the Court's decision relied on the casting vote of 
the Chief Justice.** The High Court granted a certificate for appeal to the Privy 
Coundl, the only time it has ever done so, but the Privy Council upheld the 
Griffith-Barton dedsion.*' Without CSR's testimony, the Royal Commission 
was ineffective. 
Labor's attempt to break up the Coal Vend, a combination of the largest coal 
producers from the rich northern coalfields of New South Wales and major 
interstate steamship companies that fixed the production and price of coal, was 
just as ineffective. The Coal Vend had been formed in 1906, and action against 
it under the Industries Preservation Act had been in progress intermittently since 
1907. The Huddart Parker case had removed the principal powers from the Act, 
but left the Comptroller of Customs with some powers of investigation. Proceedings 
against the Coal Vend were being prepared when Labor swept into federal office 
in 1910. These were initiated on Hughes's instructions immediately he took over 
as attorney-general. After a monumental trial, Isaacs ruled in favour ofthe Crown 
and ordered the combination to break up.** Isaacs's elaborate opinion was 
overturned, however, when the case was appealed to a full bench of the High 
Court. According to the fuU Court, the actual intent of the parties to the 
combination, upon which the case turned, was not to cause detriment to the public 
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which was outlawed by the Act, but only "to put the Newcastle coal trade on 
a satisfactory basis, which would enable them to pay adequate wages to their men 
and to seU their coal at a price remunerative to themselves, having regard to the 
capital and risk involved in the enterprise". 
For Hughes, in his battle to control trusts and monopolies, the Industries 
Preservation Act was a two-edged sword. A right-wing paper had caUed the Act 
"an excess of doctrinaire prindples"** even though it had been introduced by the 
earUer Deakin Liberals and was the favoured trust-busting instrament of Labor's 
parUamentary opponents. Hughes took the Act and demonstrated by its spectacular 
failures against the sugar and coal combines that it was impotent; as he vividly 
expressed it, "a barren fig tree" that produced "Dead Sea fruit, which has left 
the companies no worse off than they were before, and benefited the pubUc not 
at all".*' Hughes was attacked in parUament for deUberately dragging out court 
proceedings against the Coal Vend while at the same time using the delays and 
setbacks to support his campaign for increased federal powers. In the Kemf judgment 
in 1912, Griffith complained that the govemment had abandoned fair play for 
technicaUties and quibbles. Hughes responded angrily by accusing the chief justice 
of "a gratuitous and deUberate insult".'" Relations between the Griffith Court 
and the Labor government had reached a dangerous low. 
For Labor, these adverse court decisions confirmed the need for constitutional 
reform. Before the first referenda were put in 1911, Hughes had argued that the 
wealth and influence of giant corporations and trusts threatened the weU-bdng 
of the nation. Yet he claimed that the High Court had "shom" the federal 
government's power to deal with corporations and left the citizens exposed to 
corporate ravages. 
If commerce was one pillar of national prosperity, industrial relations was the 
other. In this area Hughes charged that the Griffith Court, by "narrow and 
technical" renderings of the commonwealth parUament's industrial power in section 
51(xxv), had produced "the apotheosis of absurdity" by Umiting that power so 
as to give immunity from commonwealth legislation to the states." Similarly in 
1913 Hughes claimed that the adverse dedsion of the Privy Coundl in upholding 
the High Court's dedsion concerning the legaUty of the Coal Vend demonstrated 
the need for holding the forthcoming referenda. Without carrying the referenda 
proposals there could be no effective legal restriction on combines, claimed Hughes: 
"We have done aU possible under existing law."'^ The Labor press agreed. "The 
powers of the Federation have been cut down by successive dedsions of the High 
Court", concluded the Labor Call in a critical review of the Court's dedsions, 
"untU at present they are admittedly futile."" 
If Hughes was unscrupulous in exploiting the Court's adverse dedsions as part 
of his government's broader strategy for constitutional change, the Court had 
left itself open to such treatment. It had consistently sided with monopoUsts and 
cartels against the Labor government's attempts to force their investigation and 
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regulation. In the polarization of Australian poUtics that occurred during the first 
decade of federation, the Court tended to favour the anti-Labor side: corporate 
rather than government control; restricted rather than expansive interpretation 
of federal constitutional powers; and the claims of employers over those of workers. 
"Wherever possible", the Australian Worker complmied in 1910, "the High Court 
wiU limit and curtail the powers given by the Constitution."'* After a typical 
dedsion that overtumed an award judgment by Higgins in favour of BHP company 
workers, the same paper pubUshed a cartoon of Darling, chairman of BHP, telling 
a servant: "I have ordered the High Court to attend on me. When they arrive, 
show them into the waiting room until I am ready! And, by-the-way, show that 
judge chap Higgins the door!"" 
In the growing confrontation between the High Court and the Labor 
govemment, the Court was vulnerable because its method of interpreting the 
constitution, a mixture of judidal discretion and gruff patemaUsm only thinly 
disguised by the immunities doctrines, was palpably insuffident for striking down 
important govemment legislation. The credibiUty of the Court was fiirther damaged 
by the persistent strong dissents of Isaacs and Higgins who favoured an expansion 
of central constitutional power. Moreover, in juggling state immunities and federal 
powers, the majority justices, Griffith, Barton and O'Connor, were not always 
logical or consistent, espedaUy in the troubled area of industrial relations. In 1910 
Higgins drew pubUc attention to the "blind aUey" into which the Arbitration 
Court was being driven by the dedsions of the High Court. Higgins blamed the 
High Court for burdening the Arbitration Court with a "veritable Serbonian bog 
of technicaUties" that jeopardized its practical fiinctioning.'* Hughes pubUdzed 
Higgins's strong critidsms of the High Court while the Labor press launched 
its own attack. After a series of adverse dedsions on arbitration cases in 1911, 
the Australian Worker concluded: "Arbitration is a great experiment, spoilt by 
the High Court, where 'certain elderly gentlemen in wigs' wiU not aUow the 
common rule, so that individual employers can continue sweating . . . Arbitration 
is being discredited, and it seems almost a conspiracy to drive the workers back 
to strike action."*^ 
When O'Connor died in November 1912, in the closing days of the fourth 
parUament, Hughes seized the opportunity for deaUng with the Court. With the 
Court now evenly spUt between Griffith and Barton on the one hand and Isaacs 
and Higgins on the other, the power of appointing new justices was the key to 
the Court's future. Instead of one appointment to replace O'Connor, Hughes 
proposed three. The additional two positions were created by rashing a Judiciary 
Amendment BiU through ParUament in the last two weeks of the sitting in 
December 1912. The three appointments were put forward by Hughes in the 
months prior to the defeat of the Labor government at the May 1913 elections. 
Hughes's bold initiatives have been described by many as a blatant attempt at 
"packing" the High Court.'* For the Labor attorney-general, it was one more 
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bold attempt at removing constitutional restraints on popular govemment. 
Through this daring plan Hughes provided the Labor government with the 
opportunity of appointing a block of three justices who could influence the direction 
ofthe Court for the next couple of decades. AustraUan High Court justices have 
been characterized by longevity. Their average term of office has been eighteen 
years, almost a third longer than the average term of a United States Supreme 
Court justice for the same period which is about thirteen years. The three Labor 
appointments proved no exception to the rule: Gavan Duffy served for twenty-
two years. Powers for sixteen and Rich for an astonishing term of thirty-seven 
years that, to Labor's subsequent regret, spanned the terms of office ofthe Curtin 
and Chifley Labor governments in the 1940s. Hence this block of three new 
appointments was cracial for the fiiture direction of the Court. 
To his credit, Hughes made a reasonably strong case for expanding the size 
of the Court.'"*' Higgins was vfrtuaUy full-time president of the Arbitration and 
CondUation Court; the number of High Court cases that came within its original 
jurisdiction had grown significantly with the proliferation of federal legislation; 
and the Court travelled extensively—during 1912 it sat in every capital dty, and 
in Melboume and Sydney on three and four different occasions respectively. These 
reasons were simUar to the ones used by Deakin in 1906. Hughes also reUed heavily 
on two additional reasons that linked the authority of the High Court to the 
number of its justices. As an appellate court, the High Court should not be less 
numerous than the state Supreme Courts appealed from. And in future, according 
to a complementary amendment to thejudidary Act that Hughes brought forward, 
constitutional decisions would require a majority decision rather than the chief 
justice's casting vote. 
Deakin, now leader of the opposition, complimented Hughes on having adopted 
"something approaching an adequate view of the status, importance and influence 
ofthe High Court". But he warned that the new Judidary Amendment BiU marked 
not only a stage in the growth of this Commonwealth, and of its responsibUities, but 
a critical event. Having regard to the present division of opinion amongst members 
of the existing Bench, even one appointment may possibly give a very dedsive turn 
to the interpretation of constitutional law affecting ParUament and the whole 
Commonwealth. 
Prime Minister Fisher was less discreet than his clever attorney-general in 
reveaUng the thinking of the Labor government. Neither courts nor the legal 
profession had a monopoly on constitutional knowledge, he claimed, and therefore 
they should not be treated with awe. Fisher reminded parUament that High Court 
judges came from poUtical backgrounds and retained biases and prejudices on the 
bench: 
The High Court is constituted of eminent gentlemen, each of whom has had experience 
in the field of poUtics. In addition to being members of the legal profession, they have 
been pohtidans fighting on the floor of Parliament with as much vim and shaU we 
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say, party prejudice, as does any member of this House. We regard them as distinguished 
jurists, free from party poUtical bias in the discharge of their duties, and we must assume 
that they do their best according to their high intellectuaUty, in spite of the unconsdous 
bias and prejudice which, as human beings, they must carry with them.'"^ 
As early as 1908, Holman had charged that the High Court's dedsion in the 
New Protection case depended not on constitutional necessity, but on "the 
temperament, the idiosyncrades and the inteUectual standpoint of the majority 
of the Court"."" Now Labor was in a position to do something about that. 
In its first appointment the Labor government was a model of discretion. It 
appointed Frank Gavan Duffy, a renowned advocate and a leader of the Melbourne 
Bar.'"* Gavan Duffy's father was a prominent Irish nationalist who had made a 
second poUtical career in Victorian poUtics, but Gavan Duffy himself had remained 
aloof from poUtics. Though sixty at the time, he lived to become the Labor-
appointed chief justice from 1931-35. The choice of Duffy was universaUy acclaimed, 
but the subsequent appointments of Powers and Piddington created a furore. Charles 
Powers was the commonwealth soUcitor-general and had worked for the Labor 
government in that capadty. He had a background in Queensland poUtics where 
he had been a senior non-Labor leader. Most of the public criticism was directed 
at the fact that he was a soUdtor and not a barrister, regardless of his being one 
of AustraUa's leading lawyers. 
Most of the controversy concerned Piddington. He was a scholar, a practising 
barrister and something of a poUtical gadfly. He had defeated Premier Dibbs in 
the 1895 New South Wales election and served a term as a supporter of Reid's 
Free Trade party. He was known for his radical views. Hughes was 
uncharacteristicaUy inept in sounding out Piddington's views on federal powers 
before appointing him. WhUe returning to Australia from England, Piddington 
had wired in reply to an inquiry from his brother-in-law who was in Hughes's 
service that he was in sympathy with the supremacy of commonwealth over state 
powers.'"' Hughes then announced Piddington's appointment and Piddington 
accepted the position on arrival in AustraUa, but only on the condition that his 
independence was recognized. The New South Wales and Victorian Bars formaUy 
resolved not to congratulate either Powers or Piddington on their appointments. 
The press was particularly vindictive against Piddington and accused Hughes of 
packing the Court. Despite assurances from Barton and the New South Wales 
chief justice, Piddington succumbed to the intense opposition and resigned. Hughes 
was fiirious and accused Piddington of cowardice, but Barton thought he had 
adhered to a standard of honour above the ordinary. 
In Piddington's place Labor appointed George Rich, an eminent Sydney barrister 
who had recently been appointed to the New South Wales Supreme Court. Rich 
was the protot)rpe of judges who came to dominate the High Court after the 
founding era; he was a distinguished legal expert without poUtical experience or 
party affiUation. 
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Even before Piddington's unexpected withdrawal. Labor's poUcy on judidal 
appointments had been shaped by poUtical considerations. The poUtical environment 
was such that Labor's original dedsion was to appoint a spectram of types to 
the court. Even Hughes's mistake in solidting Piddington's views on federalism 
prior to his appointment derived from Labor's position as a new reform party 
in AustraUan poUtics because Labor had no stable of proven candidates from which 
to make a choice. When Piddington withdrew in the face of viralent attack. Labor 
chose to appoint a neutral legaUst. IronicaUy, the appointment of Rich, the least 
Ukely Labor preference, was poUticaUy motivated since Labor's hand was forced 
by the poUtical faUout from the Piddington debacle. 
Thus it was the Labor party that instituted the practice of appointing technical 
experts who were aUegedly apoUtical to the High Court. These judges were 
instramental in channeUing the High Court's constitutional jurispradence towards 
a neutral legaUsm. And Labor did this for poUtical reasons. 
World War I interlude 
During the term of the first majority Labor government, 1910-13, the federal 
constitution had been subjected to increasing centraUst pressures while the High 
Court, in defending the original compact of Australian federaUsm, had become 
poUtidzed. These grovmg confrontations, however, were defiised in 1914 because 
grave matters of national and international poUtics intervened and forced 
constitutional issues into the background. Labor was briefly out of office in 1913-14 
after the Liberal party scraped in with a majority of one at the 1913 election. 
Cook's Liberal govemment was largely ineffectual because Labor retained a strong 
Senate majority. Most of the Cook govemment's energies were dissipated in trying 
to obtain the necessary conditions for a double dissolution by manoeuvring a 
reluctant Senate into rejecting proposed govemment legislation. When that 
dissolution finally occurred, it was granted by the govemor-general on the basis 
of contrived and fUmsy grounds and over the Senate's protestations.'"* AU Cook's 
carefiil scheming came to nothing because Labor was returned to government in 
the 1914 elections with a sizeable majority in both Houses of parUament. 
Labor's second term in office as a majority government was markedly different 
from the first. Absent were the constitutional turmoU, the great legal battles and 
the continuous agitation for sweeping constitutional changes. The reason for this 
was the Great War which was declared on 4 August 1914 during the election 
campaign. Labor won the battle of words with a pledge to support Britain "to 
our last man and our last shiUing". Its energies whUe in office were totaUy absorbed 
in honouring that pledge and organizing AustraUa's massive war effort. More than 
three hundred thousand AustraUan volunteers fought in France, the Middle East 
and at the disastrous GaUipoU landing, their contribution to the fighting attested 
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by their 64 per cent casualty rates which were higher than those of any other 
Empure country including Britain.'"' Despite this extraordinary volunteer 
response. Prime Minister Hughes accepted the advice of Westminster poUtidans 
and the insatiable generals and tried to introduce conscription to feed stiU fiirther 
the bloody trench warfare in France. In the face of bitter opposition from within 
the Labor movement, Hughes twice forced the issue of conscription to a popular 
plebisdte but was defeated on both occasions. After the first plebiscite in 1916, 
he was forced out of the Labor party and led a large block of senior Labor 
parUamentarians into a new Nationalist party that absorbed the old Liberal party. 
The federal parUamentary Labor party was shattered.'"* It managed to hold on 
to only twenty-two out of the seventy-five seats in the House of Representatives 
in the 1917 elections and languished in opposition untU 1929. 
The constitutional impUcations of these events were enormous. Labor's passion 
for sodal reform and its solid majorities in both Houses of parUament in 1914 
spelt constitutional confrontation. As it turned out. Labor's energies were 
channelled into the war or dissipated as the party was torn apart in the bitter 
conscription debate. For its part, the High Court co-operated in the national cause 
by UberaUy construing the commonwealth's defence power to permit near-dictatorial 
federal action in executing the war effort. The constitutionality of the War 
Precautions Act 1914-16, which aUowed the executive government to make 
virtuaUy any regulations it thought desirable "for the more effectual prosecution 
ofthe war", including regulation of "the disposal or use of any property, goods, 
articles or things of any kind", was upheld by the Court. The leading case, Farey 
V. Burvett (1916), that upheld the vaUdity of commonwealth laws that authorized 
the fixing of bread prices in Victoria, provided the judges with a forum for 
expressing their patriotic support for the war effort. War, said Isaacs, was the 
"ultima ratio of the nation".'"' Consequently in time of war, the defence power 
became "the pivot of the Constitution" with Umits "bounded only by the power 
of self-preservation". During war the Court would co-operate by giving the 
broadest possible interpretation to the defence power, and otherwise staying its 
hand. Isaacs's opinion has the ring of grand rhetoric: 
When we see before us a mighty and unexampled struggle in which we as a people, 
as an indivisible people, are not spectators but actors, when we, as a judidal tribunal, 
can see beyond controversy that coordinated effort in every department of our life may 
be needed to ensure success and maintain our freedom, the Court has then reached the 
hmit of its jurisdiction. If the measure questioned may conceivably in such drcumstances 
even inddentally aid the effectuation of the power of defence, the Court must hold 
its hand and leave the rest to the judgment and vdsdom and discretion of the Parliament 
and the Executive it controls—for they alone have the information, the knowledge and 
the experience and also, by the Constitution, the authority to judge of the situation 
and lead the nation to the desired end. 
After Farey v. Burvett, the Court upheld aU the government's defence regulations 
that were chaUenged. These included regulations for the detention of suspects. 
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deportation of aUens, property protection, confiscation and disposition of enemy 
subjects' property, and prevention of propaganda prejudidal to recraitment. 
Judidal patriotism allowed the reconciUation of section 92 and the war effort. 
In the Wheat case (1915),"^ the Court held that section 92 did not forbid 
compulsory acquisition of wheat under a state marketing scheme. Nor did section 
92 prevent the compulsory holding of cattle for purchase by imperial authorities, 
according to the Court in Duncan v. Queensland (1916). 
Prime Minister Hughes's relentless pursuit of the imperial war received no check 
from the High Court, but it destroyed the Labor party. After the 1916 spUt, 
Labor was relegated to a secondary role in federal poUtics for the next thirteen 
years. From the opposition benches it could neither instigate constitutional reform, 
nor force the pace of change with progressive legislation, nor influence the 
composition of the Court through judicial appointments. In Dr Evatt's words. 
Labor had entered "a long era of powerlessness and futile opposition"."* 
The Engineers decision: realignment 
The constitutional revolution effected by the Engineers case occurred independently 
of direct, pressures from Labor, but it was not independent of the overall poUtical 
environment that Labor's entry into Australian politics produced. The Engineers 
case greatly expanded the federal parliament's arbitration power by interpreting 
it to cover state-run enterprises involved in industrial disputes that spread beyond 
the limits of any one state. Since the national structure of key unions enabled 
industrial disputes to be easily spread interstate, the commonwealth government 
gained effective arbitral control over national wages.'" This indirectly satisfied 
a key plank in the Labor party's platform and a growing demand of the working 
population. As early as 1910 when it critidzed the High Court for taking a "narrow 
legal view of powers under the Constitution", the Bulletin had proclaimed: 
It is evident that before the Federal Court can be of any real consequence, industrial 
regulation must be taken from the squabbUng States. If the Constitution means anything 
it is that Australia is an industrial unity. It is absurd that the States may set up laws 
to advantage themselves, and the High Court may not vary these anti-federal 
conditions. 
The impact of the Engineers decision extended far beyond the area of industrial 
relations. Because it discredited the doctrine ofthe immunity of instramentaUties 
and substituted a more Uteral method of interpretation, the dedsion foreshadowed 
a considerably broader scope for all federal legislative powers. This loosened the 
severe constitutional restraints that had weighted the federal system so heavily 
against the implementation of Labor policies. The Labor party had shifted the 
focus of AustraUan poUtics away from the balanced federaUsm of the founders 
and their zealous concern for state rights towards a more nationalist, centraUzed 
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constitutional order. Though the federal Labor party was decimated and in 
opposition, its presence ensured that AustraUan poUtics would remain considerably 
left of the founders' centre. Since the dimensions of Australian politics had been 
changed irrevocably by Labor, some constitutional realignment in favour of its 
preference for stronger central powers was necessary. Moreover if the High Court 
was to continue to function as an independent institution there had to be some 
neutral ground on which constitutional adjudication could be based, other than 
the personal prestige of the judges and respect for an original compact that had 
been framed without Labor's partidpation. The Engineers decision provided both. 
The Engineers dedsion was possible because of personnel changes on the Court. 
Griffith resigned in October 1919 and Barton died in January 1920. In their places 
were appointed Adrian Knox as chief justice and H. E. Starke, both leading 
barristers. Starke, like Rich, was without poUtical experience. Knox had at one 
time served a term in the New South Wales Legislative Assembly, apparently 
because of a fleeting interest in poUtics, but he was first and foremost a legal man 
of conservative instincts.'" Because of these changes, legalists predominated on 
the Court that dedded the Engineers case. Though Isaacs and Higgins, who were 
reformist centraUsts, led the reversal and Isaacs wrote the majority opinion, the 
numbers were made up by legaUsts Knox, Rich and Starke. This coaUtion of 
reformist centraUsts and legaUsts was possible because Isaacs and Higgins in their 
own judidal approaches had already integrated the method of more Uteral 
constraction of the constitution vdth a strong preference for expansion of federal 
powers. Commitment to a literal method rather than the substantive effect of 
expanding federal powers may have been the legaUsts' motive in joining the judidal 
coup, but whatever the motive, this coaUtion of new judges abruptly ended the 
era of the founding Court and overruled its key constitutional doctrines. 
Thus, in broad terms, the Engineers decision was both a response to, and a 
consequence of. Labor-related poUtics. It was a response because it reaUgned the 
constitutional balance to accommodate an expansion of federal powers. In addition 
it substituted a Uteral technique of constitutional interpretation for the early Court's 
balandng of commonwealth and state powers that was becoming virtually 
unworkable. Pure legal technique could appeal to aU parties in Australian politics 
whereas commitment to a particular political order meant taking political sides. 
In this dual respect the Engineers decision was the Court's belated response to 
the changed poUtical environment. The dedsion was the work of a Court that 
was beginning to be dominated by professional lawyers. The divisiveness produced 
by Labor's entry into poUtics had virtuaUy ensured that legalists rather than senior 
statesmen would henceforth be appointed to the High Court bench. Such judges 
would better maintain the integrity and independence of the Court in the 
atmosphere of extreme partisanship that had resulted from the rise of the Labor 
party in AustraUan politics. 
The Engineers case remains the leading AustraUan decision because it laid down 
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the broad prindples of constitutional interpretation that the Court foUows to this 
day. A leading newspaper of the time reported: 
This is a judgment of momentous importance, providing new prindples of interpretation 
. . . The judgment of D'Emden v. Pedder is overthrown, and aU the dedsions based 
on it. People must wonder how long this new interpretation wiU last. The question 
is: Are there any such things as State rights? The people have lived for a number of 
years under the impression the State instrumentaUties are immune from Commonwealth 
interference, and they have refused in referendums to extend Commonwealth powers. 
Now the High Court has done what the people would not do. 
This new interpretation has lasted. In 1967 Menzies described the Engineers dedsion 
as "a great landmark in the history of interpretation" because "the method of 
interpreting Commonwealth powers there approved was revolutionary, and has 
had and wiU continue to have a great influence upon the scope and weight of 
Commonwealth powers"."' Despite his lack of impartiaUty—Menzies was the 
young counsel whose arguments the Court accepted in this case—this was a fair 
assessment, except that the revolution was in fact a reversion to classic legal doctrine. 
Geoffiey Sawer has expressed a similar view: "So far as a single case provides general 
premises for AustraUan constitutional reasoning, it is stiU Engineers."^^ In the 
Concrete Pipes case (1971),'^' the High Court itself forcefiiUy reaffirmed the 
prindples of Engineers. 
The particular question the Court had to answer in the Engineers case was 
whether the commonwealth's arbitration power in section 51(xxxv) of the 
constitution extended to state-owned business. This question arose in a hearing 
before Mr Justice Higgins in the commonwealth Court of CondUation and 
Arbitration and was stated for the High Court as follows: "Has the ParUament 
of the Commonwealth power to make laws binding on the States with respect 
to CondUation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial 
disputes extending beyond the Umits of one State?" In particular, asked Higgins, 
was the dispute between the Amalgamated Sodety of Engineers, a national union, 
and the Western Australian government's engineering and sawmiUing works an 
industrial dispute that came within the commonwealth Parliament's arbitration 
power? The case re-opened the basic constitutional issue of whether states and 
state enterprises were constitutionally immune from federal laws. 
The constitution was silent on the point at issue. The commonwealth arbitration 
power, section 51(xxxv), covered "industrial disputes extending beyond the Umits 
of any one State", but all section 51 powers are granted "subject to this 
Constitution". The question was whether there was anything in the constitution 
to exempt state enterprises from the general wording of section 51(xxxv). The 
obvious answer was the doctrine of implied immunity of instrumentalities that 
would have protected the state's businesses from the reach of the commonwealth's 
arbitration power. Had the doctrines and precedents of the Griffith Court been 
foUowed, probably it would have been a foregone conclusion that state enterprises 
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were exempt. The Court had held precisely that vdth respect to state railways 
in the Railway Servants case (1906).'^^ The hopelessness of the case was indicated 
by the fact that Robert Menzies, a twenty-five-year-old junior with no previous 
appearances before the High Court, was briefed for the union at the last minute. 
Due, in his words, to the "discouraging state of the decisions", he tried to argue 
that the particular Westem AustraUan state enterprises were involved in fiinctions 
of trading and not of govemment. When provoked by Justice Starke that his 
argument was a lot of nonsense, Menzies brashly agreed, but claimed that he was 
forced to it by earUer dedsions. If he were permitted to challenge those dedsions, 
he said he could undertake to advance a sensible argument.'"The time was ripe 
for such sweeping chaUenge because the High Court was now staffed by new 
men with different views. Menzies's arguments were subsequently heard and 
accepted. The central doctrines of the founders' Court were, in Barwick's cofourful 
1971 language, "exploded and unambiguously rejected"'^* and their leading 
dedsions reinterpreted or overruled. 
The majority opinion is a powerfiil polemic but a logical muddle; it says one 
thing but does another. It enthrones pure legal technique as the sole method of 
constitutional interpretation, but at the same time adjusts the constitutional mould 
to fit a changed poUtical reaUty. Sawer claims that "The joint judgment is one 
of the worst written and organized in Australian judidal history."'^' WhUe this 
may be a fair evalution of the internal logic of the opinion, Sawer's opinion does 
not do justice to the complex interplay of judicial preferences and poUtical factors 
that went into the making of the dedsion. Taken by itself the majority opinion 
is a muddle, but taken in its total context it is a fascinating piece of judicial 
craftsmanship. The key to the dedsion is the aUiance between the new legaUsts 
Knox, Rich and Starke, and the older centraUsts Isaacs and Higgins. Isaacs and 
Higgins had already integrated a legaUst technique with centraUst goals in their 
judidal approach. In this instance Isaacs was writing the majority opinion for 
himself, Knox, Rich and Starke, so he reUed heavily upon legaUstic rhetoric. Isaacs 
was supplanting the more balanced federaUsm of the founders' Court that had 
previously been dominant. To do that he had to shift the grounds on which the 
constitution was to be interpreted and the original federal balance understood. 
Rather than contradict blatantly the old Court on the grounds it had established, 
Isaacs and the new legaUsts redefined the rales of the game and so took the Court 
off in a new direction. The new legaUstic technique was a means of achieving 
a majority; it provided a plausible ground for overthrowing the old Court's 
restrictive doctrines; and it permitted the expansion of federal powers that Isaacs 
and Higgins had championed for decades. AU in all, it was a brUUant piece of 
judicial strategy and rhetoric. 
The Engineers decision offidally changed the High Court's approach to 
interpreting constitutional powers. According to the majority opinion, the Court's 
duty was to interpret the constitution precisely as framed, to read the natural 
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meaning of the text, and to proceed according to the general prindples of statutory 
interpretation. Isaacs sought formulations of a neutral, legal method from copious 
EngUsh cases. He quoted Lord Macnaghten that "a judidal tribunal has nothing 
to do with the poUcy of any Act which it may be called upon to interpret 
. . . The duty of the Court, and its only duty, is to expound the language of 
the Act in accordance vsrith the settled rales of constraction."' Isaacs quoted 
Lord Haldane's waming that when courts "endeavour to interpret the desfre of 
the country, they are in danger of going astray in a labyrinth to the character 
of which they have no sufficient guide". He endorsed Haldane's formulation of 
judidal interpretation: that a court should "exclude consideration of everjrthing 
excepting the state of the law as it was when the statute was passed, and the 
Ught to be got by reading it as a whole, before attempting to construe any particular 
section. Subject to this consideration . . . the only safe course [was] to read the 
language of the statute in what seems to be its natural sense."'^' 
American judicial authorities were out; EngUsh authorities were in. "No more 
profound error could be made", said Isaacs, "than to endeavour to find our way 
through our own Constitution by the borrowed Ught of [American] decisions." 
The settled rales of constraction had been "very distinctly enunciated by the highest 
tribunals of the Empire" which, according to Isaacs, the High Court was bound 
to follow. Isaacs set the example by referring twenty-nine times to the opinions 
of the "august tribunals of the Empire" as opposed to only four references to 
American cases. Isaacs's invoking of the Privy Coundl's authority was not for 
its own sake; the switch from American precedents meant a rejection of the key 
doctrines of the founders' Court because the Privy Coundl had already rejected 
the impUed prohibition doctrine in Webb v. Outtrim (1907).'^ This adoption of 
EngUsh authorities in Australian constitutional cases was a fundamental option 
the Court exerdsed in 1920. Since it was a fiindamental option, it is not surprising 
that Isaacs's reasons for the switch were not compelUng. 
Isaacs claimed there were two cardinal features of the AustraUan constitution 
which radicaUy distinguished it from the American: common sovereignty of all 
parts ofthe British Empire, and responsible govemment. These two features had 
Uttle to do with the issue in this case, which was drawing the Une between state 
and commonwealth power in a federal jurisdictional dispute. The sovereignty of 
the Crown and responsible govemment were features of both the states and the 
commonwealth and had Uttle relevance for jurisdictional disputes between the two. 
Since the division of legislative powers was expUcitly modeUed on the American 
constitution, American decisions were clearly to the point. Moreover, the formal 
monarchy and responsible govemment were matters of constitutional convention, 
not constitutional law. Therefore they did not bear on the issue of whether a 
strict statutory method of interpretation was appropriate for constraing the 
constitution. 
PoUtical considerations were to be replaced by pure legal technique. Isaacs claimed 
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that the method of interpretation used by the founders' Court reUed on "a vague, 
individual conception of the spirit of the compact, which is not the result of 
interpreting any spedfic language to be quoted". Rather, that Court had reUed 
"on the opinions of Judges as to hopes and expectations respecting vague external 
conditions".'^' The early Court's impUed constitutional doctrines were incapable 
of consistent appUcation, concluded Isaacs, because they were based on poUtical 
considerations that varied according to time and drcumstances and the nature of 
the power under consideration. Isaacs began by describing the constitution as a 
"poUtical compact" of the AustraUan people and defining the Court's role as "the 
chief and special duty . . . faithfiiUy to expound and give effect to it according 
to its own terms, finding the intention from the words of the compact, and 
upholding it throughout predsely as framed"."" But in the body of the opinion 
he emphasized the statutory character of the constitution and stipulated that it 
was to be read according to the ordinary rales for statutory interpretation. The 
meaning of constitutional sections was to be garnered from their words; the method 
of interpretation, not substantive considerations, was aU that was relevant. 
Despite aU the formal rhetoric about Uteral interpretation and neutral technique, 
the Engineers dedsion changed the federal balance of power in favour of the 
commonwealth. Engineers introduced into AustraUan judidal review a curious 
duaUty between the professed technique and the substantive content of judidal 
dedsion making. In fiiture, to understand the substantive aspects of dedsions it 
would be necessary to read between the Unes of opinions; to search out unstated 
premises, assumptions and contradictions in the stated "legal" reasons; to examine 
the pattern of outcomes; and to distil the frame of mind and the personal biases 
of judges. 
In the Engineers case itself a proclaimed neutral technique produced an expansion 
of national powers at the expense of the states. This was hardly surprising since 
Isaacs and Higgins who now led the Court majority were both ardent nationaUsts. 
They had supported stronger central powers since the 1897-98 Constitutional 
Convention. To take an example, it was Higgins's dogged persistence that got 
the federal industrial power into the constitution in the first place. Higgins proposed 
the matter at Adelaide in 1897 but was soundly defeated. He raised it again at 
Melboume in 1898 when the Westem AustraUan delegates were present and with 
the surprising support of John Forrest, a reputed arch-conservative who prefaced 
his endorsement with the boast that he did have "some Uberal instincts", had it 
carried by a sUght majority.'" Isaacs had supported the federal industrial power 
whUe Barton and O'Connor both vigorously opposed it as a dangerous and 
unwarranted instrasion into what were properly state matters. Needless to say, 
the power was rather tentatively defined and there was no inkling from its 
supporters, though there was from its opponents, that it might turn out to be 
of major federal significance.'^^ 
Isaacs and Higgins were both radical Uberals with reformist and progressive 
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views.'" Isaacs had served as Deakin's attomey-general, and Higgins as attorney-
general for the first minority Labor government that held office briefly in 1904. 
On the Court these two men had persistently attacked the prohibitions and 
restrictions that the three more senior judges had read into federal powers. The 
judicial method they advocated tended towards legaUsm, at least from a surface 
view, but their sodal philosophy was clearly progressive. This was baldly stated 
by Isaacs in a 1922 opinion: 
It is the duty of the Judidary to recognize the development of the Nation and to apply 
estabUshed prindples to the new positions which the Nation in its progress from time 
to time assumes. The judidal organ would otherwise separate itself from the progressive 
life of the community, and act as a clog upon the legislative and executive departments 
rather than as an interpreter.' 
Similarly, in his famous Harvester decision, Higgins warned against the Court's 
making controversial political dedsions, but then proceeded to revolutionize the 
understanding of the basic wage. 
For Isaacs and Higgins the more Uteral method of constraction estabUshed by 
Engineers served as a carefiiUy chosen means to a preferred political end. For the 
majority of judges, however, the method may weU have been chosen for its own 
sake since it fitted with their legal experience and the orthodoxy of their profession. 
As Justice Windeyer has explained this aspect of the Engineers dedsion: "For lawyers 
the abandonmeiit of old interpretations ofthe limits of constitutional powers was 
readUy acceptable. It meant only insistence on rales of statutory interpretation 
to which they were weU accustomed."'" Hence for some of the judges who 
partidpated in the dedsion the resultant expansion of federal powers may have 
been more of an acddental by-product or an unintended consequence. Thus, among 
the judidal majority, some used legaUsm as a means to a poUtical end while others 
probably subscribed to the method for its own sake. Engineers estabUshed this 
ambiguous, dual character of legaUsm. Henceforward it would be used by some 
judges, probably the majority, as an apolitical technique that produced, vriUynilly, 
a certain outcome; but a disceming few would manipulate it to achieve a preferred 
poUtical order. In Engineers, legaUsm produced expansion of federal powers, but 
it could be used with equal fadUty to do the reverse, as would be the case in 
the 1940s. 
Interim years: unrealized capacity 
After Engineers, the federal Labor party was continuaUy in opposition for the next 
two decades, except for a brief term of office during the Great Depression in 1929-31 
when it did not control the Senate. Consequently there were no confrontations 
between Labor and the Court comparable to the earUer period of Labor govemment, 
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although the appointments of Evatt and McTiernan in 1930 stirred up a poUtical 
storm and created sharp divisions within the Court. Labor's frustrating experience 
in trying to govern during the Depression highUghted the spedal problems of 
working the AustraUan constitutional system after the advent of disdpUned party 
poUtics. On the Court's side, due to changes in its personnel and in response to 
new issues thrown up by developments in Australia's poUtical economy, there 
were significant constitutional variations in technique and interpretation of key 
provisions such as section 92. The important poUtical and constitutional 
developments of the period are discussed in this section. 
The decade of the 1920s was a period of stabiUty and consoUdation in AustraUan 
poUtical history. Peace abroad was complemented by continuing prosperity at home. 
AustraUa was ruled by the Brace-Page govemment, a conservative coalition of 
the NationaUsts and the newly-founded Country party that favoured private 
enterprise and a contraction of state intervention in the economy and industrial 
relations. Indicative ofthe Bruce-Page govemment's attitude were the following: 
reconstruction of the Commonwealth Bank, set up by the Fisher Labor govemment 
in 1911 as a competitor to the private banks, under a separate board that ensured 
its independence from ministerial control, and an attempt to vacate entirely the 
field of labour arbitration and condUation in favour of the states."* This last 
attack on the dual arbitration system proved fatal. The Brace-Page government 
was brought dovra by defectors from its own ranks, appropriately led by the veteran 
Labor renegade, Billy Hughes.'" During the election Labor campaigned 
successfiiUy on the platform that an attack on the arbitration system was an attack 
on the standard of Uving and regained federal office in October 1929. 
With a relatively passive government in office throughout the 1920s, there was 
excessive slack in the constitutional system. The Court had laid the foundation 
for a considerable expansion of federal powers in the Engineers decision of 1920. 
That same year it foUowed through with McArthur v. Queensland (1920),"* a 
radical reinterpretation of section 92 that went far beyond the case in point. In 
McArthur v. Queensland the Court was asked to rule on the constitutionaUty of 
a Queensland wheat marketing scheme that interfered with the interstate flow 
of wheat from New South Wales. The Court held that the interstate trade which 
was guaranteed "absolute freedom" by section 92 was co-extensive vdth the 
mterstate trade over which the commonwealth parUament had jurisdication under 
its interstate trade and commerce power, section 51 (i). Consequently to recondle 
the two sections, the Court held that section 92 bound only the states and not 
the commonwealth. The dedsion, again written by Isaacs, was logicaUy tidy but 
had Uttle basis either in the federation conventions or in the first twenty years 
of judicial interpretation. The founders' Court had given section 92 a narrow 
interpretation, although not always a plausible or consistent one."' AU the earUer 
dedsions, Uke McArthur itself, had involved state infringements against section 
92. The Court prior to McArthur had prudently restricted its ruUng of principle 
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to the specific issues raised in the cases it had to dedde, although Griffith did 
pair a narrow anti-state reading of section 92 with dicta that the section was "equally 
binding upon the Commonwealth and the States".'*" The McArthur dedsion, 
which gave section 92 an expansive meaning but restricted its application to the 
states, suggested the enormous scope for judidal discretion that was aUowed by 
the new techniques of constitutional constraction followed by the Court after 
Engineers. 
But the Court was out of step with the political trends of the time. Under 
the leadership of Isaacs and Higgins, it was consoUdating federal supremacy and 
expanding commonwealth powers at the expense of the states at a time when 
such powers were unlikely to be utilized by the Bruce-Page govemment. By leaving 
the commonwealth's section 51(i) trade and commerce power completely 
untrammeUed by restrictions from section 92, the McArthur dedsion effectively 
staked out for the AustraUan commonwealth a commerce power that was 
potentiaUy as broad as the American. This was never actuaUzed at the time, 
however, and was later eroded by changes in judidal views. As Sawer has pointed 
out, there was "a curious dissodation between poUtics and constitutional law" 
in this period.'*' As a result, much of the capadty for expanding commonwealth 
powers for which the Knox-Isaacs Court had allowed was never utUized by the 
commonwealth parUament at the time. Govemment initiative in addition to Court 
compUance was necessary if commonwealth powers were to be expanded. 
The most significant constitutional measure of the Bruce-Page govemment was 
the appointment of Owen Dixon to the High Court in 1929 to replace Higgins 
who died in office. 
Labor returned to federal office in October 1929 with a landslide victory that 
gave it forty-six seats in the seventy-five-seat House. There was no Senate election, 
however, since the Brace-Page govemment had faUen in the first year of its current 
term. SculUn, the Labor prime minister, faUed to obtain an early double dissolution 
and, as Labor's electoral chances rapidly deteriorated, it was soon too late.'*^ The 
SculUn govemment inherited a hostUe Senate that crippled its legislative programme 
and frustrated its every move. AU of Labor's controversial legislation was either 
thrown out by the Sentate or abandoned in advance in the House of Representatives. 
The Senate provided a complete buffer for the Court. When the govemment 
adopted controversial monetary and fiscal policies to alleviate the severity of the 
depression, the Senate blocked them aU. As a result, the High Court escaped entirely 
the responsibiUty of raUng on the constitutional validity of Labor's anti-depression 
legislation. Labor's programme was far more radical than Roosevelt's New Deal, 
but there was nothing in Australia equivalent to the United States court crisis 
of 1937 because Labor did not control the Senate and so was prevented from 
implementing its programme. 
The ScuUin Labor government had the misfortune to take office just as the 
Great Depression was beginning in AustraUa — it was sworn in during the week 
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in which the New York Stock Exchange crashed. The Australian economy was 
particularly vulnerable to world depression since it depended on exports of primary 
industries and high inflows of overseas capital investment. The nation had 
partidpated fiiUy in the world boom of the late 1920s, magnifying its record 
prosperity by accumulating huge national debts. Suddenly export eamings tumbled, 
London loan capital dried up and national income shrank."' To service the huge 
national debt that requfred an increasing slice of the reduced national income, 
the govemment was forced to adopt drastic austerity measures. The SculUn 
govemment first hosted a team of financial experts headed by Sir Otto Niemeyer 
that had been despatched by the Bank of England and concemed EngUsh finandal 
interests. It then capitulated to pressure from Niemeyer, conservative economists, 
the banks and the opposition-controUed Senate and adopted the austere "Premiers 
Plan" in 1931.'** By acquiescing in that plan, the federal Labor govemment alUed 
itself with the finandal sector and the opposition against the interests of its own 
supporters. Its action aUenated many rank and file Labor members and cemented 
the rift with the beUigerent Lang Labor government in New South Wales. The 
SculUn govemment was defeated in October 1931 when the Lang faction of federal 
Labor parUamentarians voted against it in the House of Representatives. The Lang 
supporters claimed that it was immaterial whether a Labor government that was 
as compromised as the ScuUin government had become, ruled or not. 
Had Labor controlled the Senate in 1930 and 1931, Australia's constitutional 
and economic history would probably have been significantly different. Of the 
fourteen major biUs that the Senate caused to be defeated, withdrawn or lapse, 
several would have provided important developments in the federal system.'*' On 
four successive occasions the SculUn government tried to establish a marketing 
pool and support price system to aid wheat farmers, the sector hardest hit by the 
coUapse of export markets. Each time the scheme was blocked by the Senate. In 
1931 the Senate defeated the Theodore Plan by rejecting a whole spate of legislation 
that would have estabUshed central reserve banking under ministerial control, 
authorized fidudary note issues to finance pubUc works projects for the unemployed, 
and regulated interest rates. The Theodore Plan was the Labor government's 
considered response to the Great Depression and the brainchild of its briUiant 
treasurer, E. G. Theodore.'** It was a plan to reorganize and control Australia's 
monetary system in order to implement the now famUiar, but at that time radical, 
counter-cycUcal poUdes of monetary expansion and defidt budgeting. Labor's bold 
attempts to aUeviate human misery and stimulate the economy were frastrated 
by the Senate and a hostile banking system that clung tenaciously to the flawed 
economic orthodoxy of balanced budgets and monetary retraction. Even the 
pubUcly-owned Commonwealth Bank could consistently oppose the government's 
monetary poUcy since it was governed by an independent board.'*^ 
The Theodore Plan was poUtically necessary for Labor. Without it, electoral 
defeat and a permanent rift in the key New South Wales branch were virtually 
assured. The economic effectiveness of the plan was never demonstrated, but many 
critics have been generous with their praise. A later Liberal prime minister of 
AustraUa, Malcolm Eraser, wrote in 1975: "If Theodore had been aUowed to practise 
the substance of Keynes before Keynes was written, Australia's own hurt would 
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have been much reduced."'** The constitutionaUty of the plan was never tested 
before the High Court. Had it been, there was a good chance that it would have 
been found constitutional since Labor had already appointed two of its own men, 
Evatt and McTiernan, to the Court. With Gavan Duffy and perhaps Rich, they 
might have formed a majority. But controUing only half the legislative machinery, 
the SculUn govemment was prevented from testing the commonwealth's legislative 
powers through pushing the existing constitutional order to its Umits. 
There are three means of changing the constitutional balance: first, by 
implementing bold legislative measures which, provided they are upheld by the 
Court or go unchaUenged, extend existing constitutional capadty; second, and 
as a complementary measure to the first, by appointing judges sympathetic to 
such legislation; and third, by amending the constitution. The Fisher-Hughes Labor 
government had tried aU three during its earUer term of office, but without any 
significant success. The SculUn govemment was prevented from even attempting 
the first method because of the hostUe Senate. It could not take advantage of the 
legislative capadty opened up by the Engineers and McArthur decisions. 
The SculUn government did make a rather grandiose but half-baked attempt 
at major constitutional change. Early in the first parliamentary session, SculUn 
introduced three constitutional amendment biUs.'*' The Constitution Alteration 
(Power of Amendment) proposal was the most radical. It would have aboUshed 
the federal compact and judicial review with it. The proposal was to delete the 
existing amending formula of section 128 and confer upon the federal parUament 
itself fiiU power for amending the constitution. According to ScuUin that would 
free parliament from the uncertainty and vagaries of High Court dedsions: 
A change in the personnel of the High Court may mean a different interpretation of 
the Constitution, and an alteration of the powers of this Parliament. It may affect the 
validity of acts of this Parliamentary that have been in operation for years. A mere 
change in the personnel of the judidary may alter the practice of years. Thus, what 
ought to be a political matter becomes a judidal one. That is surely not in the interests 
of democratic government. Important issues Uke this should be dedded, not by courts, 
but by the Parliament that represents the people. 
ScuUin wanted parUamentary supremacy of the Westminster kind for the national 
parUament. Federation or unification would then have become policy options of 
the national parUament which in turn would have depended solely on the popular 
electoral vote. The other two constitutional amendment proposals were more 
spedfic and would have extended the commonwealth's condUation and arbitration 
power to cover aU industrial disputes, and its trade and commerce power to include 
aU matters of trade and commerce virith the single exception of state raUways. 
AU three proposals duly passed the House of Representatives in April 1930, but 
were defeated in the Senate in May. Although it was constitutionaUy possible 
for the government to hold a referendum after passing the proposals a second 
time if the Senate persisted in its rejection, the proposals were aUowed to lapse 
because they had Uttle chance of success, and also because the state Labor parties 
were generally hostUe to such sweeping changes."' 
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The ScuUin govemment's only real impact on the constitutional order was via 
the indirect method of judidal appointments. Justice Powers resigned from the 
Court in July 1929 and Chief Justice Knox foUowed him in March 1930. Isaacs 
was appointed chief justice, but the two vacant positions on the Court were not 
immediately fiUed for reasons of economy. WhUe Prime Minister SculUn and 
Attorney-General Brennan were in London attending an Empire Conference and 
securing the appointment of Isaacs as the first Australian-bom govemor-general, 
the Labor caucus dedded to initiate action. Caucus instracted cabinet to make 
two appointments to the High Court."^ Amidst press ramours that the 
appointments were imminent, the deputy leader of the opposition asked in 
parUament on 12 December 1930 whether the report that the vacandes on the 
High Court were to be fiUed by caucus was trae. Fenton, the acting prime minister, 
fdgned to be "very surprised that such a question should be asked".'" Parliament 
adjourned for the summer vacation on 18 December, and Evatt and McTiernan 
were appointed on 19 and 20 December. The appointments were bitterly attacked 
in the press and in parUament when sittings resumed in the new year. One 
opposition speaker claimed that the history of the country contained "no more 
disgracefiil chapter than that relating to the recent appointments to the High 
Court"."* The government countered by expressing shock that the impartiaUty 
of the judidary should be impugned, or alternatively that the Labor govemment 
was foUowing practices pioneered by its opponents. Curtin asked why it was 
thought that appointments to the High Court by a Labor govemment savoured 
of "poUtical partisanship", while simUar appointments made by non-Labor 
govemments did not." ' 
On the basis of "extraordinary disclosures" made in leaked confidential cables 
between ScuUin and his cabinet, Latham moved a motion of no confidence in the 
govemment on 17 March 1931. The govemment was severely embarrassed because 
the cables revealed that the prime minister and his attomey-general, then in transit 
by ship to AustraUa, had strongly opposed the appointments. According to Latham's 
charge there had been "acceptance by the Govemment of poUtical directions for 
appointments to the High Court, notwithstanding the declaration of the Prime 
Minister and the Attomey-General that such appointments would strike fataUy 
at the authority of the Court"."* The evidence was damning. A cable dated 19 
December 1930 from Prime Minister SculUn to acting Prime Minister Fenton, 
which ScuUin admitted was substantially accurate, had read: 
Telegram from Vice-president Executive Coundl to Attorney-General stating that steps 
being taken to appoint judges astounds us. It is a reversal of Cabinet dedsion, and 
means that Cabinet accepts political direction on appointments to the High Court 
judidary. PoUtical interference removing this matter from Cabinet responsibiUty strikes 
fatally at authority of Court. Attomey-General and I wiU be no party to that. Number 
of judges adequate; moreover, long vacation begins. Why rush appointments, and deny 
Prime Minister and Attomey-General opportunity to express strongly held view? We 
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have the right to take part in the discussion on this most vital question. We ask party 
to reconsider appointments before it is too late. 
In another cable to Lyons who was acting treasurer, SculUn had threatened that 
he and Brennan would "go out of office if in the circumstances appointments 
were rashed through during our absence". But Lyons was in Tasmania and not 
apparently privy to caucus's moves, and ScuUin's cables were delayed several days. 
The govemment closed ranks, except for Lyons who was in the process of changing 
his party aUegiance, and stuck by its appointments. 
Both appointees had excellent Labor credentials. McTiernan was a member of 
the federal parUamentary caucus and had previously served as Labor attomey-general 
in New South Wales, Evatt at thirty-six was the youngest man ever appointed 
to the High Court. A distinguished scholar and first-class lawyer, he also had 
been a Labor member of the New South Wales Legislative Assembly and was 
a popular advocate for the unions. SculUn strongly opposed the appointments on 
the basis that they would weaken the High Court's authority and bring it into 
disrepute. The appointments created a poUtical fiirore and provided the opposition 
with ammunition for a censure motion on the govemment. The appointees were 
deUberately snubbed by the Bar Assodations. McTieman's appointment drew special 
criticism because he was considered not to have sufficient standing at the bar to 
qualify for a seat on the bench. Menzies, who was Victorian attomey-general at 
the time, personally congratulated Evatt while deploring McTieman's lack of 
quaUfications. There was great indignation in Melboume, Menzies wrote, at what 
was taken to be "packing" of the bench."* Evatt and McTiernan weathered the 
storm, but no additional appointment was made to replace Isaacs when he became 
governor-general. Gavan Duffy, now an old man, was elevated to chief justice 
and the seventh seat on the Court was sacrificed to public austerity. The High 
Court bench remained at six justices until 1946. 
The federal Labor party disintegrated in attempting the hopeless task of governing 
during the Great Depression vdthout controUing the Senate. Its second echelon 
of senior parliamentary leaders, Lyons and Fenton, defected to the Nationalist 
opposition which then became the United Australia party. Thefr ostensible reason 
was the reinstatement of Theodore as treasurer and deputy leader before he had 
completely cleared his name in the Mungana affair,'" but the deeper reason was 
their fiindamental disagreement with Theodore's monetary and fiscal poUcies 
combined with hard-headed poUtical opportunism. Fenton and Lyons had headed 
the Labor govemment during Theodore's protracted sideUning by the Queensland 
NationaUst government and SculUn's long absence in Britain. The return ofthe 
more senior leaders meant they were relegated to second place. 
More serious was the split between the federal Labor party and the Lang state 
Labor party in New South Wales. Again Theodore was in the thick of the fight 
as he and Lang, "the two Caesars", fought for control of the key New South 
Wales party machine, with the Ukely spoUs being succession to ScuUin as prime 
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minister. This factional fighting was alUed with opposing economic strategies for 
deaUng with the depression and aggravated by the federal government's inabiUty 
to implement its relatively moderate Theodore Plan. AU these factors converged 
to produce a disastrous spUt in the party. The federal Labor government was 
devastated at the December 1931 poUs: the offidal Labor party held only thirteen 
seats, whUe the Lang faction won five others. At the national level Labor remained 
in opposition for the next nine years while it slowly mended its party stracture. 
Labor had been doubly defeated by the federal system. The bicameral stracture 
of the legislature allowed the opposition to leave the SculUn government with 
the responsibiUty for governing whUe denying it the power. Consequently Labor 
could not take the bold initiatives required for countering the depression, nor 
could it placate its more radical wing by implementing Labor poUcies instead of 
conservative ones that were dictated by the opposition Senate and the banks. In 
the second place the federal division between state and commonwealth govemments 
aUowed party infighting to be expanded and institutionaUzed into a federal battle. 
The ScuUin Labor government was defeated in 1931. Lang, the rebel premier 
of New South Wales who had wrecked the Labor party and defaulted on payment 
of his state's pubUc debt, was brought to heel in 1932 by tough commonwealth 
legislation. The new Lyons government paid the New South Wales debt interest 
and impounded New South Wales pubUc monies. The overriding force of the 
Finandal Agreement of 1928 and the constitutional validity of the federal Finandal 
Agreements Enforcement Act 1932 were sustained by a majority of the Court 
in the Garnishee cases (1932). Gavan Duffy and Evatt dissented. The dedsion was 
wUdly attacked by the Sydney Labor Daily, the mouthpiece for Lang's faction, 
as "a judgment reeking of suspidons of poUtical bias". It suggested that the Court 
was in coUusion with Lang's enemies: 
The New South Wales Government will fight against Federal brigandage, and will 
win. The justices took no thought for the welfare of the people of the State. The 
judgement has cleared the way for the Bruce Govemment, the Chamber of Manufacturers, 
the Boo Guard, and other Tory auxiliaries to level down New South Wales conditions 
to the coolie conditions of South Australia. The State Govemment wiU resist. The workers 
of New South Wales will support their Government. 
McTiernan, who made up the Court's four-two majority, was singled out for 
spedal critidsm because of his previous links with the Labor party in New South 
Wales.'*' Lang was eventuaUy dismissed by Govemor Game in a controversial 
exerdse of the prerogative power.'*^ 
With Lang out of the way and the Labor party shattered, AustraUan poUtics 
settled back into a quiet routine for the remainder of the 1930s. The depression 
bottomed out in 1932-33. Then followed a long and painful period of "natural 
recovery" that was only fiiUy completed by the onset of World War II. Lyons 
led a sequence of United AustraUa party and UAP-Country party coaUtion 
govemments untU his death in 1939 when he was briefly succeeded by Robert 
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Menzies. Again as with the Bruce-Page govemments ofthe 1920s, there was Uttle 
expansionary pressure on the federal system during the 1930s. 
The labyrinth of section 92 
The most significant constitutional developments of the 1930s were the 
reinterpretation of section 92'*' and the brief ascendancy of a style of 
constitutional jurisprudence that was more sympathetic towards the requirements 
of pubUc poUcy. This was made possible by the new Labor appointees on the 
Court and was chiefly the handiwork of Evatt. 
The McArthur dedsion (1920) had left the states in an impossible position because 
it interpreted the "absolute" freedom of interstate trade and commerce guaranteed 
by section 92 in a Uteral and expansive manner, but appUed the section solely 
against state interference with interstate trade and commerce. The states had 
undertaken vast expenditures on raUway systems which they had to safeguard 
in order to protect their finandal Uquidity. This meant integrating raU and road 
transport, and in practical terms Ucensing road hauliers and charging a fair tax 
on road usage. With the growth of the national economy and improvements in 
transport technology, AustraUa was rapidly becoming an integrated market rather 
than a federation of state economic units. Consequently, Ucensing and taxing road 
transport entaUed interfering with interstate commerce which, according to 
McArthur, was absolutely forbidden to the states by section 92. 
The second area where the states were severely curtaUed by the McArthur 
interpretation of section 92 was state marketing boards for primary production. 
The state was the natural poUtical unit for organizing agricultural poUcy and support 
pridng systems since it was closer to the growers, and because different states 
had different primary industries. But a marketing system affected interstate trade, 
either by preventing interstate producers underselling the pool price in the original 
state or by denying interstate buyers a free market. McArthur severely limited the 
abiUty ofthe states to regulate their primary industries, unless the regulation scheme 
entaUed the extreme measure of state acquisition and thereby satisfied the anomalous 
exception ofthe Wheat case (1915). The Wheat case was a wartime dedsion which 
allowed a state to acquire ownership of a product before it passed into interstate 
trade. The constitutional situation was that the federal government had the 
legislative power necessary for regulating interstate trade but was not disposed 
to exercise that power and legislate for the welfare of particular regional sectors. 
In any case the Lyons government of the day was not inclined poUticaUy to 
government action. 
It was in this context that Evatt led a majority of the Court that included 
McTiernan, Gavan Duffy and Rich to a practical and judidous reappraisal of section 
92. In a series of dedsions known as the Transport cases,'** the Court returned 
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to an earUer and more balanced interpretation of section 92. EventuaUy, that section 
was held to bind both the commonwealth and the states but in a Umited way. 
Regulation of interstate trade by either level of government was permissible if 
its real intention was to implement some vaUd purpose and not to interfere with 
interstate trade as such. For example, the effident regulation of road transport 
by a state was not an infringement of section 92. The appropriate test, according 
to Evatt's formulation in the leading Vizzard case (1933), was not whether 
individual traders might have been burdened in their interstate transactions, but 
whether a more orderly system of interstate transportation resulted. The overaU 
flow of interstate commerce, not an individual trader's right to partidpate freely 
in it, was what section 92 protected.*" Evatt even went so far as to say that a state 
monoply was not precluded in certain drcumstances.'** 
But in the area of state marketing pools, the Court was not prepared to follow 
Evatt's bold lead. In the Peanut Board case (1933) the Court held, with Evatt 
dissenting, that the state Act and regulations supporting a Queensland peanut 
marketing board were unconstitutional. The board had compulsorily acquired 
peanuts and thereby prevented growers from disposing of their crop interstate. 
Had Evatt's interpretation of section 92 prevailed, that troublesome section would 
have been made ineffectual. Evatt claimed: 
That the State lends its powerful aid, commands pooling, and goes so far as to make 
the producers' body the owner of the crops grown during the long period of years, 
is not, in my opinion, suffident to prove any forbidden hindrance to inter-State commerce 
No one doubts that the State may "sodaUze" an industry to the extent of controlling 
those engaged in it, by requisitioning their products, and by rewarding them in any 
way thought just and fitting, whether under the name of wages, compensation or 
price. 
Evatt would have aUowed virtuaUy any restictive state marketing organization 
designed to stabiUze and preserve an industry. 
Evatt's was a progressive jurispradence that could aUow bold legislative initiatives 
if they seemed to be required by the economic and administrative needs of the 
community. Such a jurisprudence weighted the balance in favour of upholding 
government initiative since the elected government was presumably in a better 
position than the judiciary to assess the needs ofthe community. Evatt's approach 
to the federal system was more practical and even-handed than Isaacs's extreme 
nationaUsm. In the Transport cases where he was joined by a majority of justices, 
Evatt was instramental in temporarily improving the position of the states vis-a-
vis section 92, not because he was a states' righter, but because the important 
constitutional chaUenges of the day came from the states that had been put into 
a constitutional straitjacket by the McArthur decision. Evatt's jurispradence was 
equally appropriate for aUowing commonwealth initiatives, but with the federal 
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Labor party in opposition during his period on the Court, there were few such 
initiatives. 
Had Evatt's views continued to attract the support of a majority of justices, 
the sociaUzation legislation of the Chifley Labor government in the late 1940s 
might have been upheld. In those 1940s cases McTiernan, who shared similar 
views to Evatt, was a constant dissenter in Labor's favour, but by then Evatt 
had resigned from the Court and was a senior Labor minister. Evatt's approach 
to interpreting section 92 was appropriate for upholding Labor initiatives, but 
whether it was feasible for maintaining judidal review and the relative independence 
of the judidary in the AustraUa federal system, given the extreme partisanship 
of Australian politics, is more doubtfiil. 
The fiindamental issue lurking in the cases concerning state marketing boards 
and transport regulation was the controversial one of state ownership and control 
versus private enterprise and a free market. If a government could acquire goods 
for the sake of orderly marketing, was there any defensible barrier to state 
acquisition for other more ideological purposes? Compulsory pools for primary 
produce were perhaps the thin edge of the sodaUzation wedge to which the Labor 
party was officially committed. The implications of the High Court's decisions 
concerning section 92 were not lost on the business community or the conservative 
press. The Argus welcomed the Peanut Board decision because it strack down "one 
of the numerous attempts to benefit groups by juggUng with economic laws".'" 
The president ofthe Sydney Chamber of Commerce said: "The dedsion is welcomed 
by the business community. If it counteracts quackery about orderly marketing, 
and the claims that Government boards can do better than trained commercial 
men, then it will help economic reUability."'*' 
Evatt's star was in the ascendent during the Transport cases of the early 1930s, 
but it was to wane in favour of that other forcefiil and brilUant jurist, Owen 
Dixon. The ground on which Evatt and Dixon joined battle was the interpretation 
of section 92. At stake was the basic issue of whether governments, either state 
or federal, could regulate interstate trade and commerce, and if so to what extent. 
The issue was of central importance because, with the increasing integration of 
the Australian economy into a national market, virtually aU major trade and 
commerce included an interstate component. The constitutionality of Labor's 
sodaUzation objective which entaUed government monopoUes and nationaUzation 
of key industries was in the balance. In more general terms, the method of 
intrepreting the constitution was at issue: Dixon's supposedly neutral legaUsm 
was pitted against Evatt's more progressive, policy-orientated approach. Dixon 
was to triumph and the waUs of legaUsm were to be restored and raised even 
higher around the dtadel of judidal power in the 1940s and 1950s. In the meantime 
Dixon staked out his position. 
Dixon was a consistent and powerful dissenter in the Transport cases. There 
he developed an alternative and equaUy novel interpretation of section 92 that 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Establishment and Consolidation of Judicial Review 113 
was to dominate the High Court in the 1940s. Dixon claimed that the only relevant 
matters for judidal consideration were the bare juristic and legal aspects of the 
constitution and the impugned statute. Dixon's technique was a subtle refinement 
of the legaUstic technique that Engineers had estabUshed, but the substance of his 
reasoning was as creative as Isaacs's had been twenty years earUer. The difference 
was that it led in the opposite direction, towards a restriction of both 
commonwealth and state legislative powers. Dixon formulated a private enterprise 
interpretation of section 92 as protective of an individual's interstate transactions 
against govemment regulation from either level of government. "The object of 
section 92", wrote Dixon in his dissenting opinion in the Gilpin case (1935), "is 
to enable individuals to conduct their commercial deaUngs and their personal 
intercourse with one another independently of State boundaries." According to 
Dixon, the purpose of section 92 was to preclude legislative interference with 
events or aspects of interstate trade and commerce. Moreover, Dixon held that 
section 92 appUed distributively to each and every transaction in interstate trade 
and not just to interstate trade as a whole.'™ Dixon was at one with Evatt only 
in holding that section 92 bound both the commonwealth and the states. Geoffiey 
Sawer has characterized Dixon's reading of section 92 as "a guarantee of individual 
Uberty appropriate to the drcumstance of a private enterprise or capitaUst sodety, 
'Uberty' in a sense determined by Herbert Spencer's sociology".'" 
The fact that Dixon was deUberately fashioning a new meaning for section 92 
has often been downplayed by those who, for one reason or another, have wanted 
to perpetuate the myth of legaUsm. Some might prefer to beUeve that Dixon finaUy 
discovered the real meaning of "absolutely free" that had lain undiscovered in the 
constitution, rather than that he read in his own novel view. WhUe Dixon himself 
was meticulous about using the rhetoric of legalism in pubUc, privately he was 
more honest. Writing to Latham in 1937, he admitted 
In cases relating to transport and other "means" "implements" and "agencies" of 
commerce, if not in aU cases, I think it is almost clear that we must proceed by arbitrary 
methods. No doubt there will be limits but political and economic considerations wiU 
guide the instinct of the court chiefly. In time the thing will work back to some prindple 
or doctrine but what it wUl be I am unable to foretell. 
Even in this private account of the judicial art, Dixon maintained the formaUties 
of legal professionaUsm. In the last sentence he professes ignorance of the underlying 
prindple that wiU finaUy emerge as having guided the decisions of the judges. 
Dixon's free enterprise interpretation of section 92 was to emerge triumphant 
only in the 1940s when Gavan Duffy and Evatt had left the Court and Rich accepted 
the Dixon view. But the groundwork for the 1940 decisions was laid in the 
interminable Utigation and judicial confusion of the 1930 James cases. James was 
a Utigious South AustraUan dried fruit dealer who, after four High Court and 
two Privy Coundl appeals, successfully challenged both state and federal attempts 
to set up a marketing scheme. The purpose of the scheme was to ration the smaU 
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but lucrative home market equitably among growers and force the bulk of the 
crop on to the world market. James first challenged a South AustraUan version 
ofthe scheme—Victoria had identical legislation —that rested on the tvdn pUlars 
of state acquisition of fhiit and restrictive quotas on the marketing of the balance 
of the crop anywhere in the commonwealth. The Court narrowly upheld state 
acquisition on the Wheat case precedent, Isaacs and Powers dissenting, but 
unanimously overruled state-imposed quotas using the McArthur rale. The 
commonwealth Dried Fraits Act 1928 plugged the gap by providing 
complementary Ucensing and quotas for the interstate trade in dried fruit. James 
chaUenged the federal legislation in 1928 but was unsuccessfiil."* A further appeal 
by James against the expanded acquisition strategy of the South AustraUan 
govemment was summarily rejected by the majority of the Court in James v. 
Cowan,"^ but again Isaacs Avrote a long dissent. 
Persistence paid off. Both James and Isaacs were vindicated in 1932 when the 
Privy Coundl reversed James v. Cowan."^ The case got to the Privy Council 
without a High Court certificate since it did not technicaUy involve a section 74 
inter se question; that is, a dispute over commonwealth-state jurisdiction. The Privy 
Coundl overruled the Wheat case with its implausible severance of acquisition 
of title from interference with interstate trade. In so doing it adopted IsaacVs rather 
extreme reasoning that prevented the states from regulating interstate trade. The 
coroUary of Isaacs's position was that section 92 did not bind the commonwealth. 
But since that was not relevant to the case, it was never endorsed by the Privy 
Council. Thus the Privy Coundl used Isaacs's reasoning to establish only half 
Isaacs's position, and the less significant half at that. 
In the meantime the personnel on the High Court had changed. AU the new 
justices, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan, thought that section 92 bound both the 
commonwealth and the states and had said so on many occasions, particularly 
in the Transport cases. On that basis James again challenged the commonwealth 
Dried Fruits Act that was now the only barrier to his free trade bonanza. In this 
instance the High Court adhered to its earUer McArthur and James (1928) precedents 
even though these were not reconcilable with the Transport cases, knowing fiill 
weU that the matter would be settled by the Privy Council.'" And so it was. 
The Privy CouncU reversed the High Court's decision and finally overraled the 
McArthur case that had bedeviUed section 92 interpretation for sixteen years."' 
The 1936 James dedsion of the Privy Coundl became the leading case on section 
92, but it had in fact resolved very Uttle. The Privy CouncU restricted its holding 
of prindple to what the majority of AustraUan judges agreed on, that section 92 
bound the commonwealth as weU as the states. In that respect it served the useful 
fiinction of clearing away wdghty precedents with which aU the AustraUan judges 
privately disagreed. 
The problem was that the Privy CouncU put no coherent alternative in place 
of the decisions it overturned. On the key dispute between Evatt and Dixon as 
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to whether section 92 was to be construed as applying to the flow of interstate 
trade as a whole or to an individual's interstate transactions distributively, the 
Privy Council was silent. Evatt's leading Vizzard opinion was described as "an 
elaborate judgment of great importance",'" but in the context of 
determining that section 92 bound the commonwealth. It was not at aU evident 
how much of Evatt's reasoning the Privy CouncU accepted. The test it proposed, 
that section 92 protected freedom "at the state barrier" or "at the border", was 
more in Une with Evatt's restrictive reading of section 92. On the other hand 
the legaUstic style of the dedsion and the substance of the holding that James's 
right to interstate trade had been infiinged by the federal legislation favoured the 
Dixonian view, though Dixon's formulation was not invoked. A further 
compUcation was that the commonwealth legislation at issue had been framed 
when it was stUl considered that the commonwealth was not bound by section 
92. The Privy CouncU never discussed whether James had an individual right to 
free trade under section 92, although he was vindicated in this instance. Thus 
in many important respects the Privy Coundl did not clarify the interpretation 
of section 92; rather, it fiirther confused things by adding the vagaries of a third 
party not famiUar with the implications of such a dedsion. 
More importantly, the dedsion was an endorsement of legaUsm, and a model 
of its irresponsible use. The opinion attempted to determine the "trae constraction" 
of the constitution from its "actual language", irrespective of consequences.'*" 
Counsel made powerful appeals to reasonableness, administrative necessity and 
consistency. For example, Robert Menzies, attomey-general for the commonwealth 
and counsel for the state of Victoria intervening, argued that if neither the states 
nor the commonwealth could control interstate trade, "the control of marketing 
in AustraUa is impossible" ' " The attomey-general for New South Wales, 
intervening also on behalf of Queensland, supported the commonwealth's existing 
power over interstate trade as vital for all the states' coUective marketing schemes 
involving dried fruit, dairy products, wheat, etc.'*^ Nevertheless, their lordships 
paid no attention to such non-legal considerations. They admitted that outlawing 
such a marketing scheme was not in the best interests of the people of AustraUa. 
"Such a result cannot faU to cause regrets", they said, "but these inconveniences 
are Uable to flow from a written Constitution."'*' Judges only constraed the 
constitution, they claimed; the people must change it. 
In the event a referendum was held, but the people proved a poor alternative 
to the Court and voted down the proposal that the commonwealth parUament 
be given the power that the Privy Court had taken away in the James case. Their 
lordships' rationale for evading responsibUity for their dedsion was doubly faUadous. 
In fact, they had effectively changed the constitution by denying the commonwealth 
power to regulate interstate trade since it had that power before their decision. 
In the second place the people were not a homogeneous body that could 
dispassionately deUberate upon a constitutional point and second-guess the Court. 
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The issue inevitably became poUtidzed. The people were not asked to approve 
a power the federal government had, but to add one it did not have, at least 
according to the highest court of law. The issue was exploited by poUtical leaders. 
Though the bulk of the federal Labor party supported the measure, the left wing 
of the party opposed it simply because it was sponsored by the Lyons govemment, 
whUe several state parties took an intransigent states' rights Une. 
Thus the judidal muddle that had reduced section 92 to a totally unsatisfactory 
state was passed back to the judidal branch to sort out. The James dedsion had 
not resolved the meaning of section 92, but nor had legislative and judicial ingenuity 
been exhausted. In two subsequent decisions the High Court upheld Victorian 
regulations forbidding the buying or selling of dried fruit that had not been packed 
in licensed packing sheds,'** and as weU a New South Wales statute declaring 
that Victorian milk that had been shipped to Sydney must be sold at a fixed price 
through a Milk Board.'*' Dixon could dissent on the ground that section 92 
protected individual parties to an interstate sale,'** and Evatt could assert: 
The fact that a legislative scheme of a State wiU have a direct and even disastrous effect 
upon the inter-State marketing business of certain individuals does not invalidate the 
scheme, provided its main objects and purposes are disparate from trade, commerce 
and intercourse and the scheme is not administered for the purpose of restricting mter-
State marketing . . Section 92 lays down the rule of inter-State free trade, not the 
rule of laissez-faire.' 
It aU depended on judidal numbers, and when Labor retumed to federal office 
at the end of 1941, McTiernan was the only justice on the Court who was genuinely 
sympathetic to Labor poUcy. Gavan Duffy and Evatt had both departed and in 
their places sat Latham and WilUams. Latham succeeded Gavan Duffy as chief 
justice in 1935 after yielding leadership of the NationaUst core of the United 
Australia party to Menzies. Though he had been a senior Liberal poUtidan, Latham 
as a judge was the epitome of Engineers prindples, first and foremost a legalist 
but also a federaUst.'** Latham's "coldly logical personality"'*' was naturally 
attuned to the Court's orthodoxy of legaUsm. Evatt resigned from the High Court 
in 1940 to enter federal Parliament as the Labor member for Balmain. His place 
was taken by Dudley WilUams, "a lawyers' lawyer, vdth conservative instincts 
but no party poUtical ties and no parUamentary experience" "" The only other 
Labor appointee on the bench when Labor came to office in 1941 was Rich whose 
appointment story has already been told. Rich was now an old man, and after 
the passing of his coUeague, Gavan Duffy, was content to hitch his fortunes to 
Dixon's bright star. 
The meaning of section 92, and by direct impUcation the constitutionaUty of 
Labor's sodaUzation objective, had not been finally determined by the courts at 
the end ofthe 1930s. Nevertheless, after Evatt had abandoned the Court in 1940, 
judidal opinion was running strongly in favour of Dixon's free enterprise 
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interpretation of section 92. After the Peanut Board case (1933), the Bulletin had 
commented: 
The High Court chewed peanuts last week, but didn't settle the matter, which isn't 
its job anyway. It dedded that a State may not set up compulsory marketing schemes, 
since they interfere with free trade. The big question is whether any Govemment, State 
or federal, should have the right to seize a man's work and sell it where, when and 
at whatever price some offidal may dedde. 
This "big question" was to be settled by the Court in the next decade, in favour 
of private enterprise and against Labor's attempts at implementing nationaUzation 
poUdes. 
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Constitution in the 1940s 
The Labor party returned to federal office in October 1941 just as Australia was 
entering its greatest national crisis. The swearing in of the Curtin government 
on 7 October 1941 ended a period of chronic instabiUty in AustraUan poUtics and 
initiated the federal Labor party's longest and greatest term of office. That term 
lasted for eight unbroken years untU the defeat of the Chifley government in 
December 1949. It spanned four years of war and four years of peace. 
During the years of war when AustraUa was fighting for its life as weU as making 
a considerable miUtary contribution to the aUied cause, the Labor government 
exerdsed unprecedented controls over the workforce and industry. National survival 
and total war necessitated such controls, while the defence power that virtually 
suspended the rest of the constitution in such drcumstances aUowed them. The 
Curtin government enjoyed almost complete power to mould national Ufe and 
production to the goals of survival and defence. It was able to indulge fiiUy Labor's 
traditional preference for strong, centralized govemment and to exercise the rigid 
control over the economy that Labor aspired to in times of peace. The Labor 
govemment took advantage of this unique opportunity to implement its key policies 
of bank regulation in 1941 and uniform taxation in 1942. For its part, the High 
Court acquiesced by generously constraing the defence power and upholding 
uniform taxation. 
The return to peace at the end of 1945 entailed a withering ofthe defence power 
but not, in the Labor government's view, ofthe necessity for continued goverment 
planning and control. For Labor's purpose in postwar reconstraction was not to 
restore the old prewar system of capitaUst enterprise that had so clearly faUed m 
the Great Depression, but to reconstract a new sodal order based on "sensible 
selective sociaUsm" Labor leaders and their senior economic advisors were fired 
by a modest Utopian vision of a society that would combine state management 
of the economy vdth Umited private enterprise so as to ensure fiill employment 
and the welfare of aU. After the Keynesian revolution in theoretical economics 
and the positive wartime experience with tight government regulation, a centrally 
managed and mUdly sodaUst economy seemed both desirable and practicaUy possible. 
Constitutional obstacles, however, obstructed the road to Labor's modest Utopia. 
The Labor government first tried to amend the constitution, but failed. It then 
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had to faU back upon existing powers in its endeavour to provide a secure legislative 
base for its extensive welfare projects, banking controls, nationaUzation of mterstate 
afrUnes, and finally bank nationaUzation. It was this legislation that dominated 
political and constitutional attention throughout the four years of the Chifley 
administration and was the subject of the great court battles. 
Although Labor controUed the Senate, the federal system provided hostile state 
governments and powerfiil private interest groups with the means of challenging 
the Labor government's legislation and subjecting it to the scratiny of the High 
Court. In effect, the Court became the superior house of review in the poUtical 
system with the success of Labor's controversial legislation depending on favourable 
judidal review. The judidal branch presided over the direction of the nation's 
govemment at this crudal period of change when upheavals in the old order had 
aUowed some scope for transition to the new. By successfully upholding its 
conservative, free enterprise view ofthe constitution, however, thejudidary was 
instramental in restricting the Labor government's initiatives to state welfarism 
and ovemiUng its attempts to implement selective sociaUsm. 
The Chifley era is emphasized in this study because it was the period in AustraUa's 
constitutional history when the High Court was most severely tested. At that 
time the case of "Labor versus the constitution" was forced to a decision, and 
the constitution won. From a poUtical point of view the High Court was completely 
successful. It adjudicted in a routine manner the divisive issues that polarized the 
community, and legitimated its dedsions in such a way that neither the Court 
itself nor the constitution it upheld were placed in jeopardy. Nor was the Court 
seriously challenged by the government. Due to Evatt's commanding influence 
in cabinet, the Labor govemment resisted strong moves from vdthin its own ranks 
to pack the Court. The government, not the Court, was forced to back down. 
Subsequently the Labor party modified its objectives and policies to fit the 
constitutional mould that the Court had insisted upon. 
War powers and an expansive Court 
Labor's wartime model of vigorous, interventionist government was the product 
of its traditional preferences for state action and control coupled with the daunting 
task of redirecting the AustraUan war effort to meet the Japanese threat in the 
Pacific. That required a basic re-orientation in national outlook and a massive 
mobiUzation and relocation of resources. 
Under previous conservative governments, Australia's outlook, its institutions 
and its defence arrangements had been geared for war in Europe that directly 
threatened Britain. AustraUa entered the war as the loyal colony and ally of a 
threatened mother country. Its subservient international status was summed up 
in the official statement of Prime Minister Menzies on 3 September 1939 bringing 
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AustraUa into the war: "It is my melancholy duty to inform you offidaUy that 
Great Britain has declared war upon [Germany], and that, as a result AustraUa 
is also at war."^ When Menzies went to London in 1940 to urge the 
strengthening of commonwealth forces in the Padfic, he was told that no British 
or commonwealth forces could be spared while Britain herself was under attack, 
and no stand could be taken against Japan unless American intervention was first 
assured. Menzies noted in his London diary at the time that "Drift seems to be 
the policy of the Foreign Office",' so by the logic of loyalty and empire drift 
also became AustraUa's foreign poUcy. 
As the Japanese threat grew daUy more ominous, AustraUa's internal poUtics 
drifted dangerously m the shaUows of petty bickering and personal feuding. Menzies 
was unable to maintain the confidence or soUdarity of his own coaUtion. His 
repeated invitations to the Labor party to join a govemment of national unity 
were tumed down since Labor sensed the imminent disintegration ofthe coaUtion 
government and the chance to govern in its own right. Labor played a skUfiil 
game of waiting that combined caution and cunning. The Labor caucus set down 
the substantial aims of Labor's electoral policy as "an essential part of the war 
effort" and a condition of Labor's entering a government of national unity.* 
Menzies was forced to resign in August 1941 and was briefly succeeded by Arthur 
Fadden. On the evidence of Percy Spender, one ofthe coaUtion's highest ranking 
ministers, that government was "indedsive, without direction, and riddled 
with the malady of dissension".' Spender's own United AustraUa party "had 
become more of a rabble than a poUtical unit. It was riddled with disaffection, 
place-seeking, and trouble-making. It had become a party of expediency."* 
Labor came into office m October 1941 because the two independents who held 
the balance of power in the house, Coles and Wilson, lost confidence m the abiUty 
ofthe UAP-Country party coaUtion to govern. As WUson put it, "the present 
Gilbertian House" might not work in a serious national crisis.' 
Japan's entry into the war, although not unexpected, was dramatic and its 
advances were astonishing. Peari Harbour was attacked on 7 December 1941, 
Singapore fell on 15 February 1942, Darwin was bombed on 19 Febraary 1942 
and the American forces in the Philippines surrendered on 6 May 1942. The shock 
of Pearl Harbour was in many respects an immense reUef for Australia since it 
brought the United States directly into the war with Japan. The faU of Singapore 
was a more traumatic experience because it exploded the popular myth that Australia 
was secure behind the protective umbrella of British naval power. As Currin 
predicted: "The faU of Singapore opens the Battle of AustraUa."* Soon AustraUan 
troops were fighting grimly in Southern Papua, part of AustraUa's trust territories, 
and a Japanese landing on AustraUa's own shores seemed imminent. 
Labor's war admmistration. and the High Court's accommodating attitude, must 
be understood in the circumstances of dire national peril and lack of preparation 
in which AustraUa found herself at the end of 1941. The Curtin government had 
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to achieve a massive mobUization of the country's resources while at the same 
time totally re-orientating national outlook and defence arrangements. In foreign 
affairs that meant tuming from Britain to America for help. The AIF divisions 
were recaUed from the Middle East and North Afiica and, despite ChurchUl's strong 
pressures, the seventh AIF division was not diverted to Burma. AustraUan forces 
were placed under the American commander. General Douglas MacArthur. In 
domestic affairs Curtin called for "the reshaping, in fact the revolutionising, of 
the AustraUan way of Ufe untU a war footing is attained quickly, effidently and 
without question" By July 1943 Curtin claimed credit for doubling defence 
personnel to 820,000 in the fighting forces and a further 350,000 in war 
production.' 
Labor's approach to war administration was most distinctive in the field of 
economic management. There Labor's techniques were deeply coloured by its 
traditional commitment to centraUzed planning and control combined with a 
distrast for private enterprise and a preference for extensive government action. 
When Labor was stiU in opposition and before Japan entered the war, Curtin 
had declared: "Capitalism as an economic system is too loose to deal with the 
problems of modem war. More public control of war undertaking is essential."'" 
The previous Menzies government had been soft on business interests and was 
reluctant to adopt unpopular but necessary measures. According to its own army 
minister, Percy Spender: "Where the Menzies Government's performance fell 
particularly short, was in the field of internal organization ofthe domestic economy 
for war purposes."" 
Under Labor administration, however, there was ruthless direction of industry 
and considerable expansion of government works by the Allied Works Council. 
A myriad of national security regulations controlled virtually every aspect of 
Australian Ufe; there were labour controls, price controls, profit controls and 
rationing. In his pleas to the American people for increased help in March 1942, 
Curtin could vouch for the maximum commitment of his own country's resources. 
AustraUa was "a nation stripped for war", he said; business interests were subject 
to "iron control and drastic eUmination of profits"; and the sacred rights and 
privileges of trade unions had been suspended.'^ This was possible only because 
the High Court aUowed enormous expansion of the section 51(vi) defence power 
duririg this period of grave national emergency. 
Bank regulation 
The swift implementation of tough banking controls by Chifley, the treasurer, 
provides one of the best illustrations of how effectively the Curtin Labor 
government combined wartime regulation under the defence power with the 
implementation of major Labor poUcy. Since control of banking was later to erupt 
as the greatest poUtical and constitutional issue of the postwar period, the 
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circumstances of Chifley's first easy victory over the private banks need to be 
examined in some detail. 
Because of the failure of the Theodore Plan and the ScuUin government in the 
early 1930s depression years, the banks had come through the depression vdth 
their independence intact but their pubUc reputations tarnished. Reform of the 
banking and monetary systems had become topical in the 1930s within the Labor 
party and the working class and in raral communities where Douglas Credit 
enthusiasts were active. The Lyons government had vaunted the integrity of the 
banking system and the virtues of orthodox finance with such success against the 
radical Lang Laborites that it only reluctantly set up the important Royal 
Commission on the Monetary and Banking Systems in 1935. Ben Chifley, out 
of parUament due to the Lang spUt in the New South Wales branch of the Labor 
party, was one of the six commissioners appointed. 
The Royal Commission held extensive pubUc hearings through 1936 and reported 
in 1937. Its findings and recommendations were an embarrassment to the Lyons 
government because they were an indictment of the existing system. The 
commission blamed the private banks for pursuing policies of self-interest that 
had fed the boom of the 1920s and exaggerated the depression of the 1930s." 
It recommended the adoption of a proper central banking system through expanding 
the powers of the Commonwealth Bank under a central banking division that 
was to be separate from its traditional trading activities. The commonwealth 
government was to control the private trading banks and co-ordinate overall 
monetary policy through this central bank. The basic presupposition underlying 
the commission's recommendations was the central Keynesian prindple that the 
national management of monetary policy could contribute significantly to the 
prevention of excessive fluctuations in productive activity. The coinddence of this 
important Royal Commission with the publication of Keynes's General Theory 
in 1936 meant that the Keynesian revolution came promptly to Australian pubUc 
Ufe. 
The commission report called for the licensing of private banks, mandatory 
provision of detaUed banking statistics and the control mechanism of spedal deposits 
lodged vdth the Commonwealth Bank and fixed in amount by the treasurer from 
time to time.'* Along with the old economic orthodoxy, the commission threw 
out the bankers' sacred canon of independence from poUtical direction and 
interference: "The Federal ParUament is ultimately responsible for monetary poUcy 
and the Govemment ofthe day is the executive ofthe ParUament", the commission 
stated." Chifley had agreed with the central banking objectives of the 
commission majority, but differed fimdamentally on the means that would ensure 
a sound banking system. In a minority opinion, he insisted that only bank 
nationaUzation and the total elimination of the powerfiil motive of private profit 
would ensure a system of pubUc banking appropriate for a weU ordered 
community.'* Later as treasurer, Chifley in fact implemented the central control 
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measures of the majority report and only finally feU back on bank nationaUzation 
in 1947 when he thought that less drastic means would prove inadequate for 
controlUng the banks. 
The Labor party's poUcy on banking, formulated at about the same time, was 
equivalent to a mixture of the commission's majority recommendations and Chifley's 
dissent. Labor's purpose, accordmg to the poUcy statement," was the utiUzation 
of AustraUa's real wealth to ensure a maximum standard of living consistent with 
its productive capadty "through national control of its credit resources" The 
"Prindples" section laid down that "the direction and control of nationaUzed 
banking" was to be vested in the Commonwealth Bank under parUamentary 
control. In the concrete "Plan of Action", however, nationaUzation of banking 
was not advocated, but only the strengthening and expansion of the 
Commonwealth Bank to provide "vigorous competition with the private banking 
estabUshments" The plan did caU for a statutory provision reserving the banking 
business of aU pubUc bodies for the Commonwealth Bank, a measure that Chifley 
was to include in his 1945 banking legislation and the High Court was to declare 
unconstitutional in the State Banking case. Thus Labor's banking poUcy, like its 
sociaUzation objective, was ambivalent; while the ultimate goal of nationaUzed 
banking was suggested in prindple. Labor's practical policy closely resembled the 
Keynesian recommendations of the Banking Royal Commission.'* In fact the two 
were so close that Curtin adopted the commission proposals as Labor's banking 
poUcy. 
In response to Fadden's November 1940 budget, Curtin proposed a Labor 
amendment stipulating, among other things, that "the private trading banks be 
regulated on the basis of the report of the Royal Commission on Banking in order 
to prevent them building up a superstructure of bank credit on the monetary 
expansion arising from war conditions"." Soon after becoming prime minister, 
Curtin stated that "in banking poUcy we shall be guided by the recommendations 
of the Royal Commission . We shaU interpret Labour's currency and banking 
poUcy in the Ught of the recommendations of that Commission."^ 
The recommendations of the Royal Commission were not implemented before 
the war because they were well in advance of bank tolerance, and the banks were 
a favoured constituency of the governing United AustraUa party. Proposed 
legislative reforms were drafted but fierce bank lobbying ensured that they never 
got beyond the first reading stage. L. F. Giblin has described the attitude of the 
private banks in the late 1930s as being one of "fight to the death" against any 
effective control of their operations by a central bank.^' Nevertheless the 
necessities of war finance made the control of banking imperative even for a 
conservative govemment. By September 1941 Fadden, then prime minister as weU 
as treasurer, had dedded to introduce by means of national security regulation 
a system of spedal deposits with limits on profits. The banks objected so strongly 
that Fadden settled for a "firm undertaking" for bank co-operation rather than 
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compulsion.^ Before this "gentlemen's agreement" could be implemented, 
however, the Fadden government was defeated. 
On taking office as treasurer, Chifley quickly brought the private banks to heel 
through a comprehensive set of national security regulations.^ Private banks were 
Ucensed; their advance poUcy was subjected to central bank control; their investment 
portfoUos were brought under Commonwealth Bank supervision; and they were 
required to provide all the information needed by the treasurer and the 
Commonwealth Bank for monitoring their activities. The control mechanism 
consisted of "special accounts" at the Commonwealth Bank in which the trading 
banks were required to deposit their surplus fiinds. The Commonwealth Bank 
controlled the level of fiinds held in special accounts and the interest paid on them, 
thereby effectively controUing the extent of bank advances and loans to the public 
as weU as bank profits. Chifley laid down two austere guiding prindples: the 
funds to be lodged in special accounts were equivalent to aU fiinds available for 
investment in excess of prewar levels; and the rate of interest paid on such fiinds 
was to be adjusted to ensure that bank profits did not exceed average profits for 
the three prewar years. The twin dangers of bank-induced inflation and excessive 
profits from war expenditure were eliminated. 
Thus an effective central banking system was instituted by the Labor 
administration using national security regulations under the defence power. The 
conditions of total war provided the necessary poUtical atmosphere and the section 
51(vi) defence power the constitutional means for controlUng private banks. The 
banks attempted no legal challenge at the time and submitted vvdthout pubUc fiiss 
during this period of national crisis, but they had not surrendered. 
Uniform taxation 
The early Labor administration also seized the opportunity provided by war to 
establish an effective commonwealth monopoly over income tax. Labor's uniform 
taxation coup formed an important part m its overaU centraUzing drive. The Labor 
government's success in implementing the poUcy and defending its constitutional 
validity before the High Court demonstrates the importance of poUtial 
drcumstances for legitimating a major constitutional innovation. 
The commonwealth had initially entered the field of income tax to finance war 
expenditure in 1914, and until 1942 both the commonwealth and the states raised 
revenue by income tax. Rates were rather modest and differed among various 
states. There was never any question that both levels of government had a 
constitutional right (based on section 51(ii) for the commonwealth, and sections 
106 and 107 for the states) to levy income taxes. 
The uniform taxation scheme that estabUshed the commonwealth's monopoly 
was a clever one that consisted of four separate biUs, only one of which reUed 
on the defence power. The scheme made it poUticaUy, though not constitutionaUy, 
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impossible for the states to impose income tax over and above the high federal 
rate. Moreover, the federal legislation made this alternative doubly repugnant by 
stipulating that any state that coUected its own income tax would forfeit an 
equivalent sum in its share of reimbursement grants paid by the commonwealth. 
Thus, once initiated, the federal monopoly could be perpetuated by a judicious 
use of ordinary federal powers. 
The scheme was introduced and justified by Labor leaders as a war measure 
to faciUtate war finandng. In March 1942 while details were still being worked 
out, Chifley obtained general cabinet approval for the scheme. A conference of 
state premiers was to be held so that the states' views on details of the proposed 
scheme could be heard. Cabinet noted, however, that "In the event of the States' 
expressing unwiUingness to relinquish their powers, the point might be reached 
where the Commonwealth would be obliged to levy taxation and return to the 
States amounts calculated on the average income tax collected over the past two 
years."^ The states did not co-operate, so cabinet approved the uniform taxation 
measures three weeks later. Commonwealth legislation was drawn up and was 
ready by May and, although widely supported by segments of the opposition, 
was hotly debated in ParUament. 
Prime Minister Curtin defended uniform taxation as "a war measure arising 
from the necessities of war" He argued that total war required the total 
mobiUzation of national resources and justified the rearrangement of 
commonwealth-state powers in the same way that it justified the curtailment of 
dtizens' rights.^ Chifley explained that there had been an alarming increase in 
war expenditure from £.515m in the previous three years to an estimated £350m 
in the coming year. Two attempts to vdn the voluntary co-operation of the states 
in the previous year had been summarily rejected as invasions of states' rights. 
Chifley accused the states of ignoring national objectives in time of war and of 
proposing no serious alternative to the imposition of uniform taxation by the 
commonwealth. He relied on the criteria of efficiency, equaUty and national 
emergency to justify this unprecedented invasion of the states' domain. The 
legislation would aUow the federal govemment to exploit the whole of the nation's 
taxable field "on the basis of equaUty of sacrifice and equaUty of citizenship" 
What the Labor government leaders Curtin and Chifley claimed was true, but 
it was not the fiiU story. That was given by Arthur CalweU who was rebellious 
and angry because he claimed that the taxation bills were not shown to the Labor 
caucus before they were presented in the House, a claim that was rejected by 
Chifley. At any rate CalweU proceeded to disclose and emphasize the Labor 
quaUties of the legislation that the Labor leaders had been careful to downplay 
in favour of national security ones. CalweU pointed out that Labor members were 
bound by their party constitution to "invest the Commonwealth ParUament with 
unUmited legislative powers and authority to create (or re-order) States or Provinces 
with delegated powers" He claimed that the government's real intention was 
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to implement Labor poUcy by estabUshing a permanent unified system of income 
taxation, and that unification of other revenue sources would Ukely foUow. As 
a self-professed sodaUst, CalweU was trampeting the other side of Labor's intention 
which was to centraUze finandal control over the national economy. CalweU happily 
predicted "the slow strangulation of the States" He said that they might "Unger 
superfluous a Uttle longer, but if they lose their right to impose income tax, they 
will become mendicants existing upon the bounty of the Commonwealth. They 
wiU, in effect, be on the dole, and for practical purposes they wiU cease to exist 
as States."" 
Opposition members attacked the legislation for precisely those reasons. Harold 
Holt branded it "a scheme for the introduction of unification by stealth and by 
the back-door method".^ Dr Price was more florid in his rhetoric: "Once again 
this Government of centralizers and socialists is using the war as an excuse to 
force on the country the policy which they want." Where the govemment preached 
patriotism, simpUdty and economy. Price saw only "a clever device, 
unconstitutional, unnecessary, unjust, and designed to fiirther the poUcy of 
centralization by destroying those guarantees which made this Commonwealth 
a federation rather than a unified state" ^ 
Although Menzies was generaUy in favour of uniform taxation, he argued that 
Labor's scheme was unconstitutional because it was in substance a scheme to deprive 
the states of their taxing power, rather than a bona fide exerdse of the federal 
taxing power. Broad as the defence power might be, argued Menzies, it could 
not be stretched to "alter the Constitution by destro)ring the States as poUties", 
Menzies said he favoured a more centraUzed constitution along South African lines, 
but during the present emergency he was committed to upholding the existing 
constitution untU it could be changed by popular referendum.'" ParUament passed 
the uniform tax legislation, but the High Court had the final say on its vaUdity, 
as it also did on the vaUdity of the Labor administration's draconian wartime 
regulations. 
Cases conceming the defence power 
It has long been recognized that a federal system is predisposed towards weak 
national government." Whereas strong government requires a concentration of 
political power and the ability to act forcefully and quickly, the Australian federal 
system, foUowing the American model, divides basic govemment powers between 
two levels of govemment, each sovereign in its own sphere. It fiirther weakens 
the national level of government by fragmenting power among its three branches, 
legislative, executive and judidal, and by dividing the legislature into two separate 
houses, each constituted on a different prindple of representation. During the 
national crisis of World War II this complicated system of fragmented powers 
was effectively suspended. Under the defence power, AustraUa had, for aU practical 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Time of Testing 127 
purposes, a unitary government. The national legislature was unified: in the first 
instance because the opposition-controUed Senate dared not oppose the Curtin 
government, as it had the SculUn govemment in the 1930s, because of far greater 
pressures for national solidarity in time of war; and after 1943 because the Senate 
was also controUed by Labor. Futhermore, parUament delegated virtuaUy the whole 
area of defence to the executive. Under the National Security Act of 1939 the 
executive was given sweeping powers "for securing the pubUc safety and the defence 
of the Commonwealth . . . and for prescribing aU matters which . . are necessary 
or convenient for the more effectual prosecution of the present war" '^  
Presiding over and sanctioning this transformation of the AustraUan constitution 
was the High Court. Rich said in one of the defence cases that a country with 
a federal form of government that becomes involved in a war which necessitated 
the direction of its whole resources to defence, "cannot hope to survive unless 
it submits itself for the time being to what is in effect a dictatorship with power 
to do anything which can contribute to its defence"." Comprehensive legal 
accounts ofthe Court's definition and appUcation ofthe defence power in its forty-
odd dedsions of the period have been given by others.'* My concern here is with 
the poUtical aspects and implications of the Court's expansive interpretation of 
the defence power, particulary in the Uniform Tax case (1942). In the defence 
cases the Court's "strict and complete legaUsm" barely disguised its broad discretion 
m aUowing the Labor government virtual free rein in directing and fordng national 
resources into a total war effort. The Uniform Tax case indicates the extremes 
to which judges were prepared to go in a time of national crisis and demonstrated 
the absurdities to which a legaUstic jurisprudence can lead if it is not tempered 
with pradence and common sense. 
In the spirit oi Farey v. Burvett (1916) the Court first upheld the National Security 
Act that aUowed the executive to govern by national security regulation." It 
subsequently aUowed regulations controlUng prices, the workforce and the 
production and distribution of goods.'* These regulations were typically drawn 
in the broadest terms and gave the appropriate minister absolute discretion. For 
example, regulation 59 of the National Security (General) Regulations allowed 
a minister to make orders providing for "regulating, restricting or prohibiting 
the production, movement, distribution, sale, purchase . of essential 
articles", whUe "essential articles" were defined as articles "appearing to a Minister 
to be essential for the defence of the Commonwealth or the efficient prosecution 
ofthe war, or to be essential to the life of the community"." The constitutional 
vaUdity of this open-ended regulation was upheld by the Court. More specificaUy, 
in the commerdal field the Court aUowed regulations controlUng landlord and 
tenant relations and rents, fixing maximum and minimum prices of shares, 
prohibiting advertising for spedal occasions such as Christmas, and adjusting 
contracts to take account of war conditions.'* 
Many of the regulations that the Court allowed as valid exercises of the defence 
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power were only very indirectly Unked to defence. For instance, the Court upheld 
a national marketing scheme for apples and pears on the basis that the export 
part of the crop was now subject to war restraint on shipping. Starke, a fairly 
regular and quite sarcastic dissenter in many of the defence cases conceming 
economic regulation, claimed that the apple and pear marketing regulations had 
no relation whatever to the "economic front", but merely propped up one sector 
ofthe economy that had been affected by war. Starke accused the Court of acceptmg 
arguments that led to the conclusion that "in time of war the Commonwealth 
had complete power to legislate m respect of the sodal and economic conditions 
of Australia". He reminded his feUow judges that "after aU, the govemment of 
AustraUa is a dual system based upon a separation of powers"." The Court even 
went as far as declaring constitutional the restriction of drinking hours in the 
name of national defence. Starke again disagreed and caUed this regulation "one 
of those irritating orders and restrictions upon freedom of action which is arbitrary 
and capricious, serves no usefiil purpose, and has no connection whatever with 
defence".*" 
As with banking and uniform taxation, the Labor govemment married national 
security with traditional Labor poUcy in the field of industrial relations. The national 
regulation of industrial matters, one of Labor's prime objectives, was implemented 
by national security regulation and upheld as constitutional by the Court in Pidoto 
V. Victoria.^^ The Court ruled that the defence power allowed the commonwealth 
to regulate aU industrial disputes and industrial unrest during wartime and in 
particular to Umit the holidays of state employees engaged in industry. In effect 
the expanded scope that the defence power allowed over industrial matters during 
wartime was held to supersede the restrictions on the commonwealth's normal 
power over industrial relations that was limited by section 51(xxxv) to disputes 
extending beyond state boundaries. 
An important part ofthe Labor government's industrial strategy was to secure 
decent wages and conditions for women who were joining the workforce in 
unprecedented numbers, often to replace men who went into miUtary service. 
The Court upheld the constitutional vaUdity of the Women's Employment 
Regulations*^ and also the Female Minimum Rates Regulations.*' The latter 
regulations allowed the commonwealth government to declare any industry a vital 
industry and, if female rates of pay were unreasonably low in that industry, to 
refer the matter to the commonwealth Court of ConcUiation and Arbitration for 
adjustment. Initiating the chaUenges in both cases was the clothing and textile 
manufacturing industry that employed large numbers of women and paid low 
wages. The constitutionaUty of such invasions ofthe states' domain by the federal 
government was upheld on the very general grounds that a contented and effident 
workforce enhanced economic productivity which in turn was related to overaU 
defence capacity. For example, in the Female Minimum Rates case Latham said: 
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I find it difficult even to think of a modern State conducting a large-scale war without 
the power of controlling the industry of the country. In the organization of the working 
capadty of the people and the provision of conditions which will make that working 
capadty available with a minimum of friction and of economic and industrial disturbance 
the Commonwealth Parliament is, in my opinion, exerdsing a power in relation to 
a subject which is most directly connected with defence. 
Starke dissented in both cases. He claimed, with some justification, that the defence 
power, extensive though it was, did not aUow the commonwealth "to sdze control 
of the whole sodal, industrial and economic conditions of Australia and legislate 
for them as it thinks proper".*' Starke was prepared to draw the Umit of the 
defence power short of Labor's industrial poUcy with respect to the employment 
of women, but the majority of the Court were not. 
The defence power, however, was not completely without limits. The Court 
disaUowed the federal government's attempt to regulate the working conditions 
of state pubUc servants engaged in routine administrative work that had nothing 
to do with the war effort.** It also overraled a mixed bag of federal attempts 
to regulate admissions to universities, to control the making of insect sprays, and 
to set general standards for artifidal lighting in factories.*' 
The defence cases demonstrate the broad discretion that judges have for greatly 
expanding one part of the constitution when they are convinced that drcumstances 
warrant such expansion. If the judges had been concerned only with technical 
evaluation of the cases before them, they might have sided with Starke in 
disaUowing many of the Labor administration's industrial and economic regulations 
that were only indirectly related to defence. But the judges themselves were acutely 
aware ofthe seriousness ofthe national crisis. Latham and Dixon had been directly 
involved in diplomatic work in Tokyo and Washington in the early years of the 
war and were privy to the great efforts that the Australian nation had to make 
in order to survive untU the tide of battle turned in the Allies' favour. In such 
a crisis the Court was prepared to aUow vfrtuaUy every regulation of individual 
and economic freedom. Approving the overaU thrast ofthe Labor administration's 
war effort, the Court rarely quibbled over detailed regulations. 
In short, the enormous expansion of the commonwealth's defence power that 
the High Court sanctioned during World War II is evidence of the judges' broad 
discretion in interpreting the constitution to suit the needs of the times. To 
accommodate this expansive interpretation of the defence power, the Court 
restricted the scope of other sections of the constitution. For example the Court 
gave precedence to the operation of the defence power over claims of religious 
freedom made under section 116 of the constitution.** It also held that sections 
98 to 102 of the constitution barring preferences for particular states did not apply 
to commonwealth legislation based on the defence power. 
Furthermore, the Court aUowed a gradual vending down of the defence 
regulations after hostiUties had finished. Dixon said that the defence power did 
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not "suffer an immediate constitutional coUapse" as soon as fighting ceased, but 
allowed "some reasonable interval of time" during which national security 
regulations could remain in force.'" This interim period was to aUow the 
govemment time to arrange an orderly transition to peace and to implement 
alternative legislation. The Court upheld vfrtuaUy aU the national security 
regulations that were chaUenged untU the end of 1948." In December the Court 
ruled that the control of new car sales under the defence power had not been 
valid in April 1947.'^ Then in a series of cases that were dedded in June 1949 
the Court terminated the transition period by raUng that the defence power could 
not support in time of peace the regulation under national security legislation of 
what were normaUy state matters in 1948, or petrol rationing in 1949." AU in 
aU, the Court was quite reasonable in aUowing a gradual phasing out of the defence 
power after the war. 
Through all of this enormous expansion of the defence power to meet the 
requirements of modern warfare and its subsequent gradual contraction to aUow 
an orderly transition to peace, the Court kept up its legaUstic facade. For example, 
Dixon formulated a highly artifidal distinction between meaning and appUcation: 
the meaning of the defence power remained constant, he claimed; only its 
appUcation changed. Dixon said: "In deaUng with that constitutional power, it 
must be remembered that, though its meaning does not change, yet unUke some 
other powers its appUcation depends upon facts, and as those facts change so may 
its actual operation as a power enabUng the legislature to make a particular 
law."'* We find Dixon's distinction erected into a general principle of 
constitutional interpretation by such treatise writers as W. Anstey Wynes who 
says, regarding interpretation of the constitution: "In trath the meaning of the 
terms of the Constitution does not undergo any change, for the nature of a grant 
of power remains always the same While the power remains the same, its 
extent and ambit may grow with the progress of history."" This is a convenient 
legal fiction for disguising the broad discretion and progressive role of judges in 
developing the law. The claim that judges simply apply the law but do not make 
or develop it is especiaUy implausible with regard to the defence power, yet it 
remains the offidal orthodoxy ofthe court and of legal authorities such as Wynes. 
The Uniform Tax case 
The Uniform Tax case (1942)'* was the most significant of the Court's wartime 
dedsions because, being decided mainly on grounds other than the defence power, 
it changed permanently the fiscal balance of the AustraUan federal system. The 
decision which allowed the commonwealth to estabUsh a virtual monopoly over 
revenue marked the high point of judicial compUance with a centraUzing Labor 
govemment. Although only a minor part ofthe tax scheme and the judidal opinions 
in its favour reUed on the defence power, the Court's dedsion is inexpUcable outside 
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the war setting. The legislation had received royal assent the day before the Battle 
of Midway, and the case was argued before the Court during that time of grave 
national crisis. As CalweU had predicted, the case was "prejudiced before the High 
Court in favour of the Commonwealth by the existing situation"." 
The four commonwealth Acts that constituted the uniform tax scheme were 
the States Grants (Income Tax Reimbursement) Act, the Income Tax (War-Time 
Arrangements) Act, the Income Tax Assessment Act and the Income Tax Act. 
The first Act provided for the reimbursement of states, by section 96 grants from 
the commonwealth, to replace the income tax revenue that they would otherwise 
have collected. The amounts to be paid to individual states were almost exactly 
equivalent to their average income tax receipts in previous budgets, and were 
inequitable in so far as different states had levied income,tax at different rates.'* 
These grants were conditional upon the states not levying taxes of their own. 
If a state persisted in levying its own tax, its grant was to be reduced by the 
amount of the tax it coUected. The second Act, which reUed on the defence power 
and was to apply for the duration of the war, allowed the federal government 
to take over the personnel, offices and equipment of the states' taxation offices. 
It stipulated that if the states set up replacement offices, the federal government 
could also take them over at any time. The third Act forbade a taxpayer to pay 
state taxes until he had first paid his federal income tax. This key stipulation was 
introduced by the words, "For the better securing to the Commonwealth of the 
revenue required for the effident prosecution of the present war" " The last Act 
imposed a uniform tax at extremely high rates in order to cover reimbursement 
grants to the states and finance the war. Taken separately each Act had a powerfiil 
mechanism for keeping the states out of the income tax, and taken together they 
constituted a scheme that made the commonwealth government sole master of 
the field. 
Four states, including Queensland, which was the only state Labor government 
to break ranks, chaUenged the four Acts as a legislative scheme whose purpose 
and effect was to strip the states of their concurrent constitutional rights to raise 
revenue. Taking the interpretive prindples oi Engineers to absurd lengths, the Court 
msisted on considering the Acts separately. Ruling that evidence from the treasurer's 
parUamentary speeches indicting that the Acts were in fact integral parts of a total 
scheme was "irrelevant and inadmissible". Chief Justice Latham insisted that "The 
words of a statute speak for themselves" *" This legalistic ruling crippled 
the states' case from the beginning. All the judges, with the partial exception 
of Starke, refiised to accept the states' strong argument that in a federal system 
neither level of government should direct its legislative powers towards destroying 
or weakening the other. Five years later in the State Banking case the Court would 
revive the state immunities doctrine to restrict the commonwealth's banking power 
in order to protect the states' right to bank with private banks, on the ground 
that such a restriction discriminated against the states. In this instance, however. 
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the Court refused to aUow state immunities as a means of safeguarding the far 
more important fiinction of states' levying their own taxation. 
AU the Acts were held by the Court to be within the constitutional power 
of the commonwealth, although there were some dissenting opinions on particular 
issues. Latham and Starke did not agree that the commonwealth's takeover of 
state taxation offices was a vaUd exerdse of the defence power. Starke fiirther 
considered that the State Grants Act was reaUy an Act to make the commonwealth 
the sole effective taxing power, rather than a vaUd exerdse ofthe section 96 granting 
power. The majority, however, held that the federal taxing power, section 51(u), 
was plenary in extent and therefore permitted the federal government to occupy 
the income tax field. The majority held that the federal government could claim 
precedence for payment of its own taxes over those of the states under the section 
109 paramountcy clause. They also interpreted section 96 broadly to uphold the 
federal government's right to make grants to the states conditional on the states 
not imposing their own tax. The federal takeover of state taxation offices was 
allowed under the defence power. As Rich said: "If the Commonwealth is to 
wage war effectively, it must control the sinews of war."*' 
The dedsion was a triumph for legaUsm and centraUsm, Latham's opinion being 
the most extreme in this regard. He began with the rituaUstic assertion of a neutral 
legal method: 
The controversy before the Court is a legal controversy, not a poUtical controversy. 
It is not for this or any other court to prescribe poUcy or to seek to give effect to 
any views or opinions upon policy. We have nothing to do with vdsdom or expediency 
of legislation. Such questions are for Parliaments and the people.*^  
Latham recognized that the strategy of the uniform tax scheme could be appUed 
to other taxes so as to make the states completely dependent upon the 
commonwealth in finandal terms. By tying poUcy conditions to section 106 state 
grants the commonwealth could subject the states completely to its wiU. Latham 
concluded: 
Thus, if the Commonwealth ParUament were prepared to pass such legislation, all State 
powers would be controlled by the Commonwealth—a result which would mean the 
end of the poUtical independence of the States. Such a result cannot be prevented by 
any legal dedsion. 
The Court could have upheld the substance of the scheme on the basis of the 
defence power. McTieman, whose opinion was the most consistent and plausible, 
went fiirther than the other judges in this direction. As weU as the takeover of 
state offices, he also upheld the main Income Tax Assessment Act requfring payment 
ofthe commonwealth taxes before state income taxes as an exerdse ofthe defence 
power. In so doing he took his cue from the Act which introduced the key section 
with the recital: "For the better securing to the Commonwealth of the revenue 
required for the effident prosecution of the present war" 
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The Court's dedsion was eagerly awaited by the Curtin cabinet. At an earUer 
meeting in April 1942 when it had approved the uniform taxation scheme, cabinet 
also dedded to appoint Dixon as ambassador at Washington to replace Casey.** 
Perhaps the two issues were not unrelated. At any rate Dixon did not sit on the 
case. Several weeks before the dedsion was handed dovra in July, the prime minister 
told cabinet that he had asked the attomey-general to consider the Court's dedsion 
on uniform taxation immediately it was given. Thereafter fiiU cabinet would be 
summoned to consider the matter.*' 
Because of the Court's favourable dedsion, that was not necessary. When the 
dedsion was handed down, Chifley said he was "gratified" vnth the Court's "go-
ahead", whUe Evatt said it was "a far-reaching result obtained by a liberal and 
common-sense appUcation of legal prindples". Hughes, now deputy leader ofthe 
opposition, was more forthright: "The judgement wUl please everyone except the 
group of State leaders who have tried to hamstring the Commonwealth. It marks 
an epoch in Commonwealth history. The States are now relegated to being 
subordinate legislators as most people want them to be."** On the other side, 
the Victorian premier was highly critical. "It is doubtful", he claimed, "if a more 
virions and discriminating act has ever been concdved, let alone put into operation 
against the people of our State."*' Victorians had a spedal grievance because, as 
the Age put it, they were put "under compulsion to pay tribute to States that 
[had] for years been glaringly spendthrift" The Age wamed the federal govemment 
that its tax plan was an emergency measure and that there was no surrender of 
the right to chaUenge the constitutionaUty of uniform taxation after the war.** 
Most commentators, however, were more reaUstic about the permanency of the 
measure, although they exaggerated its impact. The Bulletin pronounced that State 
sovereignty was dead.*' The Adelaide Advertiser agreed that the judgment, which 
it abhorred, spelt "the end of the federal era" Nevertheless, it continued with 
perverse logic, "we must show the enemy that AustraUa is not weakened by this 
vfrtual coUapse of the federal system".'" The Sydney Moming Herald concluded 
rather more soberly that there would be no return to the old system, even though 
the govemment had legislated only for the duration of the war." 
The scheme was easUy continued at the end of the war. In November 1945 
cabinet approved the treasurer's recommendation that he be given authority to 
seek the concurrence of the state premiers in the continuance of uniform taxation, 
and that if they did not agree the commonwealth parUament would legislate for 
its continuance anyway.'^ Chifley subsequently reported: 
At the Premiers' Conference held on 22nd-25th January, 1946, the Premiers unanimously 
opposed, in prindple, the continuation of uniform taxation. After it had been made 
clear, however, that the Commonwealth was determined to continue uniform tax 
legislation, the Premiers, whilst stiU maintaining thdr opposition to the prindple of 
uniform taxation, agreed to discuss the prindples on which future tax rdmbursement 
grants to the States should be based." 
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Cabinet then approved legislation to continue the scheme during peacetime.'* 
Because the Court upheld uniform taxation on a piecemeal basis and mainly 
on non-defence grounds, this wartime centraUzation of AustraUa's fiscal federal 
system was easily continued during peacetime. In view of the Court's determined 
and consistent blocking of the subsequent Labor government's attempt to expand 
federal powers after the war, such an expansive and favourable decision cannot 
be adequately explained outside its war emergency context. But the rationale for 
the dedsion owed more to an extreme appUcation of the Court's legaUstic technique 
of considering separately the legislative Acts that comprised the uniform tax scheme, 
and the expansive centraUsm of Engineers doctrines that dominated the view of 
the judges, than to the defence power. The Court made the right dedsion for 
the immedate drcumstances of grave national security, but its fragmentary approach 
and technical reasoning helped transform a temporary war measure into a major 
lasting change in the structure and balance of AustraUan federaUsm. 
The reasoning of the Court made it extremely difficult to reopen the question 
of a federal monopoly on income tax. Nevertheless in 1957 Victoria and New 
South Wales chaUenged essential parts of the uniform tax scheme, specificaUy those 
parts tying state grants to federal conditions and giving precedence to payment 
of federal tax over state tax. The states' argument was presented by Garfield Barwick 
who relied heavily on the State Banking precedent and claimed that the 
commonwealth's income tax legislation was also an unwarranted interference with 
the integrity of the states." By then there were four new judges on the Court, 
and of the other three, Dixon had not sat on the First Uniform Tax case and 
McTieman had reUed on the defence power to uphold the key clause that forced 
payment of federal taxes prior to payment of state taxes. In his opinion Chief 
Justice Dixon emphasized that "The whole plan of uniform taxation [had] 
become very much a recognized part of the AustraUan fiscal system."" No 
state had chaUenged it within fifteen years, so consequently overraling or 
distinguishing the dedsion must involve "grave judidal responsibiUty" Several 
of the judges including WilUams were not prepared to reopen the issues at all, 
but a majority made up of Dixon, McTieman, Kitto and Taylor disaUowed the 
section of the Act that forbade a taxpayer to pay state tax before he had paid 
the fuU federal tax. The origmal introduction to the section. "For the better security 
to the Commonwealth of the revenue required for the effident prosecution 
of the present war", had been changed to, "For the better securing to 
the Commonwealth of the revenue required for the purposes of the 
Commonwealth" But since the Court on this second occasion upheld the 
validity of state grants that had as a condition that states not collect then: own 
income tax, the uniform tax scheme was not disturbed.'* Thus time, poUtics and 
judicial review sanctioned what war had originaUy occasioned. 
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Postwar reconstruction, or reconstitution 
The tide of battle tumed when the American fleet held the Japanese at the battle 
of the Coral Sea in May 1942 and then won a dedsive victory at Midway in June 
1942. As the immediate threat to AustraUa was passing, the Labor government 
began considering postwar reconstraction poUdes. In Percy Spender's unsympathetic 
account, the Labor govemment had been intoxicated by the "strong vdne" of 
executive rale during wartime, and as the danger to AustraUa passed, sought to 
impose "its sociaUst platform upon the economic and industrial life of the AustraUan 
people."" There is a kernel of truth in this despite Spender's partisan 
exaggeration. He does, however, omit the cracial fact that in the August 1943 
general elections the Curtin Labor government won a landslide victory in both 
Houses of parUament. Labor campaigned on its war administration and the promise 
of a comprehensive programme of postwar reconstraction that included expansion 
of sodal services, active pursuit of fiiU employment as a guiding principle in 
economic management, and the integration and retraining of ex-servicemen. Labor 
won forty-nine of the seventy-five seats in the House and aU eighteen of the Senate 
vacandes to give it control of the Senate for the first time since 1914. Spender's 
United AustraUa party was reduced to a dispirited sheU with only fourteen members 
in the House. Thus when Labor began to assert its "doctrinal party views" and 
impose its "sodaUst platform", it was not upon an unvdlUng people. 
Labor's purpose: "sensible selective socialism" 
Labor's declared purpose in postwar policy was not to reconstract the old prewar 
economic order but, as Curtin put it as early as his policy speech for the 1940 
general elections, to reconstitute "a new social order based upon democracy and 
the rights of aU men and women to enjoy the fraits of honest toU" The many 
promises made to compensate for the heavy toU exacted from workers in World 
War I had only been partiaUy kept. As Curtin pointed out, "Expected social 
advancement was Umited by the fetters of a sodety that remained acquisitive and 
unequal." Therefore the Labor party insisted from the very beginning that serious 
attention had to be given to planning the fiiture so that those who bore the brunt 
of the fighting would not be betrayed. Curtin boasted in 1940 that his was the 
only poUtical party with a programme containing "a working plan for a new 
economic order" *" That was an exaggeration, but it did indicate something of 
the intention behind Labor's thinking on postwar reconstruction. 
Labor's credibiUty had been generaUy boosted by the Ke)mesian revolution. This 
had been a key factor in bringing Labor thinking back into the mainstream of 
AustraUan poUtical life and giving its poUdes a consistency and force that 
commanded respect. The party had faUed dismaUy in the early thirties when 
confronted by the Great Depression because it could not achieve a consensus on 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
136 Politics of the High Court 
prindples of economic management even among its own members. Moreover, 
it could make Uttle headway against the finandal orthodoxy of the time and was 
easUy cast as a radical and irresponsible party by its critics. Keynes and the whole 
generation of economists, planners and bureaucratic manipulators that he spawned 
transformed the concepts and practices of economic management. This new eUte 
shifted pubUc tolerance away from the old orthodoxies of non-interference and 
balanced budgets towards Labor's traditional position of strong central govemment 
dfrection and control. Keynes concluded The General Theory of Employment, Interest 
and Money in 1936 with these prophetic words: "It is certain that the world wiU 
not much longer tolerate the unemployment which, apart from brief intervals 
of exdtement, is assodated—and, in my opinion, inevitably associated—with 
present-day capitaUstic individualism."*' Keynes was sure, as only a master can 
be, that his reformulation of economic theory would transform pubUc life by curing 
the excesses of unemployment and depression. Following Keynes, the Labor 
government adopted economic stabiUty and fuU employment as the overriding 
prindples of its postwar economic poUcy.*^ 
After Keynes came the war. The Great Depression that had caUed forth Keynes's 
response had shaken the old economic order to its foundations. The extraordinary 
wartime productivity demonstrated the effectiveness of govemment regulation of 
the economy. In the opinion of D. V. Copland, a leading Australian economist 
and senior advisor to the Labor govemment, the war had demonstrated "what 
can be done through government control of private enterprise in guiding the 
dfrection and development of production and enterprise".*' After the depression, 
after Keynes and after the war, there could be no return to the discredited prewar 
economic system. Copland characterized that system in the bleakest terms: 
If we look at the facts prewar, we see a depressing picture of mass unemployment and 
depressed primary producers; monopoly and imperfect competition leading to an excessive 
inequality of wealth and incomes, and to a severe distortion of production from that 
most needed by sodety; unequal opportunities for health, education and occupation.** 
Labor's traditional commitment to centralized control of the economy was now 
compatible with the new economic orthodoxy that required overall management 
of the economy. 
The marriage of Keynesian economic technique with traditional Labor poKcy 
was embodied in the Department of Post-War Reconstraction estabUshed in 
November 1942. Chifley, who also retained treasury, became the first minister 
while the young Keynesian economist, Dr H. C. Coombs, was appointed to head 
the new department. In his first budget speech in 1941 treasurer Chifley contrasted 
the treatment of the working class in prewar decades with the role they were 
expected to take in the war: 
For years the working class, which is now expected to assist in the conduct of the 
war, either on the battle field or in the munitions factories, was treated worse than 
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farm horses or pit ponies in the mines. They were thrown into the streets, where they 
were left to starve. Despite that treatment they are now expected suddenly to develop 
extreme feelings of patriotism. To thdr eternal credit they have done so.*' 
Half the working population had been mobilized for war service or war production. 
Chifley was determined that they could not be tumed out on to an unregulated 
market as used pit ponies, nor aUowed to form a reserve army of unemployed 
to provide a buffer for cycUcal fluctuations in an erratic market. The pubUc expected 
a better world after the war, and the govemment's prosecution of the war had 
demonstrated that such was now feasible. "There can be no doubt", said Coombs 
in 1944, "that at the end of the war men vdU beUeve that, if for purposes of 
war we can be masters of our economic destiny, then so, too, can we be for the 
purpose of peace."** 
Underlying Labor's postwar reconstruction poUdes was the vision of a new 
sodal order that was Fabian in orientation but Keynesian in technique. This 
envisioned new world was a soUd, pragmatic and rather modest Utopia that 
combined elements of welfarism, mild sodaUsm and regulated capitalism held 
together by strong central government. Lloyd Ross, dfrector of pubUc relations 
for the Ministry of Post-War Reconstruction, sketched Labor's ideal as 
a Fabian world in which large inequalities of wealth have been removed by redistributive 
taxation, no tribute is exacted by "unproductive" capital, employment is maintained 
at its maximum by pubUc investment and monetary measures, sodal security is granted 
to all, exploitation of consumer and worker by monopolies is made impossible by sodal 
controls and by "sensible selective sodalism" but a large field is left for independent 
firms and businesses. 
Ross admitted that this was neither original nor profound but a hotch-potch of 
bits and pieces of British, American and Australian progressive thought. 
Nevertheless Ross claimed somewhat euphorically that "it's certainly nearest to 
that new order ever yet reached by industrial man—its symbol is the community 
centre" ** 
Labor statements on postwar reconstraction ranged from wild prophecies of 
an economic miUennium, to restatements of basic public policy goals in terms 
of Keynesian prindples, to concrete bread-and-butter promises of jobs, houses and 
free medidne. For instance, Lloyd Ross assured members of the Rotary Club in 
March 1944 that "by democratic planning of our national resources we can move 
to a period of boundless expansion of wealth and of Uberty" *' Coombs preached 
a simUar message to a national seminar on postwar reconstruction: 
There is no sound economic reason why we cannot achieve an economy in which there 
wiU be a high and stable level of employment, progressively improving standards of 
hving, the spectacular development of national resources, and substantial security for 
the individual... we can devote our resources to [these objectives] in exactly the same 
way as we have devoted our resources to the purpose of war. 
The 1945 White Paper, Full Employment in Australia, restated the overriding 
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prindples of economic policy as fiiU employment and economic stabUity. The 
product of Coombs's department and the Labor cabinet, this paper was a nulestone 
in the development of AustraUan pubUc poUcy. In a pubUc broadcast in 1943, 
Chifley reformulated aU this in plain terms: "The Govemment's reconstraction 
poUcy vdU aim to make Australia a land of happy homes with a job for every 
man and woman who wants one."" 
Despite some exaggerated rhetoric on both sides regarding sociaUsm and 
comprehensive plans. Labor's vision of postwar AustraUa was, as Chifley put it, 
"very much the AustraUa we have always known" Labor did have a fairly 
complete agenda of sodal welfare measures to implement, and it had adopted the 
new Keynesian strategies of economic management. But by and large this was 
the old Labor man dressed up in new clothes. Even as a social democratic party, 
however. Labor would have to do battle with powerful vested interests in order 
to implement its fairly moderate reforms. 
Although not a doctrinafre or radical sodaUst party. Labor did have a sodaUzation 
objective. If nothing else, that objective formally declared that the party was 
uns)mipathetic to capitalist free enterprise, even if it tolerated it in practice and 
had no real intention, let alone a comprehensive plan, for repladng it. Having 
such an objective gave the Labor government a powerfiil weapon of last resort. 
But is also generated excessive fear and suspidon among Labor's opponents and 
stirred them to intransigent opposition. This in turn made more likely the use 
of Labor's ultimate weapon of sociaUzation. During the war some Labor radicals 
Uke Eddie Ward, minister for labour and national service, called for the 
nationaUzation of basic industries." This was repudiated by Curtin who pledged 
that his government would not sodaUze AustraUa during the war.'* For the 
postwar period, however, selective sodalism was both a real option for the Labor 
government and a dreaded threat for its opponents. This became clear in 1945. 
In 1945, as the world moved from war to peace after the German sunender 
in May and the Japanese surrender in September, the Labor administration began 
putting in place its postwar reconstraction poUdes. The transition was marked 
by a change in Labor leadership. John Curtin died in July 1945, worn out by 
the burdens of office during a period when, as he put it, "the demands on us 
to survive were colossal and, at times, looked beyond our capabiUty" " Fate had 
conspired to replace the great wartime leader with the steady finandal planner, 
Ben Chifley, at the appropriate time. Chifley retained the treasury portfoHo 
throughout his prime ministership, s)miboUzing in his own administration that 
centraUzed and pervasive control that his government sought to impose on the 
national economy. The year 1945 was the mid-point in Labor's eight-year tenn 
of office; it was also the high point of Labor's power in federal poUtics, being 
halfway between its overwhelming electoral endorsement in 1943 and its 
comfortable victory in 1946. 
In the throne speech opening parUament in February 1945, the Labor govemment 
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gave formal notice of its postwar reconstraction and reform programme. It was 
at this point that the controversial issues of the pubUc control by the commonwealth 
government of banking and interstate airUnes were placed on the public agenda. 
These two issues were to dominate poUtical and constitutional debate for the rest 
of the decade. In rather muted terms the Labor government proposed a statutory 
authority to control interstate airUnes and announced that the wartime banking 
controls would be translated into permanent legislation.'* Labor spokesmen were 
more effiisive in proclaiming a new economic era in which "dfrect government 
intervention and positive govemment action " would replace the worn out 
shibboleths of private enterprise and individual freedom. Labor's model of 
interventionist government was paraded in its fiiU war colours: its results were 
"tremendous, and demonstrable to all" " This was to be a session of 
planning for peace; of initiating new sodal security benefits as integral parts of 
"the new order" '* 
The opposition was immediately alarmed. Menzies, now leader of the opposition 
and founder of the reconstituted Liberal party, singled out the key proposals on 
banking and dvil aviation for spedal critidsm. He accused the government of 
using the drcumstances of war to set in place major postwar social poUdes." The 
rising Country party leader, John McEwen, correctly antidpated that Labor 
intended nationaUzing interstate afrUnes.'"" Others branded Labor's reconstraction 
programme "totaUtarianism vdth a humanitarian face", and wamed the govemment 
"not to be rash in pushing its sodaUstic ideals".'"' PubUc debate was already 
raging outside parUament. Labor spokesmen complained of a stream of "insidious 
propaganda" against the govemment's proposed banking legislation.'"^ The 
professional association of doctors, the British Medical Assodation, was afready 
fighting the govemment's proposed national health poUcy which it branded as 
a "nationaUzed" health policy. 
This exaggerated rhetoric reflected the growing polarization of AustraUan 
poUtics. There was real potential for substantial change to AustraUa's poUtical 
economy because of Labor's dominant poUtical position and the ripeness of the 
country for change. By 1943-44 the Curtin government was better placed than 
any Labor govemment before or since in terms of power, experience and technical 
resources at its disposal to create the sodal and economic order that had been Labor's 
stated objective for decades. It had won an impressive popular mandate in 1943 
and enjoyed enormous prestige because of its successful war administration. The 
opposition parties had been reduced to a dispirited and factious ramp. For the 
first, and indeed the only, time since federation, a mature and united Labor party 
could look forward to governing Australia with majorities in both Houses of 
parUament and without having to devote the bulk of its energies to a national crisis. 
It was not simply that the Labor party appeared as the natural party of 
government during this period; the times were ripe for far-reaching change. The 
AustraUan nation had been forged from six separate colonies and consoUdated into 
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an integrated country during the previous four decades. It had matured through 
withstanding the stresses of war, the ravages of depression and the slackening 
of imperial ties with a tired and rapidly decUning mother country. By the end 
of the war Australia was a young nation that had not yet become rigidly set in 
its present mould. National transformations are normally associated with great 
crises; after the Great Depression and World War II AustraUa was as susceptible 
to basic change as it is ever likely to be. 
Labor's quest for constitutional powers 
As soon as the Labor government turned its attention to postwar reconstraction, 
it began agitating for constitutional reform. That was necessary to provide a secure 
constitutional basis for proposed legislation that would ensure survival of the 
banking, marketing and industrial reforms that the Labor administration had akeady 
achieved under the defence power during wartime, and to provide for the extensive 
array of economic and social welfare poUdes that the government intended to 
implement. In October 1942 Attomey-General Evatt introduced a constitutional 
alteration bill into parliament and had it read a first time in order to initiate 
discussion. In late November 1942 Curtin and Evatt presented a new draft bill, 
revised after public discussion, to a spedal constitutional convention representing 
the governments and oppositions ofthe commonwealth and the six states. There 
was strong opposition to proposing constitutional alterations at such a critical 
point. Therefore the Curtin goverment agreed not to hold referenda during the 
war in exchange for an undertaking from aU the state premiers that certain powers 
would be "referred" to the commonwealth for a period of five years under section 
51(xxxvii). The state legislatures were not so accommodating. The Tasmanian 
Legislative Council rejected the referral proposal outright. South AustraUa and 
Western AustraUa made substantial amendments to the particular powers that 
were proposed, whUe Victoria's assent was made conditional on aU the other states 
passing identical measures. Only New South Wales and Queensland, where strong 
Labor governments were entrenched, honoured their premiers' undertakings. 
Consequently, in Evatt's view, there was "no practical method left for laying a 
sound constitutional basis for AustraUan postwar reconstruction, to which this 
Government has pledged itself to the people, except by an appeal to the 
people'""' 
Accordingly, in February 1944, Evatt introduced the Constitution Alteration 
(Post-War Reconstraction) BiU into parliament. The biU proposed a referendum 
to vest in the commonwealth for a limited period of five years from the end of 
hostiUties powers to make laws with respect to the fourteen matters that the state 
premiers had agreed to refer to the commonwealth. Evatt so restricted the 
referendum proposals to enhance their chances of being carried by the Senate, still 
controlled by the opposition, and by the people, who were generally wary of 
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constitutional change. As Evatt pointed out in his submission to cabinet, "The 
desire for almost unrestricted power is understandable but getting the people to 
consent is a very different thing."'"* In any case, he reported that members of 
the spedal cabinet committee that had worked on the proposals were "very 
impressed by the almost unUmited potentiaUties of several of the powers" akeady 
included in the Ust. In the House, Evatt's arguments in support of the biU were 
more restrained; he claimed that the present constitutional division of powers did 
not permit "national action to meet the urgent practical needs of the postwar 
period". Evatt singled out the important areas of employment and unemployment, 
prices and profiteering, and the production and distribution of goods as areas in 
which the defence power in time of peace provided no sure foundation for 
commonwealth laws. 
It is clear from Evatt's arguments, and from the extent ofthe additional legislative 
powers that Labor wanted to add to commonwealth jurisdiction, that postwar 
reconstruction had an extraordinarily broad meaning. The changeover from war 
to peace was in itself a massive task since it involved the re-location of about half 
the entfre workforce. But as Menzies pointed out in his response, "Whatever the 
defence power enables you to do in time of war it enables you to undo in time 
of peace."'"' The uncertainty inherent in judicial discretion may have been 
unsatisfactory, but the past pattern of broad judidal interpretation ofthe defence 
power made Menzies's 1944 proposition a reasonable expectation. In the event, 
it was reaUzed. But as we have seen. Labor's purpose was not simply to wind 
down the war effort but to build a new sodal order, albeit a rather pedestrian 
one that wedded Keynesianism to traditional Laborism. 
For example, Evatt argued that the proposed power to make laws with respect 
to employment and unemployment was necessary so that the Commonwealth could 
"estabUsh better standards of employment throughout AustraUa" That had been 
a primary concern of the earUer Labor govemments of Fisher and Hughes. In 
fact, vdth the exception of provisions dealing with the demobilization and 
reinstatement of armed service personnel, the Ust of additional legislative powers 
Evatt sought for the federal parUament included vfrtuaUy aU the areas that a Labor 
government would have needed to secure in order to implement its poUdes 
independently of postwar reconstraction. The Ust included powers to legislate 
with respect to emplo)mient and unemployment, organized marketing of 
commodities, companies, trusts, combines and monopoUes, profiteering and prices, 
production and distribution of goods, overseas exchange rate and overseas 
investment, air transport, uniformity of railway gauges, national works, national 
health, famUy aUowances and people of the Aboriginal race. Though certain 
provisions spedfied state co-operation or approval of some form, the Ust of 
amendments entaUed an enormous expansion of constitutional powers available 
to the commonwealth parUament. While aU these various heads of proposed 
legislative power could be related to some aspect of postwar reconstraction, they 
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were more directly relevant to the implementation of Labor poUcies and reforms. 
The main thrast of Evatt's argument was not so much that an orderly transition 
to peace was impossible under the existing defence power but that the 
implementation of Labor poUdes in times of peace was difficult, or perhaps even 
impossible, under the existing constitution. Labor's postwar programme had been 
endorsed by the people in 1943 but the govemment could not be sure of carrying 
out its mandate without substantial constitutional change. Evatt therefore laid 
down the axiom that "Parliament should, as a general rale, be given authority 
to pass legislation on a topic to which electors have given their approval." Evatt 
claimed that the constitution should be indifferent between "a poUcy of 
nationaUzation or of greater govemment control" and "the opposite poUcy oi laissez-
faire or complete legislative inaction" '"*In effect Evatt was asking for a neutral 
constitution that allowed implementation of Labor or Liberal policy 
indiscriminately, depending only on the voters' choice. He wanted the equivalent 
of parUamentary sovereignty in a unitary state where the government in national 
office would represent a single majority. That was not possible in a federal state 
where powers were divided between federal and state parUaments and their 
respective govemments. 
There was in fact a basic tension between AustraUa's federal constitution and 
Labor's purpose. The former was heavily weighted against implementation ofthe 
latter. Whereas the Labor government was intent upon centralizing power to 
enable national planning and control for the purpose of implementing economic 
and welfare programmes, AustraUa's constitutional system presupposed and favoured 
a Uberal order in which individuals were left at Uberty to define and pursue their 
own interests and to make their own economic and welfare arrangments. For 
that purpose the constitution, which was modeUed on that of the United States, 
had divided and checked govemment powers. There had been a revolution in social 
welfare thinking since the Americans had designed their constitution and the 
AustraUans had copied it in the 1890s, but the division of powers had left sodal 
and economic jurisdiction mainly with the states. 
Menzies, who fiiUy appredated the Uberal character ofthe constitution, opposed 
the amendments on the grounds of basic Uberal principles. He invoked Thomas 
Jefferson's strictures against the centralizers of his day: 
the way to have good and safe government is not to trust it aU to one, but to divide 
it among the many, distributing to every one exactly the fiinctions he is competent 
to ftilfil. ^ 
What has destroyed liberty and the rights of men in every government which 
has ever existed under the sun? The generaUzing and concentrating aU cares and powers 
into one body 
In any case the commonwealth had become the dominant level of government 
in the federation. Anticipating the constitutional strategy that the Labor party 
was to adopt under Whitlam, Menzies stressed the commonwealth's extensive 
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scope for initiating and dfrecting state works under section 96 that allowed the 
parUament to tie financial grants to the states vdth any terms it saw fit. Hence 
the commonwealth already had suffident power to direct much of the states' 
spending, and it had also recently acqufred a monopoly over income tax. Menzies 
pointed out that the commonwealth already possessed the power of the purse, 
and he emphasized the spedfidally Labor intention behind the reconstruction 
proposals. Menzies claimed it was the first time in the history of AustraUa that 
an obvious poUtical manifesto was being made the subject of an amendment to 
the constitution.'"* Other Labor opponents were more extreme. Describing the 
initial 1942 Constitutional Convention in the Herald, Keith Murdoch branded 
Labor's attempts to buUd up the powers of the central government as "a 
revolutionary procedure disguised as a war reform a cyclone masquerading 
as a zephyr" '"' 
Labor easUy passed its referendum biU in parUament and subnutted the proposals 
to the people in 1944. By then, however, AustraUans were weary of war regulations 
and govemment dfrectives. Menzies, who had conspicuously absented hunself from 
the conferences that drafted the original proposal for referral of legislative powers, 
spearheaded the Liberal campaign against the referendum proposals by cleverly 
identifying increased central powers with sociaUsm, regimentation and industrial 
conscription. Evatt wore himself out in an extensive national campaign. He "did 
a giant's work, with a courage and distinction that ought to have chaUenged others 
to greater efforts", but to no avaU. Many Labor supporters were lukewarm and 
some were even opposed to the amendments. State Labor parties had vested interests 
in maintaining state powers, and many Labor supporters made up the large 
majorities that voted down the proposals. The "No" vote carried 56 per cent of 
the popular vote and aU states except South Australia and Western Australia. 
As had been the case in previous attempts. Labor's elaborate scheme for 
transforming the constitution had failed. It was left with the old constraints of 
a federal system and the existing range of legislative powers. The Labor 
govemment's attempt to amend the constitution in 1944 brought out the restrictive 
character of that instrament and the trae colour of the federal Labor government's 
postwar intentions. The failure to expand central powers helps to explain the 
extreme pressures that were subsequently put upon the constitution when the 
Labor govemment tried to implement its programme using existing constitutional 
powers. 
High Court reconstruction overruled 
The altemative avenue for expanding commonwealth powers that previous federal 
Labor governments had exploited was that of judicial appointment. During its 
eight years of office in the 1940s, the Curtin and Chifley administrations made 
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only one appointment to the High Court, WilUam Webb in 1946, and he was 
unsympathetic to the Labor cause. Part of the reason for Labor's extremely 
conservative record in appointing new judges to the High Court during this crucial 
period was chance combined with the dogged determination of Rich and Starke 
to sit out Labor's term of office. Both judges retired in early 1950 after the new 
Menzies Liberal government was sworn in. By then Rich was eighty-seven and 
Starke seventy-eight. The other part of the reason was Evatt. He squashed a bold 
"High Court Reconstruction" plan that would have given the Labor government 
three new appointments by increasing the Court from six to nine members. 
When Labor came to office in 1941 it faced a very experienced but at the same 
time a hale and hearty Court. Although Rich and Starke were quite old men, 
the average age of the judges was only about fifty-eight which is relatively yovmg 
for AustraUan High Court judges. AU six judges, Latham CJ, Rich, Starke, Dixon, 
McTieman and WUUams JJ, survived Labor's eight-year rule. The Court that began 
assessing the Chifley government's sodal and economic reforms in 1945 was a 
very experienced one. Four of the judges had been on the High Court bench for 
fifteen years or more; in addition Latham had been chief justice for ten years; 
while WilUams, the least experienced judge, had served only five years on the 
High Court. 
The High Court of the 1940s was comprised of judges who were predominantly 
from narrow professional backgrounds and without poUtical or public experience. 
Ofthe six judges, only McTiernan and Latham had been involved in politics and 
public Ufe, McTiernan as a New South Wales Labor attorney-general in the early 
1920s and a federal Labor member at the time of his appointment, and Latham 
as leader of the old NationaUst party. Latham had resigned from the leadership 
in favour of the Labor renegade Lyons, and to make way for Menzies. Menzies 
got Latham's safe Kooyong seat and the attorney-generalship while in return 
Latham was appointed chief justice. The other four judges were aU legal spedalists 
who were appointed to the Court after distinguished careers as barristers and judges. 
It was hardly surprising that the High Court of the 1940s was extremely legaUstic 
in view of the strictly professional background of the majority of its members 
and the fact that Latham had also adopted an ultra-legaUstic approach. Moreover, 
by the 1940s Dixon's influence over the Court had become dominant. 
More importantly, despite its favourable wartime decisions, the Court was 
generally unsympathetic to Labor. All the judges except McTiernan and Rich 
had been appointed by non-Labor govemments, but only McTieman was favourably 
disposed to Labor policy and consistent in upholding all the federal Labor 
government's legislation that was chaUenged during the postwar period. The 
attitude ofthe Court was becoming clear to the Labor side weU before the adverse 
decisions in the Airline Nationalization and Pharmaceutical Benefits cases in 1945-
In 1943 a Perth barrister who had been appearing before the High Court in 
Melbourne reported to Evatt "some very interesting conversations with some of 
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the Members of the Bench" He warned Evatt that some of the Labor 
administration's National Security Regulations might be mauled, and went on: 
I gathered from more or less direct statements some of the judges do not think much 
of Sodalism and their dedsions might be affected by the fact that they consider your 
Govemment is trying to attain SodaUsm under the guise of National Security. 
My general impression is that the High Court has given you Uniform Taxation but 
you won't get very much besides that unless you keep on the very straight and narrow 
paths spedfically defined by the Constitution. 
Such suspicions were also held by CalweU and Ward, two of the most radical 
and outspoken ofthe Labor ministers, who began pushing a "High Court Bench 
Reconstraction" plan as the war was drawing to a close. The plan was first raised 
in cabinet as an agenda item under that title in June 1945. Since Curtin was absent 
because of iU health (in fact he was dying) and Evatt was overseas, this poUticaUy 
explosive item was deferred. It was agreed that the acting prime minister and 
the acting attomey-general would discuss the matter with the solidtor-general 
and submit a response after Evatt's return."^ CalweU persisted in pushing the 
issue at the next cabinet meeting in July while Evatt was still overseas. This time 
cabinet dedde that the acting attomey-general should submit to cabinet "a proposal 
to increase the membership of the High Court Bench and matters related 
thereto" ' " 
Evatt had retumed to AustraUa in time for the cabinet meeting in August 1945. 
The court reconstraction proposal was again raised, and the attomey-general asked 
to consider the matter and submit an agendum to cabinet. At the September 
meeting of cabinet, however, Evatt was again absent and no agendum on 
reconstracting the Court was brought forward. CalweU persisted in raising the 
issue, this time in the more concrete terms of a proposed amendment to thejudidary 
Act. Cabinet then asked the acting attorney-general to bring before cabmet the 
next day "notes regarding the appointment of fiirther judges" "* The next day 
cabinet dedded to defer the question of an amendment to the Judiciary Act untU 
the next meeting of full cabinet. 
The time for procrastinating had been exhausted. FuU cabinet met a week later 
on 2 October 1945. Despite the fact that Evatt was stiU absent, the issue was 
put to the vote. The outcome of this contentious cabinet decision was recorded 
in fiiU: 
The foUowing questions were put to Cabinet and the decisions of Cabinet are recorded 
hereunder: — 
(1) Whether the question of increases in the number of Judges of the High Court 
should be deferred for dedsion until the first Cabinet meeting after the return to 
Australia of the Attorney-General? 
No decision. 
(2) Whether the number of High Court Judges should be increased? 
Approved 
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(3) Whether the increase should be one in number? 
Not approved. 
(4) Whether the increase should be three in number? 
Approved. 
(5) Whether the necessary legislation should be deferred until after the return of the 
Attorney-General? 
Approved.^^^ 
CalweU's persistence had paid off; a majority of the cabinet were prepared to approve 
his bold plan to reconstruct the Court. The moderates, who wanted only one 
new position to restore the Court to its strength of seven before the depression, 
were defeated, but the record of the cabinet dedsion suggests that they were able 
to force the final compromise of deferring the enabUng legislation untU Evatt's 
return. That was crudal. There was to be no repeat of the 1930 episode of cabinet 
hastily appointing new judges behind the attorney-general's back. 
Despite the drcumstances of his own appointment, Evatt was, as his biographer 
notes, "proud of the dignity of the High Court and jealous of its reputation" '" 
At the next meeting of cabinet which he attended there was a terrific row. CalweU 
records that Evatt resented the interference of laymen in the highest of legal matters 
and that he stressed that Labor would be accused of packing the Court. Calwell 
relates that he responded in typical fashion: "if our proposal could be described 
as one of packing the bench, then the successful plot that put Evatt and McTieman 
on the bench at the same time was certainly an instance of packing" Calwell 
recaUs that he and Ward attacked Evatt so vehemently on that occasion that, despite 
Evatt's "thick hide", he was reduced to tears.'" Nevertheless, despite his reported 
breakdown, Evatt carried the day and the cabinet dedsion of 2 October 1945 was 
amended as follows: "that it be a recommendation to the ParUamentary Labour 
Party that the Attorney-General prepare and introduce legislation to amend the 
Judiciary Act by the creation of one additional Judgeship of the High Court of 
AustraUa","* 
The High Court was narrowly saved, but only because of the dominant influence 
of Evatt in the Labor government. Without Evatt's stand at this point, the con-
stitutional history of Australia might have been quite different. The poUtical 
storm that would have broken had the Labor government persisted with CalweU's 
High Court reconstruction plan can be gauged from the controversy that was 
stirred up by its decision to restore the size of the Court to seven. After Isaac's 
appointment as governor-general in 1930, the size of the Court had been reduced 
to six. The reasons for this reduction in the number of judges from seven to six 
were the finandal stringency required by the depression and also the acute embar-
rassment suffered by the SculUn government over the appointments of Evatt and 
McTiernan. In 1946 Evatt argued that in view of the increased workload of the 
Court, the possibility of split decisions and the advanced age of several of the 
justices, it was time to restore the number of seats on the Court to seven. Even 
this modest amendment provoked accusations of unprindpled court-packing from 
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the opposition. For example H. L. Anthony claimed that "the decisions of judges 
are largely influenced by their previous history and prejudices over many years", 
and dted Evatt as an example. Anthony invoked memories of Roosevelt's famous 
court-packing plan that would have aUowed the president to increase the size of 
the United States Supreme Court from nine to fifteen. He said that Evatt would 
use the amendment to appoint somebody aligned with the Labor party and sug-
gested that Barry was the Ukely choice.'" 
Evatt was even more cautious in filling the single position he had created. An 
obvious choice whom Evatt passed over was in fact J. V. Barry, a prominent 
Melbourne KC and an active member of the Labor party. Barry's candidacy had 
earUer been advanced in the House by a Labor partisan'^ and tipped by Anthony 
in his inflammatory speech cited above. Barry had suitable credentials for a Labor 
appointee, and had been engaged by the Labor administration to assist with various 
high level commissions of inquiry. In July 1943 he staged a brilUant defence of 
Ward that promptly ended the bizarre "Brisbane Line" Royal Commission that 
had been forced on the government by the opposition and the independents who 
at the tune held the balance of power in the House.'^' In the 1943 elections Barry 
stood as the Labor candidate for Balaclava, a stronghold of the United Australia 
Party. As an unfiiendly newpaper bluntly put it, "With no chance of winning 
Mr Barry is apparently less concerned with impressing unattached voters than 
attracting the favourable notice of his ALP masters by playing up to thefr favourite 
prejudices."'^ ^ Barry also campaigned strenuously for the Labor side in the 1944 
referendum. 
A number of factors went against Barry's selection. The first was his age—he 
was forty-two—but given Evatt's own appointment to the High Court at only 
thirty-six years of age Barry's relative youth could not have been too significant. 
More important were the bitter divisions within cabinet and the fact that Evatt 
had bested CalweU and Ward who were Barry's strongest supporters.'^ Other 
senior ministers Uke Frank Forde supported WiUiam Webb because he was a 
Queenslander. Furthermore Barry may have become too much of an outspoken 
Labor partisan for Labor leaders Chifley and Evatt who, unUke CalweU and Ward, 
scrapulously avoided poUtidzing the Court or pubUcly critidzing its dedsions. 
In fact, as his subsequent career demonstrated, Barry would have been a suitable 
choice. He was appointed to the Victorian Supreme Court in 1947, became 
chairman of Melbourne University's Department of Criminology in 1951, and 
chairman of the Parole Board of Victoria in 1957. Barry won an international 
reputation as a jurist and scholar in penology and criminology.'^* 
Instead of Barry, the Labor govemment chose Webb who had been chief justice 
of Queensland since 1940 and was at the time the Australian judge on the 
International War Crimes Tribunal in Tokyo. Even Webb was accused by some 
of having pro-Labor sympathies because of his appointments to the War Crimes 
Tribunal and to a federal Industrial Relations Coundl by the Labor govemment 
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in 1942. These accusations were unfounded, however, as Webb had no real 
sympathies for Labor. In any case Webb did not take up his position on the High 
Court untU 1948 and in the only important case concerning the vaUdity of Labor 
legislation in which he partidpated, the Second Pharmaceutical Benefits case (1949), 
he was part of the majority that invalidated the Labor scheme. Since he was an 
experienced judge without poUtical affiliations, Webb was an extremely safe choice, 
as Rich had been for an earUer Labor government in 1913. 
The defeat of CalweU's High Court reconstraction plan in 1946 meant that, 
on balance, the Labor government remained pubUcly committed to the orthodoxy 
of an apoUtical and neutral Court. Evatt, who was deeply committed to the whole 
professional ethos of lawyers, narrowly saved that view of the Court. Had Evatt 
been less of a lawyer, and less convinced of his abiUty to change the dfrection 
that the Court was Ukely to take through the sheer persuasiveness of his own 
arguments, he may not have taken such a conservative stand. Thus, ironically, 
it was largely because of Evatt that legaUsm survived and the High Court was 
able to consoUdate its own position of poUtical supremacy whUe cutting down 
the key legislative initiatives of the Chifley govemment. In the final an%sis, it 
seems that there was a sense among the Labor leaders that the conventions of 
legal neutraUty and judidal independence had to be preserved regardless of the 
cost in terms of Labor policy. The Labor cabinet's final dedsion to reverse its 
earUer endorsement of CalweU's scheme to reconstract the High Court and its 
conservative choice of Webb to fiU the single position that it created on the High 
Court show that the Chifley Labor government was committed primarily to 
traditional parUamentary and consensus poUtics, and to radical reform only in so 
far as that was permissible vtrithin such Umited bounds. 
An obstructive court 
There were two complementary parts to Labor's postwar reconstruction 
programme: one was central control ofthe national economy induding, if necessary, 
pubUc ownership of vital services such as airlines and banking; the other was 
provision of a comprehensive system of social services. In a spectacular series of 
constitutional cases between 1945 and 1949 the High Court obstracted both. In 
the two Pharmaceutical Benefits cases (1945 and 1949) the Court twice invaUdated 
legislation providing for free medidne which was to be the first stage of Labor's 
national health scheme. 
During the early war years, the Labor administration began planning its postwar 
sodal welfare programmes. By the end of 1942 Chifley had prepared a preUminary 
estimate ofthe costs involved in developing a comprehensive system of social services 
in AustraUa. The Ust of services to be provided included "Free Health, Medical, 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Time of Testing 149 
Hospital, Dental and Pharmacy Services" " ' The scheme that was envisaged for 
providing free health and medical benefits was broadly set out as including: 
(1) a salaried medical service 
and 
(2) Commonwealth Govemment assuming direction, in collaboration with the States, 
of aU public hospitals, asylums and public health services.'^ ' 
This ambitious proposal was considered at length by cabinet in early 1943. There 
was some attention given to the financial constraints imposed by war, the need 
to work with the states in such areas as hospitals, and the existence of powerful 
interest groups that would be affected by the changes. For instance Evatt thought 
that "there should be at present no nationaUsation of doctors, but that hospitaUsation 
and other such benefits should be conducted through the existing channels as far 
as possible".' Others were more optimistic. The minister for sodal services 
suggested that much of the programme, including the items of free medicines 
and free hospitaUzation, "could be put into being without any great disraption 
of existing rights and interests" Prime Minister Curtin said, in a similar vein, 
that the biggest hurdle was getting the services started. Although many of these 
services were at the time quite novel to AustraUa, Curtin claimed that once they 
were started "any Government would shrink from discontinuing them. On the 
contrary the natural action would be a progressive amplification of the services." 
At this point the Labor govemment was severely underestimating both the length 
and cost of the war effort and its own abiUty to bring into Une strong interest 
groups such as doctors. What the early cabinet documents do make clear is that 
the Labor government's original goal was a nationalized health service run by 
a salaried medical profession. 
As it turned out Uttle could be spared from the war effort for social security 
by the Curtin administration. Nevertheless, the government committed itself to 
substantial sodal security spending, which it deferred for the duration of the war, 
through the National Welfare Fund. By this means one quarter of personal income 
tax receipts were earmarked for sodal security expenditure and credited to the 
nind for spending after the war. In the meantime the govemment sought legislative 
power over national health in the 1944 referendum, but failed to secure it. For 
this reason, and also because of the continumg drain that the war made on personnel 
and resources, the Curtin wartime government had to proceed with its national 
health scheme on a very Umited and piecemeal basis. 
The Pharmaceutical Benefits Act 1944 was the ffrst modest instaUnent of Labor's 
national health scheme. It was to provide free medidne at an annual cost of two 
mUUon pounds to be appropriated from the National Welfare Fund. The scheme 
was quite simple and efficient in its administrative detaUs. All proven drugs were 
to be Usted in a comprehensive, standardized formulary. Doctors would prescribe 
drugs from this formulary using a standard prescription form. The patient would 
present this prescription at a pharmacy to obtain the drugs, whUe pharmades were 
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to be reimbursed directly by the federal government. There were sound pubUc 
health and administrative reasons for using a standardized Usting of drags that 
would be eUgible under the scheme, and for insisting on standard prescription 
forms. All free drugs could be ffrst vetted by a panel of experts; unnecessary 
prescribing could be monitored; and costing and administration would be fadUtated. 
The practical disadvantage of such a scheme was the hostUity of the medical 
profession to a govemment-controUed pharmaceutical scheme that standardized 
the process of doctors' prescribing drags to thdr patients. 
The scheme was attacked from the very beginning by the combined forces of 
the opposition parties and the medical profession with Sir Earle Page, the "traant 
surgeon" and ex-leader of the Country party, spearheading the attack in 
parUament.'^ When the Pharmaceutical Benefits BiU was first introduced, its 
opponents branded it "another instalment of the dole" and "the thin edge of the 
nationaUzation wedge".'^' The professional assodation of medical practitioners, 
the AustraUan division of the British Medical Association (BMA), had aheady 
come out against the scheme. In December 1943 the BMA told the commonwealth 
minister of health that the medical profession must be "entirely untrammeUed" 
and that the welfare of the sick would be "seriously jeopardised by the adoption 
of any scheme which would Umit the freedom of a doctor in prescribing"."* 
Underlying their purported concern for the sick was the doctors' real concern 
for thefr complete professional autonomy. The profession was haunted by the spectre 
of sociaUzed medicine. Commenting on the Pharmaceutical Benefits legislation, 
the Victoria president of the BMA warned "that the profession has to face what 
is, without beating about the bush, the threat of nationaUzation, the loss of its 
ancient freedom and independence and the prospect of regimentation into a dvil 
service" ' ' Therefore the doctors were intent on holding the Une against any 
encroachment by the federal Labor government on their traditional domain of 
free enterprise medicine. The BMA explained to the minister of health m 1947 
that its members opposed the pharmaceutical benefits scheme because of "the 
opportunity provided for the introduction of a nationaUzed medical service by 
means of an act not drawn up for that purpose" "^ The BMA dfrected extensive 
propaganda against the nationaUzation of medicine and any system "designed as 
a stepping-stone to the nationaUzation of medicine" " ' 
First Pharmaceutical Benefits case (1945) 
The Pharmaceutical Benefits Act became law in 1944 and its constitutionaUty was 
chaUenged in 1945 by the anti-Labor attorney-general of Victoria who brought 
an action on behalf of three Victorian doctors, the president, vice-president and 
secretary of the Medical Society of Victoria. The plaintiff claimed that the Act 
was invalid since it was not referable to any commonwealth legislative powers. 
The commonwealth in turn contested the plaintiffs standing to bring such a 
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chaUenge. The Court decided both the question of standing and the substantive 
constitutional issue against the commonwealth. 
The Court's dedsion on the question of standing was the culmination of its 
previous generous practice of aUowing a state attomey-general to chaUenge the 
vaUdity of commonwealth legislation that affected the interests of his state. In 
his opinion Dixon reformulated the Court's generous poUcy of giving standing 
to state attorneys-general: 
It is the traditional duty of the Attomey-General to protect pubUc rights and to complain 
of excesses of a power bestowed by law and in our Federal system the result has been 
to give the Attorney-General of a State locus standi to sue for a declaration wherever 
his public is or may be affected by what he says is an ultra vires act on the part of the 
Commonwealth or of another State. *^ 
In this way, by using the friendly offices of a sympathetic state attorney-general, 
the doctors were able to take their contest with the federal Labor government 
before the High Court. The case is a typical example of how a smaU but politicaUy 
astute eUte group can exploit the legaUties of a federal system to check threatening 
govemment legislation. 
The substantive issue in the case turned on the characterization of the Act and 
the scope of the section 81 appropriation power in the constitution. According 
to section 81 aU commonwealth revenues can be "appropriated for purposes of 
the Commonwealth in the manner and subject to the charges and UabUities imposed 
by this Constitution" The question was whether the phrase "for the purposes 
of the Commonwealth" had a broad, open-ended meaning that allowed the 
commonwealth parUament to determine for itself the purposes for which it could 
appropriate money, or whether the phrase had a narrow meaning restricting 
appropriations to purposes that were specified within the legislative powers of 
the commonwealth parUament as set out in the constitution. The Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Act reUed on the broad interpretation of the appropriation power which, 
as Menzies pointed out, had exceUent credentials: "For 40 years the Commonwealth 
ParUament acted on the wide view.""' But no previous federal government had 
pushed this power to such an extent. The plaintiffs case depended on characterizing 
the Act as primarily legislation regulating medical matters that were properly in 
the states' domain. 
Although the point on which the case turned was the technical one of whether 
the section 81 phrase, "for the purposes of the Commonwealth", had an open-
ended or a restrictive meaning, the implications of the decision were enormous 
because the constitution expressly enumerated only one commonwealth social 
security power, section 51 (xxiii), covering old age and invaUd pensions. The case 
was biUed as "the most momentous since uniform taxation" because, if it succeeded, 
the commonwealth govemment's whole sodal service stracture would coUapse."* 
The Age lamented the partisanship that was crippUng the government's legitimate 
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endeavours: "The Commonwealth cannot act with any sense of security, or of 
constitutional propriety, in fields of national concern."'" 
The Court was hopelessly divided on the meaning and scope of the appropriation 
power, although only McTiernan was prepared to uphold the Act. McTieman's 
dissenting opinion was the most straightforward, and was at one extreme of the 
judidal spectrum. He held that "the purposes ofthe Commonwealth" were "such 
purposes as the ParUament determines" That made the appropriations power as 
broad as the elected representatives of the people chose to make it. McTiernan 
coupled this broad interpretation of section 81 with a progressive view of the 
development of the constitution and a restricted scope for judidal review. He said: 
"The Constitution puts the power of the purse in the hands of ParUament, not 
in the hands of the courts.""* Latham agreed with McTiernan that the 
appropriation power was constitutionally unUmited and that in practice it was 
for ParUament to determine its scope, but he invalidated the Act on a legaUstic 
dilemina of characterization. Latham posed that dilemma as follows: either the 
Act was for the appropriation of money, or it was reaUy for the control of doctors, 
chemists and the sale of drags, and only inddentaUy for the appropriation of money. 
Latham held that it was the latter. Therefore by a blatant use of the legaUstic 
technique of characterization, Latham effectively undercut his broad mterpretation 
of the appropriation power. 
At the opposite end of the spectram of views on the scope of the appropriations 
power were Starke and WiUiams. Starke simply rejected the claim that the 
commonwealth had unlimited power to appropriate its revenues for any purpose 
that it thought proper. WiUiams based his argument for a strictly Umited 
appropriations power on a static characterization of the original federal system. 
Expenditure had to be supported by the "particular purposes and those alone" 
for which the states had created the commonwealth in the original compact.'" 
Between Williams's rigidly static view of interpreting the constitution and 
McTieman's loosely progressive and centraUst view, there was obvious room for 
a more balanced developmental approach that preserved the essential federal character 
ofthe instrament while allovdng for national growth and changed sodo-economic 
conditions. In a series of 1947 opinions cuhninating in the State Banking case Dixon 
attempted to outline such a position. But in the First Pharmaceutical Benefits case 
he merely suggested the lines such reasoning might take: "In deddmg what 
appropriation laws may vaUdly be enacted it would be necessary to remember what 
position a national government occupies and to take no narrow view, but 
the basal consideration would be found in the distribution of powers and fiinctions 
between the Commonwealth and the States.'"*" Dixon did not develop such 
reasoning in this case because, Uke Latham, he also chose to decide the case on 
the narrower technical grounds of characterization. Dixon, with Rich concurring, 
characterized the Act as bdng primarify for legislating a detailed and coherent 
plan for the dispensing of free medidnes, and onfy incidentaUy for appropriating 
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money. Dixon claimed to be reserving his opinion on the substantive issue of 
the scope of the appropriations power. While that may have been formally the 
case, his reasoning impUcitly assumed a narrow interpretation of the section 81 
"purposes of the Commonwealth". If the appropriations power was as broad as 
McTieman maintained, it would clearly allow an appropriation for any purpose 
chosen by the federal government, including the funding of a free pharmaceutical 
benefits scheme that was at issue here. 
The individual opinions of the judges who made up the majority are not 
persuasive. Among the majority there was no consensus of reasoning on the key 
issue of the scope of the purposes for which the federal government could make 
appropriations under section 81. Latham held that "the purposes of the 
Commonwealth" were unUmited, Starke and WilUams that they were Umited 
to purposes that were spedfied in the commonwealth's grants of power as set 
out elsewhere in the constitution, while Dixon and Rich said the question was 
irrelevant for the case. These five judges were united only in their view that the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Act was invaUd, and by their characterizing it in a way 
that impUed its invaUdity. The holdings of the majority judges are more Uluminating 
than the reasons that support them: aU five judges held the legislation invaUd but 
reUed on three quite different sets of reasons to do so. Only McTieman was prepared 
to vaUdate the Act. Had Latham been consistent in his reasoning, he might have 
joined McTiernan. The configuration of the High Court with respect to Labor 
legislation for the rest of the decade had already emerged. The warning that had 
been passed on to Evatt in 1943 "that the High Court has given you Uniform 
Taxation but you won't get very much besides that unless you keep on the very 
straight and narrow paths spedfically defined by the Constitution" was proving 
correct. Yet only Ward pubUcly queried the Court's decision and even he was 
atypically drcumspect and moderate in his response: "I have never attacked the 
personnel of the High Court but I do not think its powers should be greater 
than those of ParUament."'*' 
Cabinet was stunned by the Court's decision which was handed down in 
November 1945 while Evatt was overseas. After Sir George Knowles had attended 
the cabinet meeting and explained the judgment, cabinet approved the resolution 
that "The Govemment is so concerned with the decisions of the Court that it 
wiU ask the opinion of eminent constitutional lawyers as to the constitutionaUty 
of similar social legislation."'*^ Five eminent lawyers, ranging from Robert 
Ganan to Garfield Barwick, were consulted. They confirmed the government's 
fears that the constitutionality of much of its social welfare programme was now 
in jeopardy because of the impUcations of the High Court's adverse decision on 
the Pharmaceutical Benefits Act. Legislation providing for maternity allowances, 
child endowment, widows' pensions, and unemployment and sickness benefits 
that had afready been enacted was said by all counsel to be either doubtful or 
invalid.'*' 
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The Pharmaceutical Benefits dedsion had dealt a severe blow to the Labor 
govemment's whole sodal security programme. The Court had dfrectly overruled 
the free medidne scheme, but more importantly it made the rest of Labor's existing 
and projected sodal security legislation constitutionaUy suspect. Having sanctioned 
the federal govemment's usurpation of the revenue field in the Uniform Tax case, 
the Court had now restricted the scope of its power to appropriate money for 
spending. The only sodal security matters that the constitution specificaUy provided 
for were invalid and old age pensions in section 51 (xxui). 
The Labor govemment's response to this judidal straitjacket was the 
Constitutional Alteration (Sodal Services) BiU to aUow the federal government 
to legislate for: "the provision of maternity aUowances, widows' pensions, child 
endowment, unemployment, pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital benefits, medical 
and dental services (but not so as to authorize any form of civil conscription), 
benefits to students and family aUowances." This carried by a majority in aU the 
states at the 1946 referendum and became section 51 (xxiiiA) ofthe constitution. 
Its purpose was to secure the Labor govemment's sodal security legislation against 
the ravages of the High Court. When Evatt introduced the bill in parUament, 
the opposition readily supported aU the heads of power except that concerning 
"medical and dental services". Evatt's explanation, that the fiinction of this clause 
was "to enable the Commonwealth to make use of the services of doctors and 
dentists to provide national medical and dental services",'** did nothing to allay 
the opposition's fears. Opposition spokesmen immediately raised the prospect of 
the nationaUzation of health and dental services. Menzies sketched the constitutional 
possibiUty of the government's setting up its own services as it had done in the 
Airline Act, but then, without the restriction of section 92 that appUed only to 
interstate trade and commerce, proceeding to nationalize the whole field.'*' To 
win opposition backing for the amendment, Evatt accepted Menzies's "dvil 
conscription" quaUfication that made the commonwealth's power to provide medical 
and dental services subject to the restriction "but not so as to authorize any form 
of dvil conscription" This qualification was to prove fatal to the government's 
new legislation in the Second Pharmaceutical Benefits case. 
The sodal services amendment proposal was one of three submitted to the people 
in 1946 in a referendum that coincided with general elections. The other two 
amendment proposals, which faUed to carry, concerned powers to allow national 
organization for the marketing of primary products regardless of section 92, and 
national regulation of industrial matters throughout AustraUa. For the election, 
Labor campaigned on its record and the implementation of its sodal security 
programme. Chifley placed special emphasis on the significance of the three 
referenda proposals for implementing Labor policies. If the social security 
amendment were carried, he promised that the scheme for free medidnes that 
had been invaUdated by the Court would be re-enacted. The sodal security 
amendment was carried, and the Chifley Labor government was returned with 
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handsome majorities in both Houses of parUament. With an impressive popular 
mandate and a constitutional amendment in hand, the Chifley administration was 
now confident of implementing its pharmaceutical benefits scheme. 
Second Pharmaceutical Benefits case (1949) 
The pharmaceutical benefits scheme was re-enacted in virtuaUy the same form 
as the 1944 Act. Senator McKenna, a lawyer and accountant and one of Labor's 
most competent ministers, was now in charge of the difficult health and sodal 
services portfoUo. Labor's pharmaceutical benefits scheme was reintroduced and 
passed as the Pharmaceutical Benefits Act of 1947. Since this Act placed no 
compulsion on medical practitioners or pharmaceutical chemists to take part in 
the scheme, and since it lessened the economic barriers to the patients' treatment 
and was covered by the new constitutional amendment, the government beUeved 
that both professions would co-operate.'** That hope proved to be iU-founded. 
The doctors were intransigent because they feared that free medicine was the 
first step towards a nationalized medical scheme. Most of the negotiation between 
McKenna and the federal coundl of the BMA was over administrative detaUs. 
In these negotiations the BMA claimed "the right to judge" whether the form 
of administration chosen by the govemment was "Ukely to advance the effidency 
of a pharmaceutical benefit scheme, or any other essentially medical scheme" '*' 
The doctors' fears of socialized medidne were fuelled by provocative statements 
from both the government and opposition. In pointing out that "times change", 
Arthur CalweU claimed that "the great days of the private practice of medicine 
are over here and m every other part of the world" '** Menzies exploited the 
situation vdth his considerable rhetorical skiUs: "The ultimate objective of the 
Govemment is the aboUtion of private practice . The biU is just one step towards 
the achievement of that objective."'*' 
When the scheme came into effect in June 1948 it was boycotted by the great 
majority of doctors. The federal coundl of the British Medical Association advised 
its members to stay outside the scheme and to refuse to accept delivery of the 
commonwealth formulary and prescription forms. An estimated 3,200 doctors, 
comprising over half the BMA membership, returned their formulary and 
prescription forms unopened to the ministry while most of the doctors remained 
outside the scheme. By early 1949, with only 117 doctors participating. Labor's 
free medidne scheme was an embarrassing failure. There was no possibiUty of 
co-operation from the medical profession whose attitude was, in Chifley's words, 
one of "conservatism and downright pigheadedness"."" Consequently the 
govemment made the scheme compulsory by simply legislating that all prescriptions 
for items Usted by the commonwealth formulary of drugs had to be made on 
commonwealth prescription forms. Since the formulary contained all the usual 
dmgs that would be routinely prescribed, doctors were in effect forced to partidpate 
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in the scheme. The penalty for non-compUance was fifty pounds. In introdudng 
this tough legislation Senator McKenna promised that regulations would be 
pubUshed to ensure the patients' right to reject formulary prescriptions and free 
benefits. In June 1949 this option was vwitten mto the Act, probably for the purpose 
of enhandng its validity in the ensuing High Court challenge."' 
The federal coundl of the BMA chaUenged the constitutionaUty of the amended 
1947 Act on the ground that having to write prescriptions on standard forms 
using standardized drag names imposed a form of dvU conscription on the medical 
profession. Counsel for the plaintiff argued that doctors were forced to make their 
services available "under practical compulsion" or cease to practise their 
profession."^ Attorney-General Evatt, appearing for the commonwealth, argued 
that the constitution had been amended for the very purpose of providing exactly 
the type of scheme being chaUenged. The constitutional amendment had approved 
"a great new power of social service" which Evatt said was entitled to be given 
a broad and liberal interpretation. 
For the second time the Court overruled the Labor govemment's welfare scheme. 
Latham, Rich, WilUams and Webb made up a majority which niled that the 
compulsory prescription requirement of the legislation was a form of dvil 
conscription and hence unconstitutional. Dixon, this time dissenting along with 
McTiernan, described the requirements regarding prescription writing as matters 
of "incidental character" and merely "the observance of formaUties" Only Dixon 
and McTiernan gave carefiil consideration to the meaning of civU conscription, 
a term that was drawn from the wartime practice of conscripting dviUans to work 
in war production and services. Dixon, whose dissenting opinion was a model 
of carefiil reasoning, rejected the majority's identification of dvil conscription with 
compulsion of a trivial kind. He distinguished between regulation in which an 
incident of medical practice was stipulated on the one hand, and the compulsion 
to serve medicaUy or to render medical service on the other. Only the latter could 
be called dvil conscription in the sense proscribed by the constitution. Dixon said: 
"There is no compulsion to render this service. But there is a compulsion as to 
the formalities to be observed when the prescription is set down as a direction 
for the chemist. In strict accuracy I think it is not a medical service that 
is made compulsory. "'^ ^ 
But the majority of the judges ruled unconstitutional the government's 
pharmaceutical benefits scheme, and in so doing registered a basic preference, for 
private enterprise medicine and untrammeUed professional autonomy. Latham reUed 
upon a domino-style argument: if the government could regulate the writing of 
prescriptions, it could equaUy regulate a doctor's time and place of practice, class 
of patient and routine for deaUng with patients - "the whole practice of a doctor 
could be completely controUed" "* The reasoning of aU four of the majority 
judges presupposed that doctors had an absolute right of free choice in their 
professional practice that could not be touched, even in inddental ways, by 
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govemment. The legislation was unconstitutional because it impinged upon some 
primordial right of contract between doctor and patient that was presumed to 
be protected by the constitution. As WiUiams put it, the legislation was 
unconstitutional because it requfred "a compulsory service to the Commonwealth 
for the purpose of the Act which is super-imposed upon the contract of the 
parties".'" 
The Second Pharmaceutical Benefits case was a triumph of positive individuaUsm 
and professional autonomy over govemment regulation ofthe inddentals of medical 
health care deUvery and its provision of a rather modest welfare scheme. In effect 
a majority of the Court were putting the professional freedom of doctors beyond 
even inddental regulation by the federal govemment. The right of doctors to 
prescribe in whatever form they chose was made constitutionaUy sacrosanct, whUst 
the Labor govemment's second attempt to introduce its pharmaceutical benefits 
scheme that had been popularly endorsed by the electorate and specificaUy provided 
for by a constitutional amendment was overruled by the Court. 
The Second Pharmaceutical Benefits dedsion was handed down in November 1949 
just before the Chifley govemment was voted out of office. By this time there 
were two significant changes in attitudes: of the press towards the Labor 
govemment and of Labor members towards the Court. Both had soured since 
the First Pharmaceutical Benefits case in 1945. Leading metropoUtan daiUes applauded 
the dedsion, blaming the govemment for attempting to sodaUze medidne, for 
authoritarianism, for being a bully and for attempting to evade the 
constitution."* It was reported that the Chifley government might make an issue 
ofthe High Court's obstruction of its poUdes at the coming election: "They could 
stress that they have been hamstrung by the High Court, and could introduce 
reform of the Court as an issue. A section of the Labor Party has been urging 
the appointment of lawyers with Labor leanings—after all Roosevelt packed the 
Supreme Court."'" This did not occur. Chifley denied that Labor would pack 
the Court, and the Court's cloak of legal impartiality was publicly adhered to. 
The Court as defender of private enterprise 
The AustraUan Labor party had been formaUy committed to the nationaUzation 
of industry in one form or another from the very beginning. The 1890 platform 
of the Australian Labor Federation, the precursor of the Labor party, had as its 
first general objective "the NationaUsation of aU sources of wealth and all means 
of produdng and exchanging wealth" In 1921, after experimenting for several 
decades with less doctrinaire formulations of purpose, the party reverted to a full-
blooded sodaUst statement of its objective as "the sociaUsation of industry, 
production, distribution and exchange" This was considerably muted by the 
Blackburn Declaration, an explanatory rider adopted at the same time reassuring 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
158 PoUtics of the High Court 
the party itself and the pubUc that it did not seek to aboUsh private ovraership 
of any property that was used by its owner "in a sodaUy useful manner and without 
explofration" "* This remained the Labor party's stated objective in the 1940s. 
It had not previously been implemented nor had its constitutionaUty been tested 
before the High Court. 
At the sixteenth Federal Conference of the Labor party in December 1943, when 
the tide of war was turning and after Labor's landsUde victory at the 1943 federal 
poUs, it was resolved "that a nation wide campaign for sodaUsm be started 
immediately" This resolution was referred back to the federal executive for action, 
and in turn passed on to the state executives of the party."' Although Uttle was 
done, the motion shows that large sections of the party favoured action on the 
party objective. The federal govemment's dedsion to nationaUze interstate afrUnes 
was in part a response to this demand from within Labor party ranks. 
While recognizing that the constitutional position was "most insecure" after 
the failure of the 1944 referendum,'*" cabinet nevertheless dedded in 1944 to 
proceed with the nationaUzation of interstate afrUnes.'*' The dedsion was cleared 
with Drakeford, the minister for dvU aviation, who was in America at the time. 
In reply to a wire from cabinet, Drakeford drew attention to the precarious 
constitutional position, but nevertheless supported a tougher Une than cabmet had 
taken. Drakeford said "if afr Une services are to be nationaUzed, we should 
nationaUze the lot", including intrastate as weU as interstate services. Drakeford's 
reply also indicated that the party caucus as weU as its federal conference had been 
pushing for implementation of the party objective: "A ffrm declaration of poUcy 
and intention on these lines ought, I feel, to satisfy Caucus that Cabinet has every 
intention of giving effect to party poUcy when conditions are favourable and will 
make success certain."'*^ 
The AirUne case and section 92 
The biU to nationalize interstate airUnes was debated in parliament in the second 
half of 1945. With AustraUa on "the threshold of the Air Age", the Labor 
govemment wanted to secure this key growth industry as a pubUc utiUty.'*' The 
practical alternatives for AustraUa, Drakeford claimed, were either a private 
monopoly or a government monopoly. Already one large company, AustraUan 
National Airways (ANA), dominated the industry. ANA was in turn owned by 
a consortium of shipping interests which in its own right was one of the most 
powerfiil transport combines in the country. Drakeford claimed that the shipping 
lines were kUUng two birds with one stone; they were extending their profit-
making activities while at the same time ensuring that the new transport medium 
did not endanger thefr existing business. The AustraUan National AfrUnes 
Commission was to be set up with powers to acquire, establish and maintain air 
services subject to ministerial control. No new Ucences would be issued to private 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Time of Testing 159 
operators, and the commission was empowered to take over existing interstate 
airlines. 
Drakeford put up a bold front on the constitutional question. He said that the 
govemment presumed it had the necessary constitutional power over interstate 
air traffic to support its legislation despite charges in the press that, having lost 
the referendum which included a specific power over dvU aviation, the govemment 
had ndther the constitutional power nor a mandate to interfere with afr traffic. 
Drakeford denied both claims and asserted that the federal govemment had always 
had legislative power over interstate afr traffic. "Had the referendum been 
successful", he added, "this legislation would in all probabiUty have covered 
intrastate as weU as interstate airUnes." 
Menzies cleverly cut much of the ground from under Drakeford's reasoning 
and reduced the issue to the fiindamental choice of state ownership versus private 
enterprise."* He explained that ANA had been formed by amalgamating smaUer 
afrUnes at the suggestion and with the blessing of the UAP-Country party 
govemment in 1936. The then postmaster-general wanted a national airline to 
which he could award a national contract for carriage of maUs. Menzies pointed 
out that the federal govemment afready controUed "all existing airUne operations, 
air routes and stopping places, fares and freights, time-tables and frequency of 
services, the rates paid for the carriage of mails, the safety of aircraft, the training 
of crews, methods of flying operations, air navigation, disdpline and control" 
Why then did Labor want to nationaUze ownership when it could control 
everything else? The Labor defenders argued that in either case there was a natural 
monopoly that would be ran by professional managers and technicians. In such 
a monopoly situation the motive of private profit could not be expected to ensure 
the most economic service, or best serve the public good. The Liberals replied 
that the profit motive was the best incentive to effidency and development and 
that the government could ensure that pubUc ends were served by instituting 
appropriate regulations. The Liberals fondly referred to airUne advances in private 
enterprise America, but failed to note that America was far more populous than 
AustraUa and supported a number of competitive airlines. The opposing positions 
of the Labor govemment and the Liberal opposition reflected different basic 
commitments; the opposition advocated the marriage of private enterprise and 
govemment regulation whereas the Labor government stood firm on pubUc 
ownership and control.'*' 
The constitutional validity of the AustraUan Airline Act was immediately 
challenged in the High Court by ANA, the emerging giant of the airline industry 
that, in Labor's estimation, was weU on its way to monopoUzing the field. 
Appearing for ANA, Garfield Barwick argued that the federal trade and commerce 
power, section 51 (i), was a power to regulate and not a power to prohibit or 
restrict. He argued that section 92 was imported into section 51 by the words 
"subject to this Constitution", and that it was a general qualification to aU section 
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51 powers. Consequently, according to Barwick's interpretation, section 51 (i) 
should be read as a power "to make laws with respect to trade and 
commerce among the States but so that trade, commerce and intercourse 
among the States shaU be absolutely free".'** 
The case turned on two major constitutional questions: (i) did the section 51 
(i) commonwealth power over interstate trade and commerce aUow the govemment 
to estabUsh a monopoly over interstate air transport; and if so (ii) did section 92 
prohibit such a monopoly? The five judges—McTiernan did not sit on the case 
because his father died on the eve of the hearing —answered both questions in 
the affirmative. Though they were unanimous in their holdings, each judge wrote 
a separate opinion. 
None of the judges had any reservations about the plenary nature of the trade 
and commerce power or its suffidency to support the creation of a government 
monopoly over airUnes. Dixon's dismissal of the narrow interpretation of section 
51 (i) is most interesting and seldom referred to by those critics who take his 
"strict and complete legaUsm" at face value. He rejected the narrow view of the 
trade and commerce power, that it was a power to regulate but not a power to 
prohibit or restrict, because such a view was grounded on a nineteenth-century, 
naturaUst concept of trade. Paraphrasing MarshaU's famous comments on the 
American constitution, Dixon said: 
It plainly ignores the fact that it is a Constitution we are interpreting, an instmraent 
of government meant to endure and conferring powers expressed in general propositions 
wide enough to be capable of flexible appUcation to changing drcumstances. It confuses 
the unexpressed assumptions upon which the framers of the instrument supposedly 
proceeded with the expressed meaning of the power.'*' 
Fresh from his sojourn in the United States as a wartime ambassador, Dixon was 
intent upon avoiding the pitfaUs of the American Supreme Court in the 1930s 
when it interpreted the "due process" clause of the American constitution to 
safeguard the sanctity of contract and private enterprise. Because of the expHdt 
words of section 92 in the AustraUan constitution, the AustraUan judges could 
uphold private enterprise by a more Uteral reading of the constfrutional text. 
The commonwealth's argument was based squarely on the Transport precedents, 
espedaUy Vizzard's case that had aUowed a New South Wales system of restrictive 
Ucensing of motor vehicles involved in carrying goods in interstate trade. The 
restrictive licensing was aUowed in that case on the grounds that it fadlitated 
and co-ordinated interstate transport. In this instance involving interstate afrUnes, 
the commonwealth's defence was stated as follows: 
So far as section 92 is concemed a monopoly could be granted, in the interest of efficiency, 
to one of the existing companies, to a Government, to anyone; therefore the Act is 
not obnoxious to section 92 merely because it is designed to give a monopoly to the 
Commission which it constitutes so long as the Commission provides adequate services. 
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The only question is whether to do so may properly and reasonably be regarded as 
fadlitating air transport.'*' 
Latham was the only judge who considered this argument in his written opinion 
and he rejected it. He denied that the airUne Act was for purposes of safety or 
effidency, which might have been grounds for upholding the statute, on the basis 
that it introduced regular and orderly control into what otherwise might have 
been unregulated, disorderly and possibly fooUsh competition. 
AU the judges mcluding Latham read private competition into section 92 and 
held that such private competition was to extend to the provision of afrUne services. 
In so doing they accepted the arguments of Sfr Garfield Barwick who had made 
his reputation as an advocate in opposing the constitutional vaUdity of national 
security regulations before the High Court, and had a keen sense of judidal attitudes 
that were then current on the High Court bench.'*' The Act contravened section 
92, Latham said, because it was "directed against aU competition with the inter-
State services of the Commission" The most extreme identification of section 
92 with free competition was made by Starke who said: 
The object of section 92 is to maintain freedom of inter-State competition—the open 
and not the closed door—absolute freedom of inter-State trade and commerce. An act 
which is entirely restrictive of any freedom of action on the part of traders and which 
operates to prevent them engaging their commodities in any trade, inter- or intra-State, 
is in my opinion, necessarily obnoxious to section 92.'^" 
The Act effectively precluded everyone but the commission from engaging in 
interstate trade. Therefore the majority held that it contravened section 92 of the 
constitution. 
Dixon and WilUams distinguished this case from the Transport precedents which 
were the foundation of the commonwealth's defence. Dixon acknowledged that 
there was ample authority in the Transport cases for the proposition that the absolute 
freedom of section 92 was compatible with the regulation of individuals. He 
distinguished those cases from the Airline case, however, on the grounds that they 
dealt with means or implements of trade while the Airline case dealt with actual 
trade. In Dixon's view there was a "sharp differentiation between commercial 
deaUngs, or perhaps commerdal and other intercourse, on the one hand, and, on 
the other hand, motor vehicles as means or implements used for that purpose and 
no more" ' " Dixon concluded that the Act concemed the carrying of people and 
goods interstate, and that such commerical carrying was intrinsicaUy as much 
interstate commerce as the sale and deUvery of goods from one state to another. 
That may well be, but so is the carriage of people and goods interstate by means 
of motor transport. In short, Dixon's distinction was not adequate to differentiate 
interstate road transport that the Court (with Dixon dissenting) had allowed 
govemments to regulate restrictively, despite section 92, from interstate afr transport 
that Dixon was here stipulating govemments could not regulate. Having 
distinguished this case from the Transport precedents in this way, Dixon appUed 
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the dictum of the Judidal Committee of the Privy CouncU that section 92 guaranteed 
"freedom at the frontier", and raled that the airline Act violated such freedom. 
If Dixon's distinguishing ofthe Transport cases was inadequate, that of WilUams 
was highly contrived. He claimed that the Transport cases were distinct because 
they concemed state-owned roads. According to WUUams, if interstate road carriers 
persuaded owners of private land on each side of the border to buUd a road on 
which to carry on their business, states could not interfere with such carriage 
without violating section 92. In the afrUne business the commonwealth could 
monopoUze only aerodromes and navigation aids, said WilUams, but not apparently 
afr routes."^ On that implausible basis the current airUne case could be 
distinguished from the earUer road transport cases. 
Rich's holding was the most straightforward and the least reasoned. He simply 
stated that the question of a statute's vaUdity with respect to section 92 was a 
question of fact and in this case he was "unable to feel any doubt" that the airhne 
Act violated section 92. '" 
The Airline decision reflected the dominance on the High Court of Dixon's 
private enterprise view of section 92, and the demise of Evatt's altemative view 
that would allow government regulation and control provided the flow of trade 
was maintained. This was the second great revolution in the judidal interpretation 
of this enigmatic section. The ffrst had occurred twenty-five years earlier when 
Isaacs dogmatically asserted on behalf of a new bench of judges that section 92 
bound only the states but not the commonwealth, and later that it protected "a 
personal right attaching to the individual and not attaching to the goods"."* 
Dixon had taken over this notion that section 92 guaranteed an individual's personal 
right to free trade and applied it against the commonwealth as weU as the states. 
Thus in Dixon's creative hands section 92 became a bulwark to protect private 
enterprise against the government's monopoUzing the field. It could be used by 
the Court to block a federal Labor government's attempt to estabUsh a pubHc 
monopoly over any sector of the national economy that involved interstate trade. 
In the Airline case the High Court overruled Labor's attempt to nationalize 
interstate airUnes. The Court decided that the section 51 (i) trade and commerce 
power aUowed the commonwealth parUament to set up a pubUcly-owned interstate 
airUne but that section 92 prevented it from monopoUzing the field. The resuk 
was the creation of the pubUc airUne, Trans Australia AfrUnes (TAA), and the 
continuation of the private airUne, Australian National Airways (subsequently 
Ansett-ANA). The significance of the Airline decision extended far beyond the 
nationaUzation of interstate afrUnes, however, since it sanctioned an interpretation 
of section 92, that, if adhered to, precluded the nationaUzation of interstate 
industries per se. The Court had interpreted section 92 as a guarantee of free 
enterprise competition and individual trading and transport rights. It had read 
individual liberty and private enterprise into this section of the constitution and 
had thereby put Labor's sociaUzation objective beyond the pale of the Australian 
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constitution. The subsequent Bank Nationalization dedsion ofthe High Court was 
a logical extension of the reasoning of the Airline case. 
Most surprising of aU, the Court made this highly poUtical decision without 
disturbing Us neutral, legal unage. In reportmg the dedsion, the Sydney Moming 
Herald said: "The Court has not passed judgment on economic and sodal poUdes, 
but on the legal aspects of the Constitution."'" The Brisbane Courier agreed, 
insisting that "the Court's judgment had nothing to do with the case for or against 
nationaUzation of airUnes. It was interpreting the Constitution.""* 
The State Banking case (1947) 
Money, said Thomas Hobbes, one of the precursors of modern capitaUsm, is the 
Ufeblood of a poUtical commonwealth since it "goes round about, nourishing, 
as it passeth, every party thereof ' " In early 1945 Chifley legislated to convert 
the national security regulations that had imposed central banking controls on 
the private banks during wartime using the defence power, into peacetime 
legislation. The Commonwealth Bank Act 1945 set up a central banking division 
vrithin the Commonwealth Bank with powers to control the poUdes and activities 
of the whole banking system. The prewar independent bank board was replaced 
by a single govemor dfrectly responsible to the commonwealth government. The 
broad mandate of the central bank was set out in the Act in grand Keynesian 
terms: to pursue monetary and banking poUcies that would best contribute to 
(a) the StabUity of the currency of Australia; 
(b) the maintenance of fuU employment in AustraUa; and 
(c) the economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia."* 
At this point Chifley was prepared to settle for the fuU paraphemaUa of central 
banking that had worked so weU during the war, rather than impose nationalization 
that he had advocated in his 1937 Royal Commission dissent. He had avoided 
inserting provisions in the biU which were not essential for effective control, and 
which might have given rise to adverse propaganda and injured AustraUa's credit 
standing overseas.'" 
The banking legislation included two additional policies that were to prove 
espedally contentious. The trading division of the Commonwealth Bank was to 
compete actively vdth the private banks for ordinary business; and public bodies 
could be required to bank vdth public institutions, either the commonwealth or 
state banks, at the treasurer's discretion. The former measure provided the ground 
for outraged cries of unfair competition from the banks. The latter measure 
triggered the chaUenge m the State Banking case (1947) and proved to be the AchUles' 
heel of the 1945 banking legislation. 
Although the central control of the banking system that the Labor government 
was legislating was not so different from that being introduced in other countries 
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at about that time, there was a shrill response from the opposition and the private 
banks.'*" Menzies wanted a retum to the old system of independent private 
banking. He reUed on Keynes's earUer Treatise on Money that was now out of 
date—as one parliamentary interjector pointed out, Ke3mes had turned "a few 
economic somersaults" since that earUer pubUcation.'*' Menzies caUed the banking 
biUs a striking example of the govemment's desfre to perpetuate "the servUe state" 
in AustraUa long after the war emergency had passed. He predicted "slow 
strangulation of the private banking system in favour of a pubUcly owned and 
poUticaUy controUed banking system" Fadden claimed that the banking legislation 
was the first step to sodaUsm.'*^ He quoted Chifley's 1937 Royal Commission 
dissent that the best banking system for a community was one under national 
control, and that the Commonwealth Bank should be extended "with the ultimate 
aim of providing the whole ofthe services now rendered by private trading banks", 
Fadden also quoted the resolution of the 1943 Federal Labor Conference, the 
supreme poUcy-making body of the Labor party, directing the government to 
proceed with implementing the party's banking programme. That resolution had 
stipulated that the national security regulations regarding banking be translated 
into legislation so that the Commonwealth Bank be put "in complete control 
of the banking system" and that the Bank be made "subservient to the 
Government" 
The private trading banks resented the Labor government's strict controls over 
their accustomed autonomy. They had submitted reluctantly to Chifley's wartime 
regulations and lobbied strongly against the 1945 banking legislation when it was 
before the House. This legislation required the private banks to transfer their 
wartime special deposits to new spedal accounts at the central banking division 
of the Commonwealth Bank. The seven major private banks advised the govemor 
of the Commonwealth Bank at this point that their compliance vdth the banking 
law was not to be interpreted as acceptance or as estabUshing a contractual obUgation 
to maintain such accounts in the fiiture. As Chifley later stated in the House, 
"the private banks, obviously acting in concert and on legal advice, made it clear 
at that time that, while they were submitting to the legislation for the time being, 
they were reserving the right to challenge it at a suitable opportunity."'*' 
There was no challenge to the constitutionaUty ofthe banking Act in the High 
Court untU 1947 when Chifley moved to implement section 48, which empowered 
the treasurer to prevent private banks from conducting business for public 
authorities, including local govemments that came within the legislative jurisdiction 
of the states. This contentious provision served two purposes; from a technical 
point of view it enhanced the capabiUties of central monetary control, and as well 
it was a way of implementing Labor's preference for public rather than private 
enterprise. Section 48 was not implemented untU 1947 because the Commonwealth 
Bank had inadequate fadUties in Melbourne and Sydney where the bulk of such 
accounts were held.'** When this was remedied, the governor of the 
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Commonwealth Bank approached the private banks m February 1947 and suggested 
that they should voluntarily transfer local government accounts to the 
Commonwealth Bank without requiring the treasurer to invoke section 48. The 
private banks refiised with thefr spokesman, L. J. McConnan, pointing out that 
legal counsel had raised doubts as to the constitutional vaUdity of section 48.'*' 
On 1 May 1947 Chifley mformed some two hundred local govemment authorities, 
including the dty of Melbourne, that an order would be issued under section 48 
forbidding private banks from conducting their business as from 1 August 1947. 
This led the Melboume dty councU to bring an action in the High Court to have 
the Banking Act 1945, or alternatively the controversial section 48, declared 
unconstitutional and the treasurer restrained from implementing it by an injunction. 
The private banks were heavUy impUcated as "behind-the-scene" coUaborators 
to the chaUenge. Melbourne was the acknowledged banking capital of AustraUa 
since it contained the head offices of five of the nine major trading banks.'** The 
organization of assodated banks at Melbourne was the key policy-making body 
for the private banking estabUshment and its "national mouthpiece" '*' The 
chairman of this body was L. J. McConnan, who was also the general manager 
of the National Bank. The Melboume dty coundl was a customer of the National 
Bank and was advised by the same firm of soUcitors as the National Bank. As 
Arthur CalweU sarcasticaUy pointed out, the soUdtor for the Melbourne dty coundl 
"happened, by the strangest coinddence in the world, also to be the secretary 
of the Victoria division of the Assodated Banks of AustraUa" '** 
The hand of the private banks was also evident in the plaintiffs original statement 
of claim which chaUenged the whole of the 1945 Banking Act including the key 
sections 18 to 22, goveming spedal accounts. These were the crux ofthe control 
mechanism, since they aUowed the govemment through the central bank to control 
bank Uquidity and advance poUcy. The plaintiff was going to argue that section 
48 of the banking act was invalid on the ground that sections 18 to 22 constituted 
a law imposing taxation within the meaning of section 55 of the constitution, 
and consequently that any provision of the Act other than taxation was invaUd.'*' 
This general attack was dropped, according to L. F. Crisp, because Chifley 
threatened that "if the private banks sought to emasculate essential provisions of 
the 1945 Acts, on whatever pretext or behind whatever 'front', he would go to 
the Umit to sustain the basic purposes of that legislation"."" The more general 
attack was dropped at the insistence of some influential private bank leaders, 
including McConnan, who were reluctant to chaUenge the determined treasurer 
head-on at this point, though the banks were apparently divided on the issue.'" 
Three states intervened in the case. Victoria, which at the time had one of its 
infrequent Labor governments, supported the commonwealth and the banking 
legislation, whUe the anti-Labor state govemments of South AustraUa and Westem 
AustraUa joined the private banks in supporting the challenge by the Melbourne 
dty coundl. The intervention of Victoria against the Melboume dty councU 
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indicates the extent of Labor soUdarity, espedaUy as Victoria had insuffident fadUties 
of its own that might provide an alternative to the Commonwealth Bank for the 
dty's large account. Thus the parties to the dispute were Labor and anti-Labor; 
the federal and Victorian Labor governments on the one hand, and the Melbourne 
city coundl backed by the private banks and two non-Labor state governments 
on the other. The real issue was pubUc-versus-private enterprise, but the case was 
argued in standard commonwealth-versus-state categories of constitutional law. 
Again we see how a written constitution that is subject to judicial review can 
transfer an important political and public controversy from the realm of popular 
choice or political compromise to that of judicial decision making. 
The High Court was unanimous in holding that the section 51 (xiii) federal 
banking power was a fiiU-blooded power and that state banking meant the busmess 
of banking and not banking transactions to which the state was a party as customer. 
The banking power, section 51 (xiu), gives the AustraUan parUament power with 
respect to "banking, other than State banking; also State banking extendmg beyond 
the limits of the State concemed, the incorporation of banks, and the issue of 
paper money" Barwick argued on behalf of the Melbourne dty councU that the 
federal banking power aUowed only the regulation of banking transactions and 
that state banking included, and therefore exempted from federal control, banking 
transactions in which a state or a state authority were customers. Either argument 
would, if accepted, have been sufficient to invaUdate section 48 but neither was 
accepted by the High Court. 
Instead, the Court, vdth McTieman dissenting, brought back a modified version 
ofthe doctrine of impUed immunities and held that section 48 was invaUd because 
it discriminated against the states (Latham, Dixon and WiUiams), or that it violated 
an essential fiinction ofthe states (Rich, Starke and WUUams). Such state immunity 
from federal discrimination or violation of essential activities was implied by the 
basic nature of the federal system and operated to restrict commonweakh legislative 
powers including the banking power. Rich actually denied that there was any 
general implication in the framework of the constitution, probably for the sake 
of consistency with his 1920 Engineers opinion, but reached the same conclusion 
by simply stating that the constitution explicitly provided for the continued 
existence of the states."^ 
The majority holdmg was at odds with the spfrit ofthe leadmg Engineers dedsion, 
as McTiernan emphasized in his dissenting opinion. Quoting extensively from 
the extreme reasoning of Engineers, McTiernan said: 
no implication of a restriction upon the exerdse of Commonwealth legislative power 
is permissible if it is "formed on a vague, individual conception of the spirit of the 
compact" and is "not the result of interpreting any specific language to be quoted, 
nor referable to any recognized prindple of the common law of the Constitution".'" 
Ndther was the possible abuse of powers a vaUd reason for limiting the natural 
force of language. McTiernan could have emphasized the point, at the risk of 
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embarrassing the chief justice, by quoting Latham's dictum from the Uniform Tax 
case that even if the commonwealth destroyed the poUtical independence of the 
states by using its taxing power to the Umit, such a result could not be prevented 
by any legal decision since it was a poUtical matter. 
The Court's partial break with Engineers principles which had been appUed in 
thefr fiiU rigour only three years before in the Uniform Tax case reflected the 
dominant influence of Dixon. Dixon had not sat on the Uniform Tax case and 
had reservations about it."* The Airline dedsion was the culmination of a revival 
of a modified immunities doctrine begun by Dixon and Evatt in the 1930s. In 
West's case (1937) both judges had argued strongly that certain intergovernmental 
immunities were impUed by the federal system. Dixon set out the prindple that 
the constitution as an instrument of federal government impUed that neither the 
commonwealth nor the states could use thefr powers to discriminate against the 
other, while Evatt said that neither the commonwealth nor the states could direct 
legislation towards the destraction of the normal activities of the other.'" 
The five judges who made up the majority in the State Banking case used both 
the Dkon and Evatt versions of the immunities doctrine: that a federal law could 
not discriminate against the states, and that a federal law could not violate an 
essential fiinction ofthe states. Latham and Dixon reUed upon the former principle 
of not discriminating against the states, whUe Rich and Starke relied upon the 
latter principle of not violating an essential fiinction of the states, and WilUams 
reUed on both. The two versions of the prindple are quite sound since the basic 
federal stracture is the essence of the constitution. The problem is with applying 
these two variations of the federal prindple to the legislation in question. 
In this respect the Rich-Starke-WiUiams holding was implausible and iUogical. 
These judges began with the sound federal prindple that an essential fiinction 
of a state, and a state instrumentality such as the Melbourne city coundl, was 
the right to manage its own fiinds, including a right of access to adequate banking 
fadUties. But then these three judges assumed that a right of access to adequate 
banking fadUties entailed, or was equivalent to, the right to use private banking 
fadUties. In other words freedom of choice among private banks was assumed 
to be an essential part of the management of funds. Rich said this most explicitly: 
"the power freely to use the fadUties provided by banks must be regarded 
as essential to the effident workmg of govemment" "* This assumption that the 
essential fimction of a state or a state instramentaUty entailed free choice among 
pre-existmg private banks lacked any constitutional foundation. The right to 
manage funds does include access to adequate banking fadUties, but not necessarily 
to private banking fadUties. If adequate services were available from a public 
institution, that would be suffident. In the same way postal and telecommunication 
faciUties are an integral part of modern administration, but that does not imply 
that for the essential fiinctions of a state or state instramentaUty to remain 
unimpaired by commonwealth legislation there must be freedom of choice among 
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competing private suppUers of such services. The adequacy of Commonwealth 
Bank fadUties was never chaUenged in the course of argument before the Court 
or in the opinions of any of the judges. Chifley had given an assurance that adequate 
pubUc faciUties were avaUable and that seems to have been universaUy acknowledged. 
Dixon repudiated the absurd line of reasoning used by Rich, Starke and WilUams: 
"The prima-fade rale is that a power to legislate vdth respect to a given subject 
enables the ParUament to make laws which, upon that subject, affect the operations 
of the States and thefr agencies." That was the essence of the Engineers case expressed 
as a legal proposition. In Dixon's view the Engineers rule was subject to reservations 
relating to the prerogative, to the taxing power and in this instance to 
discrimination against states. Dixon based this last reservation on an elaborate 
but moderate reformulation of federal impUcations and immunities."' He then 
held that section 48 of the banking Act discriminated against the states because 
they were "singled out and deprived of their freedom of choice which the existing 
system offered" Whereas ordinary dtizens and corporations could use private banks, 
state authorities could not. Dixon did not assume that states had an absolute right 
to private banking; they had only a contingent right to use private banks if such 
existed. Dixon concluded: 
At bottom the prindple upon which the States become subject to Commonwealth law 
is that when a State avails itself of any part ofthe established organization ofthe Australian 
community it must take it as it finds it. Except in so far as under its legislative power 
it may be able to alter the legal system, a State must accept the general legal system 
as it is estabUshed. If there be a monopoly in banking lawfiiUy established by the 
Commonwealth, the State must put up with it. '" 
The State Banking case is far more significant for what it implied and what it 
provoked than for what it actually decided. The Court decided that the banking 
power was a broad and plenary power but that it was restricted by state unmunities 
that invalidated section 48. There was no consensus on the extent of such state 
immunities and there were two different formulations of the immunities prindple. 
But section 48 was not an essential part of Labor's banking controls. More 
significant was the Court's reUance upon a modified doctrine of federal unpUcations 
and immunities. Though entirely vaUd and eminently sensible for mterpreting 
a federal constitution, such a doctrine was at variance vdth the mainsteam of 
AustraUan constitutional jurisprudence since the 1920 Engineers case. It is significant 
that the majority of the Court, with the exception of the Labor judge McTieman, 
chose in this case to revert to a doctrine of federal implications. This reaffirmation 
of a more balanced view of federaUsm was invoked to check a strong Labor 
government that was intent upon pushmg federal legislative powers to the Umits 
and utiUzing the fiiU scope that the Engineers dedsion had aUowed. Why did it 
occur m this case? A plausible explanation is that the Court, unable in this mstance 
to caU upon section 92, needed a foundation for its dedsion that was not otherwise 
available in the expUdt words of the constitution. This is but another instance 
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of the propensity of judges to create, adapt or revert to past interpretive theories 
in order to substantiate their dedsions. The resurrection ofthe doctrine of federal 
immunities indicated the mood of the Court towards the Chifley Labor 
government; it was restricting the scope of the federal government's power and 
restocking its legal arsenal vdth an appropriate doctrine for such a purpose. 
The key question of whether the federal govemment had power to nationaUze 
banks was not at issue in the case and was not decided, at least not explicitly. 
The Rich-Starke-WUUams position did preclude bank nationaUzation by unpUcation 
because if the states had a sovereign right to use the faciUties of private banks 
then quite clearly the commonwealth could not aboUsh them. Dixon and Latham 
deUberately left the question open whUe McTieman's reasoning could easily be 
extended to permit bank nationalization. Dixon said a government monopoly in 
bankmg was not ruled out provided it were "lawfiiUy estabUshed" This was stiU 
formaUy an open question. 
The Bank NationaUzation case (1948) 
Chifley's unmediate response to the State Banking dedsion was bank nationaUzation. 
Copies of the judgments in the State Banking case were immediately flown to 
Canberra where, after a couple of days of mtense discussions, cabinet unanimously 
approved "that the Prime Minister and the Attorney-General prepare legislation 
for submission to the ParUamentary Labor Party for the nationaUzation of 
banking-with the exception of State Banks—making adequate provision for the 
protection of the shareholders and customers of the Banks and the staffs employed 
by the Banks." Earlier in June before breaking up for the winter recess, the 
Labor caucus had authorized cabinet to take whatever steps were necessary as a 
resuk of the High Court's dedsion.^ When Chifley subsequently presented the 
bank nationaUzation legislation, embodying "fiindamentals of Labor poUcy to which 
every member here subscribes", to caucus, it was endorsed within twenty 
minutes.^' 
The AustraUan pubUc was stunned. The Age, the least antagonistic of the major 
newspapers throughout this period, expressed "utmost astonishment" at Chifley's 
announcement of bank nationaUzation: "There was no need for it and no public 
demand."^^ Most of the other reaction from the anti-Labor side was far more 
extreme. Bank nationaUzation was branded a tactic of "Red totaUtarianism" and 
"SodaUst dictatorship".^' Business leaders were outraged, pointing out that "a 
banking monopoly would give the power of Ufe and death over businessmen", 
and claiming "control of banking wiU mean complete nationaUzation. Banking 
is the life blood of industry."^ The polarization of AustraUan poUtics was 
complete vdth the Labor party and its union supporters closing ranks behind the 
Chifley govemment. The federal executive of the party congratulated the 
govemment on its dedsion.^"' The secretary of the Victorian branch of the Labor 
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party said that organized labour everywhere would enthusiastically support the 
dedsion: "The ALP's objective is sodalism, and the dedsion is an important 
contribution to the objective.""" Some hardUne unionists went further, claiming 
that the banks should be nationaUzed without compensation. 
Why nationaUzation and why such a swift response? Crisp attributes the 
astonishing unanimity and despatch of the government to the ascendancy that 
Chifley had estabUshed over his coUeagues by 1947 and the faith they had in 
his judgment.^* Others have claimed that Chifley acted rashly and "out of 
pique" ^ Section 48 of the banking Act that was overraled in the State Banking 
case was not an essential part of the 1945 banking controls, and bank nationaUzation 
was not essential for controlling the private banks. Evatt had explained this to 
his coUeagues: "The reaUy important prindple has not been chaUenged. We could 
do all we want vdthout nationalization."^'" While Chifley's leadership, and 
perhaps his overreaction, provide part of the explanation for bank nationaUzation, 
the more important factor was Labor's purpose within the political circumstances 
of the time. 
Chifley interpreted the successfiil chaUenge in the State Banking case as the first 
step in a piecemeal dismantling of the 1945 legislation at the instigation of the 
hostile private banking establishment. By nationalizing the private banks, the 
government sought to settle the issue once and for all by removing its potential 
challengers. The lesson that Chifley drew from the State Banking case was that 
a banking law that was within the federal ParUament's banking power could be 
invaUdated by judidal interpretation of other sections of the constitution. The 
net effect, from Chifley's point of view, was as foUows: 
The position which confronted the Government was that while doubts had arisen as 
to the constitutional vaUdity of its banking legislation, there was evidence that the private 
banks were maintaining their hostUity towards this legislation and were biding their 
time against a suitable opportunity to chaUenge it in the hope of throwing off the restraints 
they so strongly disliked. 
The dedsion showed that full public control of banking as sought under the 1945 
legislation could not be secured without pubUc ownership of banking. The decision 
forced the Govemment to re-examine aU the circumstances, constimtional and otherwise, 
surrounding the legislation of 1945. 
Whether rightly or wrongly, this was the way Chifley and his government 
understood the cfrcumstances and consequences of the State Banking case. They 
could wait for a major chaUenge from the banks when it would be most opportune 
for the banks and most embarrassing for the govemment, or they could take the 
initiative and eUminate the potential challengers. They chose to do the latter. As 
CalweU bluntly put it, "the Govemment dedded to finish the banks in thefr present 
form before the banks finished the people of AustraUa in another depression".^" 
More important than the circumstances that provoked the dedsion was Labor's 
sociaUst purpose. Unless one gives proper recognition to the Labor party's 
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sodaUzation objective and Chifley's original preference for pubUc ownership of 
banking, bank nationaUzation does not make sense. Labor was primarily a 
pragmatic, reformist party, but it did have a formal sociaUst objecrivq^ which, for 
some Labor leaders like Chifley, provided "the Ught on the hiU". NationaUzation 
was the Labor government's ultimate weapon that it reverted to when less severe 
measures seemed ineffective. As Chifley explained, 
The Labor party has maintained for many years that, since the influence of money is 
so great, the entire monetary and banking system should be controlled by public 
authorities responsible through the Government and Parliament to the nation. On this 
prindple the Labor party has held fiirther that since private banks are conducted primarily 
for profit and therefore foUow polides which in important respects run counter to the 
public interest, their business should be transferred to public ownership.^ '* 
Bank nationalization was completely in accord with Labor orthodoxy; Labor party 
members supported it immediately and unanimously because they did so 
instinctively. 
Revisionist accounts, such as that by David Stephens, claim that Labor's bank 
nationaUzation dedsion was completely devoid of sodaUst intent.^" For Stephens 
it was a pragmatic measure taken within a predominantly private enterprise 
economy for the purpose of making capitaUsm work more efficiently for welfare 
purposes: "There is a world of difference between nationaUzing the banks as part 
of a coUectivized economic system, as in Russia, and nationaUzing them as a 
pragmatic measure within a predominantly private enterprise economy."^'* Trae, 
this was no Russian socialism but a sociaUst policy directed towards traditional 
Labor purposes. It is as sUly to claim that Labor's bank nationaUzation was not 
sodaUst at aU as it is to claim that it was doctrinaire sociaUsm, as some critics 
of the right have done.^" The trath is somewhere in between, as Evatt pointed 
out in a subsequent review of the issue: 
The major point is that Mr Chifley considered that his main aims in govemment, a 
full employment economy and a state providing sodal security in a free sodety, required 
fuU control over banking. Since, under the constitution as interpreted by the Court, 
the indirect method was of doubtful vaHdity, he was prepared to stake all on the direct 
method. It would be as wrong to say he did this out of doctrinaire pedantry, as that 
he was opposed, as doctrinaires are, to sodaUzation.^ '^ 
Although directed only to Keynesian welfare ends, bank nationaUzation was 
one of the greatest chaUenges to capitaUsm that has ever occurred in Australia. 
It produced such a massive and concerted counteroffensive from the whole capitaUst 
estabUshment that those who seek to impose the theory of hegemonic class rale 
on AustraUa take this as the prime example that supports thefr view.^" The banks 
mobiUzed aU their considerable resources of money and manpower to block 
nationalization and defeat the Labor government.^^ Menzies cleverly seized the 
opportunity to estabUsh his ovsm position and that of his newly reconstracted Liberal 
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party as the champions of estabUshment values and traditional Australian liberal 
democracy. 
Bank nationalization was not only a lethal attack on a powerfiil sector of capital; 
it also threatened the sanctity of private property that is the economic foundation 
of liberal democracy. Menzies caUed bank nationalization "the most far-reaching, 
revolutionary, unwarranted and un-AustraUan measure introduced in the history 
ofthe ParUament". Menzies grasped the intimate relationship between individual 
Uberty, business competition and the profit motive—in other words between 
UberaUsm and capitaUsm. An important part of Uberty is liberty to seek profit 
and enjoy unequal property as the finiit of enterprise. CapitaUsm is an integral 
part of traditional UberaUsm and an important support for preservation of individual 
liberty. To attack capitaUsm is therefore to attack an integral part of traditional 
UberaUsm. Consequently in his defence of private banking, Menzies was not simply 
fighting for a privUeged oUgopoly but for the fundamental principle of poUtical 
economy underlpng liberal democracy. "Without the chance of profit and the 
search for profit", Menzies claimed, "the whole industrial expansion ofthe EngUsh-
speaking world since the beginning of the nineteenth century would never have 
been accomplished." For Menzies and the Liberals, Labor sodaUsm was a threat 
to the traditions and economic potency of the EngUsh-speaking dviUzation. This 
particular sodaUzation measure was no example of "unpremeditated iUegitunacy", 
but "the normal child of long-considered sociaUst poUcy".^ '^ 
The first major victim of bank nationaUzation was the Cain Labor government 
of Victoria that feU in October 1947. The Legislative CouncU, described by the 
Age as "a conservative junta elevated to a position of trast by a restricted franchise", 
seized on the issue of bank nationaUzation and blocked supply. ^ ^ The Cain 
government, which depended on the support of two independents, was forced 
to a general election. A leading role in the Legislation CouncU's tactic was taken 
by Sir Frank Clarke, a Liberal member of the council and also vice-chairman of 
the National Bank. Hfe was dubbed by Labor Sfr "Bank" Clarke.^" The state 
Liberal party campaigned on the issue of bank nationaUzation whUe the state Labor 
party tried unsuccessfiiUy to restrict the issues to state matters. Liberal leader 
HoUoway declared in his policy speech: "there is one issue and one issue only-
the nationaUzation of banking" He promised that "a Liberal Government will 
fight the Commonwealth at every turn. It will intervene in any litigation that 
may take place The banking legislation wiU be fought to the last ditch."™ 
The Victorian Labor government of premier Cain was badly defeated by this close-
knit alUance of the reactionary Victorian upper House, the private banks and the 
opposition Liberal party. Immediately after taking office Premier HoUoway met 
vdth the premiers of the other non-Labor state governments of South AustraUa 
and Western AustraUa to draw up a concerted campaign against bank 
nationaUzation. These three states joined the private banks as co-plaintiffs in the 
Bank Nationalization case. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Time of Testing 173 
Immediately the cabinet decision to nationaUze banks was announced, the banks 
retained Garfield Barwick who had successfiiUy argued both the State Banking case 
and the Airline Nationalization case.^" The banks also joined with the Liberal 
party in setting up a special private company which they liberally endowed with 
fiinds to cover the contingency of being taken over before they had a chance to 
initiate legal proceedings. SUnukaneously the banks sought a restraining injunction 
from the High Court. Neither was necessary because the government agreed to 
aUow time for a legal chaUenge before the legislation was invoked. Senator 
McKenna, the acting attomey-general in Evatt's absence, explained to caucus that 
a complete agreement had been reached by both sides for bringing the case to 
court "for a quick dedsion on the legal aspects of the BiU" as soon as the legislation 
received royal assent. McKenna "hoped that the whole case would be finaUsed 
both in the High Court and the Privy CouncU within a period of nine 
months".^ As it tumed out neither the courts nor the plaintiff would be hurried 
and the case dragged on for more than two years. 
As soon as the banking Act received royal assent, the banks began legal 
proceedings, as had been agreed with the government. Dixon granted an 
interlocutory injunction preventing the Act being brought into operation untU 
its constitutionaUty had been determined by the High Court. That was on 15 
December 1947, but it was not until 9 Febraary 1948 that the case was heard 
by the fuU bench of the High Court. The government's efforts to obtain a more 
timely hearing on the grounds that the legislation might be requfred for a possible 
economic emergency were tumed dowm, and the judges took thefr summer vacation 
as usual. 
Attomey-General Evatt argued the commonwealth's case before the High Court. 
His reply took up a record seventeen days of the thirty-nine-day hearing and stands 
as a monumental tribute to his faith in the power of his own reasoning and his 
conviction of the reasonableness of his interpretation of the limited scope of section 
92. Regardless of its merits, Evatt's cause was quite clearly a lost one before the 
Court as it was then constituted, and none of the judges accepted Evatt's main 
arguments on section 92. Dixon rejected Evatt's proposed "volume of trade" test 
for section 92 as irrelevant and "a consideration of an economic and not a legal 
character" ™ During the hearing Starke and Barwick ridiculed an elaborate 
memorandum on banking that was submitted by Evatt as "more a lesson in banking 
and poUtical economy than anything else" and "not a lawyer's statement but some 
sort of quasi-poUtical document".^^ Even Latham and McTiernan who upheld 
the substance of the legislation did not rely on Evatt's interpretation of section 
92, but on an artifidal severance of banking from interstate trade and commerce. 
The plaintiffs attacked the constitutionality of the banking Act on five grounds, 
listed on page 174. AU the judges except Rich and Williams wrote separate 
opinions, but since they addressed themselves to the five grounds of attack, it is con-
venient to summarize their holdings in the following schematic form: 
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Judicial holdings: Bank NationaUzation case 
Latham McTiernan Dixon Starke Rich and 
WiUiams 
1. The Act falls under no head 
of power: 
(a) neither s.51 (xiii), a law with 
respect to banking; X X X X w y* 
(b) nor s.51 (xxxi), acquisition 
for a lawful purpose. X X X* X** ^ • 
2. Acquisition, management and 
prohibition contrary to the 
absolute freedom oi %.92. X X t^*** ^ (^ .^ 
3. Acquisition infringes JM5( 
terms requirement of s.51 
(xxxi) partly virtually aU t^ u> 
4. Infringes constitutional integrity 
of the states. X X X X O O 
5. Violates Financial Agreement 
between Commonwealth and 
states under s.105 A. X X X X <^ ,^ 
X = rejected; i^ = accepted; O = not dedded. 
with reservations. 
s.51 (xxxix) needed as weU to support takeover of bank liabiHties. 
prohibition only. 
Rich and WilUams held the banking Act unconstitutional on every count except 
the fourth, that it violated the constitutional integrity of the states. They did 
not find it was necessary to decide that question. Latham and McTiernan upheld 
the Act against every chaUenge except that it infiinged "just terms" in some of 
its sections. Dixon and Starke agreed with Latham and McTiernan on aU issues 
except the extent of infringement of just terms and the cradal question of section 
92. Although Dixon and Starke both savaged large parts of the legislation with 
the flexible judicial weapon of "just terms", that damage was not irreparable, at 
least in prindple. The cradal holding was the raUng on section 92 by the majority 
coaUtion of Dixon, Starke, Rich and Williams. 
Despite the adverse views of the majority of the judges that had been clearly 
stated in the Airline Nationalization case, Evatt stiU persisted in urging his old 
interpretation of section 92, that it safeguarded "trade, commerce and intercourse 
among the States, not the trade exerdsed by an individual" ^ But the contrary 
interpretation of section 92 that Barvdck put forward on behalf of the banks was 
now the favoured one. Barwick argued that section 92 guaranteed "the mdividual's 
freedom to move from place to place and to conduct his business across State Unes" 
so that any direct prohibition or acquisition of such business by the state was 
prohibi ted.^ 
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Starke, Rich and WilUams aU gave similar extreme interpretations of section 
92 that blatantly presupposed a private enterprise economy. Starke was for restoring 
what he considered to be the Uteral meaning of "absolutely free"; that interstate 
trade "must be free from all restraints, hindrances, obstractions, interference and 
devices of every kind employed to interfere with that freedom".^' Where Starke 
read private enterprise into section 92 by means of freedom of competition. Rich 
and WUUams reUed on a personal right of the mdividual freely to engage m mterstate 
trade. They based this "individual right" interpretation on selective quotations 
from precedents, espedaUy statements of Dixon such as the foUovdng: "The object 
of s. 92 is to enable mdividuals to conduct their commerdal deaUngs and their 
personal intercourse with one another independently of State boundaries.""^ This 
earUer dissenting view from the Gilpin case was now the orthodoxy of the High 
Court majority. Rich and Williams even held the banking Act unconstitutional 
on the grounds that section 105A, the finandal agreement with the states that 
left the states free to "borrow money for temporary purposes by way of overdraft", 
impUed a right to obtain overdraft faciUties from private banks."' Starke, 
however, dismissed this as "a hopeless constraction"."* 
In his opinion Dixon went out of his way to distance himself somewhat from 
his enthusiastic disdples. He admitted that "juristically it is doubtless true that 
section 92 does not confer private rights upon individuals", and even allowed that 
"it may perhaps also be trae that its purpose is not the protection of the individual 
trader" Nevertheless, Dkon's interpretation of section 92 remained essentially 
a free market one: "[I]t assumes that without governmental interference trade, 
commerce and intercourse would be carried on by the people of AustraUa across 
State Unes, and its purpose is to disable the governments from preventing or 
hampering that activity.""' Beneath his more sophisticated argument and more 
cautious formulation, Dixon's interpretation was basically the same as Starke's. 
Dbcon dismissed previous sustained attempts at limiting the scope of section 92 
as "expediency" m the face of "the apparently mflexible terms in which the framers 
of the Constitution chose to express a policy regarded as basal to the 
federation" "* 
The constitutional vaUdity of the banking legislation that involved cradal issues 
of pubUc policy and poUtical economy was canvassed by aU the judges in the 
language of strict legaUsm. On behalf of the Court, Chief Justice Latham first 
set out the customary judicial claim that the High Court was concerned only with 
legal questions and not with the merits of bank nationaUzation as pubUc poUcy."' 
The judges used the techniques of legaUsm—conceptual definition, quasi-logical 
format, quotation of select precedents and formal dismissal of extra-legal 
considerations — to support their decisions. Yet in each case the operative premise 
of their opinions was a basic assumption about the meaning of section 92, or a 
personal preference in favour of private over public enterprise. The rhetoric of 
legaUsm also characterized the dissenting opinions of Latham and McTiernan, who 
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simply held that banking was not part of interstate trade, commerce and intercourse, 
and hence not caught by section 92. AU the judges used the techniques of legaUsm 
to dress up basic judicial choices. 
Latham was the least consistent. In the earlier Airline case he had ruled that 
nationalization of airlines was unconstitutional; in this case he held that 
nationalization of banking was constitutional. Latham surmounted this apparent 
inconsistency by means of his legalistic technique of characterization. Latham had 
ruled the afrline Act invalid because it was a law directed against competing 
interstate services and hence contravened section 92. The bank nationaUzation 
legislation he found valid, however, because it was a banking law and therefore 
not part of the interstate trade and commerce that section 92 protected. These 
two holdings could just as easily be reversed without changing Latham's essential 
reasoning; it depended on how he chose to characterize the impugned legislation. 
Latham's judicial technique left him with the discretion to dedde whether or not 
particular legislation was constitutional, more or less as he saw fit."* 
The High Court's decision was announced on 11 August 1948, four months 
after hearings ended and a year after the Labor govemment's dedsion to nationaUze 
banking. The response to the decision was predictable. Bankers, Liberals and 
newspaper editors were jubilant and the members of the Sydney Stock Exchange 
cheered the dedsion on the floor of the exchange. The AustraUan Coundl of Trade 
Unions deplored the fact that the constitution could so shackle a democratic 
parliament."' Putting on a brave public face, Chifley claimed a half victory; the 
legislation was a valid exercise of the banking power subject to some redrafting 
and except for the majority ruUng on section 92.^ *" 
The truly astonishing political aspect of this great unconstitutional battle was 
that, despite the Court's earUer unfavourable decisions, the anti-Labor sympathies 
of the majority of the judges, and finally the adverse ruling in this key case, the 
Labor government kept up aU the proper formalities of the respectfiil suitor at 
law. There were a few rumbUngs of deep discontent in the Labor camp, but these 
were the exception and were quickly scotched. One Labor backbencher caused 
an uproar in the House by suggesting that the High Court might delay its dedsion 
until the approach of a general election.^*' In fact that turned out to be the case 
with the Privy CouncU appeal, but it was the Labor government that insisted 
on taking the case to London. A second ugly incident was touched off by Speaker 
Rosevear when the legislation was before the House. Speaking in committee as 
the member for Dalley on the proposed court of clauns that was to be set up 
to settle disputes over compensation, Rosevear attacked the requirement that he 
claimed had been imposed by an earlier High Court of appointing judges for 
Ufe frrespective of thefr physical or mental capadty. Menzies righteously condenmed 
this as "a wicked and monstrous attack on the High Court" and "a deUberate 
indtement of the foulest and most revolutionary element in the country". Spender 
accused the government of intending to pack the High Court by moving judges 
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to it from the court of claims which would have Uttle work in the long term. 
McKenna then accused Spender of a "foul insult" to the government. Chifley, 
concerned that such outbursts might fiirther antagonize the iU feeling towards 
his government, damped down the incident by insisting that his government's 
record in judidal appointments was impeccable.^ *^ This exceptional inddent, and 
the Labor govemment's overall attitude, suggest how deeply entrenched were the 
public priorities for an apoUtical legalism throughout the period. 
Two days after the High Court dedsion came down, the government announced 
it would appeal to the Privy Coundl. As the govemment's critics pointed out, 
this was a last and desperate throw. A less conceited man than Evatt would have 
been deterred by numerous considerations against such an appeal. First, without 
a section 74 certificate from the High Court, the government's right to bring 
such an appeal was problematical. Although it agreed to hear the case in full, 
the Privy Council ended up ruUng against the government on the grounds of 
lack of standing to bring such a case without a section 74 certificate from the 
High Court. Second, it was unUkely that the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council would overrule the Australian High Court. The AustraUan Court's 
tradition of sturdy independence was grounded in the constitution's severe 
restriction of appeals and had been established by the founder's Court at the very 
beginning. The Privy Coundl had leamt its lesson in 1907 when its contrary ruUng 
on implied immunities was repudiated by the Griffith Court. Subsequently in the 
odd constitutional cases that came to it, the Privy CouncU usually adopted the 
reigning view on the High Court at the time. In this particular case it could hardly 
be expected not to endorse the dominant Dixonian view of section 92, especially 
as Dixon had a commanding reputation. Lord Denning would describe the next 
decade of Dixon's chief-justiceship as "the Golden Age" of the High Court in 
which "it estabUshed a reputation which overtopped even that of the House of 
Lords" ^ *' 
From a poUtical point of view, a Privy Coundl appeal meant considerable delay. 
Conditional leave to appeal was granted on 25 October 1948, but the hearing 
did not begin untU 14 March 1949. Again the government's attempts to speed 
up the creeping pace of the legal process were unsuccessful. The hearings dragged 
on untU June and judgment against the government was given on 26 July. The 
reasons were not released untU 26 November 1949, the day before parUament rose 
for the general election in which the Labor government was defeated. Under a 
unitary system of govemment the banks would have been nationaUzed for two 
years; under the AustraUan federal system they had survived by winning a two-
year court battle and were able to back a massive political effort to oust the Labor 
government at the next election. The Privy CouncU appeal ensured that this 
unpopular issue was kept at the forefront of public debate for the remainder of 
the Labor government's term of office. 
In so prolonging the case by insisting on an appeal to the Privy Coundl, Evatt's 
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poUtical judgment was shown to be poor. With only an outside chance of winning 
a spectacular victory, Evatt staked his own powers of advocacy. Although now 
president of the United Nations Assembly, he took twenty-two days out of an 
extraordinarily busy schedule to present exhaustive arguments for his govemment's 
position. The court Evatt addressed was a typical collection of venerable British 
law lords who had, on average, served twelve years as judges, including six years 
as lords of appeal. Porter, Simonds, Uthwatt, Du Parq and Normand were aU 
aged sixty-five or more, whUe Morton and MacDermott were somewhat younger. 
AU were Oxbridge educated except MacDermott who was a graduate and ex-
faculty member of Queen's University, Belfast. All had straight professional law 
backgrounds except two. The Scotsman Normand had been an MP for West 
Edinburgh from 1931 to 1935 and solidtor-general and lord advocate for Scotland 
in that period. The Irishman MacDermott had been an MP in the Northem Ireland 
parUament from 1935 to 1944 and minister for pubUc security and attomey-general 
during that period. Uthwatt had served on various pubUc committees assessing 
war damages.^ ** All in all, the composition and traditions of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council ensured that the fate of bank nationaUzation 
would be dedded in a technical and legaUstic manner typical of such a body. Evatt's 
cause was not helped by the deaths of Uthwatt and Du Parq, the two lords said 
to be most favourably disposed to his position, during proceedings.^*' As one 
observer described it, "This quiet and dingy constitutional drama (so quiet that 
the lawyers' words can scarcely be heard: so dingy that the lights were necessary 
today at noon) [was] played out in the presence of a smaU but intense audience 
of banking and political interests."^** Only the eminence of the actors and the 
spectators, who included Liberal premiers HoUoway and Playford of Victoria and 
South Australia respectively, attested to the size of the stakes. 
The case was dedded on the question of whether an inter se question was involved. 
Evatt had argued that the question as to whether section 92 vitiated the banking 
power was not primarily an inter se dispute, that is one concerning the reach of 
a federal power, and hence that it did not require a High Court certificate to 
bring it before the Privy Coundl. The Privy Coundl rejected this argument, raUng 
that the case had originally raised a direct inter se question regarding the reach 
of the banking power. Such a raUng disposed of the case. But not content vdth 
such an easy and straightforward way out of an immensely difficult problem, the 
Judidal Committee went on to endorse much of the High Court's reasoning 
regarding section 92 and to add its own contradictory observations by way of 
dicta. It gave two reasons for taking up the substantive issue: ffrst, the High Court 
might StiU grant a certificate (this was highly improbable) and the case had afready 
been argued in fiiU; and second, it wanted to correct some misapprehensions 
regarding its two previous James decisions that Evatt had drawn upon. 
The Judidal Committee's argument, written by Lord Porter, closely foUowed 
Dixon's opinion in holding that banking came vdthin section 92 because of the 
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controlling7ame5 precedents which, it said, estabUshed that section 92 protected 
individual freedom. Since the Act restricted individual bankers' interstate 
transactions, it violated section 92. Evatt's leading dedsion in the Vizzard case 
was praised, but this was smaU consolation for Evatt because it was not appUed. 
In effect the Privy Coundl held that bankers were analogous to the fruit grower, 
James, who had been given protection under section 92 against government 
interference with private uiterstate trade, but were different from transport operators 
who had been denied such protection in the Transport cases. 
In his famous dissents, the American Supreme Court judge OUver WendeU 
Holmes Jr was wont to draw attention to the hidden major premise of his fellow 
judges who purported to overturn important social and economic legislation on 
the grounds that it violated the legal or natural meaning of the American 
constitution.^' If one looks at the nub of the Privy Coundl's argument, one finds 
that the major premise is not too weU hidden. The argument runs: "The test 
is clear: does the Act, not remotely or inddentally . but directly, restrict the 
inter-State business of bankmg? Beyond doubt ft does, since it authorizes in terms 
the total prohibition oi private banking."^** Such reasoning is faUacious because 
"private" is sUpped into the conclusion although it does not appear in the prior 
statement of rale. The question of whether bank nationaUzation restricts interstate 
banking cannot be answered in the negative from a process of logical deduction. 
The Privy CouncU succeeded in doing so only by smuggling private banking into 
one of its premises as the High Court had done before it. To find out whether 
the banking Act did or did not restrict interstate commerce, one would have to 
assess whether the service could be properly provided by a public corporation. 
Here some test such as Evatt's "volume of flow" would be relevant. But the Privy 
CouncU rejected the rationale of that test as "unreal and unpractical".^*' 
The Privy Coundl attempted a general formulation of section 92 that bristled 
with vagaries and contradictions. "The problem". Porter wrote, "has been to define 
the quaUfication of that which the Constitution has left unquaUfied." So much 
for the orthodoxy of legalism and the interpretive doctrine of Engineersl Porter 
laid down two guiding principles to qualify "that which the constitution had left 
unqualified": that the regulation of interstate trade and commerce is compatible 
with its absolute freedom; and that section 92 is violated by direct and immediate 
restriction but not by indirect, consequential or remote impediments. But in 
subsequent comments Porter suggested problems with, and alternatives to, both 
the Privy CouncU's overaU legaUstic approach and its specific holding in this case. 
He admitted that "there cannot fail to be differences of opinion" because: "The 
problem to be solved wUl often be not so much legal as poUtical, social or 
economic." Then he added this reservation: 
[TJheir Lordships do not intend to lay it down that in no circumstances could the 
exclusion of competition so as to create a monopoly either in a State or Commonwealth 
agency or in some body be justified. Every case must be judged on its own facts and 
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in its own setting of time and drcumstances, and it may be that in regard to some 
economic activities and at some stage of sodal development it might be maintained 
that prohibition with a view to State monopoly was the only practical and reasonable 
manner of regulation and that inter-State trade commerce and intercourse thus prohibited 
and thus monopolized remained absolutely free.^" 
"Absolutely free" may be compatible with indirect regulation, but it can hardly 
be consistent with prohibition and monopolization unless section 92 does not 
guarantee private freedom, as Evatt argued. Their lordships were having it both 
ways. In deciding the case they had rejected Evatt's position in favour of an 
extension of the James principle that section 92 guaranteed individual freedom; 
yet here they were allowing Evatt's principle if the circumstances were right. In 
effect, their lordships had asserted two incompatible principles. Further, they made 
no attempt to assess whether in this instance the "setting of time and cfrcumstances" 
was or was not appropriate for a public monopoly. That would have entailed an 
examination of political, social and economic factors, as their lordships 
acknowledged. They would have had to take Evatt's arguments regarding the 
primacy of bank credit policy in the national economy and his proposed overaU 
flow-of-commerce test more seriously. It seems that in order to avoid the difficulties 
involved in such an undertaking, the Privy Coundl, Uke the High Court, considered 
only "legal" matters."' The rhetoric and forms of legaUsm, however, barely 
cloaked a basic preference for liberal individuaUsm. Judges cannot avoid making 
policy decisions simply by denying that they are doing so and using a language 
that tends to hide the fact. 
Evatt's judgment as a strategist and advocate throughout the Bank Nationalization 
cases was poor. His assessment of what could be salvaged from his crushing defeat 
before the Privy CouncU was equally erratic. Writing to a New South Wales 
Labor coUeague after the Privy Coundl's reasons had been pubUshed, Evatt claimed 
that the appeal, which had been supported by the state Labor governments of 
New South Wales and Queensland, had been "justified handsomely" He took 
the most favourable meaning that could be wrung from the Privy Coundl's 
contradictory statements about the meaning of section 92, so much so that Evatt 
thought he had turned the Dixonian tide: "I am of the view that these new 
prindples wiU probably result in the Peanuts case being regarded as wrongly dedded 
by the High Court so that the dissenting views expressed by Evatt, J., in the 
Peanuts case and Latham, C.J., in the Milk case would now be accepted.""^ Evatt's 
prediction could not have been wider of the mark. In the next decade the High 
Court completed the triumph ofthe Dixonian mterpretation of section 92 by finaUy 
overruUng the Transport cases. The Privy Coundl decision was a milestone on 
the way. 
The Labor government accepted the High Court and Privy CouncU dedsions 
because there was Uttle else it could do. Time had run out and nationalization 
was an electoral liabiUty. As the Age pointed out, the dedsions upheld pubUc 
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opinion."' The government therefore had to retreat to its more moderate 1945 
central banking legislation and try to take nationaUzation off the immediate pubUc 
agenda. That was not possible because the combined Liberal and capitaUst forces 
had mobiUzed enormous resources behind the anti-sodaUst banner. Partly because 
they feared Chifley's dogged determination, and partly as an electoral ploy. Labor's 
opponents kept the issue boiling. A new Labor govemment would substitute "slow 
strangulation for the electric chair", wamed Fadden; it would squeeze the private 
banks out of existence, predicted Menzies."* Anthony claimed that Chifley was 
determined to "break the banks" by any means he could find, even by packing 
the High Court."' 
Although Chifley insisted again and again that a Labor govemment would never 
be party to any unconstitutional action,"* there was enough vocal support for 
nationaUzation from the more radical members of the Labor camp to keep the 
spectre of sociaUsm aUve for years to come. The irrepressible Eddie Ward had 
boasted that "once the Labor movement has spoken, the fate of the banks is sealed" 
Even after the adverse court dedsions. Ward insisted that bank nationaUzation 
could be brought about: "If the people continued to retum Labor governments 
that are pledged to the nationaUzation of banking, why should not such a policy 
be put into effect"?"' Ward was also the most outspoken pubUc critic of the 
Court. A year later, from the opposition benches in the House, CalweU was still 
msisting that nationaUzation without compensation could stiU be achieved through 
the legal means of fordng the private banks out of existence through competition 
from the Commonwealth Bank."* 
Ward may have been right about the poUtics of judicial review, that if the people 
continued to retum governments that were pledged to the nationaUzation of 
banking such a poUcy would eventuaUy be put in place despite the adverse dedsions 
ofthe courts at this point of time. But he was wrong about the will of the people 
and the Labor party's persistence with an unpopular and increasingly irrelevant 
poUcy. As one Labor member put it, bank nationaUzation was "as dead as a dodo" 
after the court decisions."' A realistic view was given by McKenna on the last 
day ofthe parUamentary session when the Privy Council's reasons were pubUshed. 
McKenna said that the government "may not take any action that would have 
the effect of creating a monopoly for a govemment bank I may add 
that I find it difficult to conceive any activity that the Commonwealth could in 
fact nationaUze, having regard to the dedsions of the superior courts of this 
country."^*" Regardless of court dedsions the federal Labor party has not since 
been in a position to test McKenna's judgment. After its crashing defeats in the 
1940s and the successfiil implementation of central banking by the Menzies Liberal 
government, the Labor party has had neither the wUl, the opportunity nor the 
need to recontest the constitutionaUty of nationaUzing the AustraUan banking 
system. 
Labor's response to the concerted opposition against nationaUzation was 
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disappointing. Chifley had reaUzed at the very beginning that bank nationaUzation 
would create an enormous storm and might weU lead to his govemment's defeat. 
He wamed the Labor caucus which endorsed the bank nationaUzation legislation 
in 1947: "It is beyond doubt that if this legislation is passed we may weU pay 
a very high price and some members may be defeated, even myself."^' On the 
other hand, Chifley was convinced that if Labor backed down on its basic poUcy 
to control banking the party was doomed.^^ This was for him the test of Labor 
purpose and prindple, and the occasion for sharpening the focus of its direction. 
Addressing the Labor Federal Conference in 1951 as leader ofthe opposition, Chifley 
insisted that the Labor movement must have a clear understanding of its 
fundamental prindples and a conviction to fight for them "whether they lead to 
defeat or victory".^' Chifley was content to let the storm of opposition exhaust 
itself and use the ordinary forum of parliament to put the government's case. 
Perhaps he underestimated the effectiveness of the sustained media bUtz that the 
banks and the opposition kept up. In any case Labor lacked the means and the 
media access to counter it. But as Lloyd Ross pointed out, the Labor party had 
done virtuaUy nothing during the preceding decades to elaborate and defend its 
sodaUzation polides.^ For the most part, whenever Labor members had raised 
the sociaUzation objective in public, it was to deny that it would be implemented. 
When the Labor government nationaUzed banking in 1947 the pubUc and even 
many of its own members were totaUy unprepared. Consequently Labor spokesmen 
faced an unconvinced public and were virtually bankrapt of convindng reasons 
for justifying their action. 
The Chifley govemment was defeated at the poUs m December 1949. Its popular 
support feU almost five percent on 1947 figures and it won only forty-seven of 
the one hundred and twenty-one seats in the expanded House of Representatives. 
While bank nationalization was not the only issue in the election campaign, it 
was a major one and was blown into fearful proportions by the Liberals and their 
banking aUies. Here is one Labor member's account: 
The Labor Party was on the defensive throughout the campaign. The money and 
propaganda against the Party was limitless. Bank officers in their hundreds organized 
and disrupted meetings and distributed anti-Labor propaganda. Parties and individual 
Liberal-Country candidates received finandal support from the banks.^' 
Evatt said: "we lost the election on the Banking Bill. Chifley was right. If he 
had puUed it off we would have been out of our troubles. But the country was 
not ready."^ 
Because of the long-drawn-out court battles before the High Court in 1948 
and the Privy Coundl m 1949. the Labor govemment was never able to unplement 
its legislation and take banking off the national agenda. Had the Labor govemment 
been able to nationaUze banks with the same despatch with which it took the 
dedsion in the first place, its fate in 1949 may have been different. But the Labor 
party was lethargic and fataUstic m the face of the immense forces it had stined 
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to action. It could win only fourteen of the forty-seven new parliamentary seats 
it had created in the electoral redistribution. The AustraUan people were weary 
of wartime and postwar controls and susceptible to such opposition promises as 
the abolition of petrol ratiorung. Labor was swept from federal office and at the 
federal level spent the next twenty-three years in opposition. 
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Judicial Review as a Settled Routine 1950 
to 1984 
Introduction—Liberal ascendancy 
For a third of a century, from 1950 untU 1983, the Liberal party dominated 
Australian politics at the federal level. Menzies, who formed the modern Liberal 
party in 1944 from the remnants of the moribund United AustraUa party and 
the newly mobilizing anti-Labor groups, was prime minister for a record term 
of seventeen unbroken years.' Menzies originaUy consolidated his own leadership 
by welding the disparate but powerful anti-Labor groups into an effective poUtical 
machine. In this he was given an immense fillip by the mobilization of business 
and conservative groups against Labor's attempt to nationaUze the banks. 
Subsequently, Menzies shrewdly trimmed his government's poUdes to suit the 
long boom years of sustained economic growth. The string of electoral successes 
that kept Menzies's Liberal-Country party coaUtion government in office for so 
long was more or less guaranteed by steadUy rising economic affluence and Menzies's 
clever exploitation of anti-Communist fears in the AustraUan electorate. Under 
Evatt's troubled leadership the Labor party spUt in Victoria in 1955 over Catholic 
"Groupers" versus Communists in the trade unions, and in 1957 in Queensland 
over the same issue combined with a bitter dispute between the Gair Labor 
government and the union movement.^ Subsequent spoiUng tactics by the splinter 
Democratic Labor party combined with Labor's own unimpressive and backward 
looking leadership to ensure that the Labor party remained on the federal opposition 
benches for more than two decades. 
Unfortunately for the fortunes of the Labor party, by the time it had updated 
its leadership and its polides in the late 1960s and won office in 1972, the postwar 
decades of steady economic growth were coming to an end. The Whitlam Labor 
govemment that held office between 1972 and 1975, but did not control the Senate, 
was iU-prepared to deal with the severe economic recession that hit AustraUa in 
1974. Consequently the Whitlam period of government proved not to be the 
beginning of a new era in "technocratic" and reformist Labor government, but 
only a brief interregnum of erratic administration and stormy poUtics.' Briefly 
in opposition, the Liberal coaUtion was able to shake off the lethargy of long and 
easy years in govemment, to find a tough new leader in Malcolm Eraser and to 
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adapt its poUcies and public rhetoric to suit the leaner economic conditions facing 
AustraUa in the late 1970s and early 1980s. By exploiting the sentiments of a 
cautious "new conservatism" in the electorate* and trading on memories of 
Labor's financial profligacy and inept management, the Eraser govemment won 
handsome electoral victories in three successive elections in 1975, 1977 and 1980. 
The Liberal coaUtion only lost office in April 1983 when Prime Minister Eraser 
made several key strategy mistakes in caUing an election ahnost a year before it 
was due. The economy had declined alarmingly during 1982 but was expected 
to worsen by the end of 1983 when an election had to be held. Moreover, Labor's 
morale was low after the party failed to gain ground in the important FUnders 
by-election in Victoria. Despite bringing down an inflationary election budget 
m August 1982 and initiating an effective "wages pause" poUcy, the Eraser 
government dared not risk an election at that time because of damaging disclosures 
of the enormous scale of tax avoidance and evasion that had flourished during 
the recent years of Liberal govemment and with the connivance of some influential 
Liberal party backers, particularly in Western AustraUa. Ironically the disclosures 
came from the Costigan Royal Commission into the affafrs of the notorious Painters 
and Dockers Union that Prime Minister Eraser had appointed to embarrass the 
Labor party with which the union was affiUated.* Early in the new year when 
this issue had been played out in the media. Eraser called a snap election to take 
advantage of renewed speculation that BiU Hayden's leadership of the Labor party 
was again under threat. Prime Minister Eraser's gamble backfired when the Labor 
party suddenly changed leaders at a special meeting of the shadow cabinet in 
Brisbane that coincided with Eraser's securing a double dissolution and general 
election in Canberra. Instead of Hayden, Eraser faced the popular new leader. Bob 
Hawke, whose media image and soothing message of consensus poUtics and national 
reconciUation captured the spirit of the electorate.' At the ensuing election the 
Labor party won a substantial majority in the House of Representatives, but failed 
to gain control of the Senate. 
The Hawke Labor government was fortunate in coming to office just before 
AustraUa's economy began to improve quite remarkably. The raral sector recovered 
with the breaking of a crippUng drought, while overall economic conditions 
improved in AustraUa due to the impact of an international economic recovery. 
To the chagrin ofthe Labor party's more radical left vdng, the Hawke government 
has followed cautious and pragmatic policies. Through a "wages accord" with 
the trade union movement and tripartite consultative arrangements that involved 
big business as weU as the unions in dfrect discussions with govemment, the Hawke 
govemment has established an impressive record of competent economic 
management. 
Prime Minister Hawke called an early election in December 1984 to capitaUze 
on his continuing high personal popularity and the good luck and proven 
competence of his government's administration of the affairs of the nation during 
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a period of economic recovery. The Hawke government was returned vdth a 
comfortable majority in the House of Representatives, but with a reduced popular 
vote and a proportionate decrease of seats in the enlarged House. Moreover, Labor 
again failed to win control of the Senate. Because of this setback, and also because 
vdthin caucus the right and centre factions have the numbers to consistently outvote 
the left, the Hawke government's second term in office promises to be more 
cautious and unadventurous than the first. 
PoUtical leadership, party fortunes and electoral poUtics are the standard 
explanatory variables of pluraUst poUtical sdence and partly account for the Liberal 
coaUtion's ascendancy in postwar AustraUan poUtics. There are other deeper reasons, 
however, that are relevant to our present study of the poUtics of judidal review. 
Since AustraUa is a liberal democratic nation with a predominantly liberal poUtical 
economy, as has been argued earlier, it is to be expected that a Liberal party can 
be the "natural" party of government provided it is astutely led and keeps itseU 
attuned to both the moods of the electorate and the more substantial economic 
developments that occur in AustraUa as a consequence of its place in the larger 
capitaUst world economy. A democratic sociaUst party, to the extent that it is 
truly sodaUst or even persistently reformist, wiU normally be at a disadvantage 
when peace, security and material prosperity abound. In such drcumstances the 
tendency for an electoraUy successfiil modern Labor party is to become sodal 
democratic; to adopt progressive attitudes, smaU "1" Uberal values and a firm 
commitment to technocratic management of an efficient pubUc sector and the 
promotion of economic growth through a healthy private sector. The Hawke 
federal Labor government and the Wran, Cain, Burke and Bannon state Labor 
governments that have recently been elected or re-elected in New South Wales, 
Victoria, Western AustraUa and South Australia are aU evidence of this 
phenomenon. In thefr essentials these modem Labor govemments are Uttle different 
from alternative Liberal coalition governments. 
The consequences for judicial review of the dominance of AustraUan poUtics 
by the Liberal-Country (now National) party coalition are significant. Since the 
raUng poUtical forces have been in character with the nation's institutional 
machinery of govemment, relative harmony has prevaUed. Throughout the period, 
and with the partial exception of the Whitlam years, Australian poUtics have run 
smoothly within constitutionaUy appointed boundaries. The High Court made 
such incremental adjustments to the constitutional system as poUtical need suggested 
and judidal discretion saw fit. This process of judicial review ofthe constitution 
occurred in an entirely routine fashion in response to the steady trickle of 
constitutional cases that came to the Court.* As a result judidal review 
fiinctioned as a settled part of AustraUan poUtics for more than three decades and 
produced unexceptional overaU results. 
The broad Unes of constitutional interpretation throughout the period reflected 
and continued the estabUshed trends of earUer years. Reviewing the quarter century 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Judicial Review 1950 to 1984 187 
from 1951-76, LesUe Zines has rightly concluded that the High Court "viewed 
as a whole displayed no great changes of technique or shifts of approach" 
While noting that mdividual judges differed in emphasis and attitudes on a great 
number of points, Zines concludes that there has been "a general continuity of 
judidal method, of analysis, reasoning and argument",' Except for the traumatic 
dismissal of the Whitlam government which did not involve the Court, 
constfrutional developments during the Whitlam years were also rather muted. 
There were some novel adventures with, and probings of. Commonwealth 
legislative powers, with the High Court's dedsions bdng generaUy accommodating 
of the Labor govemment's initiatives and expansive in interpreting the 
Commonwealth's legislative powers. On the government's side, this was partly 
because the Whitlam government never controUed the Senate and was therefore 
severely constrained in its legislative programme, and partly because the Labor 
party had changed its economic poUdes and constitutional strategies since the 
Chifley days. On the Court's side, it was due to the composition of the Court 
which consisted of three Labor-appointed justices who generaUy upheld federal 
legislation and one or two of thefr "middle-of-the-road" coUeagues who were often 
in agreement. 
This chapter examines some of the more significant aspects and instances of 
judidal review during the long period of Liberal ascendancy and the brief interlude 
of Labor govemment under Whitlam. During most of this time there was Uttle 
pressure on the constitution's aUocation of legislative powers to the commonwealth 
and vfrtuaUy no controversy about judidal review by the Court. During the 
Whitlam period the Court had to rale on innovative Labor schemes and interpret 
important machinery clauses of the constitution, but this only quickened the tempo 
of constitutional poUtics. Sfr Garfield Barwick provoked a certain amount of poUtical 
interest and controversy during his last years as chief justice, but that was largely 
diffiised by his retirement in 1981 and subsequent judidous appointments to the 
bench made by the Eraser govemment. In the wake of the 1975 constitutional 
crisis and with continuing controversy over the Senate's powers with respect to 
appropriation bills and deep disagreement about the conventions of responsible 
government and the powers of the governor-general,'" the High Court and 
judidal review are now among the more settled and universaUy accepted parts 
of the constitutional system. 
Nevertheless there were important constitutional developments during this 
period. Moreover, the harmonious operation of the system and the uncontroversial 
character of judidal review are themselves significant political matters that require 
analysis and explanation. The chapter begins by looking at judicial appointments 
which explain a good deal about judicial decision making during the period, and 
ends with an analysis of the Tasmanian Dam case which was the first major 
constitutional decision ofthe Court involving the Hawke Labor government. This 
controversial dedsion marked a new plateau in the Court's incremental 
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centralization of formal constitutional powers that began with the 1920 Engineers 
case, but also exposed deep divisions among the High Court justices and showed 
how thin their accustomed disguise of legaUsm is becoming. 
Judicial appointments 
Once it is recognized that the High Court is a powerful poUtical institution-
adjudicating high-level disputes that produce winners and losers among federal 
and state governments and influential private interest groups, and shaping aspects 
of the poUtical process and of pubUc policy by interpreting the constitution in 
one way rather than another—the character of those who exerdse such power 
becomes an important poUtical consideration. Smce judges are ndther representative 
nor electoraUy accountable, the main routine poUtical control over the composition 
and character of the High Court bench is through the power of appointment." 
Once appointed. High Court judges have tenure and cannot be removed "except 
by the Governor-General in Coundl, on an address from both Houses of the 
ParUament in the same session, praying for such removal on the ground of proved 
misbehaviour or incapadty".'^ Under a 1977 amendment to the constitution, 
judges appomted since that time are requfred to retfre on reaching the age of seventy 
years. Since judges are guaranteed tenure and independence untU retirement, subject 
to removal under section 72(U) on the ground of "proven misbehaviour or 
incapadty", the process of thefr appointment is highly significant. 
According to the leading American poUtical sdentist Robert Dahl, writmg in 
1957 on the American Supreme Court, the power of appointing judges was the 
main way of ensuring "that the poUcy views dominant on the Court are never 
for long out of line with the poUcy views dominant among the lawmaking 
majorities". Dahl claimed that "it would be most unreaUstic to suppose that the 
Court would, for more than a few years at most, stand against any major 
alternatives sought by a lawmaking majority" " Dahl backed up this claim with 
figures that showed on average a new judge had been appointed to the American 
Supreme Court every twenty-two months. President Roosevelt had to wait four 
years before making his first appointment, but subsequently appointed five new 
Supreme Court justices by the end of his second presidential term, and by 1941 
eight new justices. In this way Roosevelt was able to remake the Supreme Court 
to bring it into Une with the broad social thinking and policy views of his "New 
Deal" Democratic aUiance that dominated Congress.'* 
Judidal appointments in Australia have not been seen in this way, nor have 
federal Labor govemments been wilUng or able to use the power of appointing 
High Court justices to bring the Court into line vdth thefr poUdes. That is because 
the Labor party has been in federal office for less than a quarter of AustraUan 
poUtical history and usuaUy not for successive terms of office. Labor govemments 
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have made less than a quarter of the judicial appointments to the High Court, 
appointing only eight of the thirty-four justices. Since Labor has been more the 
reformist outsider in AustraUan poUtics, and because the spedaUst bars, whence 
most Liberal appointees come, are not usuaUy sympathetic to Labor's sodal and 
economic poUdes, federal Labor governments have either gone to their own party 
members (Evatt, McTieman and Murphy) or to lawyers like Piddington and Powers 
who have been seen by the legal estabUshment as having less orthodox backgrounds 
or views for the bench. 
Federal Labor govemments have invariably found judidal appointments 
troublesome. The story of Hughes's 1913 "court-packing" plan that backfired when 
Piddington resigned in the face of scathing critidsm from the bar assodations and 
that of the furore over the Labor caucus's successful push to put Evatt and 
McTiernan on the court in 1930 have already been told. But in neither instance 
were Labor govemments in office long enough to remake the Court, even if they 
had been game enough to try. The conservative appointments of Rich in 1913 
to replace Piddington, and Webb in 1946 after Evatt had defeated the CaldweU-
Ward "High Court Reconstraction" plan, both suggest that Labor appointments 
to the High Court are, as often as not, extremely cautious. Also it should be 
remembered that Prime Minister SculUn and Attorney-General Brennan opposed 
the Evatt and McTieman appointments in 1930. Labor was unlucky not to be 
able to make any appointments through natural attrition during its "golden years" 
of office between 1941 and 1949. The six original judges who made up the Court 
in 1941 outlasted both the Curtin and Chifley governments. To make a single 
appointment in those eight years. Labor had to restore the size of the Court to 
seven. That period was quite exceptional because on average an AustraUan 
govemment can expect to appoint a High Court justice every third year. The 
average time since federation is twenty-dght months, since 1940 twenty-six months 
and since 1950 twenty-two months between appointments. But of course averages 
are an unreUable guide since judidal appointments are often bunched together. 
Thus Dahl's American observations that the power of appointment is the main 
way of bringing the dominant poUcy views of the Court into Une vdth those 
of the law making majorities have not applied to periods of federal Labor 
govemment in AustraUa. Labor has not been in federal office long enough to reshape 
the Court through routine appointments. Moreover because of the strongly 
conservative legal ethos in AustraUa, Labor govemments have been more cautious 
in balandng thefr more controversial poUtical appointments vdth other 
unexceptional ones Uke those of Rich and Webb, and more recently Jacobs. In 
this respect the Whitlam Labor government (1972-75) was typical. 
The Whitlam govemment's appointments 
The Whitlam govemment made two appointments to the Court, Kenneth Jacobs 
in January 1974 and Lionel Murphy in Febraary 1975. Jacobs was a leamed and 
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respected judge who had served on the New South Wales Supreme Court for 
fourteen years and was at the time president of the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal. Attorney-General Murphy who was responsible for the appointment 
selected Jacobs because of his learning and humane vision. Whitlam accepted 
Murphy's choice and cabinet agreed after some brief discussion about whether 
other possible candidates had been considered." The attorney-general's views 
were accepted in this, and later in his own appointment. Murphy chose weU because 
on the High Court Jacobs was sympathetic to the constfrutional vaUdity of whatever 
Labor legislation managed to get through the hostile Senate and was chaUenged 
in the Court. His judgments were notable for thefr "wisdom and clarity", as Liberal 
Attomey-General Senator Durack acknowledged on Jacob's premature resignation 
in 1979 because of iU heakh.'* 
Justice Murphy's own appointment and judidal style have been far more 
controversial. A vacancy was created by the death of Justice Menzies in late 1974. 
Murphy had been an innovative and a stormy figure throughout his poUtical career. 
In the early days of the Whitlam government he had drawn an immense amount 
of critidsm for staging an impulsive raid on ASIO headquarters in Melbourne 
to seize files that he suspected were being vdthheld from him by secret service 
offidals. Despite his outstanding work in refiirbishing the moribund Senate and 
as a law reformer. Murphy also had the reputation of being an impulsive poUtidan 
and somewhat "acddent prone" It was widely reported at the time that Prime 
Minister Whitlam was relieved to be rid of his stormy attorney, but it is also 
clear that Murphy chose his ovra exit from poUtics —or as MicheUe Grattan put 
it, his transition to another phase of his legal career and his poUtical career as 
weU." 
Murphy had advised Whfrlam that he wanted the position on the court; Whitlam 
agreed and put it to cabinet which accepted the dedsion. Murphy did not attend 
the meeting. The only opposition came from feUow New South Wales left-winger, 
Tom Uren, who was concemed about the gap that Murphy's appointment would 
leave for the left in cabinet. 
Predictably the opposition and the conservative press reacted quite differently 
from the attorney-general's colleagues. Murphy was an articulate leader of the 
left wing of the Labor party, a committed and outspoken social reformer and a 
tough politician, qualities considered by his opponents to be unbecoming to a 
judge. In an angry response, opposition leader Snedden said he did not welcome 
Murphy's appointment because it had been made "for sheer poUtical purposes" 
and would "lower the stature of the Court" '* Both the Sydney Morning Herald 
and the Age sourly pronounced the appointment "a bad one" " A former 
attorney-general, Senator Greenwood, called it "an appalling example of poUtical 
double-deaUng" and "a scandal ofthe first order", whUe Premier Court of Western 
AustraUa said it showed AustraUa was "fast drifting toward the American situation 
where judges become the play-thing of poUtical change".^ 
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AU these critics expressed concem that Murphy would sit on the half-dozen 
important chaUenges to Labor legislation that were scheduled to be heard in the 
forthcoming session of the Court. In all of this there was a good deal of poUtical 
vindictiveness and dishonest posturing. As the Canberra Times reaUsticaUy pointed 
out: "past appointments to the Court had been poUtical and as aU appointments 
are made by the government of the day, a balance in poUtical ideologies is not 
a bad thing".^' Geoffiey Sawer even said that Labor "should always make poUtical 
appointments to the High Court" and "go for the 'bold spirits'".^^ The National 
Times sarcasticaUy contrasted the fulminations of the conservative press against 
Murphy's elevation to the Court with its strange silence in 1964 when Menzies 
appointed Garfield Barwick, "an embarrassing member of his cabinet to chief 
judgeship" " 
There were some nasty aspects to the affair. Justice Murphy was sworn in on 
Friday 14 February in Sydney and was due to sit for the first time in Melbourne 
on the following Monday. In one of its less illustrious convocations the Victorian 
Bar Assodation met for more than an hour and a half on Friday evening and debated 
whether to adopt a motion deploring Murphy's appointment. The motion read: 
That in order to maintain the prestige of the High Court of Australia as the prindpal 
appeUate court of AustraUa and to ensure that the public have confidence in its dedsions, 
it is essential that positions on that bench be offered only to persons who are pre-eminent 
within the legal profession and whose fitness for office is not a matter of public 
controversy. 
And that this meeting of the Victorian Bar expresses its regret that this course was 
not adopted in the most recent appointment to the bench of the High Court.^ * 
The motion was finaUy defeated by 188 votes to 64 and Murphy was formally 
welcomed. 
The New South Wales Liberal premier, Mr Lewis, threatened to carry through 
his resentment by breaking vdth postwar tradition and appointing a non-Labor 
senator to replace Murphy. He remarked ominously at the time that he was trying 
to predpitate a federal election by giving the opposition parties control of the 
Senate." Lewis was to do exactly that with the consequences that he 
foreshadowed. Thus the Murphy appointment, because of the vindictive passions 
it aroused and the deUcate Senate balance that it altered, led indirectly to the 
constitutional crisis in October and the sacking of the Whitlam government. 
In his candid exposition of the law-making role of judges and his endorsement 
of the Court as a key agent of sodal change. Murphy has lived up to the fears 
of his conservative and traditionaUst critics. Murphy's iconoclasm, activism and 
open reformism have ensured his reputation as a "radical" and "deUberate innovator" 
on the High Court, something his foUowers applaud but his critics deplore.^ 
Murphy quite openly admits that judges make laws and, moreover, that they do 
so according to their own sodal values. At a National Press Club address in 1980, 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
192 PoUtics of the High Court 
Justice Murphy said: "One part of the role of a judge, espedally a judge in the 
higher courts, is that he not only appUes the law, he often makes or helps make 
it Judges used to pretend that they only interpreted the law, never made 
it. But the law-making role of judges is now openly accepted aU around the world." 
This judge-made law. Murphy claimed, "represents the judges' idea of what is 
appropriate, ideas fashioned on the wisdom of their predecessors and adapted to 
meet changing conditions" Explaining this law-making role of judges fiirther 
and spedfically pointing his explanation to constitutional interpretation. Murphy 
was even more expUdt: 
The influence of judges, especially in the higher courts on the development of those 
laws which most closely concem the citizen, is generaUy far greater than that of even 
most cabinet ministers. Whether this is good or bad it is a fact of life. In their law-
making functions judges necessarily have to use some guideUnes. I'm speaking for example 
of cases where the constitution or an Act of Parliament is not clear or where a novel 
case arises in the area of judge-made law. If a judge can find no guidance from precedent 
or logic what does he turn to? He turns to his own social values. No one seriously 
suggests that judges dedde cases on party poUtical lines but it is inescapable that they 
dedde them according to their own broad sodal values It is really impossible to 
get a judge who does not bring his own social values to bear on the cases. 
When admissions Uke these are combined with Murphy's other statements about 
the Court being an agent of social change which should be responsive to 
contemporary public opinion, we have the AustraUan equivalent of an American 
activist-reformist judge like Eari Warren (US chief justice 1953-69). For instance, 
at his swearing in Murphy predicted: "many of the issues which affect the lives 
of our fellow AustraUans wiU be determined over the rest of this century by the 
application of the judicial process and judicial principle in this court"." Earlier, 
as shadow attorney-general at the conclusion of his argument before the High 
Court that eighteen-year-olds should have the right to vote at the forthcoming 
federal election in late 1972, Murphy stressed the Court's responsiveness to pubUc 
opinion: 
In the end the courts do reflect the demands of the community. Right now the social 
cUmate is for widened commonwealth power, and I think the high court is beginning 
to recognise that. The highest court in EngUsh-speaking countries is so important socially 
and politicaUy, that whenever it faUs behind the current sodal outlook it becomes subject 
to critidsm and fairly soon corrects itself. 
To ensure that the court remains responsive to, and representative of, current 
sodal values. Justice Murphy claims that two things are necessary: a balance in 
the selection of judges and informed public discussion of judidal decisions.'" Both 
have been severely lacking in Australia, particularly during the earlier postwar 
decades of Liberal government. 
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Liberal appointments 1950 to 1972 
Justice Murphy's controversial appointment and his radical views on the role of 
judges and the Court have been set out in some detaU in order to highUght the 
opposite character of most other appointments to the High Court. Murphy summed 
up AustraUan appointment practices in this way: "no attempt is made to achieve 
any balance. With rare exceptions appointments are made of persons who can 
fafrly be regarded as conservative or ultra conservative."" The reasons why there 
has been no attempt to balance judidal appointments, particularly in the post-1950 
period, are threefold: first, nearly aU the appointments were made by Liberal 
governments; second, the appointees have generally come from the very select 
group of leading barristers and Supreme Court judges in Sydney and Melbourne, 
and to a much lesser extent Brisbane; and third, the dominant orthodoxy has 
been that technical experts make ideologically neutral judges who perform an 
apoUtical legaUst fiinction. In short. Liberal governments do not have to make 
controversial appointments to put on the Court judges who share their broad 
social values. 
This was never more apparent than during the Menzies Liberal era which 
corresponded to the "Golden Age of the High Court" under the chief justiceship 
of Owen Dixon. The Menzies govemment made seven appointments to the Court, 
including that of Garfield Barwick as chief justice in 1964 after Dixon retired. 
Previously, in 1952, Menzies had made the obvious elevation of Dixon, his revered 
legal mentor, to the chief justiceship. During his prime ministership Menzies fUled 
every position on the High Court except that of McTiernan, and the chief 
justiceship and one of the puisne positions twice over. AU the Menzies appointees 
were eminent lavi^ers and none except Barwick had held political office. Barwick 
had been for years the pre-eminent leader of the AustraUan bar before he was 
handpicked by Menzies for the attomey-generalship and enticed into federal poUtics 
in 1958 with the offer of Liberal party endorsement for the safe Sydney seat of 
Parramatta. He became attomey-general and, after Casey's retfrement in 1960 and 
the close 1961 general election in which the Menzies government barely hung 
on to office, minister for external affairs as weU. 
Besides Barwick, aU the other Menzies appointees were from the Sydney and 
Melbourne bars. Kitto, Douglas Menzies (a cousin of the prime minister) and 
Wmdeyer were leading barristers, whUe FuUagar, Taylor and Owen had also served 
on the Supreme courts of their respective states. FuUagar and Menzies came from 
Melbourne while all the others were from Sydney. 
Appomtments during the Menzies era were generaUy seen as apoUtical and raised 
no controversy. Even Barwick's appointment as chief justice in 1964 was seen 
by commentators more as an escape from poUtics than as a poUtical appointment 
to the Court. Because of Barwick's legal reputation, it was generally assumed 
that he would be the next chief justice if he wanted the job. There was a time 
earUer on when Barwick was considered a possible successor to Menzies, but his 
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poUtical performance was not of that caUbre. His final departure from poUtics 
was precipitated by Dixon's wish to retire and Barwick's own mishandling of 
AustraUa's relations with the United States over possible American involvement 
should AustraUa's troops in Borneo come under Indonesian attack. Barwick rashly 
claUned that America would be automaticaUy drawn mto any possible fracas between 
Australia and Indonesia through the obUgations of the ANZUS pact. This led 
to evasive denials by officials of the Johnson administration which was becoming 
increasingly absorbed in the escalating Vietnam war, and produced in parUament 
a sustained and effective attack on Barwick's handling of the affair by the Labor 
opposition." To reUeve the situation, Barwick was forced by Menzies and the 
cabinet to make a quick decision on the chief justiceship, and when he accepted 
it to take up the position immediately. The Labor opposition, however, had no 
quarrel with the suitabiUty of Barwick for such high legal office nor with the 
appropriatenesss of his appointment. CalweU paid this generous tribute to Barwick 
in the House: 
His poUtical experience wiU add useful practical knowledge of the problems of 
administration to great legal attainments. He is the better fitted for his new duties 
for having been a poUtician and for the better understanding of popular opinion and 
public needs that only a parUamentarian can attain. 
Menzies's exit from poUtics in 1967 was particularly smooth since the Liberal 
coaUtion remained in office for a further five years. This allowed the successive 
Gorton and McMahon governments to replace four of the old Menzies appointees 
with judges of similar calibre and background. In fact aU the four replacements 
were already judges: Walsh and Mason ofthe New South Wales Supreme Court, 
Stephen of the Victorian Supreme Court and Gibbs of the Federal Court of 
Bankraptcy and the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory and 
previously of the Queensland Supreme Court. Mason, who had served as 
commonwealth soUcitor-general for three years from 1964 to 1969, was the only 
one of these four judges who had worked professionaUy outside the narrow confines 
of bar and bench. 
Hence for twenty years from 1950 until 1970 when the Queenslander Harry 
Gibbs was appointed to the High Court, successive Liberal govemments appointed 
only Sydney and Melbourne judges and barristers. After the retirement of the 
previous Queenslander WilUam Webb in 1958, the Court was entirely made up 
of judges from New South Wales and Victoria until 1970. Even the balance between 
Victoria and New South Wales was skewed severely m favour of New South Wales 
which had either five or six judges on the Court between 1958 and 1972. The 
appointments of Gibbs and Stephen in the early 1970s reduced the New South 
Wales representatives to four, but with Labor's appointment of Murphy to replace 
the Victorian Menzies in 1975 the number of New South Wales judges again 
rose to five. 
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Reaction to this predominance on the High Court of New South Welshmen 
and the total exclusion of South AustraUans, Westem AustraUans and Tasmanians 
had been budding for years. The Murphy appointment was for many the last straw. 
If judicial appointments were to be poUtical, as in a sense they must be since they 
are made by the govemment of the day, then they should at least reflect something 
ofthe poUtics of federalism. At least that was a common response that Murphy's 
appointment provoked. The conservative Australian Law Joumal branded the 
resultant "disproportionate preponderance of New South Wales judges, five out 
of seven, without representation of the three non-Eastern states . objectionable 
. and . . a mockery of Federation" It questioned whether such a High Court 
could be "regarded as a traly 'Federal' Court?"" The Queensland government 
announced that it would seek ways and means in which the state could partidpate 
m future High Court appointments.'* MeanwhUe a spedal committee of the non-
Labor New South Wales Legislative Assembly was set up to inquire into the 
appointment of judges. This committee rejected the practice of making no 
appointments from the three smaUer states: "We cannot and do not accept the 
proposition that the bar and the Supreme Court bench of South AustraUa, Westem 
AustraUan and Tasmania are chronically incapable of producing a candidate well 
fitted for High Court appointment."" As a result of such pressures from the 
states, the Eraser govemment changed the appointment procedures when the Liberal 
coaUtion retumed to office in December 1975. 
The Fraser govemment's appointments: consultative procedures and a more balanced court 
After the dismissal of the Whitlam Labor government in November 1975, the 
four non-Labor state governments of New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland 
and Westem AustraUa met as a coundl of states and, as one of their demands 
of the new Fraser government, asked that they be consulted in judidal 
appointments.'* The question of the states' partidpation in High Court 
appointments had been before the Australian Constitutional Convention from its 
first plenary session in 1973. At the fourth plenary session of the convention in 
Perth in 1978 a motion advocating state partidpation was endorsed. The attomey-
general, Senator Durack, a West AustraUan, accepted the prindple of consulting 
with the states and in 1979 had that requfrement enshrined in federal legislation." 
This change to the formal procedures of appointing justices to the High Court 
was due to the backlash against Whitlam-style centraUsm and also a reaction against 
the previous practices of postwar Liberal govemments. It reflected the Fraser 
government's more sensitive commitment to "co-operative federalism" and the 
influence of the state govemments, particularly of Western Australia and 
Queensland, on the Fraser government. 
Immediately these new consultative procedures had been given legislative 
endorsement, the Western Australian soUdtor-general, Ronald WUson, was 
appointed to the High Court to replace Jacobs who resigned in May 1979. The 
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Western Australian premier, Charles Court, greeted the appointment as the"first 
finiit of the new consultative procedure" that he had been pushing for years. This 
was "an event of historic importance". Court said, because it remedied the Court's 
historical lack of "a precious asset —the perspective ofthe less populous but equaUy 
important member States of Federation".*" In rather poor taste the deputy Labor 
leader, Lionel Bowen, claimed that the appointment of a West AustraUan with 
such conservative views on constitutional matters was clearly made by the West 
AustraUan government: "The Attorney-General, Senator Durack, has meekly 
complied with the demands of his State Premier", Bowen claimed.*' While the 
attomey-general denied this charge, it was clear that the new procedures and the 
influence of Westem AustraUan Liberals on and in the federal government had 
been significant factors in WUson's appointment to the Court. At the same time 
WUson was a strong candidate for appointment, being the senior soUdtor-general 
at this time and a very experienced counsel before the High Court. 
In its next appointments when Chief Justice Barvdck eventually retired in 
February 1981, the Fraser government favoured two Queenslanders. Harry Gibbs 
was elevated to the chief justiceship while Gerard Brennan was appointed to the 
vacant position on the court. Again, though the state of origin may have been 
a consideration in these two appointments, both men had excellent credentials 
for their respective positions. Gibbs was the senior puisne justice on the Court, 
and was described by one commentator as "a consensus man" who would make 
"an outstanding Chief Justice".*^ UnUke the assertive Barwick, who Uked to refer 
to himself as "Chief Justice of AustraUa"- Gibbs at his swearing in described the 
chief justice as "only first among equals in the work of the court" Gibbs had 
a much lower public profile than Barwick and could be expected to take a more 
coUegiate approach to the office. Gibbs also expressed a more flexible, although 
StiU cautiously conservative, approach to the role ofthe Court. Whereas Barwick 
had defended a rigidly literaUst view of judging in his fareweU speech, Gibbs at 
his swearing in aUowed that the Court should "develop the law in a way that 
-will lead to decisions that are humane, practical and just" He added, however, 
that "it would eventuaUy be destractive of the authority of the courts if they 
were to place sodal or poUtical theories of thefr own in place of legal prindple". 
Labor's shadow attorney-general, Gareth Evans, was less kind than most in 
describing Gibbs as "a safe, stop gap choice" and "a competent, uncontroversial 
and thoroughly unimaginative Chief Justice".** 
Brennan's appointment was universally acclaimed. He had been appointed the 
first president of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal when it was set up in 1976 
and had pioneered its working procedures. He had also been ajudge of the new 
Federal Court of AustraUa since its inception in 1977. Even opposition spokesman 
Evans was lavish in his praise of Brennan as "a first class lawyer, a thoroughly 
humane and charming man, sensitive on dvil liberties issues and weU alive to the 
larger sodal and economic implications of the constitutional decisions the court 
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has to make." Brennan's appointment was a key one since, as the Age noted, 
"the distinctive role ofthe Chief Justice is largely symboUc", and Gibbs was afready 
on the Court. Brennan's appointment was something of a surprise since he did 
not fit the typical prototype of a Liberal appointee. As the Age explained: 
Conservative Governments in the past have generally chosen conservative judges, men 
whose professional career has been spent acting for big corporations and such individuals 
as can afford their fees. This time a Liberal-NCP Government has chosen the son of 
a Labor poUtician, a former member of the Law Reform Commission, a barrister who 
often cut his fees to serve Aboriginal clients, and a man of pronounced sodal consdence. 
It is a remarkable appointment for a conservative Government to make, and the Fraser 
Government deserves full credit for it. 
The appointment of Gibbs and Brennan reflected astute statesmanship on the 
part of the Fraser government. Barwick had poUticized the chief justiceship by 
formaUy sanctioning Sfr John Kerr's dismissal ofthe Whitlam govemment in 1975. 
In doing so Barwick had used his high judicial office in a partisan political way. 
He supported his own and Sir John's unprecedented actions by subscribing to a 
novel reading of the executive sections of the constitution and by both dovragrading 
and altering the basic conventions of responsible government.*' Moreover, during 
the late 1970s under Barwick's leadership, the High Court's public image had 
become tarnished because it was seen to have been partly responsible for legitimating 
highly artificial tax avoidance schemes that spawned a whole professional industry 
of pubUc cheating and cost the government billions of dollars in lost revenue.** 
The crasading commitment to economic libertarianism and sharp advocacy that 
Barwick had buUt his professional reputation upon and carried over to judicial 
office appeared more objectionable as their deleterious consequences became obvious 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The new chief justice and the new judge were 
seen as something of a corrective antidote. Again, as the Age put it: 
The new appointments will enhance the standing of the High Court in the community. 
They may also enhance the quaUty of its judgments. Sir Garfield Barwick was a formidable 
ideologue of economic Ubertarianism, the kind of individuaUsm that concerns itself mainly 
with such freedoms as the freedom to make money. Sir Garfield's thinking influenced 
the court in a number of judgments involving tax avoidance and business regulation 
which caused real damage to AustraUan sodety. Our present problems with tax avoidance, 
for instance, stem largely from the court's refusal to uphold the plain meaning of the 
law which declares it iUegal. 
The changes in the Court's personnel were expected to reorientate its work in 
this sensitive area and restore its credibiUty with large sections of the community. 
The other important poUtical aspect of the Gibbs-Brennan appointments was 
the fact that Robert ElUcott was passed over. ElUcott was minister for home affairs 
at the tune, having resigned the attomey-generalship in 1977 after being prevented 
from fiirther harassing former leading Labor ministers, Whitlam and Murphy, 
over conspiracy accusations in the Loans affair that had triggered the political 
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downfaU of the Whitlam government. It was ElUcott who as shadow attomey-
general in 1975 had first expounded the novel doctrine that a govemment that 
did not have the confidence of the Senate in the matter of supply must either 
call an election or resign or be dismissed by the governor-general. Before being 
enticed into poUtics by the Liberal party, and winning the federal seat of Wentworth 
in 1974, EUicott had been the commonwealth soUdtor-general from 1969 to 1973. 
Few questioned ElUcott's abiUty to be a judge on the High Court or even chief 
justice. Writing in the National Times Paul Kelly and David Marr said: "ElUcott 
would be a young, vigorous and relatively innovative chief. These are his quaUties 
as a minister. ElUcott has long displayed a concern about individual Uberties."'" 
As attorney-general ElUcott had been a reformer in administrative law, he was 
committed to Aboriginal land rights and was considered a centraUst since his days 
as solicitor-general. All these qualities should have made him acceptable to the 
Labor opposition if it had not been for his partisan role in ousting the Whitlam 
government in 1975, and subsequently his desire to fadlitate the prosecution of 
Labor ex-ministers for their actions while in government." 
The Labor party had been trying to settle scores from 1975 for some time. 
In 1980 it had launched an attack on Chief Justice Barwick for aUeged irregularities 
in a family company, Mundroola Pty Ltd, of which he had been a director until 
1974. The company had apparently failed to lodge annual returns with the 
Corporate Affairs Commission. Opposition leader Hayden signalled that pubUc 
confidence in the chief justice would be an issue at the next election. Gareth Evans 
eagerly led the charge in the Senate and called for a parUamentary inquiry into 
Barwick's affafrs.'^  The "Mundroola affair" proved to be much ado about nothing 
and soon fizzled out. But it did show that Labor's 1975 wounds were stiU tender 
and that the party was prepared to use partisan poUtical tactics to undermine pubUc 
esteem for high legal offices that were held by its opponents. As Barwick's 
retirement approached. Labor poUticians turned their attack on EUicott who was 
widely tipped as his successor. The New South Wales Labor attorney-general, 
Frank Walker, made a scathing attack on ElUcott in late 1980 with these remarks: 
His disgraceful conspiratorial role in the events that led to the sacking of the Whitlam 
Government . has made him a figure subject to much pubUc hatred, ridicule and 
contempt. It would not be possible for any reasonable State Govemment to contemplate 
the appointment of Mr EUicott to the High Court." 
EUicott's prospects for the chief justiceship might weU have weathered the storms 
of Labor's opposition had it not been for additional strong opposition from the 
non-Labor states. Towards the end of 1980 it was reported that both Queensland 
and Western AustraUa were strongly opposed to EUicott because of his "centraUst" 
stance as soUcitor-general and attorney-general.'* By mid-January 1981 when 
Barwick's retirement was announced, Tasmania had been added to the Ust and 
there were now said to be five states in "violent opposition" to ElUcott's 
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appointment." Influential papers Uke the Age warned: "To appoint an active 
poUtidan as its chief-particularly a politician who was one of the architects of 
the divisive constitutional crisis of 1975-would invite the public to see it as a 
stacked court" and as "a job for one of the boys".'* It can be seen from this 
example how the new consultative procedures have compUcated the occasional 
practice of AustraUan govemments of appomting practising poUtidans to the High 
Court. 
There are two stories about the cabinet meeting that made the appointment 
dedsions. One from the Age has it that cabinet discussed appointing EUicott to 
replace Barwick, but that despite "strong support" from Prime Minister Fraser, 
most ministers though that his appointment would "damage the standing of the 
High Court" It is claimed that EUicott was then called into the cabinet room 
and offered the puisne position which he refiised." The more likely account is 
that by this time, because of aU the media speculation and bitter opposition against 
ElUcott, there "was no question of his being offered the Bench job" The same 
report clauned that EUicott had been offered a seat on the High Court bench the 
previous year but had refiised, "preferring to gamble on getting the top job".'* 
In a surprise move a few weeks later ElUcott resigned from the Fraser ministry 
and took a judidal appointment to the Federal Court bench." He was said to 
be disUlusioned with poUtics and to be positioning himself for subsequent more 
senior judidal appointments. Apparently disiUusioned by the bench, however, he 
resigned from the Federal Court in early 1983 and returned to private practice 
in Sydney. 
As was expected, Gibbs's appointment as chief justice depoUtidzed the Court. 
Prime Minister Fraser carried the post-1975 heaUng process a step fiirther the 
foUowing year by announcing the appointment of Sfr Nmian Stephen, senior puisne 
justice of the High Court, to succeed Sir Zelman Co wen as governor-general in 
July 1982.*" Aickin's death in June 1982 created a second vacancy on the court 
at the same time. The two new appomtees were WUUam Deane and Daryl Dawson. 
Deane was an emment Sydney barrister who had been appointed to the New South 
Wales Supreme Court in early 1977, and within a couple of months to the Federal 
Court of AustraUa. He had also been president of the Trade Practices Tribunal. 
His quaUfications for appointment to the High Court were as obvious as those 
of his Federal Court coUeague Brennan who had been appointed the previous year. 
Deane's appointment was balanced by that of the Victorian soUdtor-general Daryl 
Dawson. As solidtor-general of Victoria since 1974, Dawson had developed a 
national reputation as a conservative states' righter, particularly early on in that 
office when he vigorously opposed the Whitlam government's centraUst 
poUcies.*' It was reported at the time that five out of the six states supported 
Dawson's appointment.*^ 
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Trends in appointments 1950 to 1984 
In summary, judicial appointments in the post-1950 period continued, and carried 
to an extreme, the earlier practice of appointing to the Court legal speciaUsts who 
lacked broader pubUc or political experience. AU eleven appointments that were 
made by successive Liberal coalition governments between 1950 and 1972 were 
of Sydney or Melbourne judges or leading barristers, with the sole exception of 
Gibbs who had served a comparable apprenticeship at the Queensland bar and 
on the Queensland and spedaUst federal courts. None of these men had poUtical 
experience except Barwick, and none had served in a public law position except 
Mason, who had been AustraUan solicitor-general for three years. All had been 
successful barristers who had risen to the top of their spedalized profession in 
the large and lucrative metropoUtan centres, predominantly Sydney and Melboume. 
Their quaUfication for appointment to the High Court was technical legal expertise 
as measured by individual professional entrepreneurship in servicing mainly corporate 
and wealthy litigants." What better preparation could there be, one might ask, 
for ensuring the exacting technical competence required of High Court judges? 
At the same time, by happy coinddence, what better way of guaranteeing that 
the broad policy views dominant on the Court—limiting government under law 
to the federal division of legislative powers as interpreted by the Court, and 
protecting individual and private property rights—would be in line with the poUcy 
views of Liberal governments. The ruling Liberal coaUtion was in the fortunate 
position of being able to make seemingly "apoUtical". or at least uncontroversial, 
appointments that were completely in accordance with its basic poUtical goals. 
The political requirements of federalism, however, had not been satisfied. 
Reaction had been building and was brought to a head when the Whitlam Labor 
government appointed two more justices from Sydney, particularly as both were 
progressive centralists, and one was Labor's forcefiil and controversial attomey-
general, Lionel Murphy, who had gained his seat on the High Court bench through 
politics rather than normal legal promotion. Subsequent changes in appointment 
procedures brought in by the Fraser Liberal govemment produced a greater balance 
in the state of origin of subsequent appointees to the Court. There are now three 
judges from New South Wales, two from Queensland, and one each from Victoria 
and Westem AustraUa, comprising the most federaUy diversified Court in AustraUan 
history. 
The other significant change in appointment patterns in recent years has been 
a marked swing away from bar and bench experience in Sydney and Melbourne 
which was for decades the typical career route to the High Court. In recent 
appointments experience either in federal institutions, particularly the new Federal 
Court of AustraUa, or public law positions in the states has been favoured. This 
new trend reflects on the one hand the grovdng size and significance ofthe Federal 
Court of AustraUa, and on the other hand the support of state goverments for 
state soUdtors-general who have served their own states and developed reputations 
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with other states through the formal and informal networks of that office. All 
the current members of the High Court have either had experience in a federal 
institution or as state soUcitors-general. WUson and Dawson were both state 
solicitors-general for a considerable period immediately prior to their 
appomtments—WUson of Westem AustraUa for ten years and Dawson of Victoria 
for eight years. The five other judges aU had prior experience in federal mstfrutions: 
Murphy as attorney-general. Mason as solicitor-general, and Gibbs, Brennan and 
Deane on federal courts. 
These recent trends in High Court appointments suggest that the Court is 
coming to be seen less as a private law appeUate court and more as a public law 
"Federal Supreme Court", as section 71 of the constitution describes it, with the 
qualification for appointment being speciaUzed service with a federal institution 
or as a state soUdtor-general. This is a reflection of the poUtics of federaUsm; the 
federal govemment which makes appointments favours those who have served 
in some federal capadty, whUe the states, now entitled to be consulted, prefer those 
who have served the states directly as law officers. While the High Court has 
been poUtidzed to this Umited extent, it remains the preserve of spedaUst lawyers 
rather than pubUc figures or leading poUtidans. Since the initial appointments 
of five of the founding fathers to the first Court, only five lawyer-poUticians have 
ever been appointed (Evatt, McTiernan, Latham, Barwick and Murphy) and only 
two in the last fifty years. The Murphy and ElUcott experiences in recent times 
indicate that the appointment of practising poUtidans remains highly controversial 
and wiU be strenuously opposed by powerfiil eUte groups. Thus the extreme 
partisanship of Australian poUtics combined with its conservative legal ethos have 
ensured that the High Court remains a court of lawyers who are apolitical in 
any partisan sense, but who are now more pubUcly orientated through prior service 
within the federal jurisdiction or as state law officers. 
The "Golden Age" of the High Court 
Chief Justice Dixon was reputedly AustraUa's greatest judge, and the period of 
Dixon's chief justiceship was the most eminent that the High Court has ever 
enjoyed. This has been attested in glowing terms by a wide range of commentators. 
Lord Denmng in 1975 described the 1950s and early 1960s when FuUagar (1950-61) 
served on the Court and Dixon was chief justice (1952-64) as the "Golden Age" 
of the High Court when it "estabUshed a reputation which overtopped even that 
ofthe House of Lords" ** The Australian Law Joumal, in a tribute published on 
behalf of the Victorian Bar Assodation on Dixon's death, was no less modest 
in its claims: 
In the fifties the work of the court attained a standard of excellence that gained for 
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it the reputation of bdng the finest court of law in the EngHsh-speaking world. Possibly 
there had been no stronger court since the Courts of Common Pleas under King's Bench 
in the third quarter ofthe last century. Under Dixon's presidency subtle yet perceptible 
changes occurred in the m^ner and method of the court's proceedings, and his own 
work provided a touchstone for his colleagues. Though aged 66 when he assumed office 
as Chief Justice, Dixon was at the height of his powers, and his judgements, more 
concentrated in style than they had been before the war, had a profundity without 
example since the death of WUles.*' 
Barwick, Dixon's successor as chief justice in 1964, praised Dixon's subtle yet 
effective leadership of the Court (something Banvick himself faUed to achieve) 
in a fine tribute: 
His influence as Chief Justice was marked by quite subtle yet noticeable changes in 
the atmosphere in which cases were argued. Also, as Chief Justice, he endeavoured 
to achieve a coherence in the court which would comprehend the differences of approach 
likely to exist in an appellate court of five or seven members, without diminishing the 
desirable strong individuality of those members.** 
Some insight into Dixon's method and the overpowering influence that he 
exerdsed over his feUow judges as chief justice has been given by Douglas Menzies 
(1958-74) who served on the Dixon Court: 
His authority was, of course, enormous, and when he was concerned that a decision 
should go in a particular way, his aim was to get his own judgement out first for 
circulation to other members of the Court. To differ from him was a course always 
taken with hesitation and never without foreboding. Never, however, did he attempt 
to win support for his opinion by arguing with other members of the Court. If his 
judgement did not convince, then nothing more could or would be done. Nevertheless, 
he was always wiUing to talk with other judges about their difficulties and about their 
judgements. Thus wisdom was distUled. It was in this manner that the Court 
inevitably took on something of the quaUty of the Chief Justice. When Dixon was 
Chief Justice there were with him on the Court at least two other judges of quite 
remarkable ability. Greatness encouraged greatness and set a high standard for those 
who could not aspire to greatness. It is small wonder, therefore, that the Court over 
which Dixon presided gained the world-wide eminence and authority which it did." 
As explained earUer, the Dixon Court flourished during the Menzies Liberal 
era and was, through appointment, the creation of the Menzies govemment. 
Menzies too was in awe of Dixon and committed to his judicial standards. 
Consequently the judges he handpicked for the High Court were aU spedaUst 
lawyers from Sydney and Melboume who emulated Dixon's jurisprudential style. 
Dixon had been the dominant figure on the Court for the decade before he became 
chief justice. The judges whom Menzies appointed to the Court, particularly 
Wilfred FuUagar and Frank Kitto, were disciples of Dixon from a younger 
generation of lawyers who had risen to the top of thefr profession whUe Dbcon 
was a leading influence on the Court. Not surprisingly they served as a team under 
his leadership in a way that has rarely been matched. 
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If continuky m mterpretive method and judidal technique has been a characteristic 
of judidal review in the post-1950 period as Zines claims, it is in no smaU part 
due to the towering influence of Owen Dixon. Although doctrine has been 
developed and judidal technique become somewhat less abstruse since Dixon's 
time, Dbcon remains the epitome of the AustraUan legal estabUshment's model 
of a judge. He both reflected, and made the leading contribution towards 
articulating, the legalist approach of the High Court. But to appredate the lofty 
eminence and uncontroversial character of the Court during Dixon's chief 
justiceship, it is also important to recognize the relatively serene and tranquil 
poUtical atmosphere in which the Court operated. After the great constitutional 
battles of the previous Chifley period and an early rebuff to the Menzies govemment 
m the Communist Party case, the Court was able to disengage significantly from 
poUtics. FoUowing its abortive attempt to ban the Communist party, the Menzies 
government settled down to moderate government and passed Uttle controversial 
legislation. AU its appointments to the Court were of legal spedaUsts of the Dixon 
mould. Consequently Dbcon's description of the Court's constitutional work as 
"strict and complete" legalism did portray some ofthe major traits, and certainly 
the spirit, of the Court's work during his chief justiceship. 
Nevertheless there were times when the Dixon Court was involved in important 
poUtical dedsions. Perhaps as befits the most eminent and least troubled High 
Court that AustraUa has had, the Dixon Court was particularly concerned with 
enhandng its own constitutional position. A grand occasion for asserting judicial 
supremacy over both the legislative and executive branches of government was 
provided early on by the Menzies Liberal government's most illiberal pursuit of 
Communists. The other occasion was created by the Court in the Boilermakers 
case (1956) through seizing upon a routine arbitration dispute to insist upon a 
strict doctrine of separation of powers and the pristine independence of the judidary. 
On the other hand in the Second Uniform Tax case (1957), the Court upheld the 
continuation of uniform taxation as a settled part of AustraUan federaUsm, despite 
the reservations of Dixon who had not sat on the First Uniform Tax case (1942). 
At a more routine level the unfinished business of section 92 provided the Court 
with a steady flow of constitutional work. Since the Communist Party and 
Boilermakers cases and the ongoing interpretation of section 92 were politically 
significant in their own right and are also indicative of the method of the Dixon 
Court, they will be examined in detail. 
The Communist Party case 
The Communist Party case was not primarily about civil liberties but about the 
limits of legislative and executive power and supremacy of thejudidary in dedding 
such questions. There were two important issues: first, whether the federal 
legislature could ban the Crfmmunist party under the section 51(vi) defence power 
in a period of "cold war"; and second, whether the federal executive could be 
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given absolute discretion to determine what was required for national security 
and which groups or individuals were prejudidal to it. A more fundamental issue 
raised by the Communist Party case was the basic one of "who decides?" Latham 
pointed out in forceful dissent in his last major judgment as chief justice, that 
the scope of the defence power was elastic and depended upon the security 
circumstances ofthe time "as viewed by some authority" The question was: "By 
what authority—by ParUament or by a court?"** Citing Cromwell's severe 
dictum that "Being comes before weU-being", Latham held for parUament, but 
all the other judges came out strongly in favour of the Court. 
Likewise, the Court overraled the government's attempt to give itself the 
unlimited discretion to name individuals and bar them from holcUng office in any 
industry declared to be "vital", and to dissolve groups and seize thefr property 
on "nothing but the vague or intangible conception of being prejudidal to 
the executive power", as Dixon described the legislation. According to the 
legislation the governor-general's proclamation on these matters was to be 
conclusive. Evatt, soon to be leader of the Labor opposition and appearing for 
a left-wing union that had Communist offidals, charged that this was "not the 
rale of law [but] the arbitrary fiat of a supreme power" " Dixon and aU the 
other judges except Latham agreed. In discussing the legislation, Dixon said that 
it left "the actual decision whether the body ought to be considered unlawfiil 
and dissolved accordingly completely to the final determination of the 
Executive" This offended Dixon's sense of constitutional propriety and the rule 
of law under the supervision of a watchfiil court. Taking up Latham's championing 
of CromweU, Dixon wamed that: "History and not only andent history, shows 
that in countries where democratic institutions have been unconstitutionaUy 
superseded, it has been done not seldom by those holding the executive power."™ 
In this instance it was the chief justice and ex-politidan Latham who played 
the role of "devil's advocate", The majority justices reached their dedsion by 
asserting the superiority of thejudidary's view ofthe constitutional position over 
those of parUament and the executive. The issue, as Latham put it, was "whether 
legislation for such a purpose approved by ParUament cannot be valid unless it 
is also approved by a court after hearing evidence as to the existence of national 
danger" Since there were no "actual or objective facts" that could be found by 
a court, Latham argued that the question of whether national defence required 
the suppression of the Communist party would therefore turn on "the poUtical 
opinions of the judges" Latham stuck by the legaUst prindple that the Court 
should have "no poUtical opinions" According to his restrictive test the only 
legitimate question for the Court to determine was whether there was a "real 
connection" between the legislation and "activities and possibUities which ParUament 
had said in its opinion do exist and do create a danger to AustraUa"," Although 
it was not clear how a real connection might be tested without second-guessing 
the legislature, it seems Latham was leaving that dedsion to parUament. 
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The other judges, however, required an "objective test" that they would both 
devise and administer. Otherwise, as they aU pointed out, the legislature and the 
executive would be judges in thefr ovm cases, a right they reserved for thejudidary 
alone. If there were no objective test administered by the Court, argued Dixon, 
"the Act would have the effect of making the conclusion of the legislature final 
and so the measure of the operation of its own power" '^  McTieman insisted that 
it was "wrong to make the Executive arbiter of an executive power" WilUams 
damned the legislation as "in effect an assertion by Parliament that it can dedde 
for itself whether the particular legislation was required by suffident facts to 
Unk it to a constitutional head of power. Stressing it was "the actual facts and 
only the actual facts which count", WiUiams asked if there were "any relevant 
facts, notorious or otherwise" that were suffident to support the Communist Party 
Dissolution Act. He concluded with the judidal assertion that "in my opinion 
there could not be", while rejecting outright "the mere assertion of Parliament 
or the Executive" to the contrary. FuUagar buttresses his holding against the 
legislation by appealing to the "axiomatic" principle oi Marbury v. Madison which 
gave "the courts, rather than the legislature itself. . the fiinction of finaUy dedding 
whether an Act of a legislature in a Federal system is or is not within power" 
But as we have afready seen, the authoritative opinion of Marshall in Marbury 
V. Madison is flawed because it begs that fundamental question of "who deddes?" 
what is within power. Thus the Court struck down the draconian Communist 
Party Dissolution Act by asserting its own supremacy over parUament. In this 
mstance the judidal strategy of the AustraUan High Court was reminiscent of 
MarshaU's great dedsion in Marbury v. Madison that formally established judidal 
review in America. It used the occasion of deciding a key constitutional case to 
advance its own position. 
The niceties of judicial reasoning were of Uttle concem to the protagonists outside 
the sober confines ofthe Court, but the dedsion handed down on 9 March 1951 
had a major poUtical impact. The "anti-Red" Act, as it was dubbed by the press, 
was a key plank of the new Menzies government. With its other major legislation 
to reconstitute the Commonwealth Bank under an independent board being held 
up by the Labor-controUed Senate, the government was brought to an impasse. 
The anti-Communist biU had only scraped through the Senate because it 
compromised the Labor party. Chifley caUed it a "monstrous" Act and most Labor 
supporters were opposed to it, but the legislation was gradgingly enacted by Labor 
senators because of right-wing pressure from within the party and fear of having 
to fight an election on the issue in the cold war atmosphere of the early 1950s. 
The Court's adverse decision on the constitutional issues put the Menzies 
govemment in a bind, as the Age explained: 
Prodigious preparations of the anti-Communist biU and long argument inside and outside 
Parliament, not to speak of the large cost involved, have gone for nought. 
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The national Goverment is shown to be in a weak position on the eve of setting out 
to launch what the Prime Minister outUned as a three years' programme that would 
involve stringent economic controls and reconsideration of pubUc and private investment, 
as weU as a great increase of the defence services." 
Menzies's responses to this double impasse were bold ones; he sought to override 
the Court's decision and change the Labor Senate. First he obtained a double 
dissolution of parliament from Governor-General McKeU on the basis of a broad 
and controversial reading of section 57.'* The Labor Senate that desperately 
wanted to avoid an election had been trying to hold up govemment legislation 
vdthout actuaUy "faUing to pass" it, and so provide grounds for a double dissolution. 
Menzies, however, was granted his double dissolution and in the ensuing election 
won majorities in both Houses of parliament. 
Menzies's second initiative was to seek sweeping legislative power to deal with 
Communists through a constitutional amendment. He had first responded to the 
Court's decision vdth a ringing declaration: "On behalf of the Government, I 
say this is not the end of the fight against Communism, fr is merely the 
beginning."" Menzies claimed that the decision had "disclosed grievous 
limitations" on the powers of parUament and the government to deal with 
Communists in the way he saw fit: 
We cannot deal with a hidden conspiracy such as the Communist conspiracy urgently 
and effectively if we are first bound to estabUsh by strict legal process what a body 
or individual is actually doing. 
Wars against enemies, external or internal, cannot be waged by judidal process.'* 
Menzies sought a general power to make laws with respect to communism 
and members of the Communist party and a specific power to validate the 
Communist Party Dissolution Act and so override the Court. The referendum 
was lost because neither requirement of section 128 was met: the proposal failed 
narrowly to carry a national majority and did not obtain support in a majority 
of states with New South Wales, Victoria and South AustraUa voting against it. 
In purely electoral terms Menzies was more successful, winning the first round 
of the anti-Communist fight which he continued to promote and win through 
the 1950s and 1960s. In doing so Menzies cleverly exploited some of AustraUa's 
most deep-seated fears during the cold war years. A lurid Bulletin cover for the 
issue reporting the Court's adverse decision in the Communist Party case said it 
aU; it depicted a ferocious gorilla-like man carrying a huge club emblazoned with 
the word "Communism" emerging from a dark cave to strike down the terrified 
maiden "CiviUzation"," Menzies's anti-Communist strategy in attempting to ban 
the Communist party in 1950-51, and during the Petrov Royal Commission in 
1954, left the Labor party hopelessly divided. Evatt, who became Labor leader 
after Chifley's death m June 1951, was easUy tarred with the "soft-on-Communism" 
brash. After aU, Evatt had accepted the brief of the Waterside Workers' Federation, 
a union with Communist officials and one of the plaintiffs in the sensational 
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Communist Party case and had spearheaded the case for the " N o " vote in the 
Communist powers referendum. Menzies's cleverly orchestrated campaign against 
Communists provided the larger stage on which the Labor party under Evatt's 
incompetent leadership would soon tear itself apart. If Menzies lost both the 
Communist Party case and the referendum, he nevertheless won aU the other poUtical 
and electoral battles. Meanwhile, however, the High Court had reasserted its 
supremacy and restored its credentials with Labor and the Left. It had shown 
that it was as shrewcUy perceptive of poUtics and pubUc opinion as Menzies himself. 
The Boilermakers case 
The Boilermakers case,'* although much less of a poUtical drama than the 
Communist Party case, was as important in terms of constitutional significance and 
unpact on public poUcy. The dedsion overturned the estabUshed machinery of 
industrial arbitration which had combined both arbitral and limited judidal authority 
in one tribunal for over half a century. In raUng that the exercise of non-judicial 
powers by the Arbitration Court was unconstitutional, the High Court gave an 
extreme and purist view of the judicial function that relied upon an exaggerated 
doctrine ofthe separation of powers. In J. M. Finnis's terms the Court preferred 
its own "abstract" doctrine of separation that reUed on neat conceptuaUzation to 
a more pragmatic "institutional" separation of particular functions." 
The case arose out of a routine industrial dispute. The Boilermakers Society 
of AustraUa refused to pay a fine of $1,000 imposed by the Arbitration Court. 
The background to the dispute was that the ironworkers at Morts Dock ship 
repafr yard in Sydney were on strike and the boilermakers put a ban on themselves 
doing any work that the ironworkers should have done. The Arbitration Court, 
on appUcation from the employers, ordered the Boilermakers Society to lift the 
bans. The union passed on this order to its members but some continued to 
contribute voluntarily to the ironworkers' strike fund. The Arbitration Court 
decided that the union was in contempt of court for not controUing its members 
and having them obey the order, so fined the union $1,000. In response to this 
rather severe treatment, the Boilermakers Society challenged the constitutionaUty 
of the Arbitration Court. 
The boilermakers' claim, as put by R . M. Eggleston, rested squarely on the 
abstract doctrine of separation of powers: 
The basis of this fiindamental proposition [i.e. that judidal power cannot be vested 
in a non-judidal body] is the division of powers under the Constitution as recognized 
in this country and the United States. 
Unless the power is inddental to judicial power, the doctrine of the separation of powers 
forbids the amalgamation of judidal and non-judidal functions. 
A majority of the Court consisting of the Dixonian trio of Dixon, FuUagar and 
Kitto and, surprisingly, also McTieman adopted this view. Geoffrey Sawer has 
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commented that the decision could equally well have gone the other way and 
that the majority view relied mainly on "legal casuistry".*' Finnis has shown, 
conclusively in my view, that the abstract concept of separation adopted by the 
Court had no historical basis in the founders' work but was attained by reading 
an "abstract" concept of rigid separation into the constitution's more flexible 
"institutional" division of powers. In his words: "The abstract conclusion that 
no tribunal exercising any federal judicial power may exercise any other power 
is attained by a sUde from the Institutional 'judicature' to the Abstract 'judicial 
power'."*^ 
The Dixon opinion*' is worth examining since it is a classic example of 
Dixonian techniques. A full battery of legal argument and rhetorical devices was 
used, textual analysis, quasi-logical inference, historical interpretation and the 
distillation of fundamental principle inherent in the structure of the constitution. 
First, the opinion emphasized the basic federal stracture of the constitution and 
the complementary role "necessarily assigned to the judicature which places it in 
a position unknown in a unitary system or under a flexible constitution where 
ParUament is supreme" This institutional innovation derived from American federal 
theory disposed of the defendant's claim, argued by Douglas Menzies, that the 
separation doctrine embodied in the AustraUan constitution was the pragmatic 
British, rather than the stricter American, variety. It also served as a reminder 
ofthe Court's "ultimate responsibUity" for dedding the limits of federal govemment 
powers. Next the Dixon opinion examined the language of chapter 3 of the 
constitution on the judicature which it said was "an exhaustive statement" of 
judicial power. It then made the controversial claim that it was beyond the power 
of parUament to invest any part of judicial power in a body other than a court 
created under the judiciary sections of the constitution, particularly section 71. 
The difficulty was in estabUshing this last extreme proposition. Before marshalling 
its arguments, the Dixon opinion summed up the aberrant alternatives of 
(a) attaching judicial power to a body, such as the Arbitration Court, whose 
principal function was non-judidal in order that it might better accompUsh 
its fiinction; 
and 
(b) adding to a court some non-jucUdal powers that were not andUary but dfrected 
to some non-judicial purpose. 
If (b) could not be done, the opinion claimed, (a) must be completely out of the 
question. But this does not follow because the two alternatives are logicaUy 
unrelated. The inference from (b) to (a) presupposed that the strong abstract 
doctrine of separation controls both alternatives. AU subsequent appeals to abroad 
reading of the text, to logical mference and to the American origms of the AustraUan 
constitution as articulated by IngUs Clark and Harrison Moore were rhetoricaUy 
self-serving. The conclusion that "Chapter III does not allow the exercise of a 
jurisdiction which of its very nature belongs to the judicial power of the 
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Commonwealth by a body estabUshed for purposes foreign to the judicial power" 
derived not from the constitution as originaUy drafted and appUed up until then, 
but from the judidal decision in this instance to enforce a stricter doctrine of 
separation to safeguard and enhance the judidal fiinction vdth judidal power. The 
Dixon view was subsequently endorsed by the Privy CouncU.** 
The Boilermakers decision has been criticized for inhibiting the development of 
a sound system of administrative law and in recent years support for such a strict 
doctrine of separation has decUned.*' The impact of the decision was muted 
because the government quickly persuaded parUament to make the legislative 
adjustments necessary to salvage the arbitration system. This was done by spUtting 
the arbitral and judicial functions ofthe old Arbitration Court between a separate 
commission and a court. As a result the pubUc policy impact of the decision was 
restricted, but AustraUa's industrial relations machinery was made more cumbersome 
and unwieldy. The case was important as an exercise of judicial power over 
legislative vdU and established administrative procedures, and because of the 
justifactory theory of an exaggerated separation of powers that it relied upon. 
Unfinished business: section 92 
More transport cases 
As the Communist Party and Boilermakers cases demonstrate, a major concern of 
the Dixon Court was to reassert its authority to exercise judicial review and to 
strengthen doctrinaUy the constitutional foundations of the power. In its more 
routine constitutional work that centred mainly around interpreting section 92,** 
the Court also appUed Dixonian principles that tended to expand the scope of 
judidal review. The Transport cases of the 1930s in which Dixon had persistently 
filed trenchant dissents stood as the last major bridgehead against the triumph 
of Dixonian principles. The smooth disposal of these troublesome precedents 
together with the reworking of ground rules to order this large judicial domain 
provide an interesting case study of Dixon's leadership and judicial craft. 
It is often said that the constitution means what judges say it means. That is 
tme, subject to the severe institutional constraints under which judges operate 
and the deUcate balance of public confidence that they must retain to give force 
and legitimacy to thefr dedsions. In addition, however, certain preconditions have 
to be met before judges can make or change the law; first, there must be a majority 
of judges who are prepared to make or change the law; and second, there must 
be affected individuals or interest groups suffidently aggrieved and monied to 
chaUenge the existing law. It also helps if skiUed counsel who appredate the changed 
views of thejudidary are at hand to present the cases. AU these ingredients were 
present in the 1950s to ensure that the Dixon Court would carry through the 
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unfinished business of re-interpreting section 92 to protect incUvidual traders from 
government regulations and taxes. 
After Dixon had replaced Latham as chief justice and FuUagar, Kitto and Taylor, 
aU of whom were disciples of Dixon, were appointed to the Court, there was 
a majority of judges who strongly favoured the Dixonian view of section 92. At 
the same time Australia's postwar economy was becoming more integrated and 
affluent. The boom in local import-substituting manufacturing industry and 
improvements in motor vehicle technology spavraed Urge private transport mterests 
that were prepared to persistently challenge inhibiting state road transport 
regulations that were designed to protect state raUways. Moreover since Sfr Garfield 
Barwick (personally knighted by the Queen in 1954 for his achievements in law) 
had raised section 92 Utigation to the highest pinnacle of legal practice, there was 
at hand a whole bevy of barristers, led by Sir Garfield himself, eager to work 
this lucrative field. If anything further were necessary to fadlitate the process of 
changing the law, it had been provided by the range of imprecise and self-
contradictory "authoritative obiter dicta" contributed by the Privy CouncU in the 
leading Bank Nationalization case. 
The first postwar challenge to the established systems of state road tranport 
regulations came early, in the 1950 case McCarter v. Brodie." The facts of the case 
were straightforward: a road carrier taking beer from South AustraUa through 
Victoria to New South Wales was charged by Victorian poUce for faiUng to obtain 
a licence from the Victorian government to cover the Victorian segment of the 
journey. Counsel for the carrier, Hughes and Vale, asked the Court to ignore 
the Transport cases precedent that favoured Victoria because it was inconsistent 
with the Privy Coundl's reasons in the Banking case. Dixon wholeheartedly agreed. 
He reiterated his persistent dissents ofthe 1930s and argued that the judges should 
no longer consider themselves bound by the authority of the Transport cases. The 
key to Dixon's position was his preference for individual freedom over state 
regulation, and his commitment to using "strictly legal" criteria rather than pubUc 
policy considerations in constitutional interpretation. Dixon repeated his earUer 
criticism from the Airline case that the Transport cases gave only a "pragmatic 
solution" based on considerations of the "practical operation" of legislation upon 
interstate commerce. Therefore in the McCarter case he damned the Victorian 
government's "uncontroUed discretion to grant a Ucence which impafred the carrier's 
guaranteed freedom to engage in inter-state trade".** In this 1950 case, however, 
only FuUagar joined Dixon in dissent. A majority of the Court consisting of 
Latham, McTiernan, WiUiams and Webb stuck to the Transport precedents and 
upheld the constitutionality of the Victorian legislation. 
The issue was reopened after Kitto and Taylor had been added to the Court 
and Dixon made chief justice in 1952. This time the Hughes and Vale tracking 
business challenged the constitutional validity of New South Wales regulations 
which imposed a discriminatory fee on road transport vehicles that ran in 
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competition with the state's raUways. The New South Wales regulations prevented 
individuals from using their vehicles on state roads without a Ucence and pa)anent 
of a fee. The purpose of these regulations was to ensure an orderly transport sector 
and protect the finandal viabiUty of the state's raUways. Dixon rdterated his long-
standing "personal opinion" that such a system "prohibiting transport uiJess Ucensed 
and authorizing the imposition of such a levy" was inconsistent with section 92. 
As chief justice, however, he was prepared to abide by the Transport precedents 
that had been affirmed so recently by the Court in McCarter v. Brodie, provided 
they were given as narrow an application as possible. Dixon therefore joined 
McTieman, WUUams and Webb, who with Latham had made up the McCarter 
majority, in upholding the New South Wales legislation.*' FuUagar, Kitto and 
Taylor, however, dissented on the grounds Dixon had previously set out in 
dissenting opinions. 
But the case did not rest there. It was allowed to go to the Privy Coundl by 
spedal leave of the High Court, and was overruled.'" Once again the Privy 
Coundl performed a backup fiinction of sweeping away old doctrine and precedent 
that a new majority on the High Court disagreed with. This time their Lordships 
adopted "the unusual course" of settUng the issue "not in language of their own 
but in the language of Judges of the High Court" Thdr opinion simply reproduced 
page after page of Dixon's and FuUagar's judgments on section 92. In particular 
the Privy Coundl finaUy scuttled the Transport precedents and the leading Vizzard 
case that had been so highly praised by an earlier Judicial Committee of the Privy 
CouncU. 
As was to be expected, the High Court formally endorsed the Privy CouncU's 
mling at the first opportunity which came a year later in response to a further 
challenge by the Hughes and Vale tracking company to amended New South 
Wales legislation that tried to sidestep the Privy Coundl's ruUng. This time aU 
the High Court judges feU in behind the Dixon view and held the licensing 
provisions of the New South Wales Act invaUd for infringing section 92." Dixon 
wrote a comprehensive judgment in which McTieman and Webb joined, although 
McTieman added a rather pathetic Uttle note of his own to point out that he 
was now endorsing a view he had been unable to share in the past. McTiernan 
said he remained "personally far from convinced that the result [was] one which 
the framers of S.92 either intended or foresaw".'^ The anomalous Transport 
precedents that had aUowed the states to regulate intrastate aspects of interstate 
road transport for twenty years had finally been rooted out. Now that Dixon 
had been joined by a majority of like-minded disciples on the High Court, his 
view that interstate road transport must be "as free from govemmental prohibition, 
restriction, impediment or burden as any other transaction of inter-state trade" 
was read into the Australian constitution." WhUe denying the states any 
discretionary control, most of the judges aUowed them to inake fair and reasonable 
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charges to cover the wear and tear on their roads, although Kitto and Taylor 
took the extreme view that states could make no such charges. 
The judiciary was finally in control of the potentiaUy enormous jurisdictional 
field of section 92. The judges had made of section 92 "an overriding section 
applicable to the whole range of legislative and governmental activity of every 
kind. The section had been constantly and almost as a matter of course used to 
invaUdate governmental acts of almost every kind far removed from fiscal 
matters."'* At least that was the view taken by Earl Wright of Dudley when 
he recanted in 1954 in favour of a narrow fiscal interpretation of the troublesome 
section. Dudley previously had sat for fifteen years on the Judidal Committee 
ofthe Privy Coundl and had been jomtly responsible for its 1936 James mtepretation 
of section 92. The same point can be made by comparing these AustraUan 
constitutional developments with what was happening at the time in the United 
States. There, Congress was gaining control over virtually every aspect of national 
Ufe through a broad interpretation of the commerce power by the American 
Supreme Court, while the AustraUan High Court was interpreting section 92 
to carve out for itself a comparable jurisdiction. 
The AustraUan judges had not simply claimed this new territory in order to 
substitute thier own discretion and values for those of legislators and administrators. 
Not in theory at least, as far as Dixon was concerned. He laboured to formulate 
objective criteria that embodied a moderate version of his free enterprise doctrine. 
As was to be expected, Dixon's test for section 92 entailed a highly abstract 
conceptual analysis of "essences" rather than a prudent weighing of pubUc pohcy 
requirements and practical consequences. The test depended on whether a law 
regulating interstate trade imposed a "direct" burden on an "essential feature" 
of interstate trade. If the regulation were "indirect" or the aspect of trade 
"inddental", however, the legislation was valid." Even if such a test were 
conceptually clear, its application entailed practical judgment about what was 
essential rather than inddental, and direct rather than indfreet. A more substantial 
problem for the judges in purporting to apply such a test was the need to see 
beyond the possible deceits of vdly legislators. As Zines notes. 
Yet even though the Dixon formula purported to oust the relevance of legislative purpose, 
economic consequences and value judgments in this area. His Honour made one 
quaUfication that threatened (or promised) to open them aU up again. ". . . nothing 
that has been said means that by drcuitous means or concealed design legislation may 
impair the freedom of inter-State trade, commerce, and intercourse although if the 
impairment were achieved by overt or direct means it would be invalid". 
The Margarine cases 
The free enterprise view that the High Court had read into section 92 of the 
constitution opened up a gap in the combined coverage of federal and state 
government powers. Some judges, and at times a majority, were concerned that 
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this free enterprise view of section 92, put "more and more matters outside the 
authority of aU the parliaments of Australia, Commonwealth and state" 
Consequently the Court restricted the extent of this legislative vacuum created 
by such an interpretation of section 92 by confining the scope of interstate trade. 
In the Margarine cases this entaUed a highly artifidal cUstinction being made between 
manufacture and trade. These cases take us beyond the period ofthe Dixon Court, 
but show how the judidary battled to contain the breach it opened up. 
The Margarine cases are significant because they show a different facet of the 
Court's mterpretation of section 92 that was contrary to its Hughes and Vale 
transport dedsions. In the Margarine cases the Court upheld an important regime 
of state regulation that substantially restricted interstate trade. There were four 
margarine cases, aU of which dfrectly or indirectly involved MarrickviUe, the large 
Sydney-based producer which persistently sought to bring interstate trade in 
margarine within the protective umbreUa of section 92. The states severely restricted 
margarine production by imposing low quotas in order to protect thefr dairying 
industries. The ffrst constitutional test came in Grannall v. Marrickville (1955) when 
MarrickviUe chaUenged highly restrictive legislation in New South Wales that 
prohibited the manufacture of margarine without a Ucence from the minister of 
agriculture." The Ucence set the quantity of margarine that could be produced 
and had to be renewed each year. AU the other states had simUar legislation so 
that the whole nation was covered with a web of restrictive regulation. This was 
freely admitted by the Victorian soUdtor-general, intervening by leave ofthe Court 
on behalf of his own state and South AustraUa: "AU the other States have legislation 
simUar to New South Wales", he said, in order to preserve "what each regarded 
as one of its basic primary industries, the dairy farming industry."'* 
MarrickviUe had been manufacturing large quantities of margarine for both local 
and interstate trade without any Ucence at aU. When charged with breaking the 
New South Wales law, the company raised section 92 as a defence. It briefed 
Sir Garfield Barwick, the high priest of section 92 Utigation and subsequently as 
chief justice the leading dissenter in the later Mowbray margarine case, to argue 
its case before the High Court. Barwick claimed that while every prohibition of 
manufacture might not interfere with the freedom of trade guaranteed by section 
92, the prohibition in this instance did because a large proportion of the product 
was sent interstate. The Court, however, unanimously upheld the New South 
Wales legislation on the basis of a clear distinction between manufacture and 
interstate trade. According to the joint opinion of Dixon, McTiernan, Webb and 
Kitto, manufacture was concerned "entirely with the Uberty of persons in New 
South Wales to bring a given commodity into existence by operation in that State" 
and formed '-no part of the freedom of the individual to engage in activities 
conducted across state boundaries" The opinion said that whUe section 92 
presupposed an ordered sodety where goods would be produced and traded, it 
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gave no constitutional guarantee to such precontUtions but secured only "inter-
State dealing, movement, interchange, passage etc."" 
A decade later in 1966, MarrickviUe again confronted the Court but with a 
stronger set of facts. The company had made separate batches of margarine in 
excess of its quota specificaUy for interstate orders. The company argued that section 
92 extended at least to the beginning of the manufacturing process for goods that 
were to move in interstate trade. But again a unanimous Court of five justices 
appUed the rale of the earUer Grannall case and upheld the New South Wales 
legislation. As Kitto pointed out, this second case "propounded no new doctrine; 
it places no new interpretation on section 92".'"" 
These two dedsions left the states vdth vfrtuaUy absolute (Uscretion in regulating 
the margarine trade from the production end. By co-operating as they did, the 
states could restrict the interstate trade in margarine before it commenced. But 
such apparently tight regulation was not sufficient for some of the smaller states 
that wanted to fiirther regulate margarine trade from the receiving end of interstate 
trade through restricting the sale of goods that had moved in such trade. The 
other two margarine cases involved such regulations and showed the more 
doctrinafre view of section 92 that was adopted by the new chief justice, Sfr Garfield 
Barwick. 
In the first, O'Sullivan v. Miracle Foods (S^),'"' the defendant had sold 
margarine from the Sydney company MarrickvUle in South AustraUa in violation 
of that state's regulations. Miracle Foods had broken South AustraUan law in three 
respects: the margarine sold had not been labelled writh thirty point print, it did 
not contain one-tenth percentage part by weight of arrownroot, and the ingredients 
had not been inspected by South Australian officers before production. The five-
judge Court allowed the constitutional validity of the labelUng regulation while 
noting its considerable nuisance value; South Australia's labeUing specifications 
differed only sUghtly from those of other states. The Court, however, disaUowed 
the prior inspection rale as a blatant violation of section 92, but spUt three-to-two 
over the legality of the arrowroot additive, the purpose of which was to aUow 
a simple test to be performed by inspection officers to distinguish margarine from 
butter. Barwick, Taylor and Owen found that the law requiring arrowroot additive 
was regulatory of interstate trade since it directly affected the sale of goods that 
had moved in such trade. Barwick preferred a broader scope for section 92 than 
had been previously aUowed by the High Court. In his view the states could regulate 
only those aspects of trade and commerce that "are so far removed from interstate 
movement as not relevantly to form part of that movement",'"^ Menzies and 
Windeyer dissented on the basis of a much narrowed reading of section 92. In 
their view banning the sale of margarine without an arrowroot additive operated 
after interstate trade and hence did not interfere with such trade. 
This dissenting view won out in the final case, SOS (Mowbray) v. Mead,^'^ 
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when Menzies and Windeyer were joined by McTiernan who had not sat on the 
Miracle Food case, and Gibbs, who had recently been appointed to the Court. This 
case involved the sale of cooking margarine, again suppUed by MarrickviUe, that 
had been artifidaUy coloured and flavoured in violation of the Tasmanian Dairy 
Produce Act 1969. In a narrow four-to-three decision the Court held that the 
sale of goods that had moved in interstate trade was not part of that trade but 
part of the business of retaU seUing. The test appUed by Windeyer, now in the 
majority, presupposed a very narrow scope for section 92: "If such regulation could 
be done by the Commonwealth with respect to aU States, then it can be 
done by a State ParUament with respect to its own state."'"* 
Barwick, in vigorous dissent, argued that sale was inseparably connected with 
the export and import of goods and hence was "part and parcel" of interstate 
trade.'"' Barwick seems to have the better part of reason and common sense 
because if states could control the sale of interstate goods they could surely also 
control the interstate trade in such goods. But if Barwick's argument was more 
convindng, the dedsion of the majority was more responsible. Having earUer on 
dedded to interpret section 92 too broacUy so as to protect individual traders against 
govemment regulation of thefr interstate transaction, the Court had subsequently 
to cut down the scope of this regulatory vacuum. The Mowbray decision was the 
somewhat bizarre extension of the Court's responsible efforts to redeem an extreme 
situation from within an artffical framework that it had created. Otherwise, as 
Windeyer put it, the Court would be putting "more and more matters outside 
the authority of aU the parUaments of AustraUa, Commonwealth and State".'"* 
The Whitlam interlude 
A major theme of this book has been the way AustraUa's federal constitution 
constrains federal Labor governments that try to impose reformist and sociaUst 
poUdes. The earUer antagonisms between Labor and the constitution that we have 
examined were summed up by Whitlam in 1957 as "the Constitution versus Labor" 
in these terms: 
[Tjhe AustraUan Labor Party, unUke the British and New Zealand Parties, is unable 
to perform, and therefore finds it useless to promise, its basic polides. It has been 
handicapped, as they were not, by a Constitution framed in such a way as to make 
it difficult to carry out Labor objectives and interpreted in such a way as to make it 
impossible to carry them out. 
By 1978, despite the disappointing record of his own government, Whitlam had 
changed his opinion. He then said there was nothing that a Labor govemment 
would want to do that could not be done under the existing constitution. Whitlam 
claimed that "the major obstacles against a program of reform are not constitutional 
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but poUtical. Even the Federal system itself, for aU its restrictions, limitations, 
and frustrations, need not prevent reform.'"* 
What had changed? Basically Whitlam and the Labor party in their objective, 
constitutional strategy and poUcy direction. Labor had partly transformed itself 
in fundamental ways and hence was less at cxlds with the constitution. Nevertheless, 
as the experience of the Whitlam government showed, the federal constitutional 
system remains a substantial obstacle to a reforming federal Labor government. 
The Whitlam government, however, was not hampered by the High Court as 
the previous Chifley Labor government had been, but by a hostile Senate and 
unfiiendly state governments. During the Whitlam period, the Court's more 
sympathetic stance in upholding the constitutionality of Labor legislation was due 
in large part to the balance of its composition. There were three Labor-appointed 
judges, McTiernan, Jacobs and Murphy, who were regularly joined by "middle-
of-the-roaders" Uke Stephen and Mason to form a favourable majority. This section 
examines how the Labor party was transformed between the 1950s and 1970s 
and the favourable manner with which an evenly balanced Court dealt with the 
Whitlam government's "explorations and adventures with Commonwealth 
powers".'"' 
Whitlam's 1957 statement of "the Constitution versus Labor" had summed 
up over half a century of conflict between a Labor party formally pledged to both 
the socialization of industry and the abolition of federalism, and a constitution 
that embodied and protected both federalism and private enterprise. The Labor 
party at the time was riven by sectarian and ideological strife, backward looking 
and old fashioned in its policies and nostalgic for the golden years of the Curtin-
Chifley era. Continued postwar affluence together with the consolidation ofthe 
welfare state and the continuation of Keynesian centralized management of the 
economy by successive Liberal governments had necessitated a basic rethinking 
of Labor policy. This was not achieved untU Whitlam succeeded CalweU as leader 
in 1967 and the Labor party updated its poUdes in the reform conferences of 1967, 
1969 and 1971. Labor reorientated itself away from working-class antagonism to 
private enterprise towards a benign acceptance of capitaUsm and a primary concern 
with middle-class and quality of life issues. This transformation of Labor policy 
was carried out under the dynamic leadership of Gough Whitlam and brought 
the federal Labor party back into office in 1972. 
Labor's new economics 
A major new development in Labor's economic thinking during the 1960s was 
the total abandonment of nationalization of industry as a possible option, even 
if it were not precluded by the Court's interpretation of section 92. The roots 
of Labor's economic rethinking went back a decade earUer and can be most strikingly 
seen in Whitlam himself, who was the architect and chief apostle of Labor's new 
economic approach. In 1957 after the party had reaffirmed its "sociaUst faith" of 
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the Chifley era and the goal of nationaUzation, Whitlam complained that the federal 
constitution as interpreted by the High Court made it impossible for Labor to 
unplement its basic objective. By 1961, however, Whitlam was dismissing 
nationaUzation as "the most difficult and least important aspect of sodaUsm", and 
was chiding his feUow Laborites with too Uttle initiative and imagination in 
exploiting avaUable constitutional powers, particularly section 96 which allowed 
federal grants to the states to be tied to spedfic conditions laid down by the federal 
government. "In our obsession with Section 92, which is held up as the bulwark 
of private enterprise", he said, "we forgot Section 96, which is the charter of 
public enterprise." The Whitlam government would use spedfic purpose grants 
under section 96 to cx;cupy large tracts of territory in the poUcy domain ofthe states. 
The other point Whitlam insisted upon was the transformation of the economy 
in the postwar decades so that AustraUan sodaUsts no longer needed to "ration 
scarcity but to plan abundance" The sins of modern capitalism were "ones of 
omission rather than commission", so that the fiinction of modem sodaUsm should 
not be to expropriate or create productive capital, but to fiU in the gaps left behind 
by private enterprise through expanding pubUc welfare spending."" 
Whitlam's new sodaUsm was strikingly simUar to that put forward by Anthony 
Crosland in his influential 1956 book. The Future of Socialism. Crosland rewrote 
the modem charter of British democratic sodaUsm on the basis of a bland optinusm 
sunilar to Whitlam's. Crosland claimed that the old intellectual framework of 
sodaUst discussion, particularly the concern with nationalization, was obsolete 
in postwar conditions because of two facts: rapid economic growth and the 
transformation of capitaUsm. On the second point Crosland insisted that capitaUsm 
no longer existed, having been recently replaced by "Keynes-plus-modified-
capitaUsm-plus-Welfare-State".'" As a result the task of sodaUsm had been muted 
to produdng "more sodal equaUty, a more classless society, and less avoidable 
sodal distress" That meant in practice pubUc spending on pensions, superannuation, 
health and education so as to ensure the free universaUty of benefits. Crosland 
was even more optimistic about the inevitabiUty of growth and the resultant ease 
with which the "new sodalism" could be achieved. Consequently he counselled 
against being too obsessed with growth: "I therefore see no reason, in contemporary 
Britain, to make the maximum possible rate of growth the premier objective of 
sociaUst poUcy. If we maintain, or moderately increase, our post-war rate of growth, 
we shall be able, over a period, to accommodate aU reasonable claims without 
excessive difficulty.""^ If postwar capitalism had been transformed in the ways 
Crosland and Whitlam thought, then clearly old fashioned democratic sodaUsm 
with its preoccupation with nationalizing industry was obsolete. Moreover, if 
economic growth could be taken for granted, democratic sodaUst governments 
could concentrate, as Whitlam advocated, on plugging the gaps left by capitaUst 
growth with quaUty of life programmes. Such views of Crosland, Whitlam and 
the reformed Australian Labor party proved overly optimistic and economically 
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shaUow, apt products ofthe decades of easy growth and rising affluence that helped 
spawn them. 
The Whitlam govemment swept to office m 1972 with a slogan "It's Tmie!"-as 
Whitlam said in his 1972 poUcy speech, "time for a new team, a new program, 
a new drive for equaUty of opportunities"; time "to Uberate the talents and upUft 
the horizons of the AustraUan people" Whitlam boasted that Labor's programme 
was the most carefiiUy developed and consistent ever put before the AustraUan 
people. It included a universal health insurance system, dramatic increases in 
education spending including free universities and tertiary colleges, a National 
Compensation Scheme, "a massive effort to rebuUd our existing dties and estabUsh 
new ones", "a massive attack on the problem of land and housing costs", and 
a start to "buying AustraUa back" by reversing the accelerating trend toward fordgn 
ownership in the expanding and lucrative minerals sector. In addition to such 
grandiose promises, Whitlam pledged that Labor's first priority in government 
would be to restore genuine fiiU employment, but he failed to mention inflation. 
The Whitlam programme stands as a monument to enormous vision, unbounded 
optimism and naive economics."' 
The whole Labor package promised in 1972 had no apparent cost. It was to 
be entirely funded through accelerated economic growth and the accompanying 
income tax creep. Whitlam explained that the programme depended on an 
extraordinary growth rate in the AustraUan economy of 6 to 7 per cent in each 
of the subsequent three years. Such a growth rate would automatically generate 
an additional $5 billion of income tax for commonwealth coffers."* Economic 
growth was the key to the cost side of Labor's reform equation, but how was 
it to be achieved? The national economy was already slowing down, and even 
in the boom years of the 1960s gross domestic product grew at sUghtly less than 
4 per cent in real terms. Labor spokesmen piously invoked "national planning" 
and "national co-operation", but their concrete proposals were devoid of both. 
Whitlam promised elaborate machinery to review prices, outlaw restrictive trade 
practices and to set and enforce national consumer standards, aU of which appeared 
to be dfrected towards regulatmg rather than stunulating the private sector. Growth 
required a careful nurturing of private enterprise or alternatively increasing activity 
by government but neither was forthcoming. 
According to the Crosland-Whitlam brand of sociaUsm in affluent times, the 
increased role of the state was one of distributing the largesse, not produdng it. 
This quaUty of Ufe sociaUsm depended on economic growth but did nothing to 
sustain it. Even if growth was occurring, it is Ukely that such a parasitic strategy 
would stifle it. It is hardly surprising that the Crosland-Whitlam modd of 
democratic sodaUsm that was built around so flawed a poUtical economy should 
faU in AustraUa when growth virtually ceased in the early 1970s. Real growth 
in the AustraUan economy feU to Uttle more than 2 per cent per annum in the 
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early 1970s and decUned fiirther to 1.2 per cent during the Whitlam govemment's 
term of office.'" 
Without growth, the failure of Labor's programme was virtually assured, but 
the Whitlam govemment did not see it that way. As late as September 1974 when 
severe economic problems were piling up, treasurer Crean pledged that the 
govemment would "remain steadfast in implementing its programs" The keynote 
of Crean's 1974-75 budget was "sodal progress" which was to entail increasing 
total commonwealth government expenditure by 32 per cent over the previous 
year with most of the increase going to education and health. The actual increase 
turned out to be 46 per cent, not 32 per cent as budgeted. Public expenditure 
by the commonwealth cUmbed from 24 per cent to 29 per cent of gross domestic 
product in a single year, with half the increase being funded by a large increase 
in the defidt. Crean's extravagance cost him his job. Cafrns, who was deputy 
prime minister and soon to replace Crean for a brief term as treasurer, proposed 
no practical altemative. In a pubUc lecture at the time, Cafrns admitted that the 
economy was stracturaUy unresponsive to Keynesian management techniques but 
also rejected the "draconian method", advcxated by the opposition, of admiiustering 
a sharp shock to deflate bloated expectations whUe at the same time allowing 
unemployment to rise. Instead, he preached the need for vague serial reform and 
communal responsibiUty which he admitted was an "impossible attainment"."* 
A year after Crean's 1974-75 "sodal progress" budget, the Whitlam government 
was reaping the harvest it had helped to sow; inflation of nearly 17 per cent and 
unemployment of 5 per cent. Sanity retumed with Hayden's 1975-76 budget which 
was dfrected towards consoUdation and restramt. Unfortunately for Labor, Hayden's 
budget was blocked by the hostUe Senate and the Whitlam government dismissed 
by Govemor-General Kerr. 
It has to be admitted that the poor economic performance of the Whitlam 
govemment was due to a combination of factors, many of which were outside 
Us control. It was unUkely that the dependent AustraUan economy could have 
been effectively shielded from the contagion of stagflation and recession that beset 
the leading intemational economies during the early 1970s and was conflagrated 
by the OPEC oU crisis in late 1973. Moreover, the government did make some 
significant improvements in sodal welfare and education, areas where AustraUa's 
pubUc expenditure stiU lags weU behind the levels of support in comparable 
countries. The record of the Fraser Liberal government after seven years in office 
was worse in certain areas with unemployment doubling to 10 per cent. 
Nevertheless the Whitlam govemment's record of economic management was poor. 
To excuse it as the fate of a reform govemment during recession is to faU to diagnose 
the fatal flaw in such a reform strategy. The problems of the Whitlam govemment 
went to the core of Labor's postwar version of democratic sodalism. They were 
rooted in the benign expectation that economic growth was inevitable and could 
be taken for granted, and that the fiinction of a democratic sodaUst govemment 
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was simply to syphon off for sodal welfare more of the surplus generated by setf-
sustaining economic growth. Spending the money without shouldering 
responsibiUty for generating the funds, either by cultivating the private sector 
more assiduously or by expanding productive enterprise in the public sector, was 
the Crosland-Whitlam redpe for reform. It is hardly surprising that with such 
a reform strategy Whitlam's government should suffer the fate that it did during 
a recession. 
Whitlam's "New Federalism" 
If Whitlam was a poor poUtical economist, he was a perceptive and articulate 
advocate of sodal reform. Trained as a lawyer and by disposition an orderly 
rationaUst, Whitlam had mvested a good deal of effort m rethinkmg Labor's strategy 
for working with the constitution. He was acutely consdous of the fact that a 
federal constitution that fragments power and administration and leaves the states 
with most of the responsibiUty for sodal welfare imposes a substantial barrier to 
centrally-imposed reform. Yet Whitlam remained "a committed centralist" who 
had wholeheartedly supported the Curtin govemment's sweeping powers 
referendum in 1944. He continued to beUeve "that the distribution of powers 
between the AustraUan govemment and the States under the Constitution, 
appropriate enough for a transitional government of a group of former coloiues, 
[was] whoUy inadequate to the needs of a modern federal state".'" Rather than 
aboUsh federalism which had previously been Labor's unreaUstic dream, and in 
addition to promoting constitutional changes by popular referenda, a largely firuitless 
practice routinely pursued by previous Labor administrations, Whitlam proposed 
a "new federaUsm" altemative. Whitlam thought that the Labor party could Uve 
with a federal system by carefiiUy exploiting existing powers, since the whole 
orientation of Labor's reform poUdes had changed. 
A major concern of Whitlam's was vdth quaUty of Ufe which, for most 
AustraUans, depended on the quality of pubUc services avaUable in the local areas 
in which they Uved, particularly the sprawling westem suburbs of Melbourne and 
Sydney. As Whitlam explained in a 1970 speech: 
In modem sodeties the role of local government is increasing. There are few aspects 
of our environment, our culture or our welfare which can be tackled adequately without 
involving local govemment. Ours wUl not be a modem sodety hor shaU we begin 
to solve our urban problems untU we permit local govemment to widen its role. 
InequaUty in Australia is more public than private. A family's standard of living is 
determined much more by where they live than by what they earn. The inequalities 
between regions are now far greater than any between States and indeed greater than 
they ever were between States. In developing regions the inequaUties and the burdens 
are growing. The areas with the greatest needs are predsely those with the least 
resources. 
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Consequently Whitlam proposed a "new federaUsm" that would "rest on a national 
framework for the estabUshment of investment priorities and a regional framework 
for partidpation in aU those areas which most directly determine the quaUty of 
our Uves" " ' The key was local govemment which was the legislative creature 
of jealous states, that starved it of fiinds. Whitlam's solution was quite simple: 
target abundant federal money to needy regions and worthy pubUc welfare 
programmes determined by federal commissions, and estabUsh local govemment 
as "a fiiU partner in the federal system".'^ 
The constitutional means for Whitlam's "new federaUsm" were largely at hand. 
The commonwealth govemment's monopoly over income taxation that had been 
estabUshed by the Curtin war administration and sanctioned by the Court in the 
Uniform Tax cases, had been consoUdated by successive federal Liberal govemments 
despite periodic opposition from state Liberal party branches.'^' The Second 
Uniform Tax case (1957)'^ had also reaffirmed the enormous potential scope of 
section 96, originaUy opened up by the 1926 Roads case,'" for aUowing the 
federal govemment to tie detaUed poUcy conditions to finandal grants to the states. 
The incremental creep of federal power under successive postwar federal Liberal 
administrations had extended the variety and extent of such tied grants. Tied grants 
under section 96 were therefore commonplace before the Whitlam govemment 
came to office, but as Whitlam himself pointed out: "What had never before 
been attempted was the use of those grants to achieve far-reaching reforms in 
education, mecUcal services, hospitals, sewage, transport and other urban and 
regional development programs."'^* The result during the Whitlam 
adnuiustration was a dramatic increase in spedfic purpose pa)mients to the states 
which quadrapled m the three years 1972-73 to 1975-76. By the end ofthe Whitlam 
period specific purpose grants accounted for fiiUy one-thfrd of the states' recurrent 
revenues, roughly equalling both general revenue grants and the states' own taxes 
which each made up the other two-thfrds.'" 
There were additional heads of commonwealth power avaUable to the Whitlam 
govemment that had not been previously or fiiUy exploited. The 1967 amendment 
striking out the exception of the Aboriginal race from section 51 (xxvi) of the 
constitution that aUows the commonwealth parUament to make "special laws" 
for "the people of any race" had effectively made that section into a power to 
make spedal laws for Aborigines. This power aUowed the Whitlam government 
to take over the adnunistration of Aboriginal affafrs and override some ofthe more 
obnoxious aspects of Queensland's legislation. In addition the court had restored 
a broad, although impredse, scope to the section 51 (xx) corporations power in 
the 1971 Concrete Pipes case.'^ That dedsion sanctioned the increasing use of the 
section by federal Liberal govemments to regulate restrictive trade practices, and 
aUowed the Whitlam govemment to bring in its tougher 1974 Trade Practices 
Act. As weU there was the potentiaUy enormous scope of the extemal affafrs power, 
section 51 (xxix), to support broad-ranging human rights legislation. To this end. 
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the Whitlam government made Australia a party to the United Nations 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Liberties immediately on taking office, 
but subsequently had to abandon a proposed Bill of Rights because of a storm 
of opposition. A much less ambitious but nevertheless significant piece of legislation 
that was passed under the constitutional head of external affairs was the 1975 
Racial Discrimination Act implementing a 1965 International Covenant against 
racial discrimination. This was to be challenged and upheld in the 1982 Koowarta 
PoUcy implementation, however, depends as much on the pohtics of federalism 
as on formal constitutional powers. If section 96 provided Labor's new constitutional 
charter for commonwealth action in social welfare areas, it could not guarantee 
co-operation from the states. Many saw Whitlam's "new federaUsm" as a thin 
disguise for Labor's traditional centralism. Russell Mathews has summed up the 
Whitlam period with its extensive use of specific purpose grants as the height 
of "coercive federalism" *^ Not surprisingly the Whitlam government's 
incursions into state poUcy domains using the section 96 power sparked opposition 
from non-Labor state governments. To bjrpass recalcitrant states that opposed the 
estabhshment of regional structures under the Australian Assistance Plan and 
provision of legal aid through the Australian Legal Aid Office, the Whitlam 
government reverted to the strategy of making direct grants of funds using the 
section 81 appropriation power. 
Victoria challenged this open-ended use of the appropriation power on the 
grounds that the commonwealth parliament could not validly appropriate money 
for purposes other than those that were specified in the constitution. That had 
been the finding of an earlier Court in the Second Pharmaceutical Benefits case against 
the Chifley government, as we have seen. In this instance, however, the Court 
spUt three-to-three on the substantive issue of the scope of section 81, wdth Stephen 
holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the challenge.'^' In this way 
the AustraUan assistance plan was upheld by the Court. Whitlam's subsequent 
claim that "the AAP case presents AustraUan governments wdth great oppor-
tunities to tackle national problems through the appropriations power"' is a 
dubious one, however, because there was no majority holding on the substantive 
issue of the scope of section 81. In any case the decision came down in 1975 when 
only preUminary amounts of money had been appropriated and Whitlam was soon 
to be deprived of office. 
A more secure expansion of commonwealth legislative power occurred in the 
Offshore case (1975) in which the Court upheld the constitutional vaUdity of 
commonwealth legislation that claimed jurisdiction over the entire offshore area. 
The case will be examined in some detail in the following section. It showed that 
there was some expansion of commonwealth powers during the Whitlam period 
even though the major constitutional means that the Whitlam government 
exploited—monopoly over income tax and section 96 tied grants—were ahready 
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in place. Since the Offshore case was decided on the eve of Whitlam's dismissal, 
there was no chance for his government to occupy the field by legislating to put 
in place a comprehensive commonwealth regime to regulate the offshore. Therefore 
on balance the main reformist initiatives of the Whitlam government were 
accommodated vdthin estabhshed constitutional structures. 
That is not to say that the Whitlam government was effective in implementing 
its policies. It was not. The Labor administration was too hurried and too harassed 
by the Senate and more entrenched state premiers. Even the Labor premier of 
South Australia, Don Dunstan, cridtized the Whitlam government's heavy-handed 
centraUsm at the state conference of the South AustraUan branch of the Labor 
party in 1974: "A centraUsation of decision-making in Canberra will not be an 
advance in democracy. There is no substitute for State organisations.""' As 
Michael Wood concludes, the Whitlam government's lasting achievements in this 
area were minimal: 
If Labor's attempt to force the establishment of regions in the State is seen as an exercise 
in administrative and political reform, then it failed. The policy failed because it involved 
too fundamental a reform and used too crude a method . . no permanent institutions 
were established outside Canberra so the national capital became the venue for the 
formation, execution, co-ordination and control of the policy. 
Whitlam's plan to make local government a full partner in the federal system 
through constitutional amendment was also unsuccessful. In fact all the referenda 
proposals on this and other matters put to the people in 1973 and 1974 were 
defeated. In 1973 separate proposals to give the AustraUan government control 
over prices and wages were defeated in all states. In May 1974, concurrent with 
the general election foUowing the double dissolution obtained by Whitlam to try 
to win control of the Senate, Labor's major electoral reform proposals, with those 
for enhancing the financial status of local government, were also defeated. There 
were three important electoral reform proposals: to synchronize Senate elections 
with those of the House of Representatives, to require substantial equaUty of 
electoral divisions for all AustraUan parliaments, and to require all state Houses 
of parUament to be elected directly by the people. There was a fiirther proposal 
to facilitate constitutional amendment by changing the requirements of section 
128 to require in addition to approval by an overall majority of voters, approval 
by majorities in not less than half (in other words three) rather than a majority 
(four) of the states. The local government proposals were to empower the AustraUan 
parliament to legislate for local government loan borrowings, and to bring local 
government bodies under section 96 so that they could become direct beneficiaries 
of federal grants. Since all these proposals were defeated,"' the Whitlam 
government was forced to work within the existing system, with the minimal 
success sketched above. 
The other major factor that has to be taken into account when evaluating both 
the performance of the Whitlam government and Whitlam's claim that "the major 
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obstacles against a program of reform are not constitutional but political" is the 
Senate which Labor never controlled. Not only was the Senate hostile to Labor's 
proposed legislation, it continually called in question the government's right to 
govern by threatening, and finally cutting off, supply. Some important legislation 
such as the Petroleum and Minerals Authority BiU, which was to be struck down 
by the High Court on technical grounds, was passed in the first ever joint sitting 
of parUament after the 1974 double dissolution and general election had left Labor 
again without control of the Senate. Other important legislation such as the 
proposed BiU of Rights was abandoned in the House. The Senate was manipulated 
in a partisan way by the opposition coalition to restrict, harass and finally bring 
down the Whitlam government writh Governor-General Kerr's assistance. Because 
it controUed only half the legislative machinery, the Whitlam government proposed 
and passed little controversial legislation. 
The Whitlam government has been aptly summed up by Geoffrey Sawer as 
a government of vague promise and "attractive largesse of vision", but its 
achievements were "certainly very small".'^ Despite reconciling itself with private 
enterprise and redirecting its reformist bent to social welfare programmes and to 
bolstering local and regional government. Labor under Whitlam achieved very 
Uttle. That was partly due to its own blundering haste and administrative 
inexperience, and partly due to the sheer bad luck of being in office when the 
international recession hit AustraUa in 1974. Nevertheless Whitlam's claim that 
the major obstacles to a reformist federal Labor government are now poUtical rather 
than constitutional is a superficial one. Underpinning the effective poUtical 
opposition that crippled the Whitlam Labor government were the federal 
constitutional structures of states, Senate and weighted amending formula. 
The democratic sociaUst who retains any real commitment to sociaUsm or even 
to the implementation of a nationaUy co-ordinated social welfare system can take 
small consolation from the Whitlam experience. Malcolm Fraser, who defeated 
Whitlam in the struggle for political power, had a shrewder appreciation of 
federalism. Just before ousting Whitlam's government he called on Australians 
to renew their commitment to federaUsm: "We must now re-inforce the division 
of power in AustraUa and return to a federal system of government." Fraser saw 
the fostering of vigorous capitaUsm and the strict limitation of central power as 
a pre-condition for the preservation of individual and corporate liberties. As he 
put it: "A federal system of government offers Liberals many protections against 
those elements of sociaUsm which Liberals abhor.""' The same point has been 
made by Geoffrey Sawer in reviewing the Whitlam government's experience, and 
at the same time reflecting on a lifetime spent in studying AustraUan constitutional 
politics. Sawer said: 
My inclination as a student of AustraUan social and poHtical history is to say that the 
A.L.P. would do weU to return to a frank unificationist platform. I doubt whether 
the detailed programme can be achieved on a basis of co-operative federalism, even if 
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the electoral basis of the States—not to mention the Commonwealth — is corrected to 
secure approximately one man one vote, and the upper Houses are abolished. I am quite 
certain that the sociaHsation programme could not be achieved or maintained in operation 
on such a basis. 
Since unification is totally unreaUstic, however, the Labor party remains caught 
in the old constitutional bind. To work the system effectively it needs to move 
further to the liberal centre. AU the indications of the Hawke government's 
orientation and poUcies suggest that the modem federal Labor party has done exactly 
that. 
Balanced review hy the Court 
Compared with the constitutional trauma of the Senate's blocking supply and the 
governor-general's dismissing the government, judicial review during the Whitlam 
period was relatively low key and routine. Moreover, compared with the great 
High Court battles and losses of the previous Chifley Labor government, chaUenges 
to the Whitlam government's legislation were less significant and usually 
unsuccessfiil. The reasons for this have been set out above. The Labor party had 
changed the direction of its social and economic poUcies and had become more 
sophisticated in working the constitution. As weU, successive postwar Liberal 
governments and Courts had carried forward the process of incremental centraUsm. 
And because it never controlled the Senate, the Whitlam government was severely 
restricted in its legislation. Hence as the second institution of review after a spoiling 
Senate controlled by a hostile opposition, the Court was significantly shielded 
from having to make hard decisions-. Finally, after the appointments of Jacobs 
and Murphy, there was a core of three Labor-appointed judges on the Court who 
consistently upheld the legislation of the Labor government that was chaUenged. 
For judicial review, therefore, the Whitlam period was not one of constitutional 
confrontation and chaUenge, but rather one in which there was a quickening of 
pace in established trends and some novel applications and extensions of existing 
powers. As Sawer has put it, even the adventurous legislation of the Whitlam 
period contained no "frontal assaults on accepted constitutional doctrine" " ' In 
their comprehensive review of the Whitlam government's "explorations and 
adventures with Commonwealth powers", Crommelin and Evans conclude that 
there was "Uttle evidence of any drastic re-shaping of the AustraUan federal system" 
Rather the achievement of the Whitlam government was in applying "already 
recognized powers to new fields of endeavour" " ' This conclusion was 
corroborated by a less sympathetic critic of the Whitlam government, Victorian 
solicitor-general Daryl Dawson, who said that "any real development of 
constitutional principles during Labor's period of office was limited", being 
"quantitative rather than quaUtative"."' 
Nevertheless there were significant instances of judicial review that legitimated 
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novel uses of constitutional powers, sanctioned further development of estabUshed 
doctrinal trends and clarified some key aspects of institutional structures. The 
Court's balanced and generally accommodating review is best illustrated by some 
of the leading cases for the period. These also indicate something of the Labor 
government's poUcy direction and its constitutional strategy under Whitlam's prime 
ministership. 
A good example of the Whitlam government's successfial use of existing powers 
to achieve novel ends was its environmental protection legislation that was upheld 
by a unanimous Court in the Murphyores case."^ The Environmental Protection 
(Impact of Proposals) Act 1974 was used by the Whitlam government to order 
an environmental impact inquiry into Murphyores' mining operations on Fraser 
Island in Queensland. Although Murphyores was an estabUshed producer of zircon 
and rutile concentrates, it had to obtain (under customs regulations) periodic 
permission for the export of its product overseas from the minister for minerals 
and energy. The company was strongly supported by the development-orientated 
National party government of Queensland led by Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen, 
but had come under increasing pressure from environmentaUsts for its mining 
of ecologically sensitive foreshore areas. Fearing, correctly as it turned out, that 
the environment impact inquiry would report unfavourably and therefore that 
the minister would not approve future exports, Murphyores challenged the 
constitutionality of the Environment Protection Act and sought an injunction to 
prevent the minister's taking account of environmental considerations in his decision 
on whether to grant an export permit. Before the Court, the plaintiff argued 
for a narrow interpretation of the section 51(i) trade and commerce power, and 
in particular that a law concerned vsrith protecting the environment was not a 
law vdth respect to trade. The Court, however, simply appUed weU-estabUshed 
precedents to uphold the law. The Court's decision was consistent wdth such earUer 
decisions as that prohibiting the import of airplanes into AustraUa by Ipec-Air 
to challenge the "two-airline" poUcy."* It fiilfiUed Justice FuUagar's 1954 
prediction that the commonwealth's power over exports could enter "the factory 
or the mine or the field" "^ 
UnUke in the Murphyores case, the Court was not usually unanimous in its 
decisions, nor did it always uphold the constitutionaUty of commonwealth 
legislation. The most important setback to the government, and particularly to 
its tough minister for minerals and energy R. F. X. Connor, came in the PMA 
case."' The Petroleum and Minerals Authority (PMA) was to be the 
government's vehicle for participating directly in the petroleum and minerals 
development boom, particularly in the promising offshore area over which it had 
declared commonwealth sovereignty. The legislation was championed by Connor 
who retained dogmatic views about, and an "old fashioned" commitment to, dkect 
government ownership and control in this lucrative growth area of the economy. 
Such an authority was anathema to the non-Labor state premiers and the federal 
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opposition who saw it as being "designed for nothing but naked sociaUsm","^ 
so the PMA legislation was never passed by the Senate. However it was included 
as one of the six bills Hsted in the governor-general's proclamation dissolving both 
Houses of parUament on 11 April 1974, and was subsequently passed at the joint 
sitting of parUament and signed into law. It was held unconstitutional by the 
Court on the grounds of having failed to satisfy the preconditions of section 57. 
Connor immediately announced that new legislation would be introduced, but 
Labor lacked the numbers in the Senate to have it passed. The case was significant 
as an interim setback to an important Labor inititative, but more so because it 
showed that the Court was prepared to review the internal workings of parUament. 
The constitutionaUty of the PMA Act first arose in an earlier case in which 
the Court hurriedly considered a challenge by opposition senators to the proposed 
joint sitting of parUament."' The Court dismissed the senators' challenge and 
ruled that the joint sitting could proceed, but took the opportunity to proclaim 
its authority to review the legaUty of vice-regal proclamations made under section 
57 and to determine whether legislation had "failed to pass" in the Senate in 
accordance with the requirements of section 57. A majority of judges had indicated 
that they would be prepared subsequently to examine the validity of legislation 
that might be passed at the joint sitting. Barwick even broadcast what his future 
decision on the PMA Act would be, remarking that he "would have Uttle difficulty 
in finding" that the PMA Act had not satisfied the requirements of section 57.''^ 
Only McTiernan held that section 57 matters were "intrinsically of concern to 
the Senate and the House of Representatives respectively" and were not suitable 
"for a trial in this Court" "^ 
In due course four non-Labor state governments mounted a challenge to the 
PMA Act and it was ruled unconstitutional by a majority of the Court. The grounds 
for the decision were that the Senate's decision to hold over consideration of the 
bill when it was first received in the Senate in December 1973 did not constitute 
"failure to pass" under section 57, and so the mandatory three-month interval 
required before the House of Representatives could pass the legislation a second 
time had not been satisfied. McTiernan stuck by his earlier dissent that these were 
"poUtical questions" for which courts were "not fit instruments of decision" "* 
Jacobs, also in dissent, suggested a technical way out; measuring the three-month 
interval firom the date when the House of Representatives first passed the legislation. 
While this reading of the section strained the obvious meaning of its language, 
it would have allowed the Court to avoid some "very considerable difficulties and 
uncertainties" such as determining the precise point at which the Senate actually 
failed to pass legislation. Jacobs's novel proposal precluded the further possibiUty, 
allowed by the majority view, of a double dissolution being invaUdly granted and 
a general election held before the Court could give its ruUng. The majority judges, 
however, were not deterred firom pronouncing on the working of parliament by 
such judicially intractable consequences. 
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The second chaUenge to controversial legislation passed at the 1974 joint sitting 
came in the Territory Senators case."' Although aspects of section 57 were again 
raised, the main issue was the apparent contradiction between section 122 of the 
constitution which aUows the government to provide for representation of the 
territories "in either House of the ParUament to the extent and on the terms which 
it thinks fit" and section 7 which requires that "the Senate shall be composed 
of Senators for each State" A narrow majority of McTiernan, Mason, Jacobs and 
Murphy upheld the government's legislation that made provision for two fiiU-
voting senators from each of the territories, the Northern Territory and the 
AustraUan Capital Territory. This majority held that section 7 appUed to the origmal 
Senate but that section 122 allowed for future representation of territories in the 
Senate. The minority led by Barwick argued that territorial representation in the 
Senate ^as a severe abrogation of federal principles and therefore section 122 had 
to be read subject to section 7. 
In the AAP case"" the same three Labor appointees, McTiernan, Jacobs and 
Murphy, upheld the constitutionaUty of appropriations for the AustraUan Assistance 
Plan. The AAP case was decided in favour of the government because Stephen 
ruled that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring such a challenge. The 
government had made direct appropriation of some $6 m for preUminary stages 
of the Australian Assistance Plan, which was to target federal money directly to 
regional government organizations v^dthin the states. At stake was the key issue 
of whether the federal government had power to spend money direct on its own 
programmes in the states in areas other than those for which it had specified 
constitutional powers. Ever since the Pharmaceutical Benefits case, such direct 
appropriations had been considered suspect. The issue was not satisfactorily resolved 
in this case because the court spUt three-three on the substantive issue, with Stephen 
giving victory to the government by ruUng that Victoria and the other states 
lacked standing to challenge the appropriation. 
The most important decision of the Whitlam years was the Oji/iore"' case 
which upheld the federal government's legislative assertion of sovereignty over 
the entire offshore area, including the sea, airspace, seabed and subsoil. The 
government's legislation, the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973, was declaratory 
in nature and had been modelled on the earlier draft legislation of the Gorton 
Liberal government. John Gorton, one of AustraUa's most nationaUstic and centraUst 
Liberal prime ministers, had been forced to abandon the legislation because of 
angry opposition from state premiers and a revolt writhin his own parUamentary 
Liberal party. When the Whitlam government revived the legislation and finally 
had it passed at the 1974 joint sitting, all the states chaUenged its constitutional 
vaUdity. The states preferred the previous arrangement under which the ultimate 
constitutional issue was left untested, while they enjoyed a partnership with the 
commonwealth in administering offshore petroleum and sharing in its royalties. 
The states laid strong claims to sovereignty over the three-mile territorial sea and 
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argued that the commonwealth had no constitutional power to support its sweepmg 
claims. 
In upholding the federal government's assertion of commonwealth sovereignty 
over the whole of the offshore area, the Court rejected the competing claim of 
the states that they ahready possessed jurisdiction over their adjacent territorial 
seas. The Court decided that the commonwealth could validly claim sovereignty 
over the offshore under its section 51(xxix) external affairs power. Although a 
milestone decision of enormous consequence, the Offshore case was decided by 
applying, and to some extent extending, estabUshed Unes of precedent. The external 
affairs power was given plenary scope and applied Uterally to the sea and seabed 
area external to AustraUa. Regarding the states' claim of proprietary rights to 
the territorial sea before federation, some judges denied such claims outright while 
others thought that even if such rights existed they had been transferred to the 
commonwealth at federation. Most also made the additional point that such a 
finding was consistent with the development of Australia's nationhood. As Barwick 
put it in one of his most lucid judgments: 
The resuk conforms to an essential feature of federation, namely, that it is the 
nation and not the integers of the federation which must have the power to protect 
and control as a national function the area of the marginal seas, the seabed and airspace 
and the continental shelf and incline."^ 
The High Court's decision was consistent vidth equivalent American and Canadian 
Supreme Court decisions."' 
Much of the poUtical heat was taken out of the Court's decision because it came 
down in December 1975 just after the new Fraser Liberal government had been 
sworn in. The Fraser government welcomed the decision as clearly estabUshing 
the offshore sovereignty of the commonwealth. The new minister for minerals 
and energy and deputy prime minister, Doug Anthony, described the outcome 
as "undoubtedly one of the most significant constitutional verdicts ever handed 
down by the Court". At the same time he reassured the states that existing royalty 
arrangements on offshore oil production would remain, and that "sensible 
arrangements" would be quickly settled with the States."" The Fraser 
government was keen to get the giant North-West Shelf natural gas project, over 
which the previous Labor minister Connor and premier Court had been continuaUy 
squabbling, off the ground. Moreover it needed to estabUsh its good faith with 
the states and to give some concrete substance to its "new federaUsm" rhetoric. 
For the Queensland National party government that had worked so hard and 
effectively to oust the federal Labor government, the decision was not unexpected 
but the consequences for the state were not calamitous because of the change of 
federal government. As one Queensland spokesman said: 
Fraser and Anthony made it in time. This decision would have given Whitlam carte 
blanche to cut our throats. Had Whitlam stiU been Prime Minister this would have 
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been a major defeat for the State. Now it is a whole new ball game and we can expect 
a co-operative approach with Fraser and Anthony."' 
The Fraser government's subsequent offshore constitutional settlement with the 
states was proclaimed as "a milestone in co-operative federalism" and "a unique 
achievement in the history of Commonwealth and State relations" "* This new 
agreement was certainly the most significant firuit of Eraser's new federaUsm. The 
federal government restored the states' right to control their traditional three-
mile territorial seas via the Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980. The system 
of a co-operative federal-state authority to control offshore petroleum with day 
to day administration vested in the states was retained. As well, the states were 
given control over local offshore fishing and coastal trading. In matters of 
international responsibility, however, the federal government reserved its right 
of control. 
This offshore settlement with the states which was put in place in early 1979 
undid part of the High Court's ruling. It was the result of several years of 
negotiation and was enacted in a novel way using section 51(xxxviii) for the first 
time. That curious section, which was probably included in the constitution to 
allow unforeseen matters to be dealt with in the early transition to federal 
nationhood, reads as follows: 
The exercise within the Commonwealth, at the request or with the concurrence of 
the Parliaments of all the States directly concerned, of any power which can at the 
establishment of this Constitution be exercised only by the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom or by the Federal Council of Australasia. 
It was picked up by the Fraser government and put forward as a possible way 
of binding future (Labor) governments on the grounds that what was done with 
unanimous state approval could only be undone by similar unanimous approval.'" 
AU the states, including New South Wales, South AustraUa and Tasmania that 
had Labor governments, passed legislation requesting the commonwealth to enact 
the Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act."' In so co-operating with the federal 
Liberals to recoup their traditional offshore positions, these state Labor governments 
were acting against Labor party poUcy. Federal Labor spokesmen bitterly criticized 
the joint legislative action and John Cain, the Victorian shadow attorney-general, 
denounced it as regressive for diminishing the "national stature of the country 
and benefiting only parochial state rights and the interests of large international 
companies". Frank Walker, the New South Wales Labor attorney-general, summed 
up the pragmatic attitude of the state Labor governments that endorsed the scheme 
when responding to criticisms that his explanation of the state legislation had 
been "fairly cursory"; he replied "the less said the better" " ' 
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Political convergence and judicial restraint 
After the defeat of the Whitlam Labor government, the tempo of constitutional 
review slackened. AustraUan federal poUtics once again reverted to the accustomed 
pattern of dominance by the Liberal coalition and acceptance of the constitutional 
status quo. The euphoria and optimism of the early Whitlam years was replaced 
by a mood of pessimism and public uncertainty that was reflected poUtically in 
the austere rhetoric and stern demeanour of Mr Fraser. In this domineering, 
humouriess poUtician and the estabUshed parties of government, the Liberal 
coaUtion, Australians clung to poUtical certainties in an economically uncertain 
world. The Fraser government was elected with comfortable majorities in three 
successive federal elections despite Uttle progress m managing a worsening economy. 
Meanwhile after a second devastating electoral defeat in 1977 Whitlam resigned 
from poUtics, leaving the Labor party to become more pragmatic and cautiously 
moderate in its poUcies. Labor's federal electoral victory under Hawke in 1983 
was a skilfiil exercise in public relations that offered new faces and a kinder, if 
largely vacuous, pubUc rhetoric of consensus and national reconciUation to an 
electorate that had become restless and dissatisfied with Eraser's style of government. 
Under Hawke's popuUst leadership and because of the dominance of the New 
South Wales right and of pragmatists within the Labor party, there has been a 
marked convergence in AustraUan poUtics. The Hawke government is orthodox 
and conservative in its economic policy, largely conventional and pro-American 
in foreign poUcy and moderate m constitutional matters. In short, it fits the standard 
mould of postwar Liberal coaUtion governments.''" 
Concurrently with the mcreasing convergence within AustraUan federal poUtics, 
judicial review by the High Court has become more accommodating of 
commonwealth initiatives. The High Court's dominant tendencies of restraint 
and incremental centraUsm have proceeded apace during the last decade. Just as 
it is highly unUkely that the modem Labor party would chaUenge the constitution 
as it did in the past, it seems equaUy unUkely that the High Court would interpret 
the constitution in the same negative way that it did in the 1940s. This section 
traces the themes of judicial restraint and incremental centralism, both old themes 
in AustraUan judicial poUtics firom as far back as the Engineers decision, through 
their development in some of the major recent cases. 
Judicial restraint 
Throughout most of its history the AustraUan High Court has been a conservative 
and restraining force on AustraUan poUtics through its exercise of judicial review. 
When most active and creative, as for example in interpreting section 92 against 
the Chifley Labor government in the 1940s, the Court has wielded its considerable 
power to protect estabUshed liberal values and private enterprise against reformist 
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and sociaUst challenges. Even when the Court abruptly changed direction in the 
Engineers case in 1920, it was to embrace a more traditional British approach to 
interpreting the constitution as a statute of the Westminster parliament in place 
of its earlier American-style balancing of federal and state powers. Eminent judges 
Uke Dixon and Barwick have been able to describe the Court's conservative approach 
as strict legaUsm. Barwick and others have contrasted this "legaUsm" of the 
AustraUan Court with the "poUtical" decision making of the American Supreme 
Court, accounting for the difference in terms of AustraUa's not having a 
constitutional biU of rights. 
The argument that has been put forward throughout this book is that the 
AustraUan Court is just as poUtical as its American counterpart, but that its poUtics 
are different. The difference, at least in the post-World War II period, has been 
between an openly freewheeling and reformist court and a conservative one that 
uses a more traditional legal method and rhetoric. Put another way, the difference 
is between an Earl Warren and an Owen Dixon: the one a populist poUtician 
who used the highest judicial office to impose his views of "what America stands 
for" and what appeared just and right upon recalcitrant federal and state 
legislatures;"' the other an austere rationaUst steeped in the traditions of 
nineteenth-century EngUsh law who sought always to draw his conclusions from 
legal technique and principle. 
In performing a highly poUtical and judgmental function, as when interpreting 
a constitution, it is not possible to be apoUtical and neutral. But it is possible 
to be "interpretive" rather than "non-interpretive": that is, to draw out principles 
and values from the constitution and apply them incrementally to cases as they 
arise, rather than to read one's own preferred principles and values back into the 
constitution using the opportunities provided by particular cases. While it is 
true that having a constitutional biU of rights provides far greater scope for the 
latter, the choice of method remains a basic value or policy choice for judges. 
The openly reformist approach to interpreting the American biU of rights that 
was pursued by the Warren Court is a relatively recent phenomenon for the United 
States Supreme Court. For most of its history the American Court has been a 
conservative, and at times a reactionary, force in American poUtics. Hence it is 
not having a biU of rights to interpret, but rather interpreting it in a "non-
interpretive" manner, that makes a court poUtical in the sense that the term is 
appUed to the Warren Court. 
In recent years the Australian Court has been given the chance on a couple 
of notable occasions to adopt the bold American non-interpretive approach. Some 
would see Justice Murphy asan advocate and practitioner of such a method. For 
the most part, however, the AustraUan judges have eschewed the American 
approach and in several instances decUned to foUow the American Supreme Court's 
reforming decisions. This was apparent in the McKinlay voting case in the mid-1970s 
and the DOGS case that concerned the estabUshment of religion in 1981, and 
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in a somewhat different way in recent trends in the interpretation of section 92. 
These wiU be examined in turn. 
It has become common in the United States for minority groups who cannot 
win redress for their grievances or get their way in the poUtical arena to go durectly 
to the Supreme Court. There, through judicial fiat, sweeping reforms in important 
poUtical and social matters such as correction of malapportionment in electoral 
districts, a woman's private right to an abortion and raciaUy desegregated schooUng 
were aU achieved. These reforms were not possible at the time in the more 
cumbersome process of democratic politics that has to build a majority coalition, 
surmounting mass inertia and entrenched pockets of elite resistance. Not only 
does such judiciaUy-imposed reform bypass elected governments, it also binds them 
by entrenching the reform in the constitution. The McKinlay voting case was the 
first attempt to replicate this process in AustraUa; the DOGS case on the 
estabUshment of reUgion was the second. Fortunately for the integrity of both 
the democratic process and judicial review in AustraUa both cases were unsuccessful. 
The McKialay case 
In the McKinlay case'" the Court was asked to rule in effect that the strict 
egaUtarian principle of "one person one vote" or equal sized electorates was required 
for electoral apportionment by section 24 of the AustraUan constitution which 
stipulates that "the House of Representatives shaU be composed of members directly 
chosen by the people of the Commonwealth, and the number of such members 
shaU be, as nearly as practicable, twice the number of the senators." The remainder 
of section 24 sets out the further requirement that the number of members from 
each state is to be in proportion to its population. The section also gives a method 
for calculating the number of members from each state. This is the quota method 
that works as follows: a quota is obtained by dividing the population "of the 
Commonwealth" by twice the number of senators; the number of members from 
each state is then obtained by dividing the state's population by the quota. If there 
is a remainder greater than one half, the state is entitled to an extra member. 
Finally there is a guarantee that each original state in the federation is entitled 
to five members regardless of the quota calculation. In summary, section 24 requires 
direct election of members of the House of Representatives; it limits the numbers 
of such members to as nearly as practicable twice the number of senators; and 
it gives a formula for distributing seats among the various states on a population 
basis. However section 24 says nothing about how electorates are to be apportioned 
within each state. 
McKinlay argued that the phrase "directly chosen by the people" meant equal 
representation so that electoral divisions must contain an equal number of people. 
Brian McKinlay was a Labor party activist from Victoria's largest electorate of 
Diamond Valley, a rapidly growing suburban electorate that at the time had 91,818 
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electors. This was nearly twice as large as Victoria's smaUest electorate, the country 
seat of Wunmera which had only 50,208 electors. There were similar discrepancies 
in sizes of electorates in the other states. In 1974 one ofthe Whitlam government's 
unsuccessful referenda proposals had sought to require substantial equality in aU 
electoral divisions in Australia. McKinlay was trying to win from the Court what 
the Whitlam government had failed to achieve from the people through 
constitutional amendment. He was supported by the Labor attorney-general in 
whose name the suit was formally brought; hence the anomalous formaUty of 
a challenge brought by the commonwealth attorney-general against the 
constitutional vaUdity of commonwealth legislation. 
Only Justice Murphy accepted the American Supreme Court's holding that 
"chosen by the people" (Article 1 of the US constitution) "contained a command 
of equal representation in the House of Representatives for equal numbers of 
people". Murphy argued that because the AustraUan constitution's equivalent phrase 
"directly chosen by the people" had been copied from the United States constitution 
it should be given the same meaning. He was led to this conclusion by such loose 
reasoning as "the democratic theme of equal sharing of poUtical power which 
pervades the Constitution" ' " AU the other judges interpreted the phrase 
"directly chosen by the people" narrowly, as requiring only direct, rather than 
indirect, elections. The caution and restraint typical of the majority were spelt 
out in the opinions of Gibbs and Stephen: 
we are not justified in importing new requirements into [section 24] simply because, 
as a matter of policy, they may seem to be desirable. Our duty is to declare the law 
as enacted in the Constitution and not to add to its provisions new doctrines which 
may happen to conform to our own prepossessions. 
Having entrusted to their elected legislatures rather than to this Court these wide 
powers of shaping as they see fit the details of this nation's electoral system it is not 
for this Court to intervene so long as what is enacted is consistent with the existence 
of representative democracy. ' " 
Some judges were prepared to admit that "gross discrepancies" in electoral size 
or the absence of some essential quaUty of representative democracy might vitiate 
the requurement of being "directly chosen by the people", but they did not consider 
that such an extreme situation was involved in this instance."' 
AU the judges, except Murphy, were happy to leave electoral apportionment 
within states to the processes set up by the legislature. However, the Court did 
require strict adherence to the constitution's requirements that numbers of seats 
be allocted to states on the basis of their proportionate populations, and that the 
size of the House be as nearly as practicable twice the size of the Senate. The 
Representation Act was found to be constitutionally deficient because it did not 
require regular calculations and, if necessary, redistributions of the proportionate 
number of seats for the various states. In the subsequent McKellar case'" the 
Court held invaUd sections of the Act that gave an additional seat to a state if 
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any remainder were left when the state's population was divided by the quota. 
The Court required that the remainder be greater than one half to ensure that 
the House remained as nearly as practicable only twice the size of the Senate. 
The Representation Act was changed accordingly by parUament."' 
The McKellar case challenged the method of calculating the number of members 
for each state after territorial senators had been introduced. The Act presupposed 
that for calculating the quota, section 24 could be read as foUows: that the "people 
of the commonwealth" meant the people of the states only, and that the "number 
of Senators" meant the number of senators from the states. In other words the 
people from the territories and territorial senators were both excluded from the 
calculation. This was upheld unanimously by the Court. Barwick, however, could 
not resist questioning the whole vaUdity of territorial representation in the Senate. 
He regretted that the propriety of the Court's favourable decision in the Territorial 
Senators case in which he had dissented was not re-argued, because he said it 
represented "a serious departure from the federal nature of the Constitution" that 
would otherwise become "entrenched in constitutional practice by the mere passage 
of time" " ' 
The DOGS case 
The DOGS case'™ was an AustraUan example of a phenomenon that has become 
commonplace in America; a special interest group that failed to get its way with 
the legiskture through the normal democratic means of electoral and pressure group 
poUtics sought to have its views imposed by means of a sweeping ruUng from 
the Court. State aid to independent schools, most of which are needy CathoUc 
schools, was brought in by the Menzies Liberal government in the mid-1960s 
despite some bitter sectarian opposition. It has since become a settled, albeit 
contentious, poUcy with strong bipartisan support. While church schools receive 
considerably less government funding per capita than state schools, the government 
subsidy has been steadily increasing and now amounts to hundreds of millions 
of doUars per annum.'" Most of this comes from the federal government via 
section 96 grants. DOGS (Defence of Government Schools) is a stridently secularist 
organization that has tried persistently to have state aid to religious schools cut 
off. First it ran candidates in elections and when that failed it tried to influence 
the major poUtical parties, particularly the Labor party. But since neither party 
could afford to aUenate the large CathoUc vote, the DOGS organization was left 
with the alternative of mounting a constitutional challenge. 
That was based on section 116 of the constitution that forbids the commonwealth 
to "make any law estabUshing any reUgion". Since most state aid to church schools 
came from the commonwealth, it could be stopped if it were shown to constitute 
estabUshing a reUgion within the meaning of section 116. To succeed in a 
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constitutional chaUenge, DOGS had to surmount two substantial obstacles: first, 
it was necessary to obtain standing to bring its case; and second, DOGS had to 
persuade the Court to adopt the radical distinction between church and state that 
the American Supreme Court has read into a comparable clause in the first 
amendment of the American constitution. DOGS succeeded on the first issue but 
not on the second. The group managed to win the agreement of the Victorian 
attorney-general at the time, Vemon Wilcox, for formally using his name to bring 
its case before the High Court. 
Again, as in the McKinlay voting case. Murphy was the sole judge to accept 
American constitutional doctrine. He was prepared to read "estabUshing any 
religion" very broadly to include "sponsorship or support (including financial 
support) of any reUgion" This interpretation was taken directly from American 
decisions that forbade state aid to church schools in the United States. Murphy 
claimed that the controversial American doctrine appUed to AustraUa because such 
an mterpretation of the estabUshment clause was "weU settled and accepted judicially 
in the United States prior to the framing of the AustraUan Constitution".'" 
Therefore, he concluded, a similar meaning must have been intended by those 
who wrote a variation of the American estabUshment clause into the AustraUan 
constitution. This is a controversial historical claim to say the least, and is more 
likely than not a spurious one. It is not clear just what the founders did intend 
in adopting Higgins's amendment, which was put forward to aUay the fears of 
Seventh Day Adventists who thought that it might be inferred from the recognition 
of Almighty God in the preamble that the commonwealth had power to legislate 
on religion. The fear was unfounded, and the amendment considered unnecessary 
by most delegates since the commonwealth was given no power over reUgion.'" 
The majority of judges were on surer ground in interpreting "estabUshing any 
religion" to mean constituting a particular religion or reUgious body such as a 
state reUgion or state church. As Gibbs correctly pointed out, it had not been 
decided by the American Supreme Court at the time of Australian federation that 
Congress was forbidden, by the estabUshment clause of the American constitution, 
to give financial aid to reUgious bodies. That decision was not made until 1947 
in Everson v. Board of Education }^^ Hence it could not be said that the AustraUan 
founders meant to prohibit state aid to church schools constitutionaUy. 
Perhaps it is not surprising that the traditionally more conservative AustraUan 
Court was reluctant to barge into such sensitive poUtical areas as voting 
apportionment and state aid to reUgious schools, and upset existing poUtical 
arrangements in favour of its preferred views on public poUcy, as the American 
Court has done. These were rather novel areas of adjudication and the American 
Court's mlings that were proffered as guidance represented the sort of broad-brush 
judicial poUcy making that the AustraUan Court has persistently eschewed. More 
surprising has been the Court's recent restraint in handUng section 92, which has 
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previously been the major area for judicial activism and non-interpretive review 
in AustraUa. 
Changing impressions of section 92 
The judicial unanimity on section 92 that Dixon had laboured for decades to 
estabUsh proved to be short-lived. That was hardly surprising because it was such 
a highly artificial view. As had happened periodicaUy in the past, a new generation 
of judges bringing their own personal views to the interpretation of section 92 
and applying old precedents to new cases produced yet another metamorphosis 
of meaning. In fact at present there is profound confijsion and a welter of conflicting 
interpretations. As a prominent lawyer, Ian Temby, recently complained, "in this 
labyrinth there is no golden thread": 
Rules have been laid down which aUow different answers to particular factual situations. 
Those rules have been changed with remarkable frequency. It is unusual to find a s. 
92 case without one or more dissenting judgments, and very frequently it will be found 
that High Court Justices have used different paths of reasoning to reach the same or 
similar conclusions. . Individual High Court Justices have obviously worked from 
impressions, no matter the extent to which their judgments are delivered in the language 
of logic."' 
The most notorious recent examples of unsatisfactory interpretation of the 
troublesome section arose in the hoary area of section 92 Utigation, compulsory 
agricultural marketing schemes, and in this instance involved challenges to the 
AustraUan Wheat Board. Since 1948, successive Wheat Industry StabiUzation Acts 
have given the Wheat Board an exclusive monopoly over the sale and distribution 
of wheat in AustraUa. Federal legislation is supplemented by "mirror" legislation 
in the states. This legislation requires all wheat that is not used by the grower 
on his own farm to be deUvered to the Wheat Board which controls every aspect 
of its sale, deUvery, movement and processing. There have been two recent attempts 
to break the Wheat Board's monopoly on section 92 grounds: the first by a 
Victorian flour and feed miUer, Clark King, who bought wheat direct from New 
South Wales growers, and the second by a large New South Wales grower, 
Uebergang, who sold wheat direct to Queensland miUers. 
In Clark King (1978)'^ * the Wheat Board's monopoly was narrowly upheld by 
Mason, Jacobs and Murphy, with Barwick and Stephen dissenting. Among the 
five judges who sat on the case, however, there were four quite different 
interpretations of section 92. At one extreme Barwick claimed that "it had been 
estabUshed that the freedom constitutionally guaranteed is the freedom of 
individuals" Certainly much of Barwick's professional career had been built on 
having that view adopted by an earUer Court, but now times and the personnel 
of the Court had changed. Nevertheless Barwick remained unrepentant in his 
doctrinaire isolation, freely admitting the consequences of his extreme view that 
section 92 created "a legislative gap": "the Constitution undoubtedly has created. 
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and if it matters has deliberately created, such a void".'" At the other extreme 
was Murphy who, in a one-page opinion, concluded that the legislation did not 
infringe section 92 because it did "not impose, directly or indirectly, any customs 
duty or simUar tax discriminating against trade or commerce among the 
States"."' A few years earlier Murphy had set out his contrary radical view that 
cast aside three-quarters of a century of turgid precedents by holding that section 
92 was directed solely against customs duties on interstate trade. 
The more mteresting opinions were those of the remaining judges who wrestled 
with the Privy Council's inscmtable dictum from the Bank Nationalization case that 
aUowed a government monopoly in special circumstances. In a concluding flourish 
that was at odds with the thrust of their substantive holding on section 92, their 
Lordships had said that they did 
not intend to lay it down that in no circumstances could the exclusion of competition 
so as to create a monopoly either in a State or Commonwealth agency or in some other 
body be justified. Every case must be judged on its own facts and in its own setting 
of time and circumstance, and it may be that in regard to some economic activities 
and at some stage of social development it might be maintained that prohibition with 
a view to State monopoly was the only practical and reasonable manner of regulation and 
that inter-State trade commerce and intercourse thus prohibited and thus monopolized 
remained absolutely free."" 
The question at issue therefore was whether the stabiUzation scheme that gave 
the Wheat Board a monopoly was "the only practical and reasonable manner of 
regulation" Stephen held that it was not. He cited in support a contemporary 
Industries Assistance Commission report that condemned the stabiUzation scheme 
as inefficient and ineffectual, and recommended its replacement by an alternative 
free market arrangement. Because of this report, Stephen was not convinced that 
the defendants had estabUshed that the state monopoly was justified as 'the only 
practical and reasonable manner of regulation" " ' 
Mason and Jacobs came to the opposite conclusion, that the wheat scheme was 
the only practical and reasonable manner of regulating the interstate wheat trade. 
They did not mention the unfavourable Industries Assistance Commission report 
that Stephen had reUed upon, but mstead gave a sympathetic outUne ofthe probable 
calamities of an unregulated market. The last paragraph of their joint opmion 
suggested that these two justices favoured watering down the strict "only practical 
and reasonable" test to one of "practicaUty and reasonableness" "^ 
The Clark King case did not resolve the substantive constitutional question of 
the meaning of section 92. As Barwick emphasized in his justification for the Court's 
reconsidering the matter in Uebergang soon afterwards, one of the majority. 
Murphy, "took a ground which has never been accepted by any justice of the 
court in any case" and which was "inconsistent with every decision of the Privy 
Council and of this court upon the meaning and operation of s. 92" ' " Moreover, 
two of the more conservative members of the court, Gibbs and Aickin, had not 
sat on the Clark King case. Hence only a couple of months after the Clark King 
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decision came down in favour of the Wheat Board a large wheat grower from 
Northem New South Wales, Colin Uebergang, challenged the constitutionality 
ofthe wheat monopoly scheme rather than deUver his grain to the Wheat Board. 
By the time the case was argued, Wilson had replaced Jacobs on the Court, so 
it seemed likely that Uebergang might win. 
The Uebergang case was to be only an exploratory foray into possible meanings 
of section 92, however, since the Court had set itself abstract questions about 
what evidence would be necessary to determine the vaUdity of the wheat 
StabiUzation scheme. Most of the judges decided that they needed more factual 
evidence to decide the case. Only the two extremists, Barwick and Murphy, held 
that the vaUdity of the Wheat Board could be determined a priori on doctrinal 
grounds in the opposing ways they had put forward in Clark King}^^ 
Gibbs and Wilson in a joint opinion adopted essentially the Stephen position 
from Clark King. They thought that section 92 protected the private rights of 
individuals and so prohibited a state monopoly unless there were compeUing reasons 
for such a monopoly. They proposed a stringent test that required exceptional 
circumstances and retained the ambivalence of the Privy Council formula: 
Therefore what must first be shown in order to establish validity is that a monopoly 
covering both intrastate and interstate trade is the only practical and reasonable course 
open in the circumstances. The test remains a most stringent one, not Ukely to be satisfied 
except in exceptional circumstances. If that test is satisfied, it is still necessary for the 
Court to consider whether the interstate trade, so regulated, is "absolutely free" within 
the meaning of s. 92.*'^  
On the strength of his Clark King dissent Stephen should have jomed this opinion, 
but did not. Apparently he had changed his mind, and now joined Mason in 
debunking the Privy Council test because of its ambiguities and "seeds of 
uncertainty" Stephen and Mason proposed instead a mild test of reasonableness: 
"whether or not the restrictions which the legislation imposes upon interstate 
trade are no greater than are reasonably necessary in aU the circumstances" In 
putting this another way, Mason and Stephen brought in the "public interest" 
consideration that Mason had been insisting for some time was the primary purpose 
of section 92. The criterion of "permissible regulation" of interstate trade was 
that the legislation be "no more restrictive than is reasonable m aU the circumstances, 
due regard being had to the pubUc interest" "* 
Since Aickin agreed substantiaUy with Banvick, it seemed that Uebergang could 
now chaUenge the Wheat Board before the High Court and win by four votes 
to three. But Colin Uebergang decided to quit. He and the independent 
Graingrowers' Association that represented feUow disgmntled farmers in northem 
New South Wales and southern Queensland had already been involved with the 
litigation for several years and spent an estimated $320,000. This, coming on top 
of several years of severe drought, had dampened their enthusiasm for a final legal 
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showdown with the Wheat Board.'" The upshot was that the Wheat Board 
survived and the meaning of section 92 remains uncertain. 
The Uebergang case showed that the Court was hopelessly fragmented over the 
meaning of section 92. With three new justices now on the Court its meaning 
is even more uncertain. There would seem to be two plausible ways out of this 
labyrinth which have emerged already. Murphy's method is radical and effective 
but is unUkely to be foUowed. The more likely course is for Mason's "public 
interest" view to gain increasing acceptance and for his and Stephen's 
"reasonableness" test to be used. Mason had earlier rejected the "private right" 
interpretation of section 92 in favour of his own view that it has a "predominant 
pubUc character"."' If this view is accepted by a majority and developed, it could 
lead finaUy to the Court's exercising judicial restraint in its interpretation of section 
92. Such a development would be in keeping wdth the attitude of judicial restraint 
that has been an important element in much of the Court's other work in recent 
years. It would also be in line with the sentiments of the present Court majority 
in aUowing extensive scope for commonwealth action by interpreting broadly grants 
of power such as the external affairs power. This current dominant tendency of 
the Court is considered in the final section. 
The Tasmanian Dam case: a watershed 
The Tasmanian Dam^^^ case is an appropriate historical point at which to end this 
study of the poUtics of judicial review because it is probably the most significant, 
and certainly the most dramatic, exercise of judicial review in recent decades. The 
dispute that the High Court resolved was a classic federal one between the Hawke 
Labor government and the Gray Tasmanian Liberal government over building 
a controversial hydro-electric dam on the Gordon river, below its junction with 
the Franklin river, in Tasmania's south-west wilderness. Both governments were 
locked into their opposing hard-line positions by firm commitments that had been 
endorsed by recent substantial electoral majorities. The two sides championed 
conflicting sets of values and interests; the federal government was intent on 
preserving a wild and beautiful river environment that was of national and 
international heritage significance, while the state government insisted on its 
traditional right to develop its own natural resources to provide interim employment 
in an economically depressed region and cheap hydro-electric power for further 
industriaUzation. 
Besides resolving this bitter controversy, the Court's decision was even more 
significant for its broader poUtical and constitutional impUcations. The Dam case 
was the first major constitutional decision for the newly constituted High Court 
at the very beginning of the term of office of the Hawke federal Labor government. 
Justices Deane and Dawson had been appointed by the previous Fraser Liberal 
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government only in July 1982, and therefore had not sat on the key Koowarta 
case"" that was decided earlier in May. In the Koowarta case, the Court had spUt 
four to three in narrowly upholding federal legislation that outlawed racial 
discrimination, in this instance in the state of Queensland, on the basis of a broad 
interpretation ofthe commonwealth's "external affairs" power, section 51(xxix). 
Stephen, Mason, Murphy and Brennan made up the majority while Gibbs, Aickin 
and Wilson dissented. After the Koowarta case, however, both sides lost a judge; 
Stephen was appointed governor-general and Aickin died. Since the Dam decision 
turned on the interpretation of the external affairs power, the votes of the two 
new judges were crucial. It turned out that Deane joined the Koowarta majority 
and Dawson the minority. As a result, the Court by a four to three majority 
gave a broad reading to the external affairs power, and also to the "corporations" 
power, section 51(xx), and the "Aboriginals" power, section 51(xxvi). The same 
majority of Mason, Murphy, Brennan and Deane consolidated its centraUst stand 
in the subsequent Pipeline Tax case when it ruled that the Victorian government's 
multi-miUion dollar tax on each of its three onshore oil and gas pipelines was 
an excise duty that only the commonwealth could levy.'" 
The High Court's adjudication of the Dam case in favour of the commonwealth 
is especiaUy significant in Ught of AustraUa's constitutional history. A major focus 
of this book has been the High Court's intermittent adjudication of the ongoing 
saga of "the Constitution versus Labor" whenever the Labor party has been in 
federal office. In the past, as Whitlam rightly claimed in 1957, the AustraUan 
Labor party had been "handicapped by a Constitution framed in such a way 
as to make it difficult to carry out Labor objectives and interpreted in such a way 
as to make it impossible to carry them out". But, as we have also seen in examining 
the Whitlam experience in government during the early 1970s, both the Labor 
party and the High Court had changed substantiaUy since the 1940s. The Tasmanian 
Dam decision showed that the constitution as currently interpreted by the High 
Court is unUkely to be an obstacle to the Hawke government or indeed to any 
future federal Labor governments. This section explains why this is so and examines 
other aspects ofthe Dam case that have important implications for judicial review 
of federaUsm in AustraUa. 
The Dam decision raised a number of questions about judicial review that are 
of primary significance for our study. Has the political character of judicial review 
finaUy been exposed by the conservative press and losing politicians as an 
undemocratic and improper way of amending the constitution? Or does it still 
remain a settled part of the federal political process? Did the Dam decision mark 
the end of federaUsm, or, if not, the destruction of the federal balance? Or was 
it just another incremental step in the process of centralization of formal power 
in the AustraUan constitution? 
It wiU be argued that the Dam case did not speU the end of federaUsm, but 
was another milestone in the process of incremental centraUsm of formal 
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constitutional powers that has been going on since the 1920 Engineers case. In 
a sense the Dam case was a rather straightforward appUcation oi Engineers principles 
of interpretation to a head of commonwealth power that is topical today. The 
Court's broad interpretation of the external affairs power in the Dam case was 
essentially the same as that advocated by Evatt and McTiernan in the earlier 1936 
Burgess case."^ Nevertheless the Dam decision marks a new stage in the Court's 
centraUzation of constitutional powers, and it has opened up a potentiaUy enormous 
area for expanding commonwealth powers at the expense of the states. What 
the Dam decision might well imply is not the end of federalism, but the beginning 
of the end of the judicial review of federaUsm by the High Court. In the future 
the political dynamics of intergovernmental relations and political conflict and 
compromise are likely to be more important, and judicial review less important, 
in determining the shape of the Australian federal system. 
Changing perceptions of judicial review 
The High Court's portrayal of itself and the way it is in tum perceived are important 
factors in explaining the Court's poUtical effectiveness in exercising judicial review. 
In this book it has been argued that the Court's pubUc rhetoric and legaUstic 
technique have disguised judicial power and helped legitimate the Court's 
controversial decisions. The Tasmanian Dam case provides a contemporary snapshot 
of current perceptions of the Court's role. It shows that although the judges 
continue to invoke traditional disclaimers of apolitical legaUsm, the more 
conservative and parochial newspapers and Liberal and National party state 
poUticians are now emphasizing the real poUtical character of judicial review and 
questioning its legitimacy. This significant development in the politics of judicial 
review in Australia warrants closer examination. 
The extent of the breach between the Court's own portrayal of its role and 
the perception of this newly aUenated right-wing constituency can be seen from 
comments by the two sides. Chief Justice Gibbs began his opinion in the Dam 
case with a disclaimer of policy making and an assertion of strict legaUsm: 
The wisdom and expediency of the two competing courses are matters of policy for 
the Governments to consider, and not for the Court. We are concerned with a strictly 
legal question 
Justice Wilson concluded his opinion with a similar refrain: 
It cannot be emphasised too strongly that, although the subject matter of the actions 
before the Court provides the occasion for much political controversy, the role of the 
Court is wholly divorced from that controversy. The questions which have been referred 
to it are strictly legal questions involving important issues of constitutional mterpretation. 
The Court is neither equipped, empowered, nor permitted to enter upon the merits 
of that controversy. 
Justice Deane, from the majority, also insisted on the same point, that the questions 
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before the Court were "questions of law" which were to be resolved' 'in accordance 
with legal method and legal principle" ' " 
Such claims were denied by influential AustraUan newspapers which lamented 
the decision and blasted the Court as a poUtical usurper. After pointing out the 
consistent reluctance ofthe people to change the constitution by referendum, the 
Hobart Mercury complained that: 
By the narrowest of margins, four judges from a Bench of seven have wrought the 
most fiindamental change to the AustraUan Constitution since Federation in 1901. It 
is a decision from which there is no appeal 
[N]ow, whether they Uke it or not, the AustraUan people have been presented with 
a rewritten Constitution-rewritten by judicial interpretation in a way which could 
never have been envisaged by the founding fathers of this nation."'' 
In its special front-page editorial, titled "The Constitution belongs to the People", 
the Australian argued that control over the basic principles of Australia's system 
of government had been "taken out of the hands of the people and deUvered to 
judges not answerable to any electorate". It pointed out that a group of unelected 
judges had brought about a massive change to the constitution "without the people 
as a whole being given any notice whatsoever" The consequences of such bold 
judicial poUtics were ominous, wamed the Australian: "It is inevitable that in future 
any federal govemment vsdll face an overpowering temptation to stack the Court 
with those who agree -with its poUtical objectives.""' 
Similarly, the Financial Review accused the Court of producing "a really new 
federaUsm" in which "the States must now be considered to have no certain, 
irremovable jurisdiction over anything at aU" It claimed that the High Court's 
Dam decision had produced the most important change to the balance of power 
within the AustraUan federation since the Uniform Tax case, and had "extended 
Commonwealth hegemony virtuaUy wdthout Umit" Despite the deep division 
on the Court over the meaning ofthe external affairs power, the Financial Review 
concluded: 
there is one issue upon which all members of the High Court Bench are agreed—that 
is, the enormous power of the High Court. Both the majority and the minority agree 
that the High Court can take it upon itself to interfere in the foreign policy of the 
Commonwealth Government.'" 
There is emotive exaggeration m aU these reactions, but there are also important 
elements of truth. Most of the concern was not because the dam had been 
stopped—both the Australian and the Financial Review professed opposition to its 
construction on financial and environmental grounds. Rather concern was dfrected 
at the deeper issue of non-elected judges making that decision and in so doing, 
changing the constitution and the federal balance of power. Naturally enough 
those who applauded the decision had fewer qualms about the democratic 
conundmm of judicial review. The Age, which had championed the anti-dam 
campaign and supports most progressive causes, praised the Court for being 
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"sensitive to contemporary poUtical circumstances" and "more adventurous than 
its predecessors" " ' It seems that the Age could accept the Court's action of 
making the decision because it agreed with the outcome. 
While the reaction of losing state politicians was somewhat more restrained 
than that of the conservative press, there were similar signs that the pubUc facade 
of legaUsm is also beginning to crumble in the poUtical arena. Premier Gray, the 
key figure in the dispute who had shrewdly built his poUtical career on promoting 
hydro-dams and states' rights, expressed "bitter disappointment" at the decision. 
While sticking to his earUer pledge to abide by the High Court's ruUng, Gray 
described the "decision itself as a blow to the federal system" Gray was critical 
of the fact that a court could make such a far-reaching constitutional and poUtical 
decision, and further that it could do so by such a slender majority: 
OveraU it's a very sad decision for Australia as a whole, a decision which will concern 
the majority of thinking AustraUans, not because of the environmental question, but 
because of the effect it is going to have on the role and responsibiUty of the States 
in future to determine their own direction. 
I hope there will be a recognition of the seriousness of the problem and that we will 
not move to a situation where the Constitution of this country is determined by High 
Court judges."' 
Queensland's Premier Bjelke-Petersen made essentially the same points. The 
decision, he said, marked a "black day for AustraUa that could herald the beginning 
of the end of Federation" Petersen pledged his state's support for "a campaign 
for a referendum to make it mandatory to have unanimous High Court decisions 
rather than majority decisions" ' " Sfr Charles Court, former premier of Western 
AustraUa and aggressive champion of states' rights, attracted national media coverage 
with his broadsides against the Court titled "Decision strikes at the heart of 
Australia" and "Australia's black day" Court claimed that the AustraUan 
constitution was being "rewritten by the High Court and not by the people" 
in a way that highUghted "the impossibiUty of these matters being considered 
as matters of pure law".^ 
How significant are such hostUe reactions by the media and leading state Liberal 
and National party poUticians for the continuation of judicial review by the High 
Court? To answer that question we need to know what sustains the Court in 
its adjudicative and constitutional role. In AustraUa, unUke America, we lack 
empirical studies of the way in which the Court is perceived by the pubUc. But 
if, as is Ukely, American findings are indicative of the AustraUan situation, it is 
not popular sentiment that sustains the Court's national policy-making role, as 
earUer romantic scholars speculated.^"' Rather American studies have found that 
the public is largely ignorant of the Supreme Court, while those who know 
something of its leading and more controversial decisions, such as the ones forcing 
school desegregation and allowing abortions, are often unfavourably disposed 
towards the Court.^^ If the Supreme Court is not supported by popular 
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sentiment, what does sustain its continued national poUcy-making role? A plausible 
answer has been given by Adamany and Grossman who argue that the Supreme 
Court's poUtical role is supported and protected by strategic eUtes who hold places 
in dommant national party coaUtions and key institutions of government.^"' If 
something similar appUes for Australia, the above responses of poUtical leaders 
and eUte opinion makers are highly significant, suggesting that in the Dam case 
the High Court aUenated powerful sections of its eUte constituency. It is fronical 
that the High Court retains its traditional legaUstic rhetoric while moving to the 
progressive Labor side of poUtics. 
Thi Dam decision 
Despite some of the wild accusations that were made by those who supported 
the losing side in the Tasmanian Dam case, the Court's decision did not mean 
the destruction of federaUsm. The majority judges themselves acknowledged that 
the basic federal stmcture of the constitution required the continued existence 
ofthe states and the maintenance of theur capacity to function. But the consequences 
that could be derived from such federal implications they saw as minimal. For 
example Mason claimed that aU that could be "distiUed from the federal nature 
of the Constitution", was 
that the Commonwealth cannot in the exercise of its legislative powers enact a law 
which discriminates against or "singles out" a State or imposes some special burden 
or disabiUty upon a State or inhibits or impairs the continued existence of a State or 
its capacity to ftmction. This implied prohibition—for it is in truth an impUed prohibition 
. . .—has been recognized and discussed in many cases . . . So much and no more can 
be distilled from the federal nature of the Constitution and ritual invocations of "the 
federal balance".^ 
The three dissenting judges strongly disagreed. Gibbs emphasized that 
The divbion of powers between the Commonwealth and the States which the 
Constitution effects could be rendered quite meaningless if the Federal Govemment 
could, by entering into treaties with foreign governments on matters of domestic concern, 
enlarge the l^slative powers ofthe ParUament so that they embraced Uterally all fields 
of activity. 
This was acknowledged quite freely by Mason who, after Usting numerous examples 
of international agreements covering a wide range of humanitarian, cultural and 
ideaUstic objectives, concluded: "Indeed, the lesson to be learned . . is that there 
are virtuaUy no Umits to the topics which may hereafter become the subject of 
international co-operation and international treaties or conventions."^ The Court 
was deeply spUt over the basic issue of what was entailed by, and precluded from, 
federaUsm. 
The majority mUng in effect aUowed any "internal" affair that was previously 
within the states'jurisdiction to become an "external" affair within commonwealth 
jurisdiction if it became the subject of a treaty. With the increased international-
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ization of affairs in recent decades and the greater propensity of national 
governments to enter into treaties and accords on a whole range of "internal" 
affairs, such an interpretation entails a major potential threat to virtually aU of 
the states' powers. In his opinion Brennan explained how the d)aiamic effect of 
the majority's holding eroded the position of the states under modern conditions: 
The complexity of modem commercial, economic, social and poUtical activities increases 
the connections between particular aspects of those activities and the heads of 
Commonwealth power and carries an expanding range of those activities into the sphere 
of Commonwealth legislative competence. This phenomenon is nowhere more manifest 
than in the field of external affairs. 
The inevitable consequence was, as Brennan put it quoting an earUer judgment 
of Windeyer in the Payroll Tax case, that "the position of the Commonwealth 
has waxed: and that of the States has waned" ^ ' Or as Premier Burke of 
Western Australia said in commenting on "FederaUsm after the Franklin", the 
significance of such a decision by the Court was to "provide the potential for 
a massive intrusion into the traditional responsibiUties of the states". Quite 
clearly the Dam decision changed the federal division of powers quite remarkably. 
The majority holding derives from a potent mix of two lines of decisions. The 
first is the weU-estabUshed Engineers stricture against relying on federal impUcations 
to limit the scope of the commonwealth's section 51 powers. The second is the 
much more controversial interpretation of section 51(xxix) that does not require 
that a subject matter have any international character or quality of international 
concern in order to quaUfy as an "external affair" Any matter can become an 
external affair by becoming the subject of a treaty. If the very substantial change 
to the federal division of powers that the Dam case produced and the potentiaUy 
enormous threat to the states that it sanctioned are to be reversed, one or the 
other of these Unes of decision would need to be reversed. Neither alternative, 
however, seems likely. 
The doctrine oi Engineers stiU dominates the Court as holy writ. If "constitutional 
lawyers play a role in AustraUan poUtics similar to that of theologians in the practice 
of reUgion" as Sir Paul Hasluck recently observed,^ High Court judges fimction 
as the infallible college of bishops who authoritatively sanction dogma. Engineers 
principles of interpretation were unanimously endorsed by aU judges in the Dam 
decision, while "reserved" state powers were said to be anathema. The language 
of theological discourse was even used by some of the judges in their opinions. 
For example. Mason summarily dismissed arguments from Tasmania that the federal 
corporation power should be read within the context of a federal constitution—a 
perfectly reasonable request except for Engineers dogma—for subscribing to "grave 
constitutional heresies, notably the doctrine of reserved powers, which have long 
since been denounced".^'" UnwilUng to recant on such estabUshed doctrine, the 
minority judges were unable to make coherent and persuasive arguments to Umit 
the scope of the external affairs power.^" 
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The second more controversial part of the Dam case was the majority's adoption 
of a wide view ofthe external affairs power. According to this wide view, treaty 
obUgation alone is sufficient to quaUfy a subject as an external affair. There is 
no further requirement that the subject have some pecuUarly international 
characteristic or be of international concern. This was a significant advance on 
the Koowarta case where only three judges. Mason, Murphy and Brennan, adopted 
such a view. Stephen, the fourth majority judge in Koowarta, thought that the 
treaty subject needed to be of some "international concern". Admittedly Stephen's 
was an "elusive concept" as Mason observed in the Dam case, but it at least 
suggested some plausible way of Umiting the scope of section 51(xxix). Without 
some such restriction to this section, the impUcations for federaUsm are profoundly 
disturbing, as Wilson pointed out: 
. . an expansive reading of S. 51(xxix) so as to bring the implementation of any treaty 
within Commonwealth legislative power poses a serious threat to the basic federal poUty 
of the Constitution. Such an interpretation, if adopted, would result in the 
Commonwealth ParUament acquiring power over practically the whole range of domestic 
concerns within Australia. ^ *^  
A major factor in the majority's position that has entirely escaped the attention 
ofthe angry conservative critics was the commendable commitment of these judges 
to judicial restramt. This was evident m their retention ofthe Engineers prohibition 
agamst reading m impUed restrictions to limit commonweahh powers, and in theur 
rejection of tests of sufficient international character or concern before treaty subjects 
could come within the external affairs power. The majority judges were concerned 
not to impose their views of what constituted an external affair over those of 
the national executive and legislature. Mason rejected Stephen's notion of 
"international concern" because it would involve the Court in devising judicial 
tests of what constituted the "elusive" concept of intemational concern. This would 
be "an invidious task" for the Court because such decisions would involve "nice 
questions of sensitive judgment which should be left to the Executive Government 
for determination". According to Mason: "The Court should accept and act upon 
the decision of the Executive Government and upon the expression of the will 
of ParUament in giving legislative ratification to the treaty or convention".^" In 
endorsing the "presumption of validity" for impugned laws. Murphy pointed out 
that the fact that the Court had ignored it in the past "may help to explain the 
considerable number of laws, extraordinary by the standards of other national 
courts, which have been held by this Court to be beyond the powers of the 
ParUament" Likewise in explaining how the internationalization of affairs has 
caused the federal government's position to wax and that of the states to wane, 
Brennan said "it is not the function of this Court to strike some balance between 
the Commonwealth and the States" Deane also affirmed that in characterizing 
a law with respect to external affairs, "what is the appropriate method of achieving 
a desired result is a matter for the Parliament and not for the Court" 
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Such judicial restraint on the part ofthe majority judges, if it continues, wiU 
mean a less active role for the Court in adjudicating jurisdictional disputes between 
governments. By interpreting the commonwealth heads of power so broadly, the 
Court has left the commonwealth with enormous potential power. That is the 
consequence of the Court's broad reading of specific heads of power combined 
with the basic structural design of the Australian constitution in which only 
commonwealth powers are specifically entrenched. Hence, as commonwealth 
powers wax, the states' residue of powers must wane. The Court's commitment 
to judicial restraint, its firm commitment to Engineers methods for interpreting 
heads of power, and the structural way in which the constitution divides powers 
have ensured that judicial review of federaUsm in AustraUa has produced an 
increasingly centralized constitutional system. The formal distribution of 
constitutional powers, however, does not determine the actual distribution of 
political power; it is only one of the ingredients. Nevertheless there is now the 
potential for enormous centraUzation of power and corresponding erosion of the 
states' position. Whether that occurs wdU depend on the interplay of poUtical forces 
and on the outcomes of conflicts and compromises between federal and state 
governments which, to a large extent, has always been the case. 
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Conclusion: The High Court's Political 
Achievement and the Legitimacy of 
Judicial Review 
The High Court is the authoritative interpreter of the constitution, which in very 
general language sets up the various branches of government and specifies the 
division of powers between federal and state levels of government. It performs 
a crucial poUtical function that is both adjudicative and constitutional since it settles 
key disputes involving governments and branches of government and in so doing 
also interprets the constitution to give it new meanings at different historical points 
of time. As interpreter of the basic instrument of government, the Court is in 
a certain sense superior to the other parts of the system of government and above 
poUtics. At the same time the Court is an integral part of the machinery of federal 
government and carries out its functions within a dynamic poUtical environment. 
Since the Court has to contend v«th the actions and reactions of eUtes in the 
other branches and levels of govemment, its abiUty to exercise judicial review 
depends on the complex mix of poUtical factors that have been discussed throughout 
this book. For example, the Court's work has been greatly fadUtated by AustraUa's 
poUtical culture that favours moderation and the mle of law, and by the primacy 
in federal poUtics of the Liberal coaUtion parties that have supported the 
constitutional status quo. Hence the Court's own considerable poUtical skiUs only 
partly explain its success in exercising judicial review. The Court's real power, 
as distinct from its formal power, can only be determined by carefiiUy examining 
its actual performance within the field of poUtics in which it operates. 
The Court's achievement 
This study has shown that the AustraUan High Court has been highly successful 
in its overaU exercise of judicial review. The Court was weU designed by the 
founders of the constitution and its primary function of judicial review was 
thoroughly discussed by them in convention. Its initial success was assured by 
the successive appointments to the early Court of five of the leading founders 
and senior statesmen of federation. After initiaUy balancing federal and state powers 
as befitted a nation of states, the Court subsequently adopted the Engineers method 
of interpreting commonwealth legislative powers in a plenary sense, irrespective 
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of their impact on the states. This produced a persistent, if irregular, incremental 
centraUzation of constitutional power that roughly paralleled AustraUa's growth 
to nationhood. The Court's interpretive method modified the constitutional system 
to keep pace with AustraUa's national development and integration. By so doing 
the Court preserved both the constitution and its own institutional position as 
guardian and interpreter of the constitution. Geoffrey Sawer's persistent claim that 
AustraUa is constitutionally speaking a frozen continent' is not supported by a 
historical study of the effects of judicial review. 
At a less general level of analysis the Court's interpretation of the constitution 
has not always been consistent with the structural dynamics of the nation, nor 
particularly with the poUtical demands of federal Labor governments that have 
at times pursued centraUst, reformist and sociaUst poUcies. There are several reasons 
for this. The first is a consequence ofthe tenure of High Court justices who often 
outlast the governments that appoint them. Consequently the Court often acts 
as a conservative drag on progressive developments and novel policy initiatives. 
The Fisher-Hughes Labor govemment (1910-13) and the Chifley Labor govemment 
(1945-49) examined in chapters 3 and 4 are prime examples of the Court at work 
in this role. But if the political mood of the nation swings back to become more 
conservative, as during the era of the Bruce-Page govemment in the 1920s, the 
Court and its judicial doctrine can be left out of kilter with the requirements of 
ruling national coaUtions. 
There are at least some indications that the current High Court's extremely 
centraUst interpretation ofthe extemal affaurs power has shifted formal constitutional 
powers more to the centre than the actual balance of political forces between state 
and federal governments favours. Such a decision as the Tasmanian Dam case 
undoubtedly has a centralizing impact, but its real effect is far less than the formal 
possibilities it allows. The real politics of federal-state relations rather than the 
formal prognostications of the Court are just as important in determining the 
shape of the political system. Judicial decisions have an impact, but the extent 
of that impact on the actual pattern of political events can only be determined 
by taking account of the larger poUtical environment in which the Court operates 
and in which it has a dialectical relationship with other political actors and 
institutions. 
A second important reason why the Court may not be in step with the structural 
dynamics of the nation or its partisan poUtics at a particular point of time has 
to do with the semi-autonomous position of the Court and the d)mamics of 
constitutional law. The Court and the law have an institutional Ufe and an internal 
logic of their own. While cases come to the Court through the poUtical process, 
the Court decides them according to its own legal method in the Ught of precedents 
and rules that usuaUy lack expUcit concern for the state of the nation or its poUtics. 
In fact such considerations are normaUy eschewed by judges. But if strict and 
complete legaUsm were an adequate description of the Court's method, there would 
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be nothing except chance to keep constitutional decisions compatible with national 
requirements. We have seen throughout this study that the Court's professed 
method of legalism is more a public rhetoric than a description of its real decision 
making. The "hidden" poUtical premises of judges are usuaUy not too weU hidden, 
as for instance with the Latham-Dixon Court's interpretation of section 92 to 
protect private enterprise. It would be naive to accept legaUsm at face value and 
assume that judges do not, at least covertly, assess the Ukely impact of their 
constitutional decisions upon national politics. 
There is a final reason why the Court might seem out of step with the nation's 
requirements or its partisan poUtics at a particular time. What are the nation's 
requirements and what constitute appropriate poUcies are fiindamental poUtical 
questions to which there are usually a multiplicity of competing answers and no 
obvious solutions. Each govemment wiU have partisan answers and poUcies which 
may or may not be the right ones. The judges of the Court might simply eschew 
poUcy considerations, or be overtly or covertly opposed to those being pursued 
by the govemment. That was the case in the late 1940s when a conservative Court 
blocked Labor's radical nationaUzation poUcies and some of its more moderate 
welfare legislation. The shape of the nation is as much the product of the interaction 
and clash of competing ideas and institutions as it is of any intentional order or 
national consensus. That is particularly and deUberately so for a federal system 
of govemment that breaks up national majorities and sets govemment institutions 
against one other. Moreover the Court is a particularly inappropriate instrument 
for disceming national requirements, which is probably why it formally denies 
that such policy issues are any part of its concern. The Court does have the 
constitutional document to guide it, but in having to interpret and apply that 
document in controversial cases the Court often relies on extra-constitutional 
criteria. Discerning and evaluating such extra-constitutional considerations is one 
of the chaUenges for the student of judicial review. 
A major focus of this study has been the High Court's adjudication of "Labor 
versus the Constitution". As a popuUst, reformist and mildly sociaUst party formaUy 
pledged to the abolition of federalism and the reform of capitalism, the Labor 
party in the past provided the major challenge to Australia's constitutional system 
and its predominantly Uberal capitaUst economic order. While Labor's challenge 
has been relatively modest because of the ameUorating historical and poUtical reasons 
discussed in previous chapters, it has nevertheless produced periodic landmark cases 
as during the 1940s postwar period. Perhaps more importantly Labor govemments 
have occasionally threatened to restmcture the Court. The most significant High 
Court "reconstruction" plan was that of Calwell and Ward that narrowly failed 
in the mid-1940s. But because Labor has been infrequently in federal office and 
as often as not has been rather moderate and conventional in its appointments, 
the Court has enjoyed renewed vigour, rather than being significantly changed 
by Labor's more daring appointments. 
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The Court's poUtical skills were best demonstrated in its adjudication of federal 
Labor government initiatives in the 1940s. During wartime the Court sanctioned 
an enormous expansion of central power, but in the postwar period it overruled 
Labor's centralist, sociaUst and at times even mildly reformist social welfare 
legislation. Yet its authority was not seriously chaUenged by the Labor govemment; 
Labor rather than the Court was forced to moderate its poUcies and effectively 
modify its objective. The Court upheld AustraUa's liberal constitutional order 
against Labor's more extreme chaUenges, but did sanction a more moderate 
expansion of commonwealth powers to support the postwar Keynesian welfare 
state. The bulk of Labor's poUcies as constitutionaUy sanctioned or modified by 
the Court's decisions—centraUzed uniform taxation; extensive social welfare with 
continuing strong professional practice; central, but not nationaUzed, banking; 
and direct government participation in, but not monopoly control of, banking 
and airlines—were aU continued by subsequent federal Liberal govemments and 
became more or less settled parts of national poUcy. After being raled 
unconstitutional by the Court, Labor's nationaUzation poUcy was soon dropped 
from its platform because it was considered obsolete, and replaced by technocratic 
manageriaUsm and quaUty of Ufe concerns. 
The Court has been highly successfiil as a poUtical institution, carrying out 
its difficult role with relative ease. But that is not to say that all its decisions 
have been \nse, prudent and poUticaUy astute, or even logicaUy coherent and 
intemaUy consistent. In fact the detailed analysis of this book has shown that the 
Court can often be faulted on poUtical and technical criteria. For example, the 
decision of the Court to strike down the Chifley government's pharmaceutical 
benefits scheme for the second time, after the government had been re-elected 
and carried an enabling constitutional referendum, was objectionable. Similarly 
its "private enterprise" interpretation of section 92 during the 1940s and 1950s 
was a notorious example of non-interpretive review. Yet, despite such decisions, 
the Court was not chaUenged nor its legitimacy questioned. 
From legaUsm to realism 
It has been argued that the High Court's professed method of "strict and complete 
legaUsm" has played a major part in faciUtating its poUtical work. Shielded by 
its cloak of legaUsm, the Court has been able to perform a high profile but deUcate 
poUtical function without becoming embroUed in poUtical controversy. LegaUsm 
has enhanced the Court's poUtical effectiveness and helped to legitimate its decisions. 
Consequently doubts about the legitimacy of judicial review that have plagued 
the American Court in recent decades have not been such an issue m AustraUa. 
That may soon change, however, as pubUc opinion becomes more informed and 
critical ofthe Court's tme function. For a couple of decades some academic lawyers 
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have been criticizing legaUsm and advocating a more reaUstic account of judging. 
That view is beginning to permeate sections of the judiciary. Justice Michael Kirby, 
whose articulate views are a barometer of progressive legal opinion in AustraUa, 
ridiculed the estabUshed ethos of "strict and complete legaUsm" in his recent pubUc 
lectures on The Judges. Kirby said: 
The belief that the law is a certain, definite and discoverable rule, which brooks no 
personal or idios)mcratic interpretation by the Judge, is one that dies hard. It is 
undoubtedly the view of the law held in the general community Uncomfortably 
for AustraUan Judges, increasingly left as a kind of Antipodean backwater in the approach 
to this question, a number of developments have occurred to produce the necessary 
reaUsation that Judges have, and ought to have, a function in developing the law and 
determining policy.^  
Kirby went on to expose the "official gospel" of adherence to the high techniques 
of legal argument that stiU dominates legal discourse in AustraUa. He honestly 
admitted there was "no inevitable and objectively right decision" in much of the 
judicial work of higher courts. Consequently he recommended that judges should 
expose to pubUc scrutiny the pubUc policy factors which are an integral part of 
their decision making. As weU they should delve into their subconscious minds 
and reveal for critical pubUc inspection personal factors that may have determined 
their approach. Given that judges are poUcy makers, Kirby recommended that 
"Brandeis briefs", cost-benefit analysis and multidisciplinary information on 
sociology, psychology and economics be used to assist them in making poUcy 
choices.' 
Already Justice Murphy has openly espoused such views, while other judges 
Uke Justice Mason have adopted a "pubUc interest" interpretation of section 92. 
In fact by an expansive interpretation of the extemal affairs power in the Dam 
case and a restrictive interpretation of section 92 in the Uebergang case, a majority 
of the High Court justices now seem to be concerned with broad pubUc poUcy 
and poUtical issues. The "Antipodean backwater" ofthe AustraUan judiciary that 
Justice Kirby identifies is changing markedly. 
LegaUsm is increasingly being restricted to ritual invocations that judges make 
at the beginning or end of controversial opinions. Whether it is "undoubtedly 
the view of law held in the general community", as Kirby claims, is uncertain 
because we lack empirical data. Even if that were so, it must be changing as the 
broadcast views of Kirby and other reaUst critics permeate public opinion. The 
opinions of eUte opinion makers like Kirby have probably always been more 
consequential than those of the general community for determining how the Court 
is viewed. The Dam decision jolted many ofthe Court's traditional eUte supporters 
out of uncritical acceptance of legaUsm. Leading state Liberal and National party 
poUticians and editors of some of the more conservative major newspapers, when 
confronted with a decision they thought objectionable, recognized the true character 
of judicial review and questioned its legitimacy. 
The reaUst view of judges and judicial decision making is becoming more 
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common among legislators, as evidenced by the recent endorsement of a purposive 
approach for interpreting legislation. In 1981 the Liberal attorney-general Senator 
Durack had the Acts Interpretation Act amended to require courts to interpret 
legislation iri a manner that would "promote the purpose or object underlying 
the Act (whether that purpose or object is expressed in the Act or not)" ^ This 
attempt by government to direct the judiciary to adopt a more purposive approach 
to statutory interpretation was part of the troubled Liberal government's package 
to salvage some credibility in stamping out tax avoidance and evasion that was 
rampant at the time. This was partly as a consequence of the Barwrick Court's 
highly UteraUst interpretation of income tax legislation that frequently led to 
judgments contravening its spirit and parliament's objective.^ Durack advocated 
a greater law-making role forjudges: "ParUament should stop churning out detailed 
legislation and leave more of the job of law-making to judges." Durack's 
recommendation was that parliament's laws be simpler and that judges use 
accompanying explanatory memoranda and have a greater latitude in filUng in 
the details.' At a seminar held to discuss "Extrinsic Aids to Statutory 
Interpretation" in February 1982, one judge argued that parliament should do 
nothing at aU because the matter was well in hand. Judges were no longer overly 
Uteral in their interpretation.' 
Should AustraUa adopt a biU of rights, as advocated by the governing Labor 
party's platform, there will be further pressure to erode traditional legaUsm in 
favour of a more overtly creative legislative and social poUcy-making role for the 
judiciary. The immediate response of Labor's dynamic attorney-general, Senator 
Gareth Evans, to the favourable Dam decision was to announce that the Labor 
govemment would bring in a biU of rights later in the year (1983) based on 
AustraUa's "clear-cut obUgations" under the Intemational Covenant on Civil and 
PoUtical Rights which AustraUa has ratified.' Senator Evans promised a bill of 
rights "designed to act as an inspirational and educative charter providing general 
guarantees to basic rights and freedoms" and to be accompanied "by provisions 
for administrative and limited judicial enforcement".' Such a biU was designed 
to be a transitional stage towards a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights. A 
biU was drafted and circulated in 1984, but because of Ukely opposition it was 
held over until after the 1984 election. The Hawke government's commitment 
to a biU of rights appeared to waver when Lionel Bowen replaced Gareth Evans 
as attomey-general in the ministerial reshuffle after the election. But more recently 
a statutory biU of rights that vwU bind only the commonwealth has been put back 
on the Labor govemment's probable legislative agenda. Under an independent 
reference the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affaurs is 
investigating "A Bill of Rights for Australia?" 
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The legitimacy of judicial review 
The eminent American constitutionaUst Alexander Bickle described judicial review 
as "a present instrument of government": "It represents a choice that men have 
made, and ultimately we must justify it as a choice in our own time."'" As 
legaUsm is eroded and judicial review in AustraUa becomes more vwdely recognized 
as "a present instrument of govemment", sustaining its legitimacy wiU become 
an important pubUc issue. 
Legitimacy is a vital consideration for poUtics, particularly liberal democratic 
poUtics, because poUtics is not simply concerned with power and the way it is 
organized and exercised in society. It is also concerned with legitimacy without 
which the exercise of power is but coercion based on force or trickery. The 
requirement of legitunacy is buih into the very definition of Uberal and democractie 
poUtics. Locke, the founder of modern liberaUsm, began his famous definition 
of poUtical power with the notion of legitimacy: political power is "a Right of 
making Laws ." " Likewise Rousseau, the champion of democracy, taught 
"that force does not create right, and that we are obUged to obey only legitimate 
powers" ' A recent poUtical science text maintams this tradition in claiming that 
"maintenance of legitimacy is the supreme task of poUtics" " 
Within a liberal democratic poUty, legitimacy is as important a consideration 
for a particular institution as for the poUtical system as a whole. Unless it is 
legitimate, either in its own right or as an integral part of the overaU system that 
is accepted, an institution wiU lack authority and as a consequence become either 
aboUshed, modified or simply bypassed and ignored. The Canadian Senate is a 
typical example. Despite being entrenched in the constitution with substantial 
legislative powers, the Canadian Senate has become completely ineffectual because 
it has an appointed rather than an elected base and hence lacks legitimacy." 
Legitimacy is an important consideration for our study because judicial review 
entails a court staffed by appointed and tenured judges who are neither 
representatives of, nor responsible to, the people overmling acts of the legislative 
or executive branches of government that are formaUy representative and 
accountable. In fact Philip Bobbitt has recently claimed that in America: "The 
central issue in the constitutional debate of the past twenty-five years has been 
the legitimacy of judicial review of constitutional questions by the United States 
Supreme Court." As reaUst accounts of judging replace legaUsm, the legitimacy 
of judicial review is Ukely to become the central issue for constitutional debate 
in AustraUa as weU. 
There would seem to be an obvious legitimacy problem with judicial review 
since, as we saw in chapter 2, it lacks any expUcit constitutional basis. Nor can 
it be justified by the classic Marbury v. Madison argument of MarshaU that AustraUan 
judges have sometimes invoked because that argument is circular and fallacious, 
as was shown. It is ironic that a legaUst or UteraUst who looks only at the 
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constitutional text cannot provide a justification for judicial review. Once it is 
accepted that legaUsm and UteraUsm are not adequate accounts of judging or 
appropriate methods for interpreting the constitution, however, the lack of an 
explicit textual authorisation for judicial review becomes less of a problem. There 
is ample evidence that the founders intended judicial review as the High Court's 
main function and designed the federal constitution accordingly. Moreover judicial 
review has been accepted as an integral part of the constitutional system ever since 
by generations of judges, politicians and the public. 
In not having an expUcit textual basis in the constitution, judicial review is 
no different from responsible government which is an even more important part 
ofthe constitution. The offices of prime minister and cabinet are not mentioned 
in the constitutional text, nor are their rules of operation or tenure spelt out. 
That does not mean that they were not clearly understood by those who drafted 
the constitution and by AustraUans since, at least until the 1975 crisis. And then 
it was the legaUsts and UteraUsts who gave primacy to the text and came up with 
a novel version of responsible govemment. There is a problem with judicial review, 
as writh responsible govemment, if one takes a too narrow view ofthe constitution 
that looks solely or primarily to the written text. In that instance judicial review 
like responsible government will have only conventional status or implied legal 
status in the text." However if a broad view is taken that includes as integral 
parts of the constitution both the written text and those practices, institutions 
and rules that formed part of the founders' constitutional design and have been 
accepted by Australians ever since, judicial review can be accepted as an integral 
working part of the Australian constitutional system. 
Two important consequences follow from this broad view of the constitution. 
The first is that to properly understand our constitution we need a thorough 
understanding of the founders' views as expressed in the federation debates." The 
words of the constitutional text do not necessarily make complete sense by 
themselves, and in any case important parts ofthe constitution like judicial review 
and reponsible government are not included in the text. 
The second consequence is that constitutional law, at least in the traditional 
sense, does not give a complete account ofthe constitution, nor is the Court that 
interprets the constitutional text the sole interpreter of the constitution. That 
is because the constitution includes, as well as the legal text, those practices, 
institutions and rules that formed part of the founders' design and have been 
accepted as estabUshed parts of the constitution ever since. Those who persist with 
a narrow UteraUst view of the constitution solely as the written text have an 
insuperable problem in estabUshing a legitimate basis for judicial review. 
But there is more to estabUshing the legitimacy of judicial review than 
demonstrating its constitutional basis. While a constitutional grounding is 
necessary, it is considered by many not to be sufficient on democratic grounds. 
Judges are not accountable for their decisions, and in exercising judicial review 
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they formally determine the shape of key parts of the system of government, 
including the scope of their own powers. The legitimacy issue is heightened because 
these two factors are interrelated; unaccountable judges are constitutional law 
makers. Are they not then t3nrants with unUmited power? If that appears so in 
some highly abstract sense, it is less so if the range of constraints upon judges 
and the Court are taken into account. 
In the first place the Court's scope for decision making is limited since it can 
decide only the cases that come to it. Important jurisdictional issues can be kept 
out ofthe court as the federal-state dispute over offshore ownership was by mutual 
agreement beween federal and state governments for a decade before 1975. 
Furthermore Court decisions can be modified or set aside by the affected parties, 
as parts of the Offshore decision were by subsequent mutual federal-state agreement 
and legislation. In a more formal manner court decisions can be overturned by 
constitutional amendment as was the First Pharmaceutical Benefits case by the 1946 
social security amendment to the constitution. This is an extremely cumbersome 
democratic check, however, because ofthe inertia in an estabUshed poUtical system 
and the UkeUhood of extraneous issues muddying referenda campaigns. 
The power of appointing judges provides an indirect democratic hold over the 
composition and direction of the Court, and a possible means of bringing the 
Court up to date or into line with the demands of mling national coalitions. Because 
vacancies are unpredictable and governed by chance, this is a problematical and 
haphazard check on the Court. Nevertheless govemments can ensure through theur 
appointments that a range of judicial types are put on the bench. A whole court 
of Barwicks or a whole court of Murphys would be intolerable to large sections 
of the community, but a court on which there is a Barwick and a Murphy is 
quite acceptable and perhaps preferable. In this respect it is important for the 
legitimacy of judicial review that the power of appointment not be "depoliticized" 
by handing it over to some "independent" board of professional lawyers, as some, 
usually lawyers, have advocated. 
The most potent checks on how judges exercise their power are probably the 
less formal institutional and professional ones that shape judicial behaviour, and 
the dynamic poUtical ones that in practice determine how far judges can go in 
exercising judicial review. The formal procedures of the court system routinize 
and severely constrain judicial power. The long professional sociaUzation of judges 
and the strong professional peer pressure to conform to judicial standards of 
rationaUty, objectivity and integrity are much stronger than on other political 
actors. And as we have seen in case studies throughout this book, the Court in, 
exercising judicial review has to perform its task in a complex poUtical environment 
that includes other competing institutions and eUte groups. 
In the final analysis the Court has only the power of its own judgment; its 
authority depends on the recognition and acceptance of others. Hence the power 
of judges and the boundaries of judicial review are in practice set not by what 
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judges prefer or formally pronounce but by what the rest of the poUtical system 
tolerates. In this very practical way legitimacy is built into the effective operation 
of judicial review. If judges go beyond what the political community tolerates 
at any historical point of time, the Court wiU not be obeyed and its power vnW 
decline. The Court has legitimacy as long as its decisions are considered authoritative 
and binding by the poUtical community. 
Interpretive versus non-interpretive review 
The distinction between "interpretive" and "non-interpretive" review that has 
been made in recent American constitutional scholarship helps clarify the complex 
issue of the legitimacy of judicial review." As one of the leading protagonists 
in the current American debate has remarked: "The legitimacy of non-interpretive 
review is the central problem of contemporary constitutional theory."^ Since the 
debate between "interpretivists" and "non-interpretivists" wiU Ukely be reproduced 
in Australia as reaUsm replaces legaUsm as the accepted view of the judicial process, 
it will be canvassed briefly in this section. 
The distinction between interpretive and non-interpretive review is reasonably 
clear, at least at the level of a broad concept. Interpretive review entails deciding 
the constitutionaUty of a legislative or executive act or determining the boundaries 
of federal and state powers by reference to the constitution, either its actual language 
and structure or the values and intentions of the founders which it embodies. 
The interpretive paradigm is not the mythical strict and complete legalism of the 
UteraUst who purports to look only at the plain meaning of the actual language 
of the text. As Thomas Grey has recently explained, interpretive review "certainly 
contemplates that the courts may look through the sometimes opaque text to 
the purposes behind it in determining constitutional norms. Normative inferences 
can be drawn from silences and omissions, from structures and relationships, as 
weU as from explicit commands."^' Interpretivism requires that constitutional 
inferences and rules be drawn out from the constitution, not read back into it. 
Interpretivism holds that only interpretive review is legitimate while non-
interpretive review is iUegitimate. In John Ely's summing up, interpretivism requires 
"that judges deciding constitutional issues should confine themselves to enforcing 
norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written constitution".^^ In other 
words, interpretivism allows for judicial creativity but constrains it vsrithin the 
notional bounds of what can be reasonably derived from the constitutional text. 
Non-interpretive review has no such limits. As Ely says, non-interpretivism 
sanctions the progression of the court beyond the constitutional reference to "enforce 
norms that cannot be discovered within the four corners of the document"." Or 
according to Perry, non-interpretive review is "the determination of 
constitutionaUty by reference to a value judgment other than one constitutionaUzed 
by the framers of the constitution" ^ Perry makes clear the difference between 
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creative interpretivism that mcludes the broad-ranging decisions of a John MarshaU, 
and non-interpretive review that refers to the free-wheeUng jurisprudence of the 
post-Warren Court.^ 
Non-interpretive review involves judges reading theft own preferred values and 
poUcy views into the constitution, and overmUng elected legislatures on the basis 
of what the judges prefer or think is desirable or advantageous. According to one 
critic, non-mterpretive review means constmmg the constitution according to one's 
own personal answers to the question: "Is this what America stands for?"^ 
The difference between uiterpretive and non-kiterpretive review is best iUustrated 
by some judicial examples. The interpretive position is epitomized in the stands 
of two famous American judges. Holmes and Frankfurter, against activist, non-
interpretive Courts at difference periods of America's constitutional history. In 
the early decades of this century when a reactionary American Supreme Court 
was persistently striking down on substantive "due process" grounds state 
regulatory legislation that mterfered vdth the assumed market freedom of business. 
Holmes objected to his feUow judges: "I cannot believe that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was intended to give us carte blanche to embody our economic or 
moral beliefs in its prohibitions."^' 
Some decades later Frankfiirter warned an increasingly activist liberal Court 
that "judges were not justified in writing their private notions of policy into the 
Constitution", no matter how dearly they cherished them or how mischievous 
they deemed theft disregard.^ Frankfiirter wamed more generally that the Court 
should respect the narrow limits of interpretive review: 
there is not under our Constitution a judicial remedy for every poUtical mischief, for 
every undesirable exercise of legislative power. The Framers carefiiUy and with deUberate 
fore-thought refused so to enthrone the judiciary. In this situation, as in others of like 
nature, appeal for reUef does not belong here. Appeal must be to an informed, civically 
miUtant electorate. In a democratic society Uke ours, reUef must come through an aroused 
popular conscience that sears the conscience of the people's representatives. '^ 
Earl Warren, chief justice from 1953 to 1969, is the epitome of the non-
interpretive judge. Previously a long-serving, popuUst-reforming governor of 
California, Warren, according to one biographer, 
equated judicial lawmaking with neither the dictates of reason as embodied in estabUshed 
precedent or doctrine, nor the demands imposed by an institutional theory of the judge's 
role, nor the alleged "command" of the constitutional text but rather with his own 
reconstruction of the ethical structure of the Constitution.^" 
Thus for Warren, and in many instances the Warren Court, and to a lesser extent 
the subsequent Burger Court, constitutional adjudication provided judges with 
the opportunity for instigating sweeping social reforms. On many buming social 
issues such as racial segregation and discrimination, abortion and voting mal-
apportionment where the representative branches of government would not, or 
could not, take action because of poUtical opposition or inertia, the Court became 
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the legislator of social policy. As a result during the last three decades in America 
since the original school desegregation case in 1954, the Supreme Court has been 
a major institutional source of social reform." Leading this revolution in the 
judicial function was Warren: 
reaching out to do justice, "innovating", righting wrongs, protecting liberties and 
privileges, "testing every case . . to see if justice (had) truly been done". He had engaged 
in an "awesome" but exhilarating exercise of power, and he had become convinced 
that he had exercised that power for noble purposes.'^  
American constitutional scholars have invested enormous effort into trying to 
justify non-interpretive review, either in certain specific areas such as free speech 
and voting rights or generaUy through the constitution." The reason is that they 
agree wdth what the Court has mandated, yet reaUze that such unprincipled judicial 
decision making cannot be legitimated on traditional grounds.'^ In my view none 
ofthe elaborate theoretical attempts to justify non-interpretive review are adequate. 
Such bold judicial poUtics wiU survive only as long as the poUtical community 
tolerates it. Afteady the backlash has been felt and a majority of the current Burger 
court have adopted a more restrained approach. 
Providing the AustraUan Court steers clear of non-interpretive review, it should 
experience no major legitimacy crisis as reaUst views of judging replace legaUsm. 
The High Court has indulged in a certain amount of non-interpretive review in 
the past, for example in its interpretation of section 92, but it has disguised such 
review behind a legaUstic front. Moreover the whole ethos of legaUsm has tended 
to make AustraUan judges more strictly interpretivist. There is a danger that in 
Uberating themselves from the narrow constraints of legaUsm, AustraUan judges 
and theft critics might sunply embrace non-interpretivist methods. Resuft-orientated 
jurisprudence has a certain heady appeal for reformist judges and lawyers. 
The future of judicial review 
Judicial review in Australia is presently in a transitional period. The Court is 
relatively young and inexperienced. At the same time a new era of Labor-dominated 
federal poUtics seems to have been ushered in by the Hawke government. In the 
past such a combination might have been dangerous for the politics of judicial 
review, but now that seems highly unUkely. The new Labor government has 
occupied the middle ground of AustraUan poUtics while the Court, through its 
recent decisions, has left the federal govemment with virtuaUy unlimited formal 
powers. The present Court has a majority of judges who favour centraUsm and 
judicial restraint towards federal government initiatives. From now on the poUtics 
of federal-state rivalries and intergovernmental relations wiU likely be more 
important in determining the shape of AustraUan federaUsm, and the High Court 
less important. It is as if the Court is disengaging from its old primary function 
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of poUcing federaUsm in preparation for a possible new function of interpreting 
an AustraUan biU of rights. If that is the case the AustraUan High Court wiU 
be foUowing the direction of the American Supreme Court that for nearly half 
a century has worked primarily in interpreting the American biU of rights, and 
the Canadian Supreme Court that is beginning to move in that direction with 
the new Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
In other unportant respects the AustraUan Court has recently foUowed the pattem 
ofthe American and Canadian Supreme Courts. In May 1980 the lavish new High 
Court building on the shores of Lake Burley Griffin in Canberra was opened by 
the Queen. The High Court is now located in the national capital in an imposing 
pubUc monument that symboUzes its independence and importance, and in 1984 
the Court was finaUy given fuU control over its ovra docket. Although both these 
developments were opposed by sectional groups," they have enhanced the pubUc 
status of the Court and its abiUty to devote its attention to the most significant 
matters. 
The brave new world for judicial review after 1984 wiU be a reaUstic one where 
judicial power is more openly recognized. Hence the Court wiU need to develop 
a new method and a more plausible public rhetoric than legaUsm if it is to retain 
credibUity. Since the Court's role of judicial review is a public one, the Court 
does need an appropriate pubUc language to explain ftself, not just to its own 
captive cUentele but to a more discerning public. Judicial review has always been 
a highly poUtical activity and it wiU continue to be so. It is likely that in the 
fiiture the judicial branch of government wiU be recognized for what it is and 
its poUtical work more closely scmtinized. 
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Introduction 
1. For an attempt at a sociology of the Australian legal order, see P. O'MaUey, Law, Capitalism 
and Democracy (1983). 
2. D. Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (1965); G. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, 
Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (1966), 16-61. 
3. J. Thomson, "The Teaching of Constitutional Law: Are the Materials Adequate?" University 
of Western Australia Uw Review 15 (1983): 418-19, footnotes omitted. 
4. D. Aitkin, "PoKtical Science in Australia: A Report Prepared for UNESCO" Working Papers 
in Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University (1982), 14. 
5. For example, C. Howard, Australian Federal Constitutional Law, 2nd ed. (1972); J. I. Fajgenb'aum 
and P. Hanks, Australian Constitutional Law, 2nd ed. (1980); W. A. Wynes, Legislative, Executive 
and Judicial Powers in Australia, 5th ed. (1976); R. D. Lumb and K. W. Ryan, Constitution oj 
the Commonwealth of Australia Annotated, 2nd ed. (1977); P. H. Lane, The Australian Federal System, 
2nd el (1979). See also L. Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (1981). 
Chapter 1 Stability and Conflict in Australian Politics: 
The Political Environment of Judicial Review 
1. F. W. Eggleston, Reflections of an Australian Liberal (1953), 57. Eggleston attacked Labor for 
being a closed, class party based on the trade unions and espousing an alien objective. 
2. R. Menzies, "Our Liberal Creed", speech to the Liberal Party, 1964, in H. Mayer, ed Australian 
Politics: A Reader (1966), 266. 
3. D. W. Rawson, Unions and Trade Unionists in Australia (1978), 151, 195. Also "The Paradox 
of Trade Unionism: The Australian Case", British Journal of Political Science 4 (1974): 399-408. 
4. D. Kemp, Society and Electoral Behaviour in Australia (1978), 348, 352. 
5. Ibid., 357. For a trenchant criticism of Kemp's thesis, see R. W. ConneU and M. Goot in Meaiiiin 
38(1), April 1979. •' 
6. See Manning Clark, A Short History of Australia, rev. ed. (1969), ch. 8, "The Age of the Bourgeoisie 
1861-83" Also P. Loveday and A. W. Martin, Parliament, Factions and Parties (1966). 
7. This theme is central to Bede Nairn's detailed and painstaking account of the formation of the 
Labor party in New South Wales: Civilizing Capitalism (1973). Loveday and Martin trace the 
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origins of the party back earlier to the free trade and protectionist factions that immediately 
preceded the Labor party (Parliament, Factions and Parties, ch. 6, "The First Parties"). 
8. C. B. Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (1977), 65-66. 
9. Don Aitkin, Stability and Change in Australian Politics (1977), 1. 
10. Ibid., 14. 
11. Ibid., 268. 
12. Ibid., 3. 
13. Ibid., 121-23, 130-33; 51 per cent put themselves in the middle class and 43 per cent in the 
working class. 
14. D. Aitkin, Stability and Change in Australian Politics, 2nd ed. (1982), 276, 316. 
15. Ibid., 136. Giovanni Sartori, "From the Sociology of Politics to Political Sociology", in S. M. 
Lipset, ed., Politics and the Social Sciences (1969). 
16. Aitkin, Stability and Change in Australian Politics, 2nd ed., 301, 318. For an attempt to rework 
Aitkin's data to show a more meaningful role for class, see H. Gold, "Class Identification and 
Party Choice: The Data Re-examined", in H. Mayer and H. Nelson, eds, Australian Politics: 
A Fifth Reader (1980). For Aitkin's critical comment. Stability and Change in Australian Politics, 
2nd ed., 317. 
17. R. W. ConneU, Ruling Class Ruling Culture (1977), vii, 2, 9. 
18. R. W. ConneU and T. H. Irving, Class Structure in Australian History (1980), xi. 
19. J. Rickard, "The Middle Class: What Is to be done". Historical Studies 19 (1981): 446-53. Rickard 
surmises that when ConneU and Irving "negotiated their theoretical approach for this joint 
endeavour, the exclusion of the middle class must have been written into the contract" (450). 
20. The classic in this respect is Russel Ward's The Australian Legend (1958). For Ward's response 
to his critics, see "The AustraUan Legend re-visited". Historical Studies 18 (1978): 171-90. 
21. See Hemy Mayer's critical review of the literature, "Some Conceptions of the Australian Party 
System 1910-50", Historical Studies 7, Selected articles, 2nd series (1967), 217-40. 
22. Louis Hartz, The Founding of New Societies (1964), 40-44; and Richard Rosecrance, "The Radical 
Culture of AustraUa", ch. 8 of The Founding of New Societies, 275-318. 
23. For a sample of this, see Gad Horowitz, "Conservatism, LiberaUsm, and SociaUsm in Canada: 
An Interpretation". Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 32 (1966): 143-71; and 
his notes, Canadian Journal of Political Science 11 (1978): 383-99. 
24. The leading critique of the Hartzean thesis on Australia is given by A. W. Martin, "Australia 
and the Hartz 'Fragment' Thesis", Australian Economic History Review 13 (1973): 131-47. For 
fiffther criticisms and an account of the revolution in Australian historiography, see G. C. Bolton, 
"Louis Hartz" ibid., 168-76. 
25. Hartz, The Founding of New Societies, 43. 
26. Rosecrance, "The Radical Culture of AustraUa" 304. 
27. The British developments are summarized in Roger Moore, The Emergence ofthe Labour Party 
1880-1924 (1978). 
28. T. Mann, "The PoUtical and Industrial Situation in Australia", The Nineteenth Century 56 (1904): 
475-91; also The Uhour Problem in Both Hemispheres (1903). 
29. The Webbs- Australian Diary 1898, ed. A. G. Austin (1965), 108. 
30. M. B. and C. B. Schedvin, "The Nomadic Tribes of Urban Britain: A Prelude to Botany Bay", 
Historical Studies 18 (1978): 254-76. 
31. G. Davison, "Sydney and the Bush: An Urban Context for the AustraUan Legend", Historical 
Studies 18 (1978): 191-209. 
32. See H. V. Evatt, Liberalism in Australia: An Historical Sketch of Australian Politics Down to the 
Year 1915 (1918). 
33. For a summary of their extraordinary opportunism, see entries on John Macarthur (1767-1834) 
and WUUam Wentworth (1790-1872) in Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 2: 1788-1850 
(1967). Though Wentworth's poUtical principles changed with his material fortunes, he is here 
described as a noble Whig. 
34. Charles Dilke visited Australia in 1897 and described a colonial conservative as anyone who had 
anything whatever to lose and objected to giving a share in govemment to those who had nothing. 
Greater Britain (1868), II, 39. 
35. Manning Clark, A Short History of Australia, 135-46. 
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36. Robin GoUan, Radical and Working Class Politics (1960), 38, 51. GoUan persists in describing 
as conservatives the members of Legislative Councils who were recruited from big business, 
landowning and pastoral interests. 
37. In recent years, excellent biographies of both men have been published: A. W. Martin, Henry 
Parkes (1980); R. B. Joyce, Samuel Walker Griffith (1984). 
38. Martin, Henry Parkes, 396. 
39. Joyce, Samuel Walker Griffith, 168. Griffith was at the 1891 Sydney convention when the shearers' 
strike erupted in Queensland. Joyce concludes that "although Griffith was undoubtedly partisan 
during the strike", he "deserves more credit than historians so far have given him for preventing 
the Queensland govemment firom extreme action that might have led to blood staining the wattle", 
166, 168. 
40. See N. G. Butlin's authoritative study. Investment in Australian Economic Development 1861-1900 
(1964), and Australian Domestic Product, Investment and Foreign Borrowing 1881-1938/39 (1962); 
and P. G. Macarthy, "Wages in Australia, 1891 to 1914", Australian Economic History Review 
10, no. 1 (March 1970): 56-76. 
41. In an important article in 1961, "The 1890 Maritime Strike in New South Wales", Historical 
Studies 10 (1961): 1-18, Bede Nairn gave notice that the traditional view ofthe maritime strike 
and the origins of the Labor party was "radically erroneous" The traditional view was that 
of W. G. Spence, Australia's Awakening (1909); T. A. Coghlan, Labour and Industry in Australia 
(1918), vol. 3, 1591-607; H. V. Evatt, Australian Labour Leader (1940); and Brian Fitzpatrick, 
A Short History of the Australian Labour Movement (1944). This tradition received its definitive 
statement and defence in GoUan's Radical and Working Class Politics. In Civilizing Capitalism Nairn 
presented his own painstaking account of the development of the Labor party without 1890 
as a turning point, and without the previous framework of radicalism versus conservatism, or 
labour versus capital. Nairn's account overcorrects for the deficiencies ofthe traditional histories 
and is in turn corrected by John Rickard, Class and Politics (1976). A recent comprehensive study 
of the state Labor parties fills in any gaps: D. J. Murphy, ed.. Labor in Politics (1975). 
42. Rosecrance, "The Radical Culture of AustraUa" (supra note 22), 306. 
43. Nairn chose this as the title of his book on the founding of the Labor party. 
44. Review of Gollan's Radical and Working Class Politics, Historial Studies 9 (1960): 325. 
45. Martin, "AustraUa and the Hartz 'Fragment' Thesis", 145. 
46. "In Australia", report in R. N. Ebbles, The Australian Labour Movement 1850-1907 (1960), 243-45. 
47. For an exposition and critique of Lenin's "insurrectionary" Marxism, see Ralph Miliband, Marxism 
and Politics (1977), ch. 6. 
48. See Alastair Davidson, The Communist Party of Australia: A Short History (1969), especially 177-83. 
49. R. Catley and B. McFarlane, From Tweedledum to Tweedledee (1974), 1. 
50. H. McQueen, A New Britannia (1970), 231-32. 
51. "Who Rules Austraha?", in J. Playford and D. Kirsner, eds, Australian Capitalism (1972), 132-33. 
52. A. Hamilton, J. Madison and J. Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. C. Rossiter (1961), 77. 
53. But see C. Sharman, "The Australian Senate as a States' House", Politics 12 (1977): 64-75; and 
J. Uhr, "The Australian Senate and Federalism: A Research Note", a paper delivered to the 
Third Federalism Project Conference, Australian National University, 1983. The Senate is examined 
more generally by J. M. Hutchison, "The Australian Senate: 1901-1972", unpublished Ph.D.thesis, 
Australian National University (1976); and J. Uhr, "The Canadian and Australian Senates: 
Comparing Federal Political Institutions" unpublished paper (1984). 
54. This is evident even in the titles of two leading studies of Canadian federalism: D. V. Smiley, 
Canada in Question: Federalism in the Seventies (1972); and Edwin Black, Divided Loyalties: Canadian 
Concepts of Federalism (1975). 
55. The following is essentially a summary ofthe argument in The Federalist Papers, the classic exposition 
of the theory of the American constitution. See especially Federalist Papers nos 9 and 51 (supra 
note 52), 71-76 and 320-25. 
56. A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Vintage Books edition), I, 162. For a detailed account 
of the American innovation, see Martin Diamond, "The FederaUst's view of FederaUsm", in 
Institute for Studies in Federalism, Essays in Federalism (1961), 21-64. 
57. In this respect it is important to note that the famous American constitutional bill of rights 
was adopted after the framing of the constitution and in order to placate the fears of the anti-
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federaUsts. The constitutional convention of 1787 considered that a biU of rights was unnecessary 
because all the great liberal rights of the Declaration of Independence would be sufficiently protected 
wHthin the constitutional system of checks and balances. See Hamilton's powerfol argument in 
Federalist no. 84 explaining why a biU of rights was unnecessary in the proposed constitution. 
Hamilton said: "The truth is . . that the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and 
to every usefiil purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS," Federalist Papers, 515. 
58. Australasian Federation Conference, Official Record of the Proceedings and Debates (1890), 33. 
59. The argument being advanced here is derived from poUtical and institutional theory, and is to 
be distinguished firom the more common historical argument that wealthy people can be expected 
to frame a constitution that protects wealth. For a classic statement of the latter case, see L. 
F. Crisp, Australian National Govemment, 4th ed. (1978), "The Conservative Men of Property" 
14-17. Crisp says "It was for the most part the big men ofthe estabUshed poUtical and economic 
order, the men of property or their trusted allies, who moulded the federal Constitution BiU" 
and that "their choices were undoubtedly guided by their conservative philosophies", 14. See 
also R. S. Parker, "Australian Federation: The Influence of Economic Interests and Political 
Pressures", Historical Studies 3 (1949); and G. Blainey, "The Role of Economic Interests in AustraUan 
Federation", Historical Studies 4 (1950). 
60. L. F. Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour Party 1901-51 (1955), 14. This has been changed 
somewhat with the recent introduction of a system for electing delegates to the biennial Federal 
Conference that gives some weighting to the size of each state branch. Moreover factions rather 
than state origins have become increasingly important in Labor's intemal poUtics. 
61. Evatt, Australian Labour Leader, 262-76. 
62. Irwin Young, Theodore (1971), 90. 
63. New Republic, 3 May 1939, 367-69. Gordon Greenwood was deeply influenced by Laski while 
a student in London and appUed his thesis to AustraUa: The Future of Australian Federalism (1946). 
In the second edition of his book (1976), Greenwood admits to "some degree of under-estimation 
of the extent to which federaUsm was entrenched" (ix-x). 
64. A. Caims, "The Govemment and Societies of Canadian FederaUsm", presidential address to the 
Canadian PoUtical Science Association, June 1977, Canadian journal of Political Science 10 (1977): 
695-725. 
65. Ibid., 716. Caims attacks the sociological and Marxist schools that look for political explanations 
in underlying social and economic forces. He combines a traditional constitutional and govemmental 
approach with modem elitist theory. 
66. D. C. Corbett, "Some Comments on AustraUan Socialism", AustraUan PoUticial Science Association 
paper, August 1962. 
67. In E. G. Whitlam, On Australia's Constitution (1977), 16. 
68. Nairn, Civilizing Capitalism 45, 161-63. 
69. See H. Andersen, ed.. Tocsin: Radical Argument Against Federation 1897-1900 (1977), 93, 95. 
70. J. A. La Nauze, The Making ofthe Australian Constitution (1972), 239-47; and Nairn, Civilizing 
Capitalism, ch. 15. 
71. For voting figures in all colonies, see Crisp, Australian National Govemment, 12. 
72. The accounts of the various state parties and their stands on federation are discussed in the various 
sections of Murphy, Ubor in Politics, 165, 251, 306, 349, 396. 
73. Nairn, Civilizing Capitalism, 162-65, 207. 
74. Quoted in Crisp, Australian National Govemment, 181. 
75. Quoted in Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour Party 1901-1951, 272. 
76. See Crisp's discussion, ibid., 281ff. 
77. Senator Gareth Evans's attempt to have Labor's modified socialist objective dropped was soundly 
defeated at the Melboume National Conference in 1981. See B. Galligan, "A New Objective 
for Labour?", Labor Forum 3, no. 2 (June 1981) and John Button, "The National Conference 
in Retrospect", Labor Forum 3, no. 3 (September 1981). 
78. Lloyd Ross, "SociaUsm and AustraUan Labour: Facts, Fiction, Future", Australian Quarterly 22 
(March 1950): 23. 
79. Geoffirey Sawer, Australian Govemment Today, rev. ed. (1964), 65. 
80. R. Menzies, "Our Liberal Creed", in Mayer, Australian Politics, 266. 
81. O. Dixon, Address upon Taking the Oath of Office as Chief Justice, Sydney, 21 April 1952, 
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in Jesting Pilate (1965), 247. For a comparable American view, see Justice Roberts's "yardstick" 
theory in US v. Butler 297 US 1, a 1936 dedsion striking down the New Deal's Agricultural 
Adjustment Act. 
82. R. Menzies, The Measure ofthe Years (1970), 240. CoUn Howard's view of Dixon is similar. 
Howard caUs Dixon "a master without paraUel of the degree of legal craftsmanship which he 
doubtless had in mind" and "by far the greatest influence on the interpretation of the Australian 
Constiturion": Australian Federal Constitutional Law, 2nd ed. (1972), 7. 
83. Australian Law joumal 50 (1976): 434. 
84. The Tasmanian Dam case is discussed in the last section of chapter 5. 
85. For a succinct summary ofthe High Court's legalism as a method of interpretation, see J. Thomson, 
"Principles and Theories of Constitutional Interpretation and Adjudication: Some Preliminary 
Notes", Melboume University Law Review 13 (1982): 603-4. 
86. P. H. Lane, The Australian Federal System, 2nd ed. (1979), llSlff. For a more recent and more 
sympathetic examination of the High Court's "neutral stand" by Professor Lane, see "Neutral 
Principles on the High Court", Australian Law joumal 55 (1981): 737-48. 
87. "The Law and the Constitution", in Dixon, jesting Pilate, 39. 
88. In his occasional addresses and articles, Dixon made some attempt to buttress legaUsm with 
theoretical arguments; for instance, "Science and Judicial Method", "Concerning Judicial Method" 
and "The Law and the Constitution", coUected in jesting Pilate. Dixon's theory is not very 
substantial and can perhaps be read as part of his attempt to entrench legaUsm as a judicial strategy. 
89. E. McWhinney, judicial Review, 4th ed. (1969), 76-95. 
90. Lane, The Australian Federal System, 1146. 
91. G. Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts (1967), 196-97. 
92. Blackshield, "Judges and the Court System", in Gareth Evans, ed.. Labor and the Constitution 
1972-75 (1977), 120. 
93. For a more careful examination of judicial attitudes than those of the critics of legalism examined 
here, see L. Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (1981), ch. 15. 
94. McWhinney, judicial Review, 94. 
95. Lane, The Australian Federal System, 1196. 
96. Ibid., 1197. 
97. Ibid., 1138. 
98. McWhinney, judicial Review, 95. 
99. Glendon Schubert, The judicial Mind (1965), 10. 
100. Glendon Schubert, judicial Policy Making, rev. ed. (1974), 142-43. 
101. Schubert, The juduial Mind, 286. 
102. Schubert, judUial Policy Making, 138. 
103. Ibid., 138. For a sample of Schubert's own work on the Australian High Court, see for example 
"Judicial Attitudes and PoUcy Making in the Dixon Court", Chgoode Hall Law joumal 7 (November 
1969): 1-29. For a bibUography of Schubert's articles on Australia and some local quantitative 
studies, see Eddy Neumann, The High Court: A Collective Portrait 1903-72 (1973), 128-29. 
104. For example, Blackshield used both a traditional critical method and jurimetrics in (Merent parts 
of "Judges and the Court System". For a different, more elaborate examination of judging, see 
A. R. Blackshield, "Five Types of Judicial Decision", Osgoode HaU Law Joumal 12 (1974): 539-67. 
105. "Quantitative Analysis: The High Court of AustraUa, 1964-69", Lawasia 3 (1972): 1-66, 10. 
For fiirther discussion and appUcation of jurimetrics, see A. R. Blackshield, "X/Y/Z/N Scales: 
The High Court of AustraUa, 1972-76" in R. Tomasic, ed., Understanding Lawyers (1978), 133-77. 
106. "Quantitative Analysis", 3. 
107. Ibid., 66. 
108. Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts, 196. The following discussion is based on Sawer's 
ch. 11, "Evaluation", espedally 196. 
109. The exceptions are the more traditional writers on AustraUan poUtical institutions and left-v»ring 
academics. See Crisp, Australian National Govemment, ch. 3; A. F. Davies, Australian Democracy 
(1958), 69-75; J. D. B. Miller and Brian Jinks, Australian Govemment and Politics, 3rd ed. (1964), 
127-33; and John Playford, "Judges and PoUtics in AustraUa", AustraUan Political Science Associatim 
News 6, no. 3 (August 1961): 5-11, and "Labour and the High Court", Australian Uft Review 
Febraary-March 1970, 16-22. 
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n o . Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts, 197. 
111. See the recent reaUst critique of M. Kirby, The judges (1983), 37-38; also M. Sexton and L. 
W. Maher, The Legal Mystique (1982). 
112. Commentary on Blackshield's paper, in Evans, Labor and the Constitution 1972-75, 127. 
113. "The Most Dangerous Branch? The High Court and the Constitution in a Changing Sodety" 
in A. D. Hambly and J. L. Goldring, eds, Australian Lawyers and Social Change (1976), 73. 
114. Of course the relationship between legal reasoning and logic is a difficult and contentious matter. 
See, for example, JuUus Stone, Legal Systems and Lawyers' Reasonings (1964); and Joseph Horovitz, 
Law and Logic (1972). 
115. "Sir Owen Dixon's Theory of FederaUsm", Federal Uw Review 1 (1964-65): 221-41. 
116. R. G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court (1960), 11. 
117. The Case of John Wilkes, Esq., on two Informations for Libel 4 Burr. 2527, in T. B. Howell, 
A Complete CoBection of State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason and Other Crimes and Misdemeanors 
from the Earliest Period to the Present Time, vol. XIX: AD 1753-71 (1813), no. 542 "Proceedings 
in the Case of John wakes 1763-70" 
118. Ibid., 1112. 
119. Lord Denning, Fifth Wilfied FuUagar Memorial Lecture, "Let Justice Be Done", Monash University 
Law Review 2 (September 1975): 3-12, 4. 
120. D. Marr, Banvick (1980). 
121. "Address upon taking the oath of office in Sydney", Jesting Pilate, 249. 
Chapter 2 The Origin and Function of Judicial Review 1890 to 1900 
1. Since originaUy vimting this chapter, I have had the benefit of reading James Thomson's exceUent 
thesis, "Judicial Review in AustraUa: The Courts and the Constitution", S. J. D. thesis. Harvard 
University, 1979. While I have not changed my basic analysis and argument, I have made some 
modifications and refinements to take account of some of the points Thomson has raised. My 
approach and conclusions are somewhat different ftom those of Thomson who sets much greater 
store by the fact that judicial review lacks any expUdt textual basis in the constitution. We 
are in agreement, however, that the acknowledgement of that fact raises, or should raise, a 
fundamental question about the legitimacy of judidal review that needs to be addressed. This 
chapter, and indeed the whole book, is my attempt to answer that question. 
2. E. McWhinney, Federal Constitution-Making for a Multi-National World (1966), 9. 
3. J. Archer and G. Maddox, "The 1975 Constitutional Crisis in AustraUa", JoMma/ of Commonwealth 
and Comparative Politics 14 (1976): 141, 147. 
4. "Two Constitutions Compared", in O. Dixon, Jejftn^ Pilate (1965), 100, 101. 
5. But see Thomson's claim that "there has been strong support in Australia for the abolition or 
curtailment of the judidal power to invalidate parliamentary legislation", "Judidal Review in 
AustraUa" 320 and his footnote 1279 on 211. 
6. (1803) 5 US (1 Cranch) 137. 
7. Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth (1951), 83 CLR 1, 262. 
8. "MarshaU and the Austrian Constimtion" in Dixon, jesting Pilate, 166, 174. 
9. G. LindeU, "Duty to Exerdse Judidal Review" in L. Zines, ed.. Commentaries on the Australian 
Constitution (1977), 150, 186. Controversy over the justidabiUty of aspects ofthe 1974 double 
dissolution had given the question of the proper basis and scope of judidal review an immediate 
practical relevance. This is discussed by L. Zines in "The Double Dissolution and Joint Sitting" 
in G. Evans, ed., Ubor and the Constitution 1972-75 (1977)), 229. 
10. A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962), 16. 
11. J. Bryce, The American Commonwealth (1888), 323, as Thomson notes. Thomson summarizes 
Bryce's views, "Judidal Review in Australia", 213-17. 
12. See, for example, such statements as the following by Dixon: "An exerdse of a power, whether 
legislative or administrative, cannot rise higher than its source, viz., the power itself, and an 
attempt under the power to make unexaminable what is done in ostensible pursuance of a further 
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delegation of authority must, to that extent, fail." Shrimpton v. Commonwealth (1945), 69 CLR 
613, 630. 
13. P. H. Lane, The Australian Federal System (1979), 1136. Geoffrey Sawer correctly points out 
that the Australian founders had two great models in the constitutions of the United States and 
Canada, Australian Federalism in the Courts (1967), 76. 
14. Lane, The Australian Federal System, 1143. 
15. Ibid., 1144. The whole passage is italidzed in the original. 
16. G. LindeU, "Duty to Exerdse Judicial Review", in L. Zines, ed., Commentaries (1977), 183. 
LindeU's argument in support of judidal review is essentiaUy the same as that of MarshaU. 
17. LindeU argues that "the Commonwealth Constitution . . . derived its legal existence by reason 
of the exerdse of the Imperial Parliament's legislative powers . . . [and] that courts in Australia 
are required to perform the same duties in relation to the Constitution as they are required to 
perform in relation to any other kind of law in force in Australia (165)." 
18. P. H. Lane, The Australian Federal System (1979), 1138. For additional references on this orthodox 
view of the constitution as a statute, albeit a spedal one, see J. Thomson, "Constitutional 
Interpretation: History and the High Court: A Bibliographical Survey", University of New South 
Wales Law joumal 5 (1982): 318. 
19. Although LindeU does not address himself to this particular issue, the way he sets up his argument 
that the court has a duty to exerdse judidal review does explidtly assume at the beginning 
that the court possesses jurisdiction (150). 
20. See J. Thomson, "Prindples and Theories of Constitutional Interpretation and Adjudication: 
Some Preliminary Notes", Melboume University Uw Review 13 (1982): 599-600. 
21. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, 2. 
22. R. G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court (1960), 40. 
23. Some early Australian judges did make an attempt. See Thomson, "Judidal Review in Australia" 
295, 301. 
24. Madison makes the classic argument for this position in Federalist, no. 49. 
25. Lane's chapter titled "Judidal Review or Govemment by the High Court", The Australian Federal 
System, 1135. 
26. A. Hamilton, Federalist, no. 78. 
27. "The Law and the Constitution", in Dixon, Jesting Pilate, 38, 51. 
28. Earlier, judidal review of legislation by colonial Supreme Courts had been a controversial issue 
in various AustraUan colonies, particularly South Australia. The extreme views and actions of 
Judge Boothby in South Australia, who advocated and sought to implement an enormous scope 
for judidal review of legislative actions, produced a stormy decade of confrontation with the 
newly created South AustraUan legislature. This led directly to the passage of the Colonial Uws 
Validity Act 1865 which was meant to bolster the authority of colonial legislatures. By federation, 
however, most of the earUer controversy had apparently been forgotten. For an extensive treatment, 
see Thomson, "Judicial Review in Australia", ch. 5. 
29. Federal Conference Debates (1890), 89, 91. 
30. J. A. La Nauze, The Making ofthe Australian Constitution (1972), 273. La Nauze records that 
Bryce's book lay on the offidal table throughout the proceedings of the 1897-98 convention. 
31. Federal Conference Debates (1890), 96, 106. 
32. B. R. Wise, The Making ofthe Australian Commonwealth 1890-1900 (1913), 74. 
33. Important exceptions on whose work the author draws are J. Reynolds, "A. I. Clark's American 
Sympathies and His Influence on Australian Federation", Australian Uw Joumal 32 (1958): 62; 
J. M. Neasey, "Andrew IngUs Clark Senior and Australian Federation", Australian joumal of 
Politics and History 15, no. 2 (1969): 1; and La Nauze, The Making ofthe Australian Constitution, 
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about disceming the intention that the court should exerdse judicial review from spedfic sections 
of the constitution such as section 74; Baxter v. Commissioner of Taxation (New South Wales) 
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66. Age, 12 October 1906. 
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69. For detaUs of the Labor attitude to the constitution in the various states, B. Nairn, Civilizing 
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changed the Act to require a majority dedsion in constitutional cases, Judidary Act 1912, section 
3, which amended section 23 of the Judiciary Act 1903-10. 
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Isaacs's case that the Vend practices caused public detriment, at 606 ff. 
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Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; ex Parte Broken Hill Pty Co. Ltd (1909), 8 
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133. There are now biographies of both justices: Cowen, Isaac Isaacs and Rickard, H. B. Higgins: 
The Rebel as Judge. 
134. Commonwealth v. Colonial Combing, Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd (1922), 31 CLR 421, 438-39. 
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(1932), 47 CLR 386. 
140. New South Wales v. Commonwealth (1915), 20 CLR 54, 66. 
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142. Robertson has a fiiU discussion of the matter, in / H. SculUn, 382-87. 
143. D. V. Copland, Australia in the World Crisis, 1929 to 1933 (1934); Royal Commission into the 
Monetary and Banking Systems, Report (1937), 12-13, 47-48; C. B. Schedvin, AustraUa and the 
Great Depression (1970). 
144. E. O. G. Shann and D. V. Copland, eds. The Battle ofthe Pkns (1931), ch. 4. 
145. Geoffrey Sawer, AustraUan Federal PoUtics and Uw 1929 to 1949 (1963), 22. Had Labor controUed 
the Senate, it is reasonable to expect that many more controversial poUdes than are contained 
in these fourteen biUs would have been legislated. 
146. For Theodore's own summary of the plan, see P. WeUer, ed., Caucus Minutes 1901 to 1949, 
II (1975) 416-18. B. McFarlane argues that Theodore was influenced by the progressive views 
of R. F. Irvine, former professor of economics at Sydney University. Professor Irvine's Economics 
in Australian Ubour History (1966). 
147. See for example the letter of the chairman of the board of directors of the Commonwealth Bank, 
Robert Gibson, to Theodore, 2 April 1931. Shann and Copland, The Battle ofthe Pkns, 44-47. 
This was an ultimatum to the govemment that soon "it would be impossible for the bank to 
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149. Caucus Minutes, II, 357, 365. 
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Chapter 5 Judicial Review as a Settled Routine 1950 to 1984 
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POLITICS OF THE HIGH COURT 
The High Court is a branch of our federal government and as such 
has played a key part in Australian politics. Its judges resolve dis-
putes between federal and state governments and within the 
federal government itself. The Court must exercise judicial re-
view and it is the interpreter of the Australian constitution, the 
basis of power for all branches of government. High Court deci-
sions on famous cases like Engineers, Uniform Tax, Banic Nation-
alization, and more recently the Tasmanian Dam decision, have 
all been major political events. The Court in those cases changed 
Australia's constitutional system and the pattern of its politics. 
Until now, however, the High Court has been studied mainly by 
constitutional lawyers and historians, from a narrow perspective. 
Politics of thie High Court is the first major study of the High 
Court as a significant political institution. The book assesses the 
way the Court has exercised great power, from its beginnings 
wi th the birth of our constitution, to the present. 
Dr Galligan, a political scientist, has not set out to provide a 
history of the Court, but a searching analysis of the Court's per-
formance through successive historical periods. The Court is first 
located as part of a larger political system, then shown as a politi-
cal institution in its own right. Particular attention is paid to the 
changing composition of the Court and the varying attitudes of 
the judges, and to cases of major impact for Australia. The author 
brings out an important theme in Australian politics, the continu-
ing struggle of "Labor versus the Const i tut ion", which is evident 
in periods of federal Labor government. 
This book examines the politics of judicial review in detail. It 
sets out to inform readers of the manner in which the High Court 
has exercised its power, and will be a standard reference for law 
students, lawyers, politicians and interested Australians general-
ly, at a time when the High Court is the focus of increased atten-
tion in the wake of the Dam case and the Murphy controversy. 
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